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WARREN COMMISSION AND SAYS ASSASSIN REBUKES SECRET

F.B.I. IS CRITICIZED

Security Steps Taken
by Secret Service
Held Inadequate

By FELIX BELAIR Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 27—A sweeping revision of the organization and basic operating practices of the United States Secret Service was recommended today by the Warren Commission.

The commission sharply rebuked the Secret Service for failure to make adequate preparation for the visit of President Kennedy to Dallas last November. It reprimanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation for failure to supply the Secret Service with information concerning the presence of Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas.


The commission deplored the fact that "there was no fully adequate liaison" between the F.B.I. and the Secret Service before the Dallas trip. It noted that some improvements had occurred since then but it in-

York Times.

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Today's Issue Contains
Pages in Two Sections

FINDS OSWALD AND RUBY ACTED SERVICE, ASKS GUILTY ALONE; REVAMPING



THE WARREN COMMISSION: President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy during conference in commission offices at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Building in Washington. From left: Representative Gerald R. Ford, Michigan Republic-

can; Representative Hale Boggs, Louisiana Democrat; Senator Richard B. Russell, Georgia Democrat; Chief Justice Earl Warren; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican; John J. McCloy; Allen W. Dulles, and J. Lee Rankin, counsel to commission.

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sisted that ultimate Presidential protection required improvement in working arrangements of all Federal agencies concerned, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the military intelligence branches.

The State Department was admonished to expedite more carefully requests for return to

the United States of defectors like Oswald "who have evidenced disloyalty or hostility to this country or who have expressed a desire to renounce their citizenship."

The brunt of the commission's indictment was directed at the century-old agency responsible for the safety of the President and his family. Its chief charge

was that the Secret Service had not checked thoroughly the route of the Presidential motorcade in Dallas; nor asked the local police to do so.

The commission called for the appointment of a new special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury with general supervisory authority over the Secret Service.

The commission found, however, that the conduct of the Secret Service agents in the Presidential motorcade "demonstrates that the President and the nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from agents of the Secret Service."

It acknowledged that whatever the human and material

resources at the command of the Secret Service, a President can only be made as safe as he wants to be.

The report declared that its recommendations were "compelled by the facts disclosed in this investigation." It noted that many changes had been initiated by the Commission since the assassination and that others had been adopted on the suggestion of the Commission. Others remain to be approved by the Budget Bureau.

The commission made no effort to hold any individuals in Government responsible for the assassination but exposed weaknesses in the over-all protective system.

The Commission acknowl-

edged that suggestions have been advanced to the Commission for the transfer of all or parts of the Presidential protective responsibilities of the Secret Service to some other department or agency.

Cabinet Panel Urges

The Commission believed that any such recommendation has beyond its terms of reference and was a determination that should be made by the executive and Congress after study by a Cabinet committee. This committee of Cabinet members, including the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General or the National Security Council, "should be assigned the responsibility of reviewing and overseeing the protective activities of the Secret Service and other Federal agencies that assist in safeguarding the President," the report said.

Principal recommendations of the commission for improvement of Presidential protection included:

1. Appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury of a new special assistant responsible directly to him.

2. The Secret Service should completely overhaul its facilities devoted to advance detection of potential threats against the President.

3. The agency should improve protective measure in planning and conducting Presidential motorcades.

The Secret Service should also continue its recent efforts to improve and formalize its relationships with local police departments in areas to be visited by the President.

4. The agency should be provided by Congress with the additional personnel and facilities.

5. Other Federal agencies, the F. B. I. in particular, should continue the practice adopted since the assassination of providing the Secret Service with personnel and other aid and there should be closer liaison between the service and all other agencies.

Doctor in Attendance

The commission also recommended that the President's physician should accompany him at all times. Congress, it also said, should pass legislation making assassination of the President or Vice President a Federal crime.

The commission was highly critical of the inadequacy of the Secret Service's criteria in collecting material concerning potential threats to the President's safety.

It found that although the F. B. I. had obtained considerable information about Oswald, it had no official responsibility under Secret Service criteria to refer such information to the

agency. The report stated: "The commission believes that the F. B. I. took an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence work prior to the assassination."

A Potential Threat

The information in its possession should have induced an alert agency such as the F. B. I. to list Oswald as a potential threat to the safety of the President," the commission said.

