## Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko


File Number: 65-68530

Section: 16



Federal Bureau of Investigation

8-30-99~ McWillias CLASSIFIED BY SPARMS DECLASSIFY ON: 25X b% BY LIAISON May 26, 1965 (4) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERETT TO CUCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN CTHERWISE. Director Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director, Plan John Edgar Moover, Director Subject: Declassity on: OADR Enclosed for your information are two copies of a memorandem dated May 11, 1965, containing information furnished by subject concerning his experiences while visiting in the 6 Zaclešures (3) lev York NUL SEE 65-68530) (Samy) 🖇 JJT:gci REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.42 DUPLICATE YELLOW DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION /S Fom automatic ing and



by fer

Director Contral Intelligence Agency

The Park

On June 29, 1964, Collison stated, "First of all, Nesembe is the man when I set in ESS, Second, Resembe—the Nesembe who is in your country now—is that man; Regembe, in fact, is the sen of the ex-Seviet Minister, Resembe, who died a few years ago; Resembe is really a professional ECS efficer; he is really the officer who worked at one time in the First (that means, American) Reportment of the Second

Chief Directorate, more precisely in the First Section which is responsible for the activity against the American Embessy in Moscov. Also, Mescake is really the efficer who worked at one time in the Yourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate."

Golithyn also said, "As I teld you at the beginning, he certainly tells the truth when he says that he worked in KON for a long period, that he worked in the American Reportment against the American Rebessey. That is the truth. That he worked in the Tourist Department is also correct. But he lies, he decrives, on very important points." (4)


knowledge. His words are not hearney and are particularly interesting in the light of your recent consistent that Rosento never served at all in the First (American) Department of the DEE's Second Chief Directorate.

This Person would be interpreted in receiving any further information which you may develop regarding Mescake. We are also interpreted in your recommendations for action with regard to Mescake: X/4/

HOTE:

See cover memorandum Mr. W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 6/3/65, captioned prepared by LW: mec. & (4)

Classified "Seret" because CIA material discussed is so classified ()



Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

ME:

105-104011

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Under date of 5/14/65 Central Intelligence Agency
furnished memorandum,
This memorandum pointed out that Central Intelligence agency had
conducted further intensive interrogation of the Soviet defector,
Yuri Nosenko, which has confirmed "beyond reasonable doubt" that
Mesenko never served at all in the First (American) Department of the
KGB Second Chief Directorate or as a staff officer in his other
claimed KGB assignments. Central Intelligence Agency states that
these circumstances not only establish that Mesenko is a Soviet
"plant," but also raised strong doubts as to the bona fides of
who is referred to as

Agency. Yu bloom

Agency.

the Bureau information regarding KCB activities since 5/22/62.

Central Intelligence Agency Allegations: 3 x(4) 52

Central Intelligence Agency states that Nosenko never held the KGB positions he claimed and, since the "affirmed" that Nosenko was in these positions, it is difficult for Central Intelligence Agency to construe reporting as "innocent" passage of information.  $(\nabla)(u)$   $b^2$ 

Facts: has never claimed to know Mosenko. All information which he has furnished, he has attributed to remarks of other Soviets who did claim to know him

61 67C

Information furnished by as coming from these sources was not detailed as to the precise periods that Mosenko held various positions in the KGB. The information was to the effect that Mosenko had served in the Second Directorate of the KGB during his entire KGB career. The Pas quoted as saying that Mosenko had at one time worked against personnel of the United States Embassy, later was assigned to work against journalists, and, during his last years with the KGB, worked against American and European tourists in Moscow. Chis last position was that of

Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department of the KGB, Second Directorate. On the other hand, that reported that KGB personnel who knew Mosenko indicated that he was a Deputy to a chief of a branch within

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CONTINUED OF SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

105-104811

a department of the Second Directorate, and since the Second Directorate had approximately 20 departments, Nosenko would not have appeared to be an individual in a high supervisory position

On the other hand, Central Intelligence
Agency's KGB defector, Anatoliy Golitzyn, who defected
from the KGB in Helsinki, Finland, in 12/61, states
that he knows the defector, Mosenko, and knows that he
worked in the American Department of the KGB, Second
Chief Directorate, against the American Embassy.
Golitzyn also insists that Nosenko worked in the Tourist
Department of the Second Directorate.

