Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts


Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko

File Number: 65-68530

Section: 18



Federal Bureau of Investigation



Director Central Intelligence Agency

United States greenbacks to continued that he cashed the checks as requested and probably while at Fort San Luis Obispo, California, started intermittently mailing to convelopes containing approximately \$100 mailing to convelope containing approximately \$100 mailing to convelope containing approximately \$100 mailing to convelope containing approximately \$100 mailing to containing approximately \$100 m

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with stated it was rather common knowledge when he left Moscow that he was under assignment to Fort San Luis Obispo, California

This information is being furnished to you for your possible assistance in your analysis of captioned matter and cases relating thereto

NOTE:

"Secret" inasmuch as this involves analysis of
the Sammy case, which involves attempts by CIA to resolve
the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko, Soviet defector.


is the former Army sergeant who admitted working
for the Soviets in Russia. He was subsequently convicted
of this crime and served time in the peritary. One of
his associates in Moscow was

interview of he furnished information which should be of assistance to CIA in its over-all analysis of the Nosenko investigation.

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
CONT / NO FOREIGN DISSEL (S) 65-68530 CLASSIFIED AND IAISON EXTERMIN REASO FCSS., S Date: DATE OF ORE Liaison To: DECLASSIFICATION... Director Neale Central Intelligence Agency Torrillo Attention: Deputy Director, Plans From: John Edgar Hoover, Director SAMMY) Subject: ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA This will confirm information furnished orally to Mr. E. J. Papich of this Bureaug on April 50, 1966

The information set forth below was recently provided by a sensitive confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past. In view of the sensitive nature of this source no further dissemination should be made and this information must be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within your Agency.




SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION / M

Director Central Intelligence Agency





Director Central Intelligence Agency



With regard to the foregoing your attention is directed to our communications of February 23, 1964, and September 29, 1965, which furnished other information from our source pertinent to this subject matter.

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NOTE: Above extracted from NYairtel 4/28/66 re Classified "Decet, No Foreign Dissemination" to afford adequate protection to source, a defector-in-place who represents a most important penetration of Soviet intelligence and compromise of whom would result in extremely grave damage to U. S. defense interests.

100° SECRET

SECRET //NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIRMD OFFICES ADVII UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM ROUTE IN ENVELOPE TO: SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) 5/4/66 APPROPRIATE AGENCIES FROM: SA ADVIST **b**C SUBJECT: YURI I. NOSENKO 630 Reference: New York sirtel, captioned IS-R", dated 4/28/66. 52 Source Dra Date of Contact 4/27/66 Contacted by SAS Characterized A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past 1-NY (105-65721) (YURI I. NOSENKO) (1)-Bu (65,68530) CLASSIFIED AND WIFE**b**2 EXTENDED BY 125 9 3 JM: jab REASON FOR PJD (18)FCIM, II, 1-24. BATE OF REVIEW FOR **55 MAY 1** 6 1966

N. 105 6572176

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardizes. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Buraeu should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Conferntial", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

when disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.)

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscrimminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING
ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION
TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF
THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

ALL REPRESENTION OF THIS CO FASE IS CLASSIFIED (18 CO) UNLESS HOPCINED DYNERWISE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you. Section 552	3			INFORMATION SHEET				
Section 552 Section 552 Section 552a	_3	Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.						
(b)(1)	Ŕ	Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.						
(b)(2)		Section 552			Section 552a			
(b)(3)		(b)(1)		(b)(7)(A)	□ (d)(5)			
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(b)(5)				(b)(7)(F)	□ (k)(4)			
□ (b)(6) □ (k)(7) □ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of request is listed in the title only. □ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency for review and direct response to you. □ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI at to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies). □ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to a disposition at a later date. □ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of □ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): □ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages: □ Since Page(s) X X No Duplication Fee X X for this page X XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		□ (b)(4)		(b)(8)	□ (k)(5)			
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
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FBI/DOJ


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NY 105 65721 (40)



Informant, in response to further questioning, said that he could furnish no additional details concerning the above-mentioned plan of KGB. Informant also noted that he did not know the






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FBI/DOJ



Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan (65-68530)

For information. Dissemination has been made to CIA and this matter will be closely followed with CIA


1994 20/2 Jan 19/2

ACTION:

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SECTE



NY 65-21273

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

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month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt, will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If 'the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SEUSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION FUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMATION REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.


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62 670 NY (65-21273)

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I then asked the subject if he thought it would be conceivable that the KGB or any part of Soviet Intelligence would be capable of launching a non-bona fide defector. The subject considered this for a moment and said that he did not think that Soviet Intelligence would ever do this. He said that they, of course, would be capable of doing it, but the risk involved, that is, if it was ever found out or the person's security jeopardized in any may, there would be a tremendous loss to Soviet Intelligence.



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NY (65-21273) (C)

Subject said that

Subject said that the he knows, knew a lot about KGB information; however, he has never noticed anything printed in the western press that is attributed to that is, compromising the KGB or KGB personnel.

I asked the subject if he knew of or ever heard anything about her. He said there is little or no talk the case is just not discussed.

ALL REFERENCES OF THIS AND PAGE IS CLASSIFIED OTHERWISE

SEP LET

FBI Transmit the following in . ype in plaintext or codel AIRTEL (Priority) DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) **670** SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) SUBJECT: Re NY airtel, 4/28/66, entitled (Bufile 105-104811, NY bl REC 30 65-68530-404 - VFO. - New York - New York ED AND JRN:lbm EFASCO FORM, III. O BATE OF IN A DECLASSIFICATION

Special Agent in Charge

The NYC heliance rice above information was

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The NYO believes the above information has a direct bearing on the issue of NOLENKO's bona fides and presents an opportunity to evoke from the Joviets action (or lack of action) unique ill aid up in making a determination to this end.

The NYO is not quare of HOSEMHO's current whereabouts and availability status. Dependent upon Tavorable responses from CIA to these two items, however, the HYO proposes for the Bureau's consideration the following peneral plan of action

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actions would tend to favor Mosenko's bona fides. In making this determination, we would most likely have the benefit of independent information supplied by concerning the plans and actions of the Soviets in this matter.

- 3 -



CLODE

NY [105-65721] W

It is recognized that CIA may interpret information in a somewhat different manner than does the NYO and view it as a further attempt on the part of the KGB to support the legitimate appearances of one of their controlled sources. Despite this possibility, however, the NYO recommends that the information contained in reairtel be disseminated to CIA.

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Should the Bureau decide to proceed in accordance with the above proposal by the NYO (or with some similar proposal), it is anticipated that any such action would be targeted for the 5/17 - 22/66 period when the Bolshoi Ballet troupe will be in NYC

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING
ANY IMPORDATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION
TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY
OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

5-10-66 Mr. DeLoach Mr. Sullivan Airtel Mr. D. E. Moore Mr. Branigan - Mr. Papich - Mr. Torrillo SAC, New York (105-65721) - Mr. Neale Director, FBI/(65-68530) APPROPR SAMMY AND T $V_{\alpha} \wedge_{\alpha}$ 620 RenYairtel 4-28-66 entitled forth information regarding the Sammy, NYairtel 5-2-66 and Wroairtel 5-4-66 Ы captioned "Sammy; ESP - R," suggesting a possible course of action designed to "test" the KGB plan and assist in establishing Sammy's bona fides. Sammy's bona fides. The information in your airtel of 4-28-66 was orally (1) furnished to CIA on 4-30-66 and confirmed by letter of 5-4-66 On 5-5-66 the Bureau's Liaison representative discussed with CIA the plan set forth in NYairtel of 5-2-66. CIA advised they did not wish to utilize Sammy in any operation and this included the showing of photographs to him. 62 NI GETIL EXTENDS 010 - New York P. A. - WFO KU FC: ... DATE ((105-105811 DECLASXIFICATIO AWN:cls (13)NVairtel 4-28-66 advised that NOTE: that the bI Teison . DeLoach .. Moht .__ Yairtel 5-2-66 suggested Sammy be Wick . Casper . VILLED (1) Callahan Contad ... 198 NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO Ga.e _ Foren Sullivan Tavel _ Tratter Tele. Boom

Airtel to SAC, New York

RE: (SAMMY)

65-7853

NOTE CONTINUED:

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of helping establish Sammy's bona fides. On 5-5-66, SA Sam Papich discussed the matter with CIA, which did not want to use Sammy in any operation, including the showing of photos.

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, captioned as above, dated 5-9-66, prepared by AWN:cls


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	. 7 /	SAMMY)	XW)	62 670	APP FIELD CTF: A TYPE CTF: ELLP(L) (LLP)	Casai lication	on the second	
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~e .	1 1800 PS	and sug	gests this	data shoul	d be supplem loped from i	ented as new nvestigation	info is or other	
;		in view	of their p	ast charge	s against the REC-1	of CIA should be integrity of	F SAMMY	
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but the Bureau should not be committed to approaction which would involve responsibility for SAMMY.

WFO concurs to the recommendation that

And this step should be pressed with CIA. Incidentally, this may serve as a beginning wedge to resume contact with SAMMY which is deemed desirable for our future operations.



In this connection it is feltethat our failure to appear, might set in motion forces over which we would have no control and ultimately jeopardize and other important sources of CIA and the Bureau. **b70**

b2 ··

It is also suggested that SAMMY might not be fully amenable and might use the opportunity to telephone to inform a "girl friend" of his plight and ask for an attorney or other assistance. After two years ofinvolunatry confinement such a move of desperation would not be remarkable.

The possiblity, perhaps very remote, also exists that the Although this possiblity is somewhat far-fetched, it is believed more probable

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
than the predictable CIA notion that it is merely further backstop material to support the role of SAMMY as a false defector.


To summarize, it is believed

SAMMY. Identifications by him which may be reasonably expected, if he is cooperative, should satisfy us that the story related by is accurate. Doubt is expressed that CIA would be convinced regardless of what was developed in the circumstances suggested in the NY proposals, in view of their past preconceived theories concerning SAMMY and other defector type sources. SAMMY should not be used actively in a needless operation which involves possible risk and little gain. It is felt here, that the bona fides of the need no further support at this time. It is believed the story as it concerns SAMMY will be further substantiated with the passage of time without any danger to various sources.

अधार

3 DEVICE





New York feels this might be one way of helping to establish Nosenko's bona fides. Washington Field Office, by airtel of 5-4-66, concurred in part with New York's suggested plants.

On 5-5-66 the Bureau's Liaison representative discussed with CIA the plan set forth in New York airtel of 5-2-66. CIA advised they did not wish to utilize "Sammy" in any operation and this included the showing of photographs to him.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval, is an airtel to New York with a copy for Washington Field Office, advising New York's suggested plan was discussed with CIA and that CIA did not wish to utilize "Sammy" in any operation.

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NO FOREIGN DISSENT - Liaison - Mr. Torril Mr. Neale (S) 65-68530 (Y) EXTENDED BY. 1259.9 July 6, 1966 A REASON FOR FCIM, II, 1-7.4.2 To: DATE OF REVIEW FOR Director DECLASSIFICATION Central Intelligence Agency Attention: Deputy Director, Plans From: John Edgar Hoover, Director Subject: (SAMMY) & ... The information set forth below provided by our sensitive source, who has furnished reliable information in the past. In view of the sensitive nature of the source and the data furnished, it is requested that this material be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within your Agency and that no further dissemination be made of this information. Our source advised that "everyone" in the New York Residency of the Committee of State Security (KGB) is expecting the appearance of a book by Yuri Nosenko. The source added that he had heard a number of KGB employees discussing this possibility. The main point of interest seems to be the curiosity as to which employees of the KGB will be named in Nosenko's book. The source remarked that he has heard the opinion expressed that only those KGB employees who have "failed" will be mentioned in any book written by Nosenko. KGB employees who are currently active will not be named, according to the speculation, inasmuch as the "FBI is not so foolish as to make this mistake." The source added that it is generally believed the FBI would prefer that the names of active KGB employees not be published in any book authored by Mosenko. Our source stated that he was not concerned about what Nosenko might write as he and Mosenko do not know each other. The source expressed the possibility that while both Wick _ he and Nosenko were at KGB Headquarters in Moscow in the past, :!! an an they might have seen each other in the KCB dining room, source is not aware of this. ET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION - New York (105-65721) GROUP 1 xcluda from automatic experience and MN Cls (9) MAIL KOOM SEE NOTE PAGE TWO classification

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The SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION 4

Director Central Intelligence Agency

Our source volunteered that he has not heard anything more about the interest of the KGB in Nosenko since the data which he furnished to this Bureau during April, 1966. As your Agency is aware, this Bureau by communication dated May 4, 1966, bearing the above caption, set forth the remarks of our source relative to the possibility of the KGB kidnaping Nosenko should he appear at any performance of the Bolshoi Ballet troupe, then visiting the United States.

NOTE:

The above information was secured from New York airtel 6-28-66 entitled IS - R" and is being furnished to CIA as pertinent to its interests and responsibilities.


This material is classified "Top Secret/No Foreign b70 Dissemination" to afford adequate protection to the second a defector-in-place who represents a most important penetration of Soviet intelligence. Compromise of this informant could result in exceptionally grave damage to this Nation through compromise of an intelligence operation vital to our national defense.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

(1. J.)



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ATTORACIONAL TO: SAC NEW YORK (105-65721) FROM: SUBJECT: YURI I. NOSENKO IS-R **b**2 **670** Reference: New York airtel, captioned ated 6/28/66 I3-A", dated 6/28/66 Source Date of Contact Contacted by confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past. DECLASSIFY ON: 25 PI **ჅჀ (ႣჂー**ᲜᲒ**530)** (YURI I NOSENKO TJM:lfm (5) OT RECORDED JUL 19 1966

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardizes. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Buraeu should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination

Will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

when disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KCD code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscrimminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

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NY 105-65721

Employees Of The KGB NY Residency Are Expecting And Awaiting Publication of A Book By YURI NOSENKO

YURI NOSENKO, an employee of the Second Main Directorate of KGB, defected to the US while serving in Switzerland during the early part of 1964.

N.I. 10 5 65791 SECRET

PI

During the interview of 6/23/66, informant stated that now, "everyone in KGB in NY" is awaiting and expecting publication of a book by NOSENKO. Informant said he had heard a number of KGB employees mention this. Informant said the main point of interest seems to be curiosity about which employees of KGB will be pared in NOSENKO's book.

NOSENKO's book. Informant said

In connection with this, informant stated that he is not at all concerned about what NOSENKO might write in his book. He said he does not know NOSENKO "at all" and that as far as he is aware, NOSENKO does not know him. Informant said it is quite possible that at some time in the past, while they were both serving in KGB Headquarters in Moscow, they might have seen each other in the KGB dining room but that if this is so, informant is not aware of it.

