

Letter to SAC, WFO
RE: SABBY X(u)
65-68530 X(u)

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per
b3 CIA
S

New York and WFO should review carefully the information contained in CIA's letter of 10-21-66 and should set forth their observations as to the possible motivation behind

[REDACTED] (S) This approach might have been designed to ascertain the present whereabouts and status in the U. S. of Nosenko. Your comments as to the possible significance of the actions [REDACTED] should be set forth in a separate memorandum entitled "Sabby." X(u)

NOTE:

Yuri I. Nosenko is a Soviet defector whose bona fides have not been established. He is under the custody and control of CIA at the present time and has been undergoing interrogation by that Agency for a considerable period of time. CIA's letter of 10-21-66 reports an interesting approach [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) CIA has asked for any information in our files regarding these individuals and WFO is being instructed to prepare in form suitable for dissemination data previously secured by this Bureau from investigation conducted at the time of visit of one of the Soviet journalists, [REDACTED] to the U. S. in 1965. X(u) (S)

[REDACTED] (S) While it may be their approach is designed to support the bona fides of Nosenko, it may also well be that they are attempting to find out just where Nosenko is in this country and what his status is. X(u)

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

5 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

Per
CIA

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

50 USC Section 403

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

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65-15530-411 enclosure & NR document dtd 8-30-66

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DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] (S)

[9/12/66] (u)

SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] (S)

ESP-R
(OO: WFO) (S)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S) DATE
Classified 5/14/82

~~See attached memo
100-709-10341
WFO: JH: CDB~~

ReWFOlet, 8/26/64, and Bulet to
CIA, dated 8/16/66, captioned "SAMMY" with a copy
of CIA memo dated 8/5/66. (S)

b2
b7C
Per CIA

A review of pertinent serials in this case by the NYO and particularly the referenced communications presents a rather disconcerting picture. On the one hand you find a penetrating, thorough and logical analysis of the available facts in this case (WFO's LHM dated 6/22/66). On the other hand you have an attempt by CIA to distort certain statements made in that analysis not for the purpose of refuting or challenging the conclusions contained therein but for the purpose of rehashing the tedious, and in this case irrelevant, issue of SAMMY's bona fides (CIA memo 8/5/66). CIA's memo represents another desperate attempt by certain elements in that agency to grasp at any seemingly contradictory or inconsistent statements by the Bureau which may be construed, through tortured thinking, as support by the Bureau for the official view of CIA that SAMMY is a KGB plant and the center of a vast Soviet disinformation scheme. (S)

EXCEPT

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b2
b7D

- 3-Bureau (RM)
- (1-65-68530) (SAMMY) (S)
- 2-Washington Field (S)
- 1-New York (105-65721) (SAMMY) (S)
- 1-New York (S)

65-68530-

JRN:mjb
(7) (S)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259 [redacted] 1/1/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2+J
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9/12/86 (S)

NOT RECORDED
183 SEP 14 1966

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ACM/RC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SECRET per CIA ltr 2-11-99

[redacted] (S)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY SLIP(S)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

NY ~~██████████~~ (S)

Rebulet noted that "it is not profitable to speculate" on the accuracy of GOLITSYN's source in the KGB in regard to captioned matter. The NYO would extend this statement to include most of GOLITSYN's information and analysis furnished in the past two to two and one-half years. Without doubt, the whole question of SAMMY's bona fides and subsequent inclusion of all defectors since GOLITSYN (but excluding him) in a gigantic, incredible Soviet disinformation scheme, by CIA had its germ in GOLITSYN's original analysis of SAMMY as a KGB plant. (S)(u)

This again points up the necessity of being extremely discreet in any statements made to CIA in these matters. The NYO feels that it is useless to contend further with CIA re SAMMY on individual cases, as reason and logic cannot overcome an obsession. It would appear to be the wisest course to rely, as the Bureau has done, on the statement that we are not in a position at this time to draw any conclusions as to SAMMY's bona fides and recognize that it is possible that he could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur. (S)(u)

~~SECRET~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP
DATE

Classified 5/7/21/9

9/29/66

DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, NEW YORK

SECRET

[Redacted]

b1

ReBuairtel dated 9/2/66 and CIA letter dated 8/30/66 entitled [Redacted]

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and six copies of an LHM, dated as above captioned. Enclosed also are two photographs of [Redacted]

Enclosed for Washington Field, for their information, is a copy of the aforementioned LHM and one photograph of [Redacted]

The LHM is classified "Secret" in order to protect this informant.

b1
b3
s
Per
CIA

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

[Redacted]

It is requested, as noted above, that the Bureau furnish [Redacted] along with their copy of the enclosed LHM.

85-1044
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/br
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per CIA HR 2-11-99

- 3-Bureau (Encls. 9) (RM) (1-65-68530) (SAMMY)
- 1-Washington Field (1-105-65721) (SAMMY)
- 2-New York

(SAMMY) (Encls. 2) (INFO) (RM)

65-68530-

LFT:mgg (6)

ENCLOSURE

61 OCT 13 1966

SECRET NOT RECORDED
 CLASSIFIED 162 OCT 7 1966
 EXTENDED BY 1459 [Redacted]
 REASON FOR EXTENSION
 FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9/29/86

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP

Classified by 1977 [Redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN



~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

September 29, 1966 (w)

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

*See addendum
AD-709-10341
Classified
Declassify on: OADR*

[REDACTED] (S)

*b1 Pen
b3 CIA*

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum dated August 30, 1966 (OSCI) and to our memorandum dated June 23, 1966, captioned as above. (w)

[REDACTED] (S) on September 8, 1966, furnished the following information regarding [REDACTED] previously referred to as [REDACTED]

EXCEPT

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
EXTENSION: [REDACTED]
REASON FOR EXTENSION: [REDACTED]
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION: 9/25/86

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GROUP 1 (S)
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

*Page 1 of 1
derivative classification
CIA*

ENCLOSURE 65-68530-

85-1266
CLASSIFIED BY: SPJALM/ren
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Per CIA HR 2-1799

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)

Classification

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

Per

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

CIA

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

50 USC Section 403

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

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(b)(6)

(k)(7)

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The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

65-68530-NR dated 9/29/66 pgs. 2-3

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1 m/s per CIA
b-1 b-2

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

S R

(S)

For additional information regarding the Amtorg Trading Corporation, refer to the Appendix section of this memorandum. (S) (u)

[REDACTED]

(S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3 per
CIA

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) *

[Redacted]

(S) *

[Redacted]

(S) *

[Redacted]

(S)

Age
Height
Weight
Build
Hair

[Redacted]

(S) *

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX

b1
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Per
CIA

1.

AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION *AW*

Amtorg Trading Corporation, according to records of the New York County Clerk, is a New York corporation formed in 1924. It has acted since then as a buying and selling agency in the United States for most of the foreign trade associations of the USSR. Since 1949, it has been registered with the United States Department of Justice pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. *KC*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

85-1444 12-7-99
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/Re
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per CIA HR 2-11-99

4 NOV 1966
See appendix
Classified by 10-709-103x1
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT :

[REDACTED] (S) NY-941
Classified by SP2ALM/Re
Declassify on: OADR
per CIA HR 2-11-99

1. Reference is made to a report from your New York Field Office on an interview with [REDACTED] on 20 February 1964. This report was among the materials from your New York Field Office that were requested by us during meetings with representatives of your Bureau on 3 and 5 January 1965 and were passed to us by Mr. Papich on 25 January 1965.

2. [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(C) Rec by WFO for files re [REDACTED] & Summary - 12/14/66. (S)

b1 b3
Per CIA

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65-68530-

NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 16 1966

~~SECRET~~

52 NOV 18 1966
FINE 129
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A

3. At approximately 1300 hours on 4 February 1964, in Geneva, NOSENKO telephoned his CIA handlers and said that he was coming, "and would not return." On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 hours, NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Residency during the day and again in the evening. (He had met with his CIA handlers from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSENKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the disarmament conference, NOSENKO learned that a coded telegram had arrived from Moscow ordering him to return immediately to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on tourism. The Residency was therefore purchasing tickets and making other arrangements for NOSENKO to depart on the following day, 5 February. As a result, NOSENKO insisted that we move him out of Switzerland before 0930 hours on the following morning, when a car was scheduled to pick him up and his absence would be first noted. Consequently, we moved NOSENKO from Switzerland to Germany on the night of 4/5 February.

4. On 26 October 1966, in the course of questioning about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recalled him to Moscow. Unexpectedly, NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid that his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording (S)

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram concerning my recall was sent by Soviet authorities in Moscow, and, therefore, no such telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

5. The background to NOSENKO's story on 4 February 1964 concerning the recall telegram [redacted]

[redacted] On 23 January 1964, at his first meeting with his CIA contacts since arriving in Geneva, NOSENKO said that he intended to defect and that he would like to do so as soon as possible. Since the disarmament conference had several months to run, [this Agency wished to retain Subject in place for the duration of the conference as a reporting source. Therefore, while assuring Subject that we accepted his defection and would aid and assist him in his resettlement, his handling officers urged him to remain in place for at least three weeks. After it was explained to him that we wished to use him as a reporting source on the Soviet delegation and the KGB Residency in Geneva, and also to provide coverage on General GRIBANOV's forthcoming trip to Geneva enroute to Paris, NOSENKO agreed to our proposal. It soon became apparent, however, that NOSENKO did not want to remain in place but wished to defect as soon as possible. For every reason that we gave him for remaining, he gave counter argument. Thus, on 23 January he said that he did not think that he would be able to obtain anything useful on the Residency because now that his friend [redacted] was no longer there he did not have a source in the Residency who would confide in him. Subject was then told that specific plans for his defection had to be worked out in Washington, and that his chief handling officer had to fly to the United States to participate in the discussions. This took place from 25 to 29 January. On 30 January NOSENKO said that he had learned from the KGB Resident that "the Chairman of the KGB would not allow GRIBANOV to travel to Geneva or Paris but only to go to Vienna," and hence would not be coming at all. (GRIBANOV actually was in Paris from 7 to 10 February 1964.) On 30 January, as a deliberate delaying tactic, we proposed that NOSENKO assist us in an audio operation against the KGB Residency, involving microphone transmitters using carrier current. On the next day NOSENKO reported that he had accidentally overheard in the KGB Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator. This technically negated our scheme and appeared to eliminate further reasons for delaying the defection. Thanks to the intervention of a weekend, we were able to delay until Monday, 3 February, for the arrival of the CHEREPANOV papers which we had told him were enroute to Geneva by pouch and which we wanted him to review urgently. This was done on 1 February. At that point, NOSENKO and the handling officer had scheduled the defection for 8 February, a Saturday.

[redacted] the handling officers, sensing

~~SECRET~~

(S)
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 S
 Per
 CIA
 (S)

~~SECRET~~

4.

NOSENKO's urgent desire to get out, were anticipating some movement to advance the defection date

It was on the day after the review of the CHEREPANOV documents, 4 February, that NOSENKO arrived with the story of the recall telegram and his irrevocable decision not to return to the Soviet delegation.

(S)

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b7C
b7D
Per CIA

6.

[REDACTED]

(S)

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: James R. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI

[REDACTED]

1/2

1/2

~~SECRET~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) DATE

Class/Disc 5/12/82

~~SECRET~~

302, 114 [11/8/66]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

Date: 11/8/66

FROM: SA [redacted]

#342

b7c

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1

(S)

b2
b7D

ReNYairtel captioned [redacted] IS-R" and dated 11/3/66.

85-1444 12-7-99

CLASSIFIED BY *SP3BIM/TK*
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X *1/60*

Source [redacted]
Date of Contact [redacted]
Contacted By [redacted]

10/20/66
SAS [redacted]

SAC [redacted]

and

Characterized [redacted]

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

b2
b7D
b7C

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S)

Classification

Date 11/9/79 JFH/mt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1-NY
- 1-NY
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- 1-NY
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- 1-NY
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- 1-NY

1-Bu 65-68530 (YURI L. NOSENKO)

REF: lfm
(19)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *1259 JSP/TK*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2+3*
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *11/8/86*

65-68530

NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 21 1966

[61 NOV 23 1966]

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

REF ID: A66000

[REDACTED]

b1

~~SECRET~~

When incorporating information furnished by [REDACTED] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination. (u)

Certain information furnished by [REDACTED] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased. (S)

b2
b7D

When disseminating information received from [REDACTED] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively. (S)

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source. (S)

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position. (S)

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [REDACTED] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY. (S)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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Section 552a

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(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6)

(k)(7)

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65-68530 - NR dated 11/8/66 pg 3

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[REDACTED] (S)
X

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~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Informant then stated to interviewing personnel that he is "100% sure" that KGB does not have any such operation at this time. (S) (u)

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) ~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11/9/66

FROM : SAC, WFO [REDACTED] (S)

SUBJECT: [SAMMY] (S)
ESP - R
[OO:WFO] (S)

b2
b7D
See memorandum
Classified by 90-709-103 x1
Declassify on: OADR

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)
DATE 11/9/66

ReBulet, 11/2/66, and CIA memo to Director, 10/21/66

Enclosed herewith are five copies for Bureau, one for New York, of LHM, dated and captioned as above. The LHM has been classified "Secret" since it contains excerpts from referenced CIA document which is so classified. (S)

b1 Per CIA
b3

The WFO indices contain no references indicating [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] are officers of KGB. As suggested in the enclosed LHM, it must be presumed the [REDACTED] hence, one or both of them are, at the very least, trusted agents of that organization. (S)

Separate LHM will be submitted concerning the [REDACTED] as requested in reBulet. (S)

b1

85-1444 12-7-99
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ew
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per CIARK 2-11-99

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)
DATE 11/9/66

ENCLOSURE

ST-107

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
- 1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 2 - WFO [REDACTED] (S)

REC-42 65-68530-412

100 of list (5)
MAT: smm
[Handwritten notes]

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 11/9/86

12 NOV 10 1966

SOVIET SECTION



5010-108

70 DEC 5 1966

~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
November 9, 1966

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 10-709/103X1
Declassify on: OADR
See addendum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

This communication is based upon memorandum of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), dated October 21, 1966
(CSCI- [redacted], which advised that [redacted]

Per CIA

[redacted] concerning Yuri Ivanovich
Nosenko, former Soviet intelligence officer who defected on
February 4, 1964, at Geneva, Switzerland. *19*

The observations set forth hereafter are submitted
for possible assistance in ascertaining the [redacted]

b1

[redacted] is an unusual evolution and
a further departure in this case from previous Soviet reactions
to KGB defections; however, [redacted]

It could be accom-
plished only with the approval of the Soviet authorities,
probably at very high level, including appropriate officials
of the [redacted]

where?

b1

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259/30p/cw 11/2/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION 243
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 11/9/84
page 1 para 1-2
derivatives classified via

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF *Classification*
DATE 1/9/79 *JSP*

ENCLOSURE

65-68530

41-285-1444 12-7-99
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/R
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
per CIA Hr 2-11-99

[SAMMY] (u)

~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted] in addition to the department where Nosenko was last employed (S) (u)

In seeking [redacted] (S) the possible interests of the various arms of that service have been considered, and several possibilities are offered hereafter as follows: (u)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) (u)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

5. [redacted] (S) (u)

6. [redacted] (S) (u)


b1
b3
S
Per
CH

b1

~~SECRET~~

[SANDY] (u)

b1



⑤ Apropos of the above paragraph, a fairly obvious motive is seen in the Soviet effort to create a channel for disinformation and propaganda. It is believed powerful forces are at work in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leaders do not always understand the changes and trends; hence, errors are committed. Likewise, it appears possible some of the recent defectors are not completely sure why they are rebelling against the KGB and the Soviet order. It does appear the Soviet leadership feels a growing need to inform their people and win their support through persuasion rather than force. (u)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. (u)



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 5/12/92

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [(65-68530)]/18

DATE: 11/14/66

FROM : SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
b2
b7D

SUBJECT: (SAMMY) (u)
ESP - R (u)
(OO: WFO) (u)

~~Classification 190-70-103x1~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification

DATE 11/19/92

ReBulet 11/2/66, and CIA memo to Director 10/21/66. (u)

Enclosed herewith are five copies for Bureau, one for New York, of LHM dated as above and captioned [REDACTED]

The LHM has been classified "Secret," as instructed in ReBulet [REDACTED]

The confidential source mentioned throughout the LHM is [REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] correspondent who first advised concerning the [REDACTED]

is [REDACTED] who is also mentioned in the LHM. (u)

The official of [REDACTED] who later informed about the [REDACTED]

City, who is also the superior of [REDACTED] New York. (u)

[REDACTED] was interviewed 6/9/66 by [REDACTED]

DEC 07 1990
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/RLW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1159 JSP/CD-11/29
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 11/14/86

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5) ENCLOSURE
- 1 - New York [(105-65721)] (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 2 - WFO

cc to CIA by LHM
12-2-66
Class (u)

MAT: smm (5) (u) b1

REC-3
EX-113

15-68530-413

NOV 15 1966

1cc kept by [REDACTED] Letter + [REDACTED] (u)

7 DEC 6 1966

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET [REDACTED]



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 14, 1966

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

See addendum
Classified by 198 209-10321
Declassify on: OADR

[REDACTED]

The information set forth hereinafter is a sum-
marization of the visit to this country in con-
nection with the visit of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was scheduled to join the sponsored group, but
did not appear. (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It was ascertained on November 25, 1964, from the
Soviet and Eastern European Exchange Staff, United States
Department of State (SEES), that [REDACTED] would not visit
the United States at this time; however, the group would be
accompanied by [REDACTED]
speaks Russian fluently. It was anticipated the [REDACTED] group
would arrive November 25, 1965, at New York City. As it
developed, the visit planned for November/December, 1964, did
not materialize and was postponed until arrival in New York City,
1965, at New York City. The group consisted of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 1359 SP2/CD 11/2/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 11/14/80

DEC 07 1999
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per CIAHR 2-11-99; 10-14-99

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification

DATE 11/9/79 JSP/ltt

Confidential

~~SECRET~~

b1

b7c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Confidential~~

[REDACTED]

(S) It departed March 18, 1965 from New York City with destination Paris, France. (S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~Confidential~~

XXXXXX
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

- Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

_____ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

_____ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

_____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
65-68530-413 pg. 3 of enclosure

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X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(S)(U)

~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

On March 5, 1965, it was learned from the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, USDS, that the above group would depart Florida March 7, 1965 and fly to Los Angeles, California, where they would meet [REDACTED] photographer, and thereafter visit movie studios and sightsee the Los Angeles area until March 8, 1965. [REDACTED] employee from the New York office [REDACTED] planned to join the group and show the Soviet guests through Carmel and San Francisco, California, and return to New York City on March 14, 1965. (S)(U)

b7c

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)(U)

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

[REDACTED]

(S) Confidential

~~SECRET~~

Source stated they spent about five days in Miami, during which time they attended several parties, one given by the "Miami Herald." They also attended a class on [REDACTED] at the University of Miami where the [REDACTED] a friend of the source. Problems in the field of [REDACTED] were discussed back and forth with the students. (S) (u)

Source advised at one of the parties they attended in Miami, they encountered a White Russian who operates a book store in South Miami, on Sunset Road, near the main shopping center. [REDACTED] were both greatly interested in this individual. (S) (u)

[REDACTED]

b1

Source advised both Soviets indicated they had been shown all the best sights in the United States and had not been shown the darker side, such as slums and so forth, and they expressed desire to see some lower class areas. Source advised his parents live in what is considered a low income group housing area at [REDACTED] Florida, and he took [REDACTED] there. (S) They were amazed at the level of living of the people in this so-called low class area. (S) (u)

b7c

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
Confidential
- 5 -

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

65-68530-412 pg 6 of enclosure

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X Deleted Page(s) X
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XXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Conf. News

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED]

(S) It was source's opinion it is unlikely other news media and publications have paid Soviets in Moscow or elsewhere for services performed by secret arrangements such as described hereinbefore and not otherwise known to their superiors. Source had no idea regarding future contacts with [REDACTED] and stated they may meet soon again or perhaps never. (S) (u)

[REDACTED]

(S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(S) Confidential

The White Russian mentioned above who operated a book store in South Miami was identified as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

place not known.

[REDACTED] he was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]

(S) (u)

[REDACTED] upon interview June 9, 1966, advised he was born [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] and is a citizen of the United States by naturalization. He was inducted into the United States Army in September, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) (u)

b7c

[REDACTED] speaks several languages fluently, including English, Russian, Yiddish and Spanish. He started the [REDACTED] in 1949 as a small book store and the business flourished in the South Florida area.

[REDACTED] advised when time has permitted, he has acted [REDACTED]

(S) (u)

[REDACTED] stated in March or April, 1965, [REDACTED] a social acquaintance and wife of a local builder, asked him if he would be interested in attending a social function at which the guests of honor would be two Soviet photographers. [REDACTED] explained the Soviets speak very little English and she was extending the invitation to make the dinner party more of a success.

[REDACTED] said he attended the party and was one of approximately thirty or forty guests at a suspicious dinner given in the home of [REDACTED] Key Biscayne, identified by [REDACTED] as one of the [REDACTED]

(S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Confidential

~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Confidential

[REDACTED] said he met the two Soviets when he identified as [REDACTED]

b1

b7c

(S) The conversation that ensued during the evening was purely social in nature and there was no political discussion with the exception [REDACTED] recalled he apprized the Russians at the outset that he believed in the capitalistic democratic form of government. X (S) (u)

It was the recollection of [REDACTED] that the two Russians were photographers who were visiting Miami to observe life in the United States in various strata of low, medium and upper class homes. [REDACTED] recalled during the course of the evening the Soviets said they hoped to visit a good book store, and he invited them to visit his store and browse around. X (S) (u)

b7c

b1

(S) [REDACTED] stated on the following day, [REDACTED] visited his book store, accompanied by a tall white male whose name he could not recall. They spent several hours looking at a variety of books. X (S) (u)

b7c

[REDACTED] recalled having gone to his residence a short distance away where he presented one of the Russians with a book of Dr. Zhivago, written in Russian, which he said has been banned in Russia. This copy was printed in Michigan. [REDACTED] said he gave a book on water skiing to the other Russian since he appeared interested in water sports. X (S) (u)

b7c

He said the two Soviets appeared deeply appreciative of the courtesies afforded them by [REDACTED] and left an address in Russia for him to use should he desire to correspond with them. [REDACTED] advised he had not written nor does he plan to correspond at any time. He was unsuccessful in a search to locate the address described above. X (S) (u)

b7c

[REDACTED] advised he had not known either [REDACTED] (S) prior to initial meeting described earlier in this memorandum. He declared no attempt was made by either Soviet to interest him or utilize him for any intelligence purpose. [REDACTED] stated in this connection he has never been contacted by any Soviet citizens for purposes of intelligence. He mentioned practically all of his relatives were killed in confinement in concentration camps during World War II. He has a niece, name not recalled, residing in East Germany, but has had no contact with her. X (S) (u)

b1

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Confidential

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

Confidential

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
Per CIA

[REDACTED]

(S)

Yuri I. Nosenko, former Soviet Intelligence Officer whose bona fides has not yet been established, on March 4, 1964.

[REDACTED]

(S)

Nosenko

[REDACTED]

(S)

Nosenko

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Confidential

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

For the protection of the confidential source and his firm, it is requested this Bureau be informed prior to any recruitment, or other approach, to the Soviet newsmen mentioned in this memorandum, on the basis of the information set forth herein.

(S)(u)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. (S)(u)

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :
FROM :
SUBJECT :

DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

DATE: 11/17/66

SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) (P)

SAMMY
ESP - R

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ReBulet, 11/2/66, enclosing CIA memorandum
dated 10/21/66.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of
an LHM captioned as above. U

NYO files contain no further pertinent information
than what is set forth in file entitled [redacted]
"IS - R" and which has previously been furnished to the Bureau [redacted]

The underlying assumption forming the basis
for the possible motive of [redacted] in
approaching [redacted] as set out in enclosed LHM [redacted]

The NYO has no information indicating these
two are KGB employees, but if not, they were [redacted]

At the same time, the NYO does not feel that
this operation lends any support to the CIA position on
SAMMY. On the contrary, if the [redacted] was
as set out in enclosed LHM, it would tend to show SAMMY
as a legitimate defector and that the KGB is still
sufficiently shaken up by his defection to institute,
even at this late date, a plan by which it might obtain
some form of compensation for its loss [redacted]

- 2 - Bureau (Encs. 5) (RM)
- 1 - New York [redacted]
- 1 - New York [redacted]

JRN: gfb
(4)

ENCLOSURE

REC-5: 65-68530 414

NOV 18 1966

DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION

70 DEC 8 1966

SECRET

SOVIET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

See address above
Classified by 105-709-103X1
Declassify on: OADR

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE 5-12-82 zms

b1
b3
S
Per CIA
classification
bureaucratic



NY [105-65721] (S)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Enclosed LHM is classified "~~SECRET~~" since it contains information received from CIA, which was so classified. (S)

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

November 17, 1966

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET~~

[Sammy] *SLY*
Espionage - Russia

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

*See addendum
by 190-709-10341*

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum, dated October 21, 1966, (ESCI [redacted] wherein CIA advised that [redacted]

[redacted] (This agent was identified as Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a former Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the United States on February 4, 1964, in Geneva, Switzerland. *SLY*)

[redacted] This unexpected development, coming some two and a half years after Nosenko's defection, is unprecedented insofar as official Soviet reactions to prior defections from their intelligence services are concerned. [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY SP8AM/MLC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per CIA/4c 2-11-99-11

DEC 07 1999

b1 b3 S
Per CIA
Appropriate Agencies and Field Offices Advise by Filing Slip(s) of Classification
DATE: 1/11/79

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY SLIP(S) OF CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY: 1259 *gsk/aw* 1/2/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION: 2+3
FCIM, II, 2.4.1
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION: 11/12/86

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

page 1, page 2, page 3
directly classified
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. *SLY*

ENCLOSURE

65-68530

414

SECRET

[Sammy] (u)

b1
b3
S
Per
CIA

[REDACTED]

The question then naturally arises: What was the [REDACTED] while this question presents a wide open field for speculation, the following is submitted for consideration as a possible motivating force in the KGB decision to take affirmative, though belated, action in the Nosenko case. (u)

b1

Since nothing has been heard about Nosenko since shortly after his defection in February, 1964, the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1

Once the above impression had been created, an enterprising press in Europe and the United States would demand to know what Nosenko has to say about this, where he is located, how he has been treated and to hear from him personally concerning the circumstances of his defection. On the assumption that the United States government is very sensitive to public opinion, the KGB would hope that the American security service responsible for Nosenko would be forced into a move which would prove embarrassing to the United States. For example, should Nosenko be allowed to meet the press, he could conceivably (u)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(Sammy) (S) (U)

recant his voluntary defection and, thus, not only place the United States in an embarrassing position but might even result in demands that he be released and, if he so desired, be allowed to return to the Soviet Union. (S) (U)

In the event Nosenko did not recant but, instead, confirmed the legitimacy of his defection, the KGB would still not have lost completely. Sufficient interest would have been generated and doubts implanted in the minds of many so that regardless of what Nosenko said, the issue would never be laid to rest and would rise again and again to annoy the United States, and by playing on family ties and nationalistic sentiment to haunt Nosenko. (S) (U)

Another

[REDACTED]

b1

b1

Per CIA

Whatever may be the

Nosenko's defection is still a matter of concern to the KGB. (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X
[] (u)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: February 10, 1967

FROM : Frank E. Bartos, Chief Intelligence Officer
Immigration and Naturalization Service

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Attention: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (u) 57C 65-68530-415
b3 per CIA
5

VIA LIAISON

Declassify on: OADR
Classified by 90-707-103x1

SECRET

FBI INFO CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/PLK
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

per CIA 172 2-11-99 only

includes automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15 FEB 21 1967

[] (u)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: [4 1967] (w)

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [(105-65721)] (w)

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
ESP - R
[(OO: WFO)] (w)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP

Enclosed for the Bureau are seven copies
of an LHM reflecting information furnished about
NOSENKO by [redacted] (w)

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Top Secret~~"
due to the nature of the information therein, the
position of [redacted] and his future value to
American intelligence. (w)

All information in the enclosed LHM was
furnished by [redacted] during January, 1967. (w)

(S) Information contained herein was obtained
from [redacted] on dates indicated by SA [redacted]
and [redacted] of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(S) [redacted] is a confidential informant who is in a
position to furnish reliable information but contact
with whom has been insufficient to determine the
reliability of his information. (w)

- 5 - Bureau (Enc. 7) (RM) (w)
- (2 - [redacted] 105-162125) (w)
- 1 - Washington Field (w)
- 1 - New York [redacted] (w)
- 1 - New York (Tickler) (w)
- 1 - New York (w)

GBM:gfb
(11)
CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED REASON
FCM, II.
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

Approved: [Signature] Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

See [redacted] 105-162125

Classified 5-12-82

Classified 1/9/79

105-162125

b3 per CIA

b1
b2
b7D

REC 10

APR 10 1967

62

(w)

[Signature]

NY [105-65721] (S)

~~SECRET~~

(S) There should be no dissemination of the contents of this communication and information from [redacted] outside of the Bureau without Bureau authorization. (S)

In the event KGB code names appear in this communication, they are not to be further disseminated. (S)

The classification given any communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau containing information from [redacted] will depend upon the nature and content of such information, each case standing on its own merits. Under no circumstances should a classification of less than "Confidential" be utilized. (S)

b1

CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [redacted] AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SENSITIVE INFORMANT. (S)

In addition to information contained in the enclosed LHM source furnished the following regarding NOSENKO: (S)

1/19/67 (S)

[redacted] (S)

Source said that after NOSENKO's defection many changes were made in the Central Office and it became very difficult to find people to send to the United States who would not have been known to NOSENKO. (S)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

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65-68530-416 pg. 3

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NY [105-65721] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

1/24/67 (S)

Source advised that the defection of NOSENKO was one of two cases which almost closed the New York Residency for all practical purposes. He stated that for some time following this all work was being done through illegal channels. He said the Residency was not permitted to work to attempt to prevent the identification of their agents. (S)

~~SECRET~~

NY [105-55721] (u)

~~SECRET~~

Source advised that the case officers of the Residency were not to know one another except for a small circle of selected people who will know all of the case officers. He said that except for this small circle of people, the case officers will be unknown not only to each other but also to the chiefs of lines other than that to which they are assigned. (u)

1/26/67 (u)

[REDACTED] (S)

b1

[REDACTED] (S)

1/28/67 (u)

[REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET~~

NY [105-65721] (u)

~~SECRET~~

Source advised that the New York Residency had received NOSENKO's picture and description. Source believed that as a result of seeing the picture and the description, he did see NOSENKO one morning on Third Avenue, in the vicinity of 64th or 65th Streets in New York City. At this time the Residency had no instructions to assassinate him but only to locate him. (u)

Source realized the difficulty in attempting to follow NOSENKO and did not do so. Source stated that this was not reported to the Residency. (u)

1/29/67 (u)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

b1

2/21/67 (u)

[REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
April 4, 1967 (u)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259 JPP/CAJ/1/3/29
REASON FOR FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 4/15/82 (u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ivanovich Nosenko

See appendix
Classification 190-709-10341
Declassify on: OADR

87-1444 10-1-11
CLASSIFIED BY SP8ALM/ck
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko is a former Soviet intelligence officer whose bona fides has not yet been established. (u)

A confidential source, contact with whom has been insufficient to determine the reliability of information furnished, advised in early 1967, that Nosenko's defection resulted in many people being made to suffer for this action. Source stated that all individuals who had been friendly with Yuri Nosenko were punished, some by losing their Communist Party membership cards and many others by being expelled from the KGB (Committee of State Security). (u)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

bl

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

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65-68530-416 pg. 2 of enclosure

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XXXXXX

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. *[Handwritten initials]*

FROM : S. J. Papich *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: YURI NOSENKO
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Confidential

DATE: 5/4/67

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Wick _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ru *[Handwritten signature]*
ON 12-7-99

The following results of a discussion with James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), held on 5/3/67, are being made a matter of record for possible future reference: *[Handwritten initials]*

The Liaison Agent pointed out that periodically the Bureau has developed leads in the Soviet espionage field which, under normal circumstances, would suggest interview of the subject. Hunt was told that such leads have not been transmitted to CIA because the Agency has been holding to the position that Nosenko cannot be interviewed and leads cannot be levied on him. The Agent asked for a current picture of CIA's relationship with Nosenko. *[Handwritten initials]*

Hunt advised that CIA's position continues to be the same; namely, the subject is not being interviewed and no leads are being discussed with him. He then stated that CIA has been in the process of preparing a voluminous report covering all CIA interviews of the subject and including the Agency's evaluation of the information. A copy of this report will be forwarded to the Bureau. *[Handwritten initials]*

See addendum 109-103 x1

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Soviet Section *[Handwritten initials]*

1 MAY 5 1967

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Linton
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:rab
(5)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *[Handwritten]*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *[Handwritten]*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 *[Handwritten]*
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *[Handwritten]*

65-68530-417

[Large handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

57 MAY 12 1967

Confidential

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

503, New York [4/10/67] (u)

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED] (S) b1

[DATE: 4/7/67] (u)

FROM : SA [REDACTED] #342 (u)

b7c

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] (S) b1
[REDACTED] (u)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF [REDACTED] DATE 11/79 SP/16

ReNYairtel, captioned [REDACTED] - R,"
and dated 3/31/67. (u)

Source
Date of Contact
Contacted by

[REDACTED] b2
[REDACTED] b7D
3/27/67
SAS [REDACTED] (u)

CLASSIFIED AND Characterized
EXTENDED BY 1253 [REDACTED] 1/3/79
REASON FOR [REDACTED]
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 [REDACTED]
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

A confidential informant
who has furnished reliable
information in the past

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

b1

REF:dje (44) (u)

COPIES CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

65-68530
NOT RECORDED
145 APR 12 1967 (u)

59 APR 14 1967

~~SECRET~~



5010-108-01

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

85-1444

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [REDACTED]