Observation: It would appear that Central Intelligence
Agency's source, Golitzyn, gives a stronger support for
Hosenko's story because of personal knowledge than
does despite the fact that Central Intelligence
Agency now says Nosenko never served in the departments
that Golitzyn says he personally knows he served in \( \frac{1}{2} \)

Central Intelligence Agency states that has 62,670 reported Mosenko was well known to various KGB personnel. In most cases, Mosenko has either denied or failed to support his friendship with these individuals as reported by 62,670

Tacts: has reported comments by Sther Soviet personnel regarding knowledge on the part of Mosenko of various KGB personalities assigned to the United States and various individuals so named were recalled to the Soviet Union within a period of time following Mosenko's defection. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed doubts regarding Mosenko's relationship

told Cantral Intelligence Agency


Observations: Nosenko's denial of knowing an individual should not be construed as proof that is supporting Nosenko's

"legend."

gence Agency. (K)(u)

Is ignored by Central Intelli-

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(5) 62,670

Facts: has never claimed to know Mosenko. On the other hand, Anatoliy Golitayn has said, "First of all, Mosenko is the man whom I met in KGB. Second, Mosenko is the Mosenko who is in your country now (6/29/1964)...is that man. Mosenko, in fact, is the son of the ex-Soviet Minister, Mosenko, who died a few years ago. Mosenko is meally a professional KGB officer; he is meally the efficer who worked it one time in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate, more precisely in the First Section, which is responsible for the activity against the American Embassy in Moscow...

CONTINUED - OVER
SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan (X)
RE:
105-104811 (X)(u) SEG 70

Observation: It would appear that Golitzyn has gone far behind affirming that "Yes, there was a Nosenko."

Central Intelligence Agency states that Nosenko, during 13.

Per CIA

GENERAL CHEERVATIONS:

Central Intelligence Agency's analysis establishes without be question that Mosenko has told numerous conflicting stories, some improbable and some obviously false. In various details, Mosenko is at variance with information furnished by the particularly with regard to individuals he is supposed to have known (4)

that is a witting channel for disinformation. This is not to say that the KGB has attempted to lay down a "line." with regard to Nosenko, the removal from the United States of persons alleged to know Mesenko could have been part of a KGB plan to minimize the possibility of leaks of information regarding Mosenko which might have been at variance with the official "line." As an example, as of 2/10/64, who knew Mosenko stated that he had been a deputy to a chief of a branch of a department in the Second Directorate. The KGB "line"laid down by before his defection was Deputy to the Chief of the 7th Department (Tourist) of the Second Directorate.

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
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan RE: 105-102811 (X)

12,62b


Nevertheless, no individual quoted by regarding finatolity Golitayn, who claimed to have known Nosenko and knew that of the Second Directorate ()


Central Intelligence Agency apparently does not let its left hand know what its right hand is doing because it now states that it has confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that Mosenko never served at all in the First Department of the Second Directorate or as a staff officer in his other claimed KGB assignments (X)


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Letter to SAC, WFO

RE: UNSUB:


NOTE CONTINUED:

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMENTION X

Director Central Intelligence Agency

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NOTE:

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Classified 'Wep Segret/No Foreign Dissemination" in order to protect our defector-in-place whose unauthorized disclosure could result in extreme damage to the national interests. Yuri Nosenko, Soviet defector,


Immetication also has determined that

information was previously furnished to them. However, **SMI** subsequently corrected the term that was used concerning the