This opportunity was taken to ask informant if he had heard anything more about YURI NOSENKO or KGB's interest in that individual. Informant said he had heard no such new information. He said he is aware of our interest in receiving any such information and he will not fail to provide information to us about NOSENKO if and when he receives it.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS A STATE OF EXCEPT. _8 AUG PORT WHERE SINGLE HERWISE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT

.C. SAMMY

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 30 June 1966, Subject:

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

REC- 59

68530-409

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UNITED STATES GC CRNMENT Memorandum то : Director DATE: July 22, 1966 Federal Bureau of Investigation Ralph Farb, Chief Intelligence Officer Immigration and Naturalization Service FROM ы SUBJECT Attention: ALL LITEURY IS CHICIASS from automatic 3 and leclassification DECLASSIFIED BY UPO DECLASSIFY ON: 25X DEC CIA HR 2-1

REC-6

Liaison Mr. Neale

65-68530-4/h Date : 10 | August 16, 1966 FCIM, II, 1-2. To: Director DATE OF RE Central Intelligence Agency DECLASSIFICATION Attention: Deputy Director, Plans From: John Edgar Hoover, Director Subject: SAMMY Your CSCIdated August 5, 1966, raises the question of whether there has been a basic alteration in this Bureau's position on the bona fides of "Samy" by reason of the investigation in the This Bureau is not in a position at this time to have draw any conclusions as to "Sammy s" bona fides and we recognize that it is possible that "Sammy" could be a Soviet plant or an agent provocateur, as you, in fact, view him. fer We are not willing, however, to view everything that "Sammy" has said as being false or misleading. You are well aware that investigation has supported various of his allegations In the the preponderance of the evidence supports Samo himself denies that he was recauted. Subsequent to interview by Agents of this Bureau, he was interrogated by the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force, and was subsequently given a polygraph examination by the Office of Special Investigations. In the opinion of the answered pertinent questions truthfully "Sammy" and by Ohis does not mean that all three men were lying in this instance. ded from automatic New York (Enclosure) WFO (Enclosure) |declassification 62 SEE NOTE PAGE TWO bip

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Director Central Intelligence Agency

On the other hand This information is not detailed and is not "firsthand" information.

NOTE:


Classified "The Security because the CIA communication which is answered herein and quoted in part is so classified by

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Deletions release to	were made pursuant to the exer you.	mptions indicated below with	no segregable material available for
	Section 552		Section 552a
(b) (1)	Per	□ (b)(7)(A)	□ (d)(5)
□ (b)(2)	CIA	□ (b)(7)(B)	□ (j)(2)
(b)(3)		□ (b)(7)(C)	□ (k)(1)
<u>50 US</u>	ic Section 403	□ (b)(7)(D)	□ (k)(2)
		□ (b)(7)(E)	□ (k)(3)
		□ (b)(7)(F)	□ (k)(4)
□ (b)(4)		□ (b)(8)	□ (k)(5)
□ (b)(5)		□ (b)(9)	□ (k)(6)
□ (b)(6)			□ (k)(7)
Information request is l	n pertained only to a third party isted in the title only.	y with no reference to the su	bject of your request or the subject of y
Documents for review	originated with another Gover and direct response to you.	nment agency(ies). These de	ocuments were referred to that agency(i
Pages conto the re	ntain information furnished by a leasability of this information fo	another Government agency(ollowing our consultation with	ies). You will be advised by the FBI as h the other agency(ies).
Page(s) v disposition	vithheld inasmuch as a final rele on at a later date.	ease determination has not b	een made. You will be advised as to the
Pages we	re not considered for release as	they are duplicative of	
Page(s) v	vithheld for the following reason	n(s):	

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views of this office concerning the

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involved in the CIA request of 5/19/66.

CIA seems strangely persistent in suggesting a reexamination in the light of the supplementary information provided in its communications of 6/29/66 and 8/5/66 which are actually of no value and almost irrelevant on the basis stated. What appears to be an unseemly touchiness in the correspondence of CIA may be due to the fact we were not duly informed about for that the earliest

Committee of the Commit

it is due to the fact the information of the probably again put in perspective by data from SAMM.

The agency appears unduly sensitive to any acceptance of statements of SAMMY, or anyone who confirms such statements, as evidenced by its indelicate references to earlier letters and conversations in which some implied support was given by the Bureau to the Agency's obsessive position that SAMMY is a controlled agent of KGB.