The F. B. I. knew, it said, of Oswald's defection, his hostility to the United States, his pro-Castro tendencies, his lies when interrogated by the F. B. I. on his trip to Mexico, where he was in contact with Soviet authorities, his presence in the School Book Depository job and its location along the route of the motorcade.

The report declared that the F. B. I.'s agent in Dallas, James P. Hosty Jr., made no effort to obtain Oswald's rooming house address nor to make any personal contact with the man he was then actively investigating.

Contradiction Is Unresolved

It was noted that Mr. Hosty had been quoted before the commission by Lieut. Jack Reilly of the Dallas police as telling him that "the F. B. I. had information that Oswald was capable of committing this assassination." This was denied by Mr. Hosty.

The commission left this contradiction unresolved. It quoted with apparent approval from testimony of the agent in charge of the Secret Service's Protective Research Section that the information known to the F. B. I. "would have made Oswald

subject of concern to the Secret Service.

The report also quoted J. Edgar Hoover, F.B.I. director, in support of Mr. Hosty's failure to consider Oswald a danger. Mr. Hoover was quoted as saying: "There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm."

Mr. Hoover said Oswald's attempt on the life of former Maj. General Edwin A. Walker was known to the F.B.I. until after the assassination.

The report originated in this con-

nection that Agent Hosty had been aware early in November of Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It said that "under proper procedures knowledge of the pending Presidential visit might have prompted Hosty to have made more vigorous efforts to locate Oswald's rooming-house address in Dallas and to interview him regarding these unresolved matters."

Data Was "Too Narrow"

The formal F.B.I. instructions to its agents outlining the information to be referred to the Secret Service were too narrow at the time of the assassination, the commission declared. "While the Secret Service bears the principal responsibility for this failure, the F.B.I. instructions did not reflect fully the Secret Service's need for information regarding potential threats."

The commission was no less critical of the Secret Service, remarking that the agent in charge of advance preparations for the President's trip received no written instructions or advice about particular problems that might arise, he had no checklist of tasks he was expected to perform or to pass on to the local police.

It was noted that the Secret Service had no more than 28 agents assigned to President Kennedy's Dallas visit. The commission indicated that this was understandable in view of the deployment of agents at Houston, San Antonio and Fort Worth for the Presidential visits earlier the same day.

However, it observed that 600 members of the Dallas police department, fire department, county sheriff's department and the Texas Department of Public Safety had been called into the protective arrangements.

Lack of Procedure

Despite this dependence on local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit by the President to any large city, is said, "the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relations with them."

"It had no prepared checklist of matters to be covered with local police on such visits to

metropolitan areas and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussion with the Dallas authorities and requests made of them were entirely informal."

The commission also insisted on stricter observance of the rules governing off-duty conduct of agents traveling with the President.

The investigation brought out that the early morning hours of the day the President was shot and after he had retired to his hotel in Fort Worth, nine off-duty agents repaired to the Fort Worth Press Club after midnight. The report noted that they had little opportunity to eat during the day.

Unable to obtain food, according to the report, the agents remained for a glass of beer or a mixed alcoholic drink.

Drinking Is Scored

Although no more than three glasses of beer or one-and-half mixed drinks were imbibed by any of the agents, the episode prompted the commission to observe that "it is conceivable that those men who had little sleep and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth."

However, the report conceded that there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy.

Members of the Fort Worth

press testified that none of the agents "was inebriated or acted improperly." The nine agents remained at the club from 30 minutes to one-and-half hours and the last one left the premises at 2 A.M.

After that, two agents returned to their rooms. The others went to the Cellar Coffee House. Most were there from about 1:45 A.M. to about 3 A.M., one agent remaining from 2 A.M. until 5 A.M., according to the report, which said:

"There is no indication that any of the agents had any intoxicating drink at that establishment."

In addition to the off-duty agents, three others on night duty for guarding the President went to the coffee house during their half-hour break.

It was established that all the agents attending the coffee house "reported for duty on time, with full possession of their mental and physical capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned duties."

The Secret Service chief, James J. Rowley told the commission that although regulations prohibit the use even of beer or wine by agents on travel status, he had not disciplined any agents lest it be inferred that their infractions might have contributed to the tragic events later in the day.

The commission recognizes said:

"The commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently. It might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation."

"Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body."

"This is the salutary goal to which the Secret Service regulations is directed, when it absolutely forbids drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours, and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep."