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counter-intelligence officer and all the years of my work in the KGB (March 1953 - February 1964) had been only in the Second Directorate (counter-intelligence) of the KGB.

I never claimed to run the case file on Oswald. I said that I knew some details connected with the defection of Oswald in 1959 and that in 1963 I had seen the whole file on Oswald. I claimed that the KGB never recruited or even planned or attempted to approach him during the whole period of Oswald's being in the Soviet Union.

What deeply surprised me was the fact that three fourths of the conversation with Mr. Epstein and Mr. Oursler were questions about the structure of the KGB and full details of the organizational structure of First and Second Chief Directorates (intelligence and counter-intelligence) of the KGB. At that time, I, myself, was preparing my book on the organizational structure of the KGB. Seeing that Mr. Epstein was more interested in details of the KGB's structure, which had no connection with Oswald, I decided that this meeting would be the only one and I was not going to see Mr. Epstein and Mr. Oursler again. They both had in mind to see me again and later made attempts to see me but I rejected any more meetings.

\$(u)

During this meeting I made a big mistake which concerns me personally. They asked where I was living at that time. I told them it was off the record but I trusted them. I said I was living in North Carolina, that I knew that the KGB was trying to locate me and that's why I wanted my answer--living in North Carolina--to stay strictly between us. But they betrayed my trust and printed the place of my living at that time.

page 3

Prologue

In May of 1962 I made my final decision that the next time that I came abroad I would never again return to the Soviet Union. In 1962 being in Geneva at the Disarmament Conference I made my contact with American Intelligence. The purpose of this contact was to receive from them assurance that they would accept me when I would

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be ready to defect. I wanted to come to the USA with more information about the KGB's activities. And the whole period of time until my defection on 4 February 1964 I was trying to gather as much of this kind of information as possible.

page 4

In the Rex Hotel in Geneva only part of the delegation was staying, not the whole delegation.

page 4

I did not use a pay phone to inform American Intelligence about my arrival abroad. This is Mr. Epstein's imagination.

I also did not offer to act as a spy for the United States when I returned to Russia after my contact with American Intelligence in 1962. On the contrary, during my meetings with the representatives of American Intelligence I underlined that under no circumstances would I agree to any contact with them in the Soviet Union and I made a statement that I would meet them only when I would be abroad next time (working in the KGB's counterintelligence I knew better about the dangers of any type of contact in the Soviet Union).

page 5

Neither while working in the early 1950s in Soviet naval intelligence in the Far East nor in my whole life did I ever see any Japanese prisoner of war. In 1953 I did not resign from naval intelligence but was transferred to the KGB (which was called MVD in March of 1953; the title KGB appeared in 1954).

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The overall responsibility of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was and is counter-intelligence work against all foreigners--diplomats, correspondents, delegations, businessmen, tourists, private visitors, etc., and Soviet citizens in contact with foreigners or suspected of being contact with them. Surveillance is done by the Seventh Directorate of the KGB on the orders of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB. Mr. Epstein even could not digest what I told him about the structure of the KGB.

page 5

I was appointed a deputy chief of section not in 1958 but in 1957. I was given a special commendation by the chairman of the KGB for the recruitment of a tourist not in 1958 or 1959, but in June of 1956.

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page 7

I never said in 1962 or any other time that I ". . . could never consider defecting from Russia." As I mentioned above, the purpose--ultimate purpose--of my contact with American Intelligence was only one--defection.

pages 5-7

Mr. Epstein mentions "a top-level case officer from the CIA, a member of the Soviet Russia Division." This person met me in 1962 and also in 1964. Through years of my work in the KGB, through years of my life in the United States I have seen and met a number of officers in the American Intelligence Service. The overwhelming majority of them were bright, intelligent and truly good professionals. This person cannot be put even close to good professionals and his knowledge of counterintelligence was a complete zero.

page 8

Mr. Epstein does not know the simple fact that Soviet law allows the marriage of a Soviet citizen with a foreigner (by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in 1947). Oswald did not need to have permission to marry.

pages 10-11

Mr. Epstein very often makes suppositions. He, like some others, assumes that the procedures for dealing with defectors in the USA must be analogous to those in the USSR. He did not even consider how many defectors came from the Soviet Union and how many came from the West to the Soviet Union. There is a big difference (I think it is possible to count on one's fingers the number of defectors from the West to the Soviet Union for the last 15-20 years.).

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In the case of Oswald there were no extensive investigations by the KGB. Oswald was not considered to be an interesting or serious target. When he cut his wrist and in the hospital stated that he would kill himself if he were not allowed to stay the KGB ordered him to be checked by psychiatrists. Two reports were received from independent psychiatrists (not connected with each other) and both reports indicated that Oswald was mentally unstable.

It is necessary to keep in mind a very important factor which helped Oswald. Khrushchev was preparing for his trip to the United States. That was the main reason in allowing Oswald to stay in the

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If he had not been allowed to st... he would have repeated his attempt to kill himself and this fact (or maybe his death) would make a big sensation in the newspapers in the West. Khrushchev did not want this type of publicity.

Mr. Epstein is a true nonentity in questions of intelligence or counter-intelligence, particularly of the Soviet Union. All of his assumptions, and suppositions show that his is trying to set himself up as judge. On many occasions he states a fact and starts to twist it in wrong directions. He assumes that there would be a file on anyone who visited or wrote a letter to Soviet embassies around the world. This is not correct. Further, there can be only one file on a person, but the same person can be mentioned and even registered in several files. In the case of Oswald the KGB's residenturas in Washington and New York no doubt knew about him: an American who defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, considered by Soviet psychiatrists to be mentally unstable, in two years re-defects to his own country and soon after that starts to write letters or visits the Soviet Embassy and again wants to return to the Soviet Union. It is obvious to anyone that Oswald was unstable, a kind of rolling stone. (Let's assume for a second--Mr Epstein's "deep thought"--that Oswald was connected with the KGB. How can Mr. Epstein explain Oswald's letters and visits to Soviet embassies? The KGB is not so foolish as to allow their agent or contact to write a letter or visit the Soviet embassy in any part of the world, not to mention their embassy in the United States). And absolutely surely the KGB's residentura in Mexico City did not know anything about Oswald. That's the reason they sent a cable about Oswald's visit and request for an entry visa to the Soviet Union.

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Mr. Epstein and, regretablely, some of the CIA officers (who were fired) do not know or don't want to know a very essential fact. In successful intelligence and counter-intelligence work an officer must never approach his target (a defector, an informer, a person under observation for recruitment, etc.) according to any set rule or pattern. Each person has his differences, his idiosyncracies. And one cannot achieve a good result without taking into account

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into consideration these differences and idiosyncracies. That's why cases and procedures in dealing with various targets are very often so different from each other (at least during my years of work in counter-intelligence).

In work against tourists the leaders of the KGB (understanding the impossibility of covering : great numbers of tourists) targetted the main part of the counter-intelligence work against important people (suspected of being in contact with intelligence) or interesting people (working for their governments, specialists on Russia or those, who had any Russian roots). Oswald was not this type of target. The KGB did not consider him an important or interesting target before he defected, when he was defecting and even after his defection. Of course, the KGB of the Soviet Union ordered the KGB of Belorussia in Minsk to watch Oswald; control his correspondence, telephone conversations, cover with agents and informers his places of work and living and also from time to time to conduct a surveillance of him. This order to the KGB of Belorussia particularly stressed that no active measures--a recruitment or a contact of Oswald--should be undertaken.

There is a very strict rule and order in the Soviet Union that no one can do anything in relation to a foreigner without permission of the Second Chief Directorate (counter-intelligence) of the KGB. It concerns the Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and also the First Chief Directorate (intelligence) of the KGB. That's why I was so certain that no section of the KGB or GRU had debriefed or recruited Oswald. Besides that I have seen the whole file on Oswald in 1963.

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page 13

Mr. Epstein mentions my false statement concerning a recall telegram from the KGB.

When I made my contact with American intelligence in 1962 I was planning to go abroad next in 1963. But being a deputy to the chief of department created difficulties for trips abroad. In 1963 my chief of department Colonel Chelnokov was promoted to a higher position and his first deputy, Colonel Kovalenko, was appointed chief of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate and I

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was moved to the position of a first deputy to the chief of the Seventh Department. Kovalenko, trying to be on good terms with me, his first deputy, agreed to my short trip abroad in January 1964, but under one condition. In October-November of 1963 the chairman of the KGB of the Soviet Union decided that the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB must organize in March or April of 1964 an all-union conference of the KGB on questions of foreign tourism in the USSR. (Top-level officers of the KGB from all republics and cities which are open for tourists would be invited to this conference in Moscow). Kovalenko told me that if this conference should take place in March he would recall me from abroad.

Several days before going to Geneva in January of 1964 I found out that the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB General Gribanov was himself going on a short trip abroad to Austria and France and on the way home he would stop in Geneva. Gribanov did not know about my trip to Geneva in 1964. My trip was approved by the chief of the Seventh Department, Kovalenko, and one of Gribanov's deputies, Bobkov, who was supervising the work of the Seventh Department.

When I arrived in Geneva in January of 1964 a part of the Soviet delegation (including myself) was staying in the Rex hotel. About 25-27 January 1964 I had my first meeting with a top-level case officer of the CIA. I told him that I was ready to defect and that I was asking to have this process speeded up. (I also told him immediately about Gribanov's trip abroad, which was a very important one.) I met this officer daily until 4 February. He was not in a hurry to proceed with my defection. I was deeply concerned by such delay. Besides, I was afraid of a recall telegram arriving from Moscow any day. But most of all I was concerned with General Gribanov's arrival in Geneva from Paris. Because should he see me in Geneva he would be very much surprised and could order me to return to Moscow. The last straw was the decision of the head of the Soviet disarmament delegation, Semen Tsarapkin, to put the

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whole delegation on 4-5 February in one of the buildings belonging to the Soviet Mission in Geneva. On the morning of 4 February I went to a secret address and announced that I was not going to return and it was the day of my defection. With the purpose of strengthening my position I made a false statement about the recall telegram.

page 18

Mr. Epstein himself is making false statements. He says that I signed the various papers my CIA case officer thrust in front of me, which constituted my official request for political asylum. In Frankfurt I asked the case officer to whom I should write a paper and he did not tell me. I, on my own, wrote a letter to the President of the United States asking a grant of political asylum and presented this letter to the case officer.

page 18

Mr. Epstein did not even research some details. He mentioned that a woman, identifying herself as Nosenko's wife, appeared at the US Embassy in Moscow. There were two women, not one, the mother and the wife, who visited the United States Embassy in Moscow and left two letters for me there.

page 19

Mr. Epstein refers to the "top-level CIA case officer" a number of times without disclosing his name. Is it not because Mr. [redacted] is distorting facts concerning me and grossly exaggerating his own professionalism? If Mr. [redacted] is giving interviews he should state his name. (Why not? He is not working now in the CIA).

Mr. [redacted] did not recruit me. He surely must remember that it was I, who contacted an American diplomat in Geneva in 1962 and asked him to arrange a meeting for me with a representative of the CIA.

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Mr. [redacted] was a very intelligent person. I do not know his qualifications in intelligence work, but as concerns his knowledge in counter-intelligence and investigation he was not worth much. Looking back to my conversations with Mr. [redacted] in 1962 and February-March 1964 I can say that he was not even interested in any details, he wanted only the "cream"--names of agents from the West recruited by the KGB, their positions and places of abode.

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About what lack of interest in the country is he talking
I could not go any place, I even did not see Washington. Speaking
about the country it is necessary to point out that Mr. [redacted]
after being fired, left the country and lives in Europe. I deeply
love this country and will never leave it inspite of the fact that
Mr. [redacted] and several others of his type took from me five years
of my life in this beautiful country.

page 20

Mr. Epstein mentions my false statement about my rank. In
September 1963 a recommendation was prepared for my promotion to the
next rank. The chief of the Second Chief Directorate, Gribanov,
decided to pass over the rank of major and the recommendation papers
were prepared, confirmed by the Party Bureau and signed for the rank
of lieutenant colonel. Being appointed in 1962 a deputy to the
chief of department, only I and one other, a deputy to the chief
of the Second Department Aleksey Suntsov--were the only two deputies
to chiefs of departments with the rank of captain among about 30
departments of the Second Chief Directorate. (The position of a
deputy chief of department is that of colonel). The papers on
promotion were transferred to the Personnel Directorate of the KGB
which, after gathering an appropriate number of promotions,
presents the list to the chairman of the KGB for final signature.
Thus my promotion was known to a number of officers in the Second
Chief Directorate. In December 1963 I was ordered to travel to
the KGB in Gorki district in connection with Cherepanov's case.
When I received my document for travel I saw that the rank on the
document was that of a lieutenant-colonel. Nobody had announced
to me that the chairman had signed the promotion list. It appears
that the officer on duty in the Second Chief Directorate assumed
the signature for my promotion took place or someone of the chiefs
of the Second Chief Directorate made a mistake and told him this was
my rank. This travel document was in my wallet when I arrived in
January 1964 in Geneva. Nobody told me until the day of my departure
abroad that the chairman had signed the order. Not lacking in human
vanity I told this was my rank. Sorry, but this is what I am guilty
of.

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pages 21-23 Again Mr. Epstein is twisting details about Oswald; he also speaks about the so-called 44 questions prepared by the CIA "experts." Some of the questions are so absurd that I seriously doubt the participation of any true CIA expert in the preparation of these questions, because they show a lack of basic knowledge about the KGB and also about Soviet laws. Those questions must have been prepared by Mr. [redacted] or somebody of his thinking but not by the experts.

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I can only add that I have seen Mr. [redacted] Mr. Alekso Poptanish and Mr. [redacted] from the FBI a number of times between mid-February and the end of March 1964. And I can state that these people really knew how to investigate and interrogate but not Mr. [redacted] and those who were with him. And these people believed me even during my first months in the USA.

page 24 ". . . no separate KGB file on Marina." There was no file on Marina, but when she married Oswald there were some materials on her in the file of her husband. When an American diplomat with his wife arrives in Moscow the KGB opens a file on him, but not on his wife. Any information received or known about the wife will be put in the file of the husband.

pages 26-28 Mr. Angleton was making assessments concerning me, he was also responsible for my incarceration, which lasted, to be coreect, about 5 years, but never did he or any of his deputies ever come to talk with me. What kind of professionals are these people? First of all, Mr. Angleton, his deputies and Mr. [redacted] "tried and convicted" me long before I arrived in the United States in February 1964. How could Mr. Angleton and his deputies judge and decide the life of a person and give sworn testimonies to the director of the CIA without ever having seen this person? And on the basis of that a decision was made about my incarceration (without due process of law) for five years.

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In my mind there is only one answer. Mr. Angleton was a sick person; he developed a persecution mania. He was sure that the CIA was deeply penetrated by the KGB. He considered that if the KGB penetrated the British intelligence (Philby) and the German

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intelligence (Felfe), the KGB must also be in the CIA. Maybe Mr. Angleton, deep in his mind, was shocked by the betrayal of Philby, with whom he was close and cooperated a long time.

In December 1961 the KGB's intelligence officer Anatoliy Golitsyn defected to the United States. I have never seen Golitsyn, but knew about him and knew his friends such as Evgeniy Kascheev, Nikolay Skvortsov from the KGB's intelligence service, Vladislav Kovshuk, Gennadiy Gryaznov, and Vitaliy Dera from the KGB's counter-intelligence service. Golitsyn was a bright, intelligent person. Almost half of his years in the KGB he spent in schools. As a field officer he was not good, but at the desk and with analysis he was not bad if one took into account his basic flaw: Very often in making analysis Mr. Golitsyn was going too-too far. One illustration of such an analysis can be given as example: Mr. Golitsyn considered that the hostile relations between the Chinese and the Soviets and the Sino-Soviet break was one of the biggest deceptions of the West.

After arriving in the USA Golitsyn immediately announced that the KGB had already planted an agent within the highest echelons of the American intelligence. This "wild duck" of Golitsyn was accepted by Mr. Angleton as a kind of enlightening disclosure.

To support this disclosure Golitsyn told that the KGB officer Kovshuk, who travelled to the United States in 1957, had a mission to contact or activate the KGB's highly important agent working in the CIA. Mr. Angleton surely gulped down Golitsyn's fib.

I knew Kovshuk a little bit more and better than Golitsyn; we never were close friends. Kovshuk was in 1957 in the USA with only one mission to restore a contact with the KGB's agent, [redacted] (S) X (u)

[redacted] (S) No doubt, it sounds so naive, simple and nonsensical to send to the USA for 11 months a section chief of the American department of the KGB's counter-intelligence with a mission to re-activate the [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) about whom I reported was a specialist in American codes and a code-machine technician. When [redacted] (S) was leaving the Soviet Union he categorically stated that under no conditions would he work with the KGB in the

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United States. The KGB always gave special priority to this type of information.

That's why after 4 years it was decided by the KGB to attempt to re-activate the work with their agent [REDACTED] (S)

By the way, the KGB had an agent who was [REDACTED] (S) but his code name was not [REDACTED] (S) and the KGB did not have difficulty with this agent until his arrest by the FBI.

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pages 28-29

[REDACTED] (S)

page 31

Mr. Golitsyn, who became Mr. Angleton's prima donna, did not see me in 1960 and 1961. Besides being on holiday each year I was in 1960 about five to six weeks in Cuba and in 1961 about six weeks in Sofia, Bulgaria. There were no frequent visits by Golitsyn to the First Department but only one visit in 1960 and a conversation with chief of section Kovshuk and another visit in 1961 and conversations with officers who worked under me--Gryaznov, Kosolapov, Gromakovskiy, Demkin and with section chief Kovshuk. When I returned my officers reported to me about the subjects discussed with Golitsyn. As far as Mr. Golitsyn's knowledge about my position as deputy to the chief of the Tourist Department is concerned, how could he know it? He defected in December 1961 but I was not appointed deputy of the chief of department until 1962.

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I dare Mr. Epstein, Mr. Golitsyn, Mr. Angleton and others to stand and talk on any of these subjects with me. What could Golitsyn know about Gribanov except his name? I never stated that I was a close friend of Gribanov. I stated that I was close to Gribanov and he was promoting me but these promotions were based on the results of my work.

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I have a question. Can Mr. Golitsyn, Angleton or anyone name an officer from the KGB's counter-intelligence who had six recruitments of foreigners in only one year. How many such recruitments had Mr. Golitsyn made during his whole career in the KGB? It seems Mr. Golitsyn was hurt by the fact that he never had the position of deputy to the chief of a department. And he had had no promotions for a long time before he defected to the United States.

page 33 Mr. Epstein is making untrue statements on almost every page. I have given information on the Cherepanov case, but I never said that he was tried and executed. How could that be? Cherepanov was arrested during the second part of December 1963. I left Moscow in January 1964, when Cherepanov was under arrest by the KGB and investigations and interrogations were taking place.

Everything that Mr. Epstein is touching is distorted, understated, or based on assumptions and suppositions only.

page 35 Mr. Epstein completely distorts the Cherepanov case.

The KGB never knew that Cherepanov had offered his services to the British intelligence. (Until his arrest, I did not know about the results of Cherepanov's interrogation.) The KGB transferred Cherepanov from the First Chief Directorate to the Second because information was received that when he was working in Yugoslavia, his wife had possibly had relations with an American or British citizen.

page 38 Mr. Epstein gives a "detailed" description of how I was subjected the first time to a lie detector. Where did he get this information? From whom did he get it? It seems Mr. Angleton and his associates were ashamed of what they put me through and that they simply decided to distort the facts.

By the way, this was the day of my incarceration which was followed by all the ugly things through which I passed for some time. In June 1975 there was published a Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States which mentioned a defector who was held in solitary confinement under extremely spartan living conditions for approximately three years. This was stated very mildly and does not convey near all that I went through.

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FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

DEC 13 1999
 CLASSIFIED BY: SP2AM/ely
 REASON: 1.5 (u)
 DECLASSIFY ON: X 1
 per DA letter 8/31/99

Date 5/21/79

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)
 ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P) (S)(u)

FCI-R
 (OO: WFO)

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP4D/mj/epm
 REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (2,3)
 DATE OF REVIEW 5/21/99 [602,949] X

Handwritten notes:
 b1 b3 b5
 PENCIA

Purpose of this communication is to make FBIHQ aware of a possible problem in utilization of [redacted] on a continuing basis, both for training and operational requirements. (S)(u)

[redacted] most recently delivered a four-hour presentation on 5/10/79 to a Basic Counterintelligence (BCI) class in Quantico. Presentation went over extremely well, and [redacted] next presentation to a BCI class on 6/28/79 is being expanded to eight hours. This expansion has met with both [redacted] and CIAHQ approval. (S)(u)

CIAHQ advises that scheduling of [redacted] for FBI requirements has not been a problem. But budgetary limitations placed on CIAHQ offices involved with defector [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
 See addendum
 Classified by 198-29-1031
 Declassify on: OADR

Classified and Extended by 197 16 MAY 22 1979
 Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)
 Date of Review for Declassification: May 21, 1999

2 - Bureau [CC-4433] (u)
 2 - WFO

WSM:dlk (4) (S)(u)

Handwritten notes:
 b7c Per FBI
 [redacted]

Approved: [Signature]
 84 JUL 2 79

Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

65-68530

b2 b7D
PER FBI

WF

[REDACTED] (u)

SECRET

b1 b7C
PENCIA

WFO has been of the opinion that it is CIAHQ's responsibility to make its defector assets available to the FBI and to bear the cost of expenses as well. FBIHQ requested to clarify funding responsibilities in this regard.

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It is re-emphasized that the above is not a problem yet; only that Agent handler's for [REDACTED] have been "sounded out" for FBI handling of [REDACTED] expenses in the future.

(u)

(u)

SECRET

FBI

0510

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

~~SECRET~~

Date 10/5/79

b1 m/s
per CIA

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P) (S)(u)

~~FCI-R~~ (S)

b2/b7D
PER FBI

DEC 13 1999

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
REASON: 1.5 (S)
DECLASSIFY ON: X /
per CIA letter 8/31/99

On 10/3/79 [redacted] was debriefed by the FBI and shown photos [redacted] stated that [redacted]

Above for information of office of origin. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified and Extended by 197
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)
Date of Review for Declassification: October 5, 1999

② - Bureau
2 - New York
2 - WFO

~~CLASS. & EXT. 5/17/82
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2, 3
DATE OF REVIEW 10-5-99~~

[WSM:dlk] (6)

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65-68530-1749

5 OCT 9 1979

~~See addendum
Classified by 99-709-703x1
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S)

Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time)

Per _____

97 NOV 20 1979

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Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1) PER CIA

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

PER CIA 50 U.S.C.

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

SECTION 403

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

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Section 552

Section 552a

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PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

b1
b3
S
PENCIL

Date 12/5/79

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P) (u)

[redacted] (s)
[redacted] (s)
[redacted] (s)
[redacted] (s)

DEC 13 1999
CLASSIFIED BY: SP7AM/ldj
REASON: 1.5 (e)
DECLASSIFY ON: X
per CDA letter 8/21/99

[redacted] was interviewed 11/29/79 and previous to that on 10/15/79, and on both occasions shown approximately [redacted] photographs. Of these photographs, [redacted] made identifications [redacted]

(u) It is noted that during meeting sessions with [redacted] time is limited and, for reasons cited above, photographs are numerous. In the interests of expediting the time frame allowed with [redacted] and to cut back on a lot of the unnecessary display of photographs to [redacted] (s) it is being recommended that [redacted]

[redacted] of those identifications made by [redacted] (s)

Next meeting with [redacted] (s) slated for late January, 1980. (u)

~~SECRET~~

Classified and Extended by 197
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2, 3)
Date of Review for Declassification: December 5, 1999

- 2 - Bureau
- 2 - WFO

[WSM:d1k] (u)
(4)

See addendum
Classified by 190-709-103X1
Declassify on: OADR

65-68530-1752

15 DEC 6 1979

5/17/82
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REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2, 3
DATE OF REVIEW 2/5/99

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FIVE

b7C
per FBI

Approved: [Signature] Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

DEC 7 1979

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1) PER CIA

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

PER CIA 50 U.S.C.

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

SECTION 403

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

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(k)(7)

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Section 552

Section 552a

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(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

PER CIA 50 U.S.C.

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

SECTION 403

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: Mr. Dean ^{LED}

9/25/81

From: [REDACTED]

b7c. Per FBI

Re: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
RELATED MATTERS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/dj
ON 12/13/99

The Document Classification Unit (DCU) is currently classifying the file on the captioned individual. Nosenko is a Soviet defector who supplied information to the FBI and CIA. In his debriefing, he advised that Sam Jaffee, a Bureau informant, was also an agent of the Soviets. Much of the information he supplied regarding Jaffee is now public knowledge through congressional hearings, etc. (S)(u)

The National Security Affidavits Unit (NSAU) is currently embroiled in U.S. District Court litigation regarding the Jaffee FOI/PA request which has resulted in the release, through court order, of documents from the Nosenko file pertaining to Jaffee. Also, more documents from the Nosenko file have been, or will be, released through other FOI/PA requests. Unfortunately, in some of these documents, Nosenko has made mention of other persons of Bureau interest and copies of these communications have been routed to those individuals' files. A few of these people have already requested their files and it must be anticipated that more will do so in the future. (S)(u)

(DC)

65-68530-1755

While all documents released are exised of information not related to the request under review, it would be relatively easy for any document examiner to compare the documents obtained by each requestor and, through mosaic or otherwise, determine most, if not all, of the information contained therein. It is deemed imperative that this not be allowed to happen, inasmuch as some of the persons mentioned are individuals, who, to our knowledge, are unaware they are of FBI interest or that Nosenko advised us concerning them. Furthermore, this deduced information would give the Soviets and others knowledge of data and techniques we possess, which would allow them to take appropriate countermeasures, thereby nullifying many man-hours of FBI investigations. The damage to national security could be significant. (S)(u)

- 1 - Mr. ^{Dean} [REDACTED]
 - 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]
 - 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]
 - 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]
 - 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]
- JHE:mjk

b7c Per FBI

OCT 14 1981

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP2 ALM (CONTINUED - OVER)
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2, 3
DATE OF REVIEW 9-25-2001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(S)(u)

Memorandum to Mr. Dean from [REDACTED]
Re: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko
Related Matters

b1c per FBI

Through consultation between DCU and NSAU, it is proposed the following steps be taken to insure that the aforementioned document comparison does not take place:

1. During the review of each volume of the Yuri Nosenko file, identify individuals he reported on and call for their files, if any.

2. Any document located in these related files which are copies of documents from the Nosenko file, are to be carefully analyzed and classified to prevent application of the Mosaic principle or other comparison. In this regard, it may be necessary and appropriate to

[REDACTED] (S)(u)

[REDACTED] (S)(u)

4. The analyst conducting this review will make a note on each enumerated serial [REDACTED]

b2
per
FBI

READERS DIGEST



MANAGING EDITOR : *Fulton Oursler, Jr.*

510

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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REASON-FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2, 1-2.3
DATE OF REVIEW *9/1/2007*~~

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September 1, 1981



*b1
b3
per
CIA*

Dear Judge Webster:

Remembering the private dinner you had with some of us on January 9, 1979, I thought you would appreciate an early look at the enclosed story, which we are running in October. I would be interested in any comments you might wish to make, on or off the record.

Sincerely,

Fulton Oursler
(u)


William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20535

... to Oursler, 9/1/81 [initials]

B
1- ENCLOSURE

65-68530-1756

DEC 13 1999
CLASSIFIED BY: *SP4 Jrm/rae*
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per OSA letter 8/31/99



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Is This American a Soviet Spy?

IN THE ANNALS of Soviet defections to the West, there is no case as bizarre or perplexing as that of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. For almost 20 years, his reputation has alternately plummeted and soared as our intelligence corps debated whether he was a true defector or a counterspy. In the end, acceptance was the verdict, and Nosenko is today a respected CIA consultant.

However, new and secret FBI findings—revealed here for the first time—declare that another Soviet, code-named Fedora, who for 15 years the FBI believed was spying for the United States, was actually a double agent under the control of Moscow. These findings raise a host of crucial questions about American intelligence operations—among them the legitimacy of other defectors, including Yuri Nosenko. Here is the story.

Adapted From "SHADRIN: THE SPY WHO NEVER CAME BACK"

HENRY HURT

IT BEGINS in 1962 when KGB officer Yuri Nosenko arrived in Geneva, Switzerland, with a Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference. During that trip, he made a secret approach to the CIA and announced that he wished to work for the West. He did not want to defect, however; instead, he preferred to meet with the CIA whenever his KGB duties took him outside Russia. Then Nosenko offered information that suggested he had valuable knowledge in many areas of CIA interest, including KGB recruitment of an American as a Soviet spy.

After this initial contact, No-

senko returned to the conference. The CIA officer flew to the United States convinced that the CIA had secured the prize of all prizes in intelligence: an "agent in place"—a spy who would work for America in the very heart of the Soviet secret service.

The officer's enthusiasm disappeared shortly after he reached CIA headquarters. There he was told a secret that only a handful of CIA officers then knew. Another KGB officer, a man named Anatoli M. Golitsin, had defected to the United States six months earlier and stated that the KGB had penetrated the CIA at a high level. He had also

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ENCLOSURE

warned that the Soviets would send out false defectors to deceive and confuse Western intelligence and to divert any investigation that would lead to the KGB spy in the CIA. (Indeed, a number of highly placed Soviet intelligence officers did appear, among them a United Nations diplomat whose code-name, Fedora, would become inextricably linked with Nosenko.)

The thrust of Nosenko's information was that there was no Soviet penetration of the CIA. His leads about KGB recruitment of an American spy pointed to the U.S. military.

In the following weeks, a meticulous examination was made of all that Nosenko had told the CIA officer. When it was compared to what Golitsin had revealed and to other information, the CIA was led to believe that Nosenko had been sent as a disinformation agent by the KGB. If he ever contacted the Americans again, it was agreed, there would be no hint of this determination. He would be met secretly and debriefed so that the CIA could learn what he wanted to say. But as long as these suspicions prevailed, he would never be accepted as a true defector.

Nothing was heard from Nosenko for 19 months. Then, in January of 1964, two months after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he appeared in Geneva again. He stated that he wanted to defect to the United States—and he offered an irresistible temptation.

He said that he had been in charge of the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald, the man who had assassinated President Kennedy.

A Confirmation of Lies. A crucial question centered on whether the Soviet Union had played any role in the President's murder. For it was known that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and had remained out of sight until his return to the United States in 1962.

All knowledge of Soviet procedures indicated that the KGB would be intensely interested in Oswald, who had arrived in Russia just after leaving the Marine Corps, where he had served as a radar operator at a military base in Japan. During that period he had visual access to the U-2 spy plane which his unit had tracked on the radar screens. The U-2 flew on covert reconnaissance missions, many of them over the Soviet Union. Upon his defection Oswald had told a U.S. embassy officer that he wanted to provide the Soviets with useful information.

Nosenko's statements about Oswald, during his second series of clandestine meetings in Geneva, astounded the CIA in 1964—and continue to astonish virtually everyone to this day. He declared that the KGB never had the slightest interest in Oswald and never gave him even a routine debriefing. If there were any lingering doubts that Nosenko was dispatched by Moscow, this preposterous account quashed them. But the CIA faced a quanda-

ry. The Warren Commission would soon begin hearings on the assassination. The FBI would need to be apprised of Nosenko's report. No one could risk turning away the only purported Soviet source who might shed light on the President's assassin.

As the CIA men debated the question, Nosenko steam-rolled a decision by insisting that he had received a telegram recalling him to Moscow immediately. This created urgent pressure on the Americans to reach a decision. Nosenko was spirited to American soil.

When the FBI learned about Nosenko's defection, it turned to Fedora, the Soviet U.N. diplomat who had been providing the Bureau with information since 1962. From his inside knowledge of KGB activities, Fedora was able to confirm that Nosenko had been sent the recall telegram. When a question arose about Nosenko's rank in the KGB, Fedora corroborated Nosenko's claim that he was a lieutenant colonel. In general, Fedora supported Nosenko, which encouraged the FBI's ready acceptance of the new defector.

But there was another urgent reason why the FBI wanted to accept Nosenko as legitimate: he was saying just what FBI director J. Edgar Hoover wanted to hear about Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union. Hoover was determined that Oswald be adjudged a "lone nut" by the Warren Commission. Such an assessment would relieve

any FBI responsibility for Oswald having been on the loose in Dallas.

Nothing seemed awry about Fedora's corroboration of Nosenko's rank—or in Fedora's confirmation that Nosenko had received a recall telegram—until later, when Nosenko admitted that he had been only a captain in the KGB. Still later, the National Security Agency, through an analysis of cable traffic between Moscow and Geneva, established that no recall telegram had been sent to Nosenko. Confronted, Nosenko confessed his deception.

This curious corroboration between Nosenko and Fedora of demonstrable lies—and other similar connections—gave strong support to CIA suspicions that both sources were being manipulated by Moscow. While the CIA did not have jurisdiction over Fedora, it could certainly call the shots on Nosenko. Thus began one of the strangest episodes in American espionage.

"Sent to Deceive." The first two months of Nosenko's debriefing in the United States took place under normal conditions applied to any defector. The purpose was to judge the scope of his knowledge, the areas of his expertise, and to gain enough information to provide a basis for extensive debriefing over the months, even years, that would follow. The CIA had already found so many oddities in Nosenko's material that the officers handling the case believed he was a false agent. But Nosenko was not told of these conclusions, and indeed the door was

always open to the possibility that he could prove his bona fides. He was treated like any other defector.

One of the strangest aspects of Nosenko's information was the overlap with material that Anatoli Golitsin had provided. Six months prior to Nosenko's first contact, for example, Golitsin had given details of listening devices planted in the American embassy in Moscow. Independently, Nosenko gave the same information. For four years, he said, his assignment was to spy on embassy personnel. Asked if there were microphones in the new embassy wing, he said there were none. Later more than a hundred were discovered there.

Golitsin also gave leads to a high-level KGB penetration of the British Admiralty. He had had only part of the picture—substantial clues that ultimately would have led to fruition. Nosenko was able to fill in a gap, which lent support to the proposition that some of his contributions were of great value.

But to a trained counterintelligence eye, this dovetailing suggested a Soviet decision to promote Nosenko by giving him information on cases already compromised by Golitsin.

The significant point is that under normal debriefing, Nosenko's credibility continued to sink in the eyes of the CIA. By April 1964, there was such an accumulation of lies on Nosenko's ledger sheet that the CIA concluded that its friendly efforts to elicit truthful information from

him were useless. There was a unanimous feeling among the officers then handling Nosenko that he was a Soviet agent. It was clear that he was of no value as a source for the Warren Commission, simply because his information on Oswald was hopelessly contradictory, much of it patently false. Nosenko was placed under hostile interrogation in an effort to make him confess that he was a Soviet agent.

Fifteen years later, the officer in charge of Nosenko in the early days described the situation to a Congressional committee:

"Nosenko's story of Oswald is only one of scores of things that Nosenko said which made him appear to be a KGB plant. If the Oswald story were alone—a strange aberration in an otherwise normal performance—perhaps one could just shrug and forget it. It is not. We got the same evasions, contradictions, excuses, whenever we pinned Nosenko down. [This] included Nosenko's accounts of his career, of his travels, of the way he learned the various items of information he reported and even accounts of his private life. All of those irregularities point to the same conclusion: that Nosenko was sent by the KGB to deceive us."

Changes of Fortune. The years that followed were terrible for Nosenko. He was kept under conditions far worse than those of any modern U.S. prison. He was deprived of daily showers, television, writing, any form of entertain-

ment. For part of the time he was even deprived of reading material and exercise. The questioning and the detention went on for hours and days and, finally, years. But no matter how tightly knotted Nosenko's lies and contradictions became, he refused to admit that he was a Soviet agent.

In the spring of 1966, with Nosenko still in detention, there appeared in Washington, a promising young KGB agent who came to be known as Igor. He claimed to be eager to work for the United States. In order to enhance his position in the KGB, he successfully solicited assistance from U.S. intelligence officials in the purported recruitment of a Soviet defector named Nicholas Shadrin, who was now a well-adjusted American citizen. Shadrin was put to work by the Americans as a double agent against the Soviets—pretending to have been recruited by Igor. Nine years later Shadrin vanished, presumably into Soviet hands, while on an assignment in Vienna.

In addition to recruiting Shadrin, Igor had a potpourri of urgent business. Among other things, he told American officials quite specifically that he could vouch for the fact that Nosenko was a true defector.

Igor's certification occurred at the nadir of Nosenko's crumpled fortunes. His story, oozing deception, was in shambles. Yet it was clear Nosenko was not going to break. There was no alternative

but to bring the matter to some conclusion.

Finally, in late 1968, after years of increasingly wrenching internal debate and an official re-examination of the case, the CIA granted Nosenko his bona fides. Though Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence during this period, approved Nosenko as an independent contractor for the CIA, he has made it clear that he intended Nosenko to be settled into American life in a manner in which he could pose no threat. Even though Helms agreed to award Nosenko his bona fides, his suspicions of the odd defector had never diminished.

For several years Nosenko, living a private life, drew a paycheck from the CIA for various non-sensitive duties. But his association with the FBI was extensive. At last, the FBI could fully utilize its two mutually corroborative sources—Nosenko and Fedora.

Meanwhile, Nosenko's small band of supporters at CIA continued to grow, even though some of his original detractors remained strongly influential. During the mid-1970s, tumultuous changes racked the Agency, following the replacement of Richard Helms by William Colby. In early 1975, after the resignation of most of Nosenko's chief detractors (over unrelated matters), the men who supported Nosenko moved into positions of influence. Almost at once Nosenko was brought into the

Agency as a counterintelligence consultant.

The consternation among those who originally suspected Nosenko was overwhelming. It was seen, as utterly incomprehensible that a man so widely suspected as a Soviet plant could suddenly be resurrected, considered rehabilitated, and placed in a position of trust in the most sensitive section of the CIA's clandestine services. He remains there to this day.

A Serious Stumble. In the wake of the torrid debate over Nosenko, there is a quagmire of dissension. The professionals who originally suspected Nosenko are on one side. On the other are those who in subsequent years have managed to win enthusiastic support for Nosenko from the highest intelligence officials in the land. The few original doubters still in the intelligence services are mute; others, long retired, seem almost resigned to the proposition that Nosenko has won lasting acceptance. Only a few believe the case should be re-opened to examine the question of what Nosenko's acceptance means to the U.S. intelligence services.

One of the most bizarre aspects of the matter is the fierce intensity one encounters from Nosenko supporters for merely questioning his total acceptance. According to an official statement from the CIA, Nosenko "continues to be used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the Agency, the FBI, Air Force, and others." In this capacity, he is in direct contact with

this country's most carefully concealed covert personnel—by any standards a peculiar place to put a man with such an unprecedented background. But these supporters are stymied when they try to explain why anyone can be reasonably sure Nosenko is a true defector. In the end, they say there is no way to show a reporter the significant reasons because doing so would reveal sensitive information.

Nosenko's friends today claim that he has provided vital information to the United States on various cases which cannot be revealed. They suggest that he can be credited with providing information on more than 200 cases of great significance. When told of this, Nosenko's detractors suggest that perhaps once he was released from CIA custody he was provided with new information by the Soviets—much of it very good intelligence—to bolster his chances for full acceptance.

Whatever the truth, Nosenko is established as a respected participant in the U.S. intelligence community, a position attained by few Soviet defectors. He is accepted by both the CIA and the FBI.

But along Nosenko's rocky rise to respectability, there was one serious stumble—one that might have left his supporters in a state of humiliation if not full-blown suspicion. It happened in 1978 when the House Select Committee on Assassinations, looking into the history of Lee Harvey Oswald, undertook an examination of Yuri Nosenko.

As the only nonpartisan, non-intelligence group ever to have full access to the file on Nosenko, the committee reached the official conclusion that this strange defector was a liar. The official report states: "the committee was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald—whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978, or perhaps to both." The committee, explaining that its purpose was not to determine the validity of Nosenko other than in his statements about Oswald, stopped short of drawing wider conclusions. But it was firm in its assertion that Nosenko, the man who brought the message from Moscow that the KGB never had the slightest interest in Oswald, is a liar.

"I Was Telling the Truth." In addition to the committee's thorough review of the files, intelligence agents and officials were called to testify about Nosenko. At nearly every juncture, their testimony—even when trying to support Nosenko—was devastating to the proposition that he was the sort of man who should be accepted by the U.S. clandestine services to give lectures on counterintelligence and be handsomely paid.

Take, for example, the testimony of Bruce Solie of the CIA Office of Security, the man who orchestrated the original clearance of Nosenko in 1968. Solie and Nosenko became friends, and later when Nosenko was married Solie served as his best man at the wedding. In a sworn deposi-

tion, Solie quickly conceded that he was uninformed about Nosenko's positions on Oswald. But Solie agreed that the Oswald aspect of Nosenko's testimony is "an important part to be considered" in any evaluation of Nosenko's bona fides.

Staff counsel Kenneth Klein struggled to understand why Solie was willing to accept Nosenko's statements on Oswald even though he claimed he had never asked him a single question about Oswald during the CIA re-examination that finally cleared Nosenko. The best answer Klein could elicit was that Solie was willing to accept whatever Nosenko said as true unless he was shown information to the contrary—a peculiar philosophy for a security officer.

Finally, Klein asked Solie if it was proved that Nosenko was lying about Oswald, "Do you think that would change your opinion as to whether he was bona fide?"

"It sure would," Solie replied.

John Hart, a former high CIA official, was brought out of retirement in 1978 by CIA director Stansfield Turner to explain the Agency's position on Nosenko. Curiously, Hart announced he knew almost nothing about Nosenko's Oswald connections, even though the committee had asked the Agency to send someone to speak to that point. Pressed by an incredulous Congressman, Hart finally arrived at the following statement:

"Let me express an opinion on Mr. Nosenko's testimony about Lee

Harvey Oswald. I, like many others, find Mr. Nosenko's testimony incredible. Therefore, if I were in the position of deciding whether to use the testimony of Mr. Nosenko in this case or not, I would not use it." This was an odd contrast with his own statements, and with an Agency response to an interrogatory submitted to the committee two weeks earlier, asserting that the CIA believed Nosenko's statements about Oswald were "made in good faith."

But none of this was as damaging to Nosenko as his own appearance before an executive session of the committee. Kenneth Klein opened his questioning with a summary of what Nosenko had told the staff up until that point: "You have testified that the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you decided he was not interesting without speaking to him."

From that point on, staff counsel Klein elicited new and astonishing contradictions and inconsistencies. Repeatedly, Nosenko retreated to the explanation that Klein was using material that Nosenko had provided while under hostile interrogation. But when Klein asked if the hostile interrogations ever led him to lie, Nosenko stated, "No, I was telling the truth." Indeed, most of Nosenko's information on Oswald—including details that the committee concluded were lies—is contained in an FBI report of early March 1964, a full month before

Nosenko was placed under hostile interrogation.

Nosenko complained bitterly to the committee about the conditions of his long and solitary confinement. He repeatedly insinuated that his treatment went far beyond spartan conditions, even claiming that he had been improperly drugged. A number of officers from the CIA and FBI swore to the committee that they never saw any evidence that Nosenko had been drugged or physically abused. Finally, Nosenko conceded that he had never even been slapped.

In the end, as Nosenko sunk deeper into a morass of contradictions, he begged committee chairman Louis Stokes to stop the questioning. He submitted that he should not be questioned about anything he said during the period he was under hostile interrogation, although he swore that he always told the truth about Oswald. The committee stopped the questioning.

In its final report, the committee made the following statement:

"[The committee] questioned Nosenko in detail about Oswald, finding significant inconsistencies in statements he had given the FBI, the CIA and the committee. For example, Nosenko told the committee that the KGB had Oswald under extensive surveillance, including mail interception, wire tap and physical observation. Yet, in 1964, he told the CIA and the FBI there had been no such surveillance

of Oswald. Nosenko indicated there had been no psychiatric examination of Oswald subsequent to his suicide attempt, while in 1978 he detailed for the committee the reports he had read about psychiatric examinations of Oswald.

"In the end, the committee was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter. The fashion in which Nosenko was treated by the Agency—his interrogation and confinement—virtually ruined him as a valid source for information on the assassination. Nevertheless, the committee was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald. The reasons range from the possibility that he merely wanted to exaggerate his own importance to the disinformation hypothesis with its sinister implications."

One might expect such a conclusion by a committee of Congress to have a negative bearing on Nosenko's position in the intelligence community. Not at all. In fact, not a single major publication is known to have even mentioned that the House committee concluded that Nosenko had lied. Immediately, as if to assuage Nosenko's hurt feelings over his humiliation before the committee, CIA director Turner issued a private statement to his employees reviewing selected aspects of the case and concluding: "Today Mr. Nosenko is a well-adjusted American citizen utilized as a consultant by CIA and is making a valuable contribution to our mission."

Fedora Unmasked. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Nosenko story is the fact that his acceptance is linked to other defectors—including Fedora and Igor—who have come under intense suspicion.

The thorniest of these linkages involves Fedora. Not only did this agent corroborate specific lies in Nosenko's story, he went much farther. He told the FBI that the KGB was so distraught over Nosenko's defection that its operations in New York City were shut down. This odd and unsubstantiated claim looked even more peculiar when the CIA confirmed that KGB operations were continuing in Switzerland, a country where Nosenko had served and where presumably he knew of operations about which he could provide sensitive information.

The basic questions about Fedora's bona fides first were made public in 1978 by Edward Jay Epstein in *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*. Epstein revealed that the FBI had placed great faith in Fedora and fed him large quantities of U.S. secrets in order to enhance his position in the KGB. Showing Fedora's links to Nosenko, Epstein concluded: "If Nosenko was now ruled a fraud, then Fedora would seem to be a part of the same Soviet deception. And if Fedora were really under Soviet control, it could bring down the entire FBI counterespionage structure like a house of cards."

Still highly protective of its source Fedora, the FBI began a secret investigation to determine the source for Epstein's information. In fact, there was such alarm within the intelligence community that serious stories circulated that Fedora—by then back in the Soviet Union—probably had been tortured and executed by the Soviets as a result of the revelations. The result of the search for Epstein's source is not known.

Far more important, however, was a subsequent investigation by the FBI aimed at assessing Fedora's bona fides. By 1980 this investigation—one of the most tightly held secrets in the intelligence community—had ended with the FBI's electrifying conclusion that *Fedora was a Soviet agent, that he was under Moscow's control during the years of his association with the FBI, including the period when he was giving urgent support to Nosenko.*

One might expect such a conclusion to lead to a re-examination of all related cases and sources, including Nosenko and one of his chief certifiers, Igor. But as of the summer of 1981, this had not happened. The finding on Fedora—until now

known only to a few intelligence officials—is viewed as a piece of history unrelated to anything going on today in U.S. intelligence.

It is far from clear why officials have refused to pursue the seemingly pointed implications of the FBI's new findings, or why they do not want to reopen the bewildering Nosenko case. And it is astounding that every sign indicates that Igor is still considered a valid source—even in light of his certification of Nosenko, even after the manipulation and the tragic loss of Nicholas Shadrin.

A public revelation that any one of these curious defectors is a false agent could have awesome bureaucratic repercussions. If one falls, others must fall, creating havoc inside intelligence services where crucial analyses and long-term plans may have been built upon the supposed reliability of these sources. The most ominous question is whether it has become simpler to live with Nosenko and other sources with whom he is linked, than to cast out any one of them and risk tumbling the whole internal structure of cases and strategies.

"Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back," from which this article was adapted, will be available at bookstores in November. You may also obtain a copy (postpaid) by sending a check or money order made out to Reader's Digest Press in the amount of \$13.95 to Reader's Digest Press, 200 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10166.



To : B.E. Nolan, Jr.

Date December 30, 1981

From :

[Redacted]

b7c per FBI

b7D per CIA

Subject :

[Redacted]

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OUTSIDE SOURCE

September 9, 1981

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b7c per CIA
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Mr. Fulton Oursler, Jr.
Managing Editor
Reader's Digest
Pleasantville, New York 10570

Dear Mr. Oursler:

Many thanks for sending me an advance copy of the Hurt article "Is This American a Soviet Spy?" which will appear in the October issue of the Reader's Digest. I read it with great interest. Consistent with our policy of neither confirming or denying the existence of foreign counterintelligence investigations in general, or any particular sources or methods that might be utilized in such investigations, for security reasons, it would not be appropriate for me to offer any comments on the article. But I do appreciate your sending it to me.

I hope we will have another chance for a visit before too long. Best wishes,

Sincerely,

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

DE-84

65-68530-1757

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