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
1 - Liaison 1 - Mr. McWilliams June 24, 1965/ X/u BY LIAISON Date: To: Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT John Edgar Hoover, Director From: WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. . . Subject: by 190/709-103x1 Declassify an: PADR is made to the report of Special dated April 8. 1964. at see Di and the report of Special Agent dated April 7, 1964, at Seattle, D The classifications of the above-referenced reports have been downgraded by this Bureau frum "Yo Ter" to "Secret," You are requested to d your copies of referenced reports to

1 Bufile (65-68530 Sammy) (1) CLASSIFIED BY SZA DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/ IM:MEC:hrt NOTE: CIA forwarded by Form 1669 dated 5-4-65 33 Tep Secretarious which had been downgraded by that Agency to 1669 the Communications mentioned by CIA and further traced what Bureau communications also contained the original information which was classified also contained the original information which was classified for secret. The reports mentioned in this letter reiterated information contained in one of the 33 documents, which was classified to secret. The information, therefore, must be downgraded to secret. State Department is being so advised. CIA and all Bureau offices have been or are being notified by separate communication of the downgrading.



TO: FBI Top Secret Control Officer NOTIFICATION OF DOWNGRADING 0F DATE TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS 4 May 1965 THE FOLLOWING TS DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN DOWNGRADED TO X SECRET CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND TS NO. DATE (2) DATE COPY FWD. (6) NO. OR SHORT SUBJECT FORWARDED TO Feb 64 1 7 Feb 64 Feb 64 1 Feb 64 1 7 Feb 64 Feb 64 1 7 Feb 64 1 Feb 64 W 24 <u>(25)</u> 7 Feb 64 Feb 6 7 Feb 64 Feb 6 7 Feb 64 5-68530-25 Feb 6 7 Feb 64 1 7. Feb 6 7 Feb 64 ,1 7 Feb 7 Feb 64 7 Feb & 2 FBI Feb 64 (2) AFTER DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN DOWNGRADED AND IS CONTROL RECORDS CORRECTED, DESTROY THIS FORM. A PERMANENT RECORD OF AUTHORITY TO DOWNGRADE TS MATERIAL IS MAINTAINE Chief, RID 8-59 1669 (21) SEPRET

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Director Central Intelligence Agency 43


Rer CIA

Your assistance in this matter is appreciated.

Enclosures - 4

NOTE:

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


Classified "Confidential" since it sets forth information pertaining to intelligence activities by a foreign government directed against the United States.

-CONFIDENTIAL

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bic Letter to MFO

RE: SAMOY X

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
Mr. McWilliams

Liaison ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCON TO THE EXCEPT (8) 65-68530 June 21, 1965 (1/2) 4 To: Director FORM, II, 1-2.4 Central Intelligence Agency DATE OF RE CECLASSIFICATI Attention: Deputy Director, Plans Fron: John Edgar Hoover, Director Subject Reference is made to your Form 1669, dated May 1965, captioned "Motification of Downgrading of Top Secret Documents," wherein are set forth the identifications of thirty-one documents that your Agency downgraded from ecret" to "Secret." In connection with the above, your attention is directed to the following documents of this Bureau which were furnished to your Agency. These documents were classified "Top Secret" inasmich as contained therein is information so classified in the aforementioned thirty-one documents of your fon are requested to downgrade from "Top Secret" he following documents of this Bureau: of Letter Caption February 17, 1964 February 17, 1964 February 17, 1964 June 3, 1964 bionage Ťalson LM:mec Mohr \_ (24)Casper. Callahan See page la for Contad \_ Felt. Bureau copies Gale NOTE PAGE Rosen Sulliya downgrading and declassification

la SECRET

Per CIA Director Central Intelligence agency Date of Letter Caption March 9, 1965 February 19, 1964 February 19, 1964 February 20, 1964 February 20, 1964 February 24, 1964 February 24, 1964 March 13, 1964 February 24, 1964 February 26, 1964 February 27, 1964 March 2, 1964 March 4, 1964 November 20, 1964 Memoranda Date Caption Place February 24, 1964 New York February 24, 1964 New York February 24, 1964 New York March 5, 1964 San Diego March 23, 1964 New York April 14, 1964 New York May 28, 1964 New York August 7, 1964 New York SECRET





NOTE:

Classified "Secret" inasmuch as it sets forth the names of numerous subjects whose identities were furnished to us by "Sammy," who is Yuri Nosenko, Soviet defector whose unauthorized disclosure could have damaging effects on the national interest. In addition, the incoming CIA communication was classified "Secret." Said incoming communication set forth many of the above names or captions.

