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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12/11/64 (u)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-60531) (u)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (65-15896) (u)

JUL 19 1964

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (u)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2AUM/PA
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
85-1444 (Per CIA letter
5-10-2000)

ESP-R
(GRU)
(OO: New York)

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Re NY letter 11/3/64, and Bulet 11/23/64 (u)

- ① - Bureau (RM)
 - (1-65-62911) [REDACTED] (u)
 - (1-65-64201) (UNSUB; aka [REDACTED]) (u)
 - (1-65-64189) [REDACTED] (u)
 - (1-65-68530) (NOSENKO) (u)
- 3 - Los Angeles (65-5401) (RM)
 - (1-65-6380) (UNSUB; aka [REDACTED]) (u)
 - (1-65-6390) (UNSUB; aka [REDACTED]) (u)
- 1 - Phoenix (65-840) (UNSUB; aka [REDACTED]) (RM) (u)
- 2 - San Francisco (65-4558) (RM)
 - (1-65-5175) [REDACTED] (u)
- 6 - New York
 - (1-65-16756) [REDACTED] (u)
 - (1-65-17170) (UNSUB; aka [REDACTED]) (u)
 - (1-65-17150) [REDACTED] (u)
 - (1-65-65721) (NOSENKO) (u)

JFH:hjr
(19) (u)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY: 1259...
REASON FOR EXTENSION: FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2...
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION: 12/11/84 (u)

NOT RECORDED
DEC 16 1964

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF CLASSIFICATION DATE 12/26/78 JPH/aw

66 JAN 21 1965 (u)

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-60531-329

NY [65-15896] (u)

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The prime purpose of this communication is to review the case from its inception in 1945 up until the present time. [redacted] has recently returned to the US, after spending 15 months abroad travelling through Europe and Asia. During this travel he again visited the Soviet Union. (u)

Information has been received subsequent to his departure from the US in June, 1963, that [redacted] is presently engaged in intelligence activities on behalf of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (u)

The secondary purpose of this communication is to act as a guide post in an effort to determine if an interview with [redacted] in the near future would be productive. (u)

I.

CAUTION (u)

BECAUSE OF THE WIDESPREAD RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS CASE, THIS COMMUNICATION WILL, OF NECESSITY, INCLUDE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SOURCES, MUCH OF WHICH HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