

On 5/47/69, the following cases were discussed:




In addition, he was shown photographs and names of several groups of the several groups of additional pertinent information was obtained.

Soviet Intelligence Service's use of the U. N. General Assembly was discussed with NOSENKO and an LHM has been submitted summarizing his comments





On 6/6/69 the following cases were discussed: 在以 On 6/11/69, the following matters were discussed: In addition, he was shown photographs of case was discussed and he On 6/16/69, the was shown photographs and names perte





On 6/18/69 the following cases were discussed (1)

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
On 6/26/69, the following matters were discussed:

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In addition, photographs of several groups of

WFO has or will prepare appropriate communications in the individual cases referred to above in those instances where substantial additional or clarifying information was obtained.

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During the reported interviews of NOSENKO, he was very cooperative and gave no indication that he was attempting to withhold information or deceive the interviewing agents.

WFO will continue interviews of NOSENKO.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) \((4)

SUBJECT

TO

FROM

(00:WFO)

FEB 04 2000 CLASSIFIED BY SPRACE **DECLASSIFY ON: 25X** PER CIAILHA UNTED

INFORMATION CONTAINED

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ReWFlet 7/8/69.

Enclosed under separate cover of this letter are cards constituting the letters

Also enclosed are cards for letter

Upon the completion of processing of these cards by the WFO, it is requested that they be returned to the NYO.

- Bureau (RM)

 Washington Field / (1 - With Package) (RM)

New York

REC 27

65-68530-488

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1862 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES G ERNMENT L INFORMATION CONTAINE HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXI THE SHOWN OTHERWISE. DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: 7/18/69 S.C. IFU FEB 0 4 2000 SUBJECT: CLASSIFIED BY 5 PL HUM (00: FO) PUR CIA Ketter dutell ReNYlet 7/15/69 enclosing cards constituting the letters Enclosed for NYO under separate cover of this letter are referenced cards, which have been processed by WFO. Upon receipt thereof, NYO is requested to forward additional cards for processing by WFO. 2 - Bureau 3 - New York 1105-65721 (1- With Package) (RM) 1 - WFO APPRORRIATE ACENCIES £ 65-68530 - 489

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1862 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES ('ERNMENT Memorandum**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) TO DATE: 7/22/69 670 SAC, WFO FEB U ZOUD CLASSIFIED BY SPZAUM SUBJECT: DECLASSIFY ON: 25X / Pur e 14 testes dutan 5-13 (00:WFO) per 65-68530-490 APÉTOPRIAT D PIEES C 2 FEC-28 Bureau New York (105-65721) (Rid) 12 JUL 23 1969 TIFO **(**6) Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



also advised that orked under a Chief of a branch of the 16th Department which had responsibility for security within the Committee on Atomic Energy. Sheaded up a group of Second Chief Directorate people sent to Cuba "toward the end of 1961" as advisors to afford instruction, guidance and assistance to Cubans in organizing effective Cuban Counterintelligence Security Service. A/(u)

NYO is requested to attempt to identify the members of the Soviet group which attended the Sat Kingston, New York in 1960 and also visited the Brookhaven National Laboratory so that WFO can ascertain through liaison with CIA if any members of this group travelled to Vienna, Austria in 1961. WFO also will display to "SANDAY" names and photographs of members of this group for his comments.

It appears clear that the 16th Department, SCD, KGB did not operate against the American Embassy in Moscow. It is possible that in their work against black market operators in Moscow, the 16th Department could become aware of American Embassy personnel engaged in black market activities; however, any recruitments of such personnel would be handled by the 1st (American) Department, SCD, KGB and the Chief and Deputy Chief of the 1st (American Embassy) Section, 1st Department, SCD, KGB would be aware of such operations. "SAMMY" was Deputy Chief of the 1st Section in 1960-1961. NYO is requested to submit its comments concerning whether or not ld (d sufficiently knowledgeable of the functions and operations of the various departments of the SCD to have recognized this apparent discrepancy in information furnished to him by

*b*2

Page 14 of Wairtel 6/18/62 states pip said he was awarded the equivalent of one month; s pay in connection with his work in a supervisory capacity in the 16th Department of the group within the 16th Department which developed three Americans among American Embassy personnel. One of the three Americans helped personnel of the SCD get into





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WFO /\$(U)

safe in the United States Embassy to photograph various documents contained therein. The last of the three was developed in about 1960; the other two had been developed at some earlier time. All three were males and all three were civilians. Solid not say what type of work these Americans did, but it was impression they had "small jobs" rather than high positions (U)

From interviews of "SAMMY" it appears obvious personnel of the 1st Section, 1st Department, SCD, KGB, and certainly the Deputy Chief of the 1st Section, would have to be aware of such recruitments

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES *'VERNMENT'* Memorandum: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: 7/23/69 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. SUBJECT ReWFOlet 7/18/69. Enclosed for WFQ_under cover of this letter are cards constituting the letters. Also enclosed arecards for latters Upon completion of processing by the WFO, it is requested that the enclosed cards be returned to the NYO. 2 - Bureau (RM) 3 - Washington Field (1 - With Package)(RM) 1 - New York FEB 04 2000 JRN: jn CLASSIFIED BY SPZALM HA PECLASSIFY ON: 25X / PUR CIA WHEN OWED 5 13-49 (05-68530-

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1882 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES **VERNMENT** ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT lemorandum WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) TO DATE: 7/25/69 FROM SAC, WFO SUBJECT: ESP = (00:WFO) b70 ReWFOlet dated 7/23/69. concerning Sand requesting the New York Office to identify the bl On 7/24/69, BRUCE SOLIE, CIA, advised The attention of the New York Office is directed to file captioned XS NYfile YS)(WFOfile indicates that Oporn 10/8/20, Moscow, described as Senior Engineer, State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy, USSR Council of Ministers, was with this group which was to attend the International Conference on High Energy Physics at Rochester, New York, 8/25 - 9/1/60; will visit Columbia Burea OPEN 105-65 New (RM) (1 ST-113 WFO (1 JPW:sls (8)U.S. Savings Bonds Regulary on the Payroll Savings Plan



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Nevis Laboratory, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 9/2/60; Princeton University, 9/3/60; New York City, 9/4 - 5/60; Harvard University, 9/6/60; Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, New York, 9/7 - 8/60; and depart for Russia 9/9/60.

wfo will display photographs of captioned group as well as a photograph of "SAMMY" for his comments (4)

It would appear that may have confused in connection with the 1960 visit to

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lemorandum TO [7/24/69]X/2(4) DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: FROM SAC, WFO ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED SUBJECT: HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. (00:WFO) Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau and two the information of New York of an LHM captioned Speporting information furnished by "SAMMY (X) The enclosed LHM is classified "Se ret" since it contains information from CIA so classified. The sources in the LHM are CIA who was interviewed by SAs on 6/18/69/V REC- 60 CLASSIFIED BY SPEAKING 5-68530-493 JUL 25 196 Bureau (Encs. ew York (105363720 18005 2) (Info) (RM) Oce LHM JPW:sls X Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Psyroll Savings Plan

MAY 1882 EDITICE:
GSA FPIGR (41 GFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES (

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
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

July 24, 1969 (4)

STORET PET



The Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, New York, reported that Carrived in the United States at New York, New York, on April 21, 1969.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of privative in the FEL. It is the property of the FEL it is the property of the FEL and is bound to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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
MAY 1962 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES **VERNMENT** INFORMATION CONTAINED LIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ERE SHOWN OTHERWISE TO Director DATE: July 24, 1969 Federal Bureau of Investigation Frank E. Bartos, Chief Intelligence Officer (4)
Immigration and Naturalization Service FROM SUBJECT Attention: Mr. Rose VIA LIAISON


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MemorandumDIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) TO DATE: 7/31/69 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE (OO:NY) Enclosed are 5 copies for Bureau and 1 for information of NYO of LHM dated 7/30/69 captioned Steporting information from "SAMMY". The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" since CIA has requested that information from "SAMMY" be so classified. The source in the LHM is "SAMMY" who was interviewed by SAs on 7/29/6 9. "SAMIY" prepared a typewritten report set forth in the LHM voluntarily and without direction of interviewing agents after the article attached to the LHM refreshed his memory concerning 2 - Bureau (English... 1) (Info) (RM) 1 - 1FO REC-52 6 5 - 6 8 5 30 -**5** AUG 1 1969 CLASSIFIED BY STALL **DECLASSIFY ON: 25X** UR UNKLAN autaD 1969Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan DIE

UNITED STATES

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SUNDAY, JULY

In Recent Years the System has Betrayed Signs of Strain in a Notorious Series of Currency Cris

A Quarter Centur Appraisal

(Following are excerpts of an address, "Bretton Woods, Twenty-Five Years After," delivered last month by International Monetary Fund Managing Director Pierre Paul Schweitzer, at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario.)

By Pierre-Paul Schweitzer

Like most revolutions, the movement which culminated at Bretton Woods in July, 1944, was the product of its time. Three main considerations motivated the pioneers of that movement. These were, first a realization that, as a result of the War, the international economy had been violently disrupted; secondly, a fear that after the War the vicious cycle of boom and slump would be repeated; and, thirdly, a recognition that to cope with these problems much greater international ecoperation would be necessary than had prevailed before 1939.

How severely the War was breaking up the established economic relationships became increasingly clear as it went on. By 1944 the signs were unmistakable. Only the United States and Canada among the major trading nations of the prewar world showed promise of emerging with little economic hurt. Continental Europe was a scene of widespread devastation. Japan too was crumbling; and the United Kingdom had spent practically all its reserves and run up massive deuts to pay for essential imports. Despice the relief afford by Lend-Lesse, World War II had carried much further the transference of economic power-across the Atlantic.

There was a common fear that, as after World War I, a brief boom would be followed by a disastrous slump. By 1920 wholesale prices in most European countries were more than three times as high as they had been in 1913. Within the next two years these prices had fallen by 50 per cent. Not until 1925 had world trade surpassed its prewar level, and only a few precarious years of prosperity supervened before the onset of the Great Depression.

Stable Employment

Partly as a result of this disaster, governments in the thirties were beginning to place a high and stable level of employment in the forefront of their policy aims. The first effects of this preoccupation, however, had been to stimulate economic nationalism. Competition for exports had led to chaos in the exchanges, as country after country devalued in the hope of undercutting its neighbors. The paraphernalia of exchange restrictions, multiple rates and fivetuating currencies proliferated. It may be claimed that these devices served as a support for domestic recovery programs, but a high price was paid in terms of uncertainty and international disruption.

Little had been done by way of cooperation to repair the fragmentation of the world economy. The most ambitious attempt was the Tripartite Agreement in 1936, which was prompted by the devaluation of the French franc and sought to concert among its members safeguards against the effects of any further devaluations. But it had no means of enforcement and no separate organization to give it permanence; and it was of little consequence.

So it was that the countries that came together in 1942 and 1943 to prepare the way for Bretton Woods brought to their discussions a common determination to adopt a code of financial conduct in the international sphere which would outlaw competitive depreciation of exchange rates, a common recognition that international financial assistance would be needed to assist countries to abide by this code, and a readiness to relinquish some part of national authority in the interests of the international community as a whole.

Embodiment of Principles 4.

The International Monetary Fund was created as the embodiment of these principles. We may now look back across twenty-five years to appraise the handiwork of its founders and to see what lessons interceing experience holds for the future conduct of international monetary manage-

ment. If I dwell rather on the weaknesses associated with the system created at Bretton Woods, I do not mean to disparage its achievements, which are recognizably outstanding.

The dream of Bretton Woods—or, as many cynics were to say for more than a decade after the conference, the illusion of Bretton Woods—was the unrestricted convertibility for current transactions of at least the major currencies. This became a reality some ten years ago and in many cases was extended also to capital transfers. The real output of the membership of the Fund, their trade in goods and services, and the flow of investment capital among them have expanded beyond all expectations and with barely any interruption.

The achievements of the system and of the related revolution in national policies have changed our whole way of describing the economic climate. We talk much less of the business cycle, much more of rates of growth in real income. Insofar as the economies of



member countries are still subject to cyclical phenomena, we no longer describe these in the terms used 30 years ago—"prosperity and depression." The problems have been transposed to a different key and we speak now of "overheating" and—occasionally—"recession."

Yet in recent years the system has betrayed signs of strain in a notorious series of currency crises. Less spectacular but more ominous have been the introduction in some cases of restrictions on current transactions, the tinkering with border taxes, the reimposition or tightening of capital controls and the sluggish growth of aid. These developments have given rise to a keen debate on the adequacy of the system established a generation ago. As I said, I propose tonight to concentrate on those aspects of the system where performance has been less satisfactory. In that context, I shall deal first with exchange rates, secondly with the adjustment process, and thirdly with the provision of adequate reserves.

The current controversy has centered chiefly on the exchange rate regime. It has been seriously questioned whether the par value system is not unduly rigid and outmoded in the present world. This system was intended to provide a stable environment which, by encouraging commercial inter-change, would stimulate the growth and sharpen the efficiency of the world economy and its constituent parts. Stability, as the Fund has stressed in the past, does not mean rigidity. Specific provision was written mio the Articles of Agreement for changes in par values; and where countries-in deficit or suplus-can no longer maintain broad equilibrium over time in their external payments without having to incur undue unemployment or price inflation, it is wholly proper that this provision should be used.

Yet in some Instances, despite the existence of this provision, exchange rates that had ceased to be appropriate have been maintained. And this has contributed to the persistence of payments disequilibria, the encouragement of speculation and crises in the exchange markets. Moreover, the rigidity of exchange rates in this sense has aometimes led to corrective measures of a kind that deny the very purposes which the par value system seeks to promote.

It is also true that the present framework differs in at least one important aspect from the world envisaged when the Articles of the Fund were agreed. The drafters were well aware that a country might have to alter its exchange rate in response to relative changes in its real economic position.

Eut they did not envisage that a country would have to be so much concerned about the public's changing views on the strength of its currency. Speculative capital movements were to be suppressed rather than financed; indeed, limitations were put on members' access to the Fund to finance capital outflows. While the liberalization of payments for capital transactions has been a major factor in bringing about an integrated world economy, it has also greatly increased the possibility of sudden pressures on exchange raies, notably when underlying economic developments gives reason to suppose that an adjustment would be appropriate.

New Flexibility

The strains thus experienced by the system have led to suggestions that it might function better if there were more room for exchange rates to change. Various possibilities have been advocated for various kinds of flexibility intended either to facilitate adjustment in the basic balance of payments or to provide more incentive for equilibrating speculation or to combine these two objectives in some degree.

These suggestions deserve careful study in the full context of the achievements of the present system, of its weaknesses to be sure, but also of the grave disturbances of which the drafters at Bretton Woods still had the most immediate and vivid recollections. It is true that the world's financial system has been badly rocked in the last few years; and it would be foolish to minimize these disturbances. But it is also true that they have been overwhelmingly financial, not economic, in kind.

It seems to me that the essential characteristics of the par value system remain valid now as they were twenty-five years ago. Stability of exchange rates has made a key contribution to the balanced expansion of the world economy. The major advance toward international cooperation in the economic field that was achieved at Bretton Woods was that the rate of exchange for each currency was made a matter of international concern.

It is only by bringing exchange rates under international jurisdiction that the risk of competitive depreciation and other forms of currency watfare can be avoided. It is true that since the end of the War this risk has not manifested itself as a serious one; but this experience at least partly reflects the success of the Bretion Woods system and in no wise justifies dismantling the protection provided by the Articles of the Fund.

Anarchic Practices

In this connection I should like make one very general point. Gover ments have in the postwar period it creasingly accepted responsibility fo the performance of their nation: economies in terms of employmen output, price stability and other majo economic variables. The rate of e: change has a major impact on all thes aspects and is bound to be political! sensitive. In my view, it is therefor unrealistic to suppose that govern ments would be prepared to accept a ternative regimes that would put th rate of exchange at the mercy of mai ket forces alone. Almost certainly rates would continue to be manager and common rules would have to b agreed to forestall any possibility of :

reversion to anarchic practices. It is a least open to doubt, however, whethe generally acceptable criteria could b worked out in this area.

I believe that any case for chang must be convincingly made in light o the interrelated aims—growth and sta bility—which any system should serve

Although I have so far dwelt almos exclusively on exchange rates, it would of course be wrong to consider this matter in isolation. Changes in exchange rates are one element in the broader mechanism that has come to be called the adjustment process. In certain circumstances rate changes are an indispensable condition for the correction of economic maladjustment but even so they are part only of what must be a concerted attack on that problem.

The Fund is very much concerned with the adjustment process as Article I makes plain. One of the purposes of the Fund, in accordance with its other objectives is ". . .to shorten the dura tion and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members." It is inevita ble that countries should from time to time develop deficits or surpluses in their external payments; and it is im portant for the member concerne and, in the case of the main tradin countries, for the system as a whole that these should be contained and co rected within a reasonable period time and in a manner consistent wit the other objectives of the Fund. Unfdrtunately members' imbalances ha not always been notable for the bre ity of their duration or the modesty

See BRETTON, H2, Col. 1.

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IMF Was a Product of Its Time

BRETTON, From H1

their size. The long-standing deficits of the United States and the United Kingdom and the surpluses of some continental European nations are serious cases in point.

Against this background some commentators have argued that the international community should formulate and adopt uniform rules for financial policy to introduce an element of automaticity into the adjustment process. That approach tends to underrate the complexities of this world. In seeking to achieve simultaneously a variety of economic objectives of differing degree of compatibility, countries need leeway to apply that combination of policies which is best calculated to overcome their particular difficulties and takes account also of the range of instruments at their disposal.

A mechanistic formula, even if it were operationaly feasible or politically acceptable, would inhibit this flexibility of response. At the same time there can be no question that, in the pursuit of their domestic objectives, countries should give adequate weight to the evolution of their external payments. This means that countries should be prepared to coordinate and temper their economic policies in light of the implications that these have for other countries and the world economy.

Fruitful Interchange

The responsibilities of surplus and deficit countries in the adjustment process have been extensively discussed in the Fund and in Working Party 3 of the OECD. This interchange has been fruitful in identifying problems of common concern and in increasing understanding as to appropriate responses. Having said this, I am bound to add that there remains a gap between understanding and practice. This stems partly from imperfections in economic diagnosis and forecasting. At the same time the tools for implementing policy are often cumbersome to use and lacking in precision when applied.

Yet, after due allowance is made for such difficulties, there remains a basic problem which is political in nature which has not infrequently impeded prompt and appropriate action. It consists broadly in a reluctance to dampen down excessive aggregate demand until the inflationary process has caused substantial damage; and also in an unwillingness to make necessary adjustments in exchange rates not simply for reasons of national

prestige but also because this is no easy option in terms of its effect on the real income of particular sectors of the community.

It is not readily apparent to me how this problem, in light of its nature, can be resolved simply by changing the monetary system. To the extent that political will is engaged, it seems necessary that countries should accept. that timely action is in their own selfinterest in all but the very shortest term. It may be that this is being, or will become, more widely recognized as a result of experience over the last several years. If the chaos of the 'thirties could be followed by the incomparably more responsible approach of the postwar period, I am inclined to believe that the improvement can be carried further.

New Encouragement

It is possible to take encouragement from the fact that countries have made and are making the effort to adjust. The two major deficit countries of past year, the United States and the United Kingdom, have shown much determination in this respect. To improve the severe imbalance in the system, however, persistent action on their part will be necessary for some long while ahead. At the same time the policy reactions of a wide range of other countries will be hardly less important. As the United States and the United Kingdom move into surplus, the payments positions of many other countries will become less easy.

This expectation has been confirmed by developments in the first quarter of 1969. During this period the United States, although in record deficit on the liquidity basis, had a large surplus on official settlements account; and the United Kingdom also was running a moderate over-all surplus. This situation had an immediate impact on the payments and reserve positions of a number of industrial countries and began to provoke certain defensive reactions.

These recent developments underline an essential requirement of the international monetary system which, though understood by some at Bretton Woods, was not provided for in the structure that emerged. This is the need for a continuing accrual over the longer run of global reserves in a quantity sufficient to permit countries that conduct their international transactions in a responsible fashion to increase their reserves adequately as those transactions expand.

This need was satisfied in the earlier years of the system created at Bretton bricant of that system.

Woods, although it would perhaps be too generous to say that its architects had clearly foreseen how this aspect would work. The increase in reserves during the 'fifties through the early 'sixties was not statistically very large. The annual rate of growth was about 21/2 per cent as against an increase of trade in the order of 6 cr 7 per cent a year. The main explanation for the fact that reserve growth was nevertheless adequate is found in the massive redistribution of reserves that took place during the period.

Decline in Stock

The United States especially, and a number of developing countries, that had ended the War with very large accumulated reserves could well afford an absolute decline in their stock. The small amount held by foreign countries in the form of claims on the United States could readily be expanded without hasitation on the parti of debtor or creditor. These adjust-ments together with accruals of newly mined gold permitted the combined reserves of countries outside the United States to grow roughly in proportion to the expansion of their trade. In these circumstances countries were able to sustain that rapid expansion, to liberalize current and-in many cases -capital transactions and to devote resorces to assisting developing coun-

The process of reserve growth that I have just outlined ceased to function some five years ago. Such reserve growth as there has been since thenand it has been small—has been in the form of monetized credits to countries in balance of payments deficit. It is clear that this is no basis for the longrun growth of world reserves.

Fortunately the imagination which twenty-five years ago produced the Articles of Agreement of the Fund has not been wanting in recent years. The proposed Amendment to the Articles provides a constructive solution to the need for deliberate reserve creation that is now materializing as the traditional process ceases to function. The discussions and negotiations that preced agreement on the special drawing rights facility were protracted and by no means easy. Nevertheless, I think that we can take some satisfaction in the fact that a procedure has been worked out and will soon be available to meet an emerging defect of the system, without the world economy having had to provide the proof, through large-scale misery and dislocation, that adequate reserves are the required lu-




Photo Courtesy of E. M. Bernstein

BRETTON WOODS—There was hope 25 years ago that the Russians would join in the post-war international financial organizations. The picture above shows the delegations of the United States and Soviet Union. Among the participants were, in back row, from left, Edward M.

Bernstein; third man, Dean Acheson; fifth, Harry Dexter White; and scated third from left Fred M. Vinson; fourth, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau; fifth, Soviet delegation leader, M. S. Stepanov, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade.

SECALI

SIV



By Ed Huffman...The World Bank

IMF RECEPTION—Dean Acheson, left, a veteran of the Bretton Woods, N.H. Conference which set up the International Monetary Fund 25 years ago, and who as Undersecretary of State is credited with helping secure Congressional approval for it, chats with Robert S. McNamara, present World Bank head, at a reception and dinner Friday night at Bank and IMF headquarters, Washington. Hosts were McNamara and Pictre-Paul Schweitzer, IMF managing director. More than 40 veterans of the conference attended, including Edward M. Bernstein, Sir Redderes Opie, Emilio G. Collado, Wynn Plumtree and Guillermo Seville-Sacasa, dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

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OFTIGNAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1862 EDITION SSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.8 UNITED STATES VERNMENT 1 emorandumTO DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE Per (Cu:WFC) about Enclosed are 6 copies for Bureau and 2 for NYO of LHM captioned Deporting interview LZWW. The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" since CIA has requested that information from "SAMAY" be so classified. The source is "SAMAY" who was interviewed by SAs on 7/25/69. (4) **bic** Bureau (Enc. 6) New York (105-65721)(Enc.2)(RM) Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regula un cushettu detas



TMENT OF JUSTICE UNITED STATES DE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535 July 30,1969

reliable information in the past, was shown the names and

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UIL . SAINED EXCEPT

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On July 25, 1969, a confidential source, a former officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) whose bona fides has not been established but who has furnished

photographs/


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concerning the following individuals:

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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

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recommendations nor conclusions of the FEI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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UNITED STATES (**VERNMENT** 8/1/69 : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) (4) **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. SUBJECT (00:WFO) ReWFOlet 7/30/69. Enclosed under cover of this letter is a box containing cards constituting the letters An the NYO. Also anclosed are cards from letter Upon the completion of precessing of the cards, WFO is requested to return them to the NYO 2.- Bureau (RM) 3 - Washington Field (1 - with Package) (RM) 1 - New York JRN: jrn FEB 0 4 2000 CLASSIFIED BY SPACE AND FIL SLIP (-

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TO

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1862 EDITION GEA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES ${\it 1} emorandum$ DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) 8/4/69 DATE: SAC, NEW YORK ((105-65721) **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT SUBJECT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. (00:WFO) ReWFOlet dated 7/24/69 enclosing LHM entitled containing information furnished by "SAMMY" WFO's attention is called to WFO file Kentitled IJIS - R", which file lists one arrived in NYC on 9/1/59 and departed on 9/14/59 If it has not already done so, WFO is requested to exhibit the photograph of "SAMMY" for possible identification as 65-68530- 4/99 Bure WFO 1 - New York JRN: jrn APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AD"ITA I

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan


MAY ISR EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES OVERNMENT emorandum TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: 8/5/69 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED FY FROM SAC, WFO WHERE SHOWN OTHER SUBJECT (00:WFO) ReWFOlet dated 7/1/69 Interviews with YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO by Agents of WFO have continued as indicated below. On 6/30/69, the following cases were discussed Although some additional information was obtained concerning these cases, no particularly significant data was Photographs of In addition, photographs Pere displayed to him and he made identifications of officers. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES On 7/9/69, the following cases were discussed Bureau New York (65-657∠1) (RM) - WFO ETT:sls Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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WFO (4) 670 SEL

In addition, NOSENKO, in the presence of Mr. BRUCE SOLIE, the CIA officer who has sat in on most of the interviews by WFO Agents, volunteered his services to the Bureau. He explained that he is not fond of desk work and always wanted "action." He stated that he felt that he met people easily and could quickly assess and evaluate people. While assigned to the KGB, he was active in operations contacting sources and informants and directing activities. Even when he became a Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of Department, he actively participated in operations. He stated that due to his past experience and his background, he felt certain that he could be of use to the Bureau, particularly in the field of assessing and evaluating people. He suggested that the Bureau may have a special interest in Soviets assigned to this country or might be able to use him against subjects of Russian background or







to assess sources concerning whom the Bureau may have some doubts as to their bona fides. He emphasized that he would follow instructions explicitly and would take no independent action.

In response to questions NOSENKO stated that in his opinion the KGB, during the first two or three years after his defection, would have desired to liquidate him but thereafter his liquidation would operate to the detriment of KGB. He also was of the opinion that things are changing in the Soviet Union which would reduce the possibility of KGB desires to liquidate him. He also was of the opinion that KGB would not make any attempt to recruit him for operational activity within the United States although he considers this a possibility. He stated that he had no fear of making contact with Soviet officials assigned to or visiting this country to assess them or to make recruitment pitches to them. He emphasized that he would be completely at the disposal of the Bureau and would carry out any action desired of him.

NOSENKO was thanked for his offer of cooperation and advised his offer would be given serious consideration. WFO will discuss this matter with Mr. BRUCE SOLIE and will subsequently submit recommendations to the Bureau. $\mathfrak{S}(\mathcal{G})$

MAY 1982 EDITION GEA FFMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES VERNMENT DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) DATE: 8/5/69 **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. (UO: WFO) ReNYlet 8/1/69 enclosing cards constituting letters Enclosed under cover of this letter is a box containing referenced cards, which have been processed by WFO. Upon receipt of the enclosed cards, NYO is requested to forward additional cards for processing by WFO. 2 -Bureau (RM) CLASSIFIED BY 3 -New York [(105-65721) (1 - with Package)(RFI) DECLASSIFY ON: 25 PURCUA Tether do 1 - WFO Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1962 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CPR) 101-11.8 UNITED STATES VERNMENT DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) TO 8/8/69 DATE: SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. SUBJECT FEB 05 2000 (00:WFO) ReWFOlet 8/5/69. Enclosed under cover of this letter are cards presenting the letter MAIso enclosed are cards representing Upon completion of the processing of these cards by the WFO, it is requested that they be returned to the NYO - Bureau (RM) - Washington Field (1 - with package) (RM) 1 - New York JRN: jrn APPROPRIA AND FIELD ADVIS EX 104 REC-50 14 AUG 11 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1962 EDITION GEA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES *YERNMENT* MemorandumDIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) 8/12/69 b2 67D **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** SAC, MFO HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. (OU:WFU) RelYlet 8/8/69 enclosing cards constituting the letters Enclosed under cover of this letter are referenced cards, which have been processed by WFO. Upon receipt of enclosed cards, NYO is requested to forward additional cards to WFO for processing. FEB 0 5 2000 2 - Bureau (Rid) CLASSIFIED BY STACK 3 - New York (65-68530)(RM) DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1-with package)(Rif) 14R CIA Hether dates 1 - WFO JPW: iw APPROPRIATE ACTIONES AND FIF ADVIE SLIP 12 AUG 13 1969

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Enclosure

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CIA CIA

Photographs of other Soviet nationals with similar first and middle names were shown to but he stated they were not identical with and reiterated that told him he had been in the US in 1960

Concerning the US in 1960 with a gollowed essentially the same schedule here as stated he had observed the did, it is noted that stated he had observed that son two occasions and that shad said was

described the function of the 16th Department, SCD, as having the responsibility for providing security within the Committee on Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union and, on another occasion, stated the 16th Department, SCD, had the responsibility for working against the members of the diplomatic corps of foreign countries who were stationed in Moscow. This apparent discrepancy was not further explored with

Regarding the recruitment of the three American Embassy employees, fold that he had personally been rewarded, as a result of these accomplishments, in his supervisory position in the 16th Department.

This situation poses several possibilities:

1. Either "SAMMY" or the list mistaken as to the number of the Department having security responsibilities for the Soviet atomic energy program in 1960. In this regard, the NYO feels that certainly "SAMMY" has first-hand knowledge and it is possible that may have inadvertently recalled telling him that he, was with the 16th Department instead of the 12th Department. knew very little concerning the organizational set-up and division of responsibilities within the SCD and if the discrepancy involved the personal knowledge of as opposed to that of "SAMMY", the NYO would have to go along with "SAMMY".

S in 1960, en several e for reasons known

as he claims, under another name. There have been several instances of the Soviets utilizing this technique for reasons known only to them. This point could be resolved very easily, if were available for contact, by exhibiting the photograph of the pertinent visiting

help in this regard as neither accordingly, we face an impasse on this point insofar as and "SAMMY" are concerned.

3. may have falsely told that he had travelled to the US in 1960. This does not seem valid, nowever, as there is no logical reason for the US to do so even though it would be logical for someone with the seem valid the Soviet atomic energy program to make such a trip as did the Sin 1960 (4)

furnished to as suggested by Washington Field, particularly as to his receipt of an award for his part in the recruitment of the three Americans. Again, however, no logical purpose can be perceived for such action on spart

The NYO suggests as a possible solution to the question of putative travel to the US in 1960, that Washington Field compared protograph with those of the members of the visiting the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the members of the visiting the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that with those of the putative travel to the US in 1960, that will be putative travel to the



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UNITED STATES GC RNMENT MemorandumDATE: 8/21/69 TO DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) FROM SUBJECT: ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UI! LASSIFIED EXCEPT (00: WFO) WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. ReWF01et, 8/18/69. Enclosed under cover of this letter are constituting the letters Also enclosed are cards representing the letters Upon completion of the processing of these cards by WFO, it is requested they be returned to the NYO. FEB u 7 2000 CLASSIFIED BY SPZALM APPROPRIATE AGENCIES GECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 PER CIA MEHER CLATED 5-3-49. AND FIL ADVII 2 - Bureau (RM) - Washington Field (1 - with Package) (RM) 1 - New York REC-15 65-68530-//HIM JP/M AUG 22 1369 JRN:en (6) Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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Copy # 3 of 8

Operational Memo #N-307

22 August 1969

Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

File

1. Attached is a transcript of an interview with the Source on the afternoon of 22 August 1969. Participants in the inferview were the Source,

2. An original and seven copies have been made of this memorandum and attachment and are being given the same distribution as previous Operational Memoranda.

Bruce L. Solie


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