65-68530-377
CHANGED TO
65-69602-1

JUL 7 1965

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREN IS UNCLASSIVED
DATE 2/24/82 BYSPAFMFFFM

SAC, New York (105-65721) Director, FBI (65-68530)

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All offices receiving copies of this letter are
hereby requested to downgrade from "Top Secret" to "Secret" all
decuments set forth in attached three-page enclosure which Bureauth records indicate were sent to or by recipient effices. (SAU)

In the event recipient effices forwarisdiacepy of a In the event recipient effices forwarddacopy of a "Top Secret" document to another field office without notifying the Bureau, it is the responsibility of the forwarding office to notify the other office or offices of the downgrading. P(U) As perusal of the enclosure indicates, many of the documents referred to were forwarded to various recipient offices UNRECORDED COPY FILED as enclosures to a letter. Enclosure CLASSIFIED AND F1. 125 Beston (Enclosure) Leason for E Chicago (Enclosure) FORM, II, 1-2.4.2 TATE OF REVIEW FOR Los Angeles (Enclosure) CECLASSIFICATION New Haven (Enclosure) Philadelphia (Enclosure) **Б**Ш) San Diego (Enclosure) San Francisco (Enclosure) Seattle (Enclosure) **REC 44** WFO (Enclosure) Per CIA **(S**) Tolson AND FIR Mohr \_ DeLoach Casper. Callahan Felt ... Gale Rosen Sulliv SEE BUREAU CO ES CONTINUED PAGE 12 Trot Holn MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET

Letter to SAC, New York

RE: SANNY (\$\(\text{SANNY}\) (\$\(\text{C}(u)\)

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NOTE:

CIA by Form 1669 5/4/65 forwarded to the Bureau a list of 33 documents which that Agency had downgraded from "Too Secret" to "Secret." A thorough review of all Bufiles relating to the aforementioned 33 documents has been made and all of the originals obtained from CIA have been downgraded in Bufiles.

Additionally, a review was made of all Bureau communications that incorporated the "Top Secret" information furnished by CIA which have necessitated the classification of "Top Secret." All these communications contained in Bufiles have been located and downgraded to "Secret."

In those instances where Bureau communications classified "Top Secret" were furnished to other Government agencies, said Government agencies have been notified by separate communication that they should be downgraded.

The enclosure to this letter sets forth the identities of all documents, both Bureau and CIA, which were classified "Top Secret" and downgraded in Bufiles. Recipient offices which received or seat the aforementioned "Top Secret" documents are being instructed to downgrade their copies to "Secret."

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CIA memo (copy)	2-13-64	WFO & NY		
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Bulet to CIA	2-24-64	NY & WFO	x	
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
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
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


Caption



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Director Central Intelligence Agency




HOTE

Above extracted from results of interview of Fedora, our defector—in-place, on 6/10/65. The above is being furnished to CIA as pertinent to its interests and responsibility concerning KHB operations.  $\times(\times/u)$ 

Classified "Two Stret/No Foreign Bissen" to afford adequate protection to the street who represents a most important penetration of Soviet intelligence, compressing of which would result in extremely grave danger to the Hation.

EN PORTOR DIRECT (U)



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Airtel to SAC. Wro SECTION

bl Per bz CIA

On page two of the report of SA dated 1-15-62, at Washington, D.C., captioned

is set(S)

forth that one Sh former employee of the Department of the Navy, admitted in September, 1952, that he was a homosexual.

You should determine if the above identical with captioned subject. (u)

(f.)

## NOTE:

Inasmuch as Bufiles do not contain Bureau information on subject, WFO is being directed to obtain same. Undoubtedly, the Department of State has been in receipt of the information concerning subject for a considerable period of time and therefore has conducted an investigation of him. WFO in its investigation of subject will obtain whatever investigation State conducted on subject.  $\times (\mathcal{U})$ 

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
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

11	Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.									
	Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.									
	Section 552			Section 552a						
	□ (b)(1)		(b)(7)(A)	□ (d)(5)						
	□ (b)(2)		(b)(7)(B)	□ (j)(2)						
	□ (b)(3)		(b)(7)(C)	□ (k)(1)						
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	□ (b)(5)		(b)(9)	□ (k)(6)						
	□ (b)(6)			□ (k)(7)						
	☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject equest is listed in the title only.									
	Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.									
	Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).									
<u> </u>	Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.									
	Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of									
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The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  65-168530-380 EBF										
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
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Liaison Mr. McWilliams

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HENEYM IS UNCH 1991FIED EXCEPT WHIRE SHOWS CAMEDYIBE.

June 24, 1965 (X/(U) BY LIAISON To: Office of Special Investigations Air Force Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Di John Edgar Hoover, Director LEASON F FCIM, II, DATE OF REVIE DECLASSIFICATION Reference is made to our letter to the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 19, 1964, captioned as above, a copy of which was fe to your organization. (X) (U) graded the classification of referenced letter from ested to do unication. LM: MEC: hrt ADVISED BELIF (S) 47 JUN 28 1965 2 (4) NOTE: CIA forwarded by Form 1669 dated 5-4-65 33 "Top secret" classifications which had been downgraded by that Agency to "Secret." The Bureau downgraded all of the communications mentioned by CIA and, further, traced what Bureau communications also contained the original information which was classified "Top the latter mentioned in the latter me The letter mentioned in this letter reiterated information contained in one of the 33 documents, which was classified as "Top steret." The information, therefore, must be downgraded to "Selfet." OSI is being so advised. CIA and all Bureau offices have been or are being notified by separate communication of the 36 JUL 6 1960 Bushing

OCT 29 1999 CLASSIFIED BY SPZ ALMIN DECLASSIFY ON: 25X per eta UTR 2/10/99



Director
Central Intelligence Agency

In relation to the above, your attention is directed to your referenced February 28, 1964, communication wherein is set forth that "Sammy" advised

As prior communications in this case have set forth, subject was issued a United States passport on February 29, 1960, for travel to Scandinavia, Russia, Poland, and France, and, according to the subject, he left the United States for Stockholm on May 1, 1960. Also, according to subject, he departed by bus from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and particular transfer of the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and particular transfer of the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, and the States for Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland, for Joseph 1981, and France, a

on May 1, 1960. Also, according to subject, he departed by bus from Helsinki, Finland, for Leningrad on May 21, 1960, for his first tour into the USSR. During his last tour in the USSR in September, 1960, according to the subject, an attempted recruitment was made of him by the Soviets.

The above is set forth at length in order to point out the discrepancy that exists in regard to the statement of your source.

In view of your statement set forth in paragraph nine of referenced January 11, 1962, letter, this Bureau has interpreted the word

If, as investigation indicates, subject was only in the USSR from late May, 1960, to September, 1960.

(3)

You are requested to advise

according to your source, or that your source



SEE NOTE PAGE THREE.

SECRET

Diractor Central Intelligence Agency

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
NOTE: PIC

Classified "Secret" inasmuch as it sets forth information concerning (CIA Scurce) and Yuri Nosenko (Samuy), Soviet defector, the unauthorized disclosure of which could have serious effects on the national interest. Additionally, CIA communications containing the above information are classified "Secret." (u)



Nosenko advised

Due to the conflicts concerning dates concerning subject as set forth above, CIA is being asked to clarify the matter.





When incorporating information furnished by into communication suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardised. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Ы Б2 Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate

when disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively. (u)

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING
ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION
TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF
THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

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