The CIA statement in memorandum to the Director dated 8/5/66, on page two, namely.

endeavored to enhance his image with CIA by inaccurately describing his past and making himself appear of greater importance in KGB than was the true situation, there are few if any instances where information reported by SAMMY has been found to be false or inaccurate. Because of CIA's persistance that SAMMY is a false agent, this office has had occasion to compare information furnished separately and SAMMY in nine cases. We arrived at the conclusion the material of SAMMY was more detailed and accurate than that the lit is observed nearly two and one-half years have elapsed since CIA first discovered

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SAMMI to be provocateur and began hostile interrogation to induce a confession. So far as known to this office, nothing of significance has been developed by CIA to support its position. On the other hand, there has been an impressive accumulation of data from various sources supporting or tending to support the essential story related by SAMMI and his authenticity as a former officer of KGB. The readiness of CIA to attack each new source whose information confirms the statements of SAMMI and to include such sources in an ever expanding KGB conspiracy may be described as a depressing phenomenon.



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

UNI' D STATES DEPARTMENT OF J'TICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington,

August 26, 1966

ALL INFORMATION COUTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASS FIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

This communication has been prepared in response to the memoranda of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Per addressed to this Dureau under date August 5, 1966, including CIA captioned as above. It is designed to disper any courusion arising through the crossing of pertinent correspondence in the mails and perhaps to further clarify the Bureau memorandum of June 22, 1966, which was concerned with certain regulations of and with he principal sources.

The Bureau case entitled:

pressur dated February 6, 1962 (CSCI

effect interviewed by S cents of the Federal Bure Investigation.

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FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 DATE OF REVIEW

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the investigation by the

Pederal Bureau of Swestigation

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The Bureau case captioneds

was opened on the bests of the memorantum deted April 4, 1752, (CSCI- which reported information imported to

extensive investigation and the additional detailed information supplied by Yuri I. Hosenko, it was concluded that was the subject of this case. Subsequent incorviews have pretty well established the accuracy of this resatification.

The CIA memorandum of May 19, 1966, introduced "new" material not previously made available to this Bureau as indicated in the above mentioned CIA memorandum of August 5, 1966, This "new" information was also reported to have been given to

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The CIA memorandem described just above was studied excefully in conjunction with the two cases mentioned hardspecture. In response to the request AA the CIA memorandem May 19, 1966, for the views of this library exception of the library of the Bereau memorandem dated June 22, 1966 was prepared. His memorandem stated the excelusions that

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Per 61 CIA 63

memoranda of April 4, 1962, May 19, 1966, setting forth the

In the preparation of the Durees management dated.

June 22, 1966, due consideration was given to all of the later

elerified.

Although the apparent discrepancy was noted in the Bureau memorandum of June 22, 1966, the writer of that document was not influenced sufficiently to make any difference in his analysis. The explanatory memoranda of June 29, 1966, and August 5, 1966, do nothing to change this opinion although they serve a useful purpose in setting straight the record of discrepance and the newcrandum of August 5, 1966.

With further reference to the mentioned above which referred

original CIA memorandum of February 6, 1962, did not describe

further observed when

ease on March 13, 1962, by Special Agents of Federal Barons of Investigation

interview on

a April 19, 1962, the source said be the

of June 22, 1966, was aware of the excitor of the June 22, 1966, was aware of the excitor reports.

arrange this is not entirely clear since it is not a greater greater should be given

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In cenclusion, it is observed the CIA memorandum of May 29, 1966, was concerned


The CIA removander considered and alternately as possible Suspects for these cases and a requested the views of this Bureau. Nothing more was requested and the Bureau memorandum of June 22, 1966, was directed to this limited task.

as suspect in two other cases.

This discomming continues in ther

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it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

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To:

From:

captioned, "Secret."

Enclosures - 2

(6) 1 - 65-68530 (Sammy)

interview subject

FJC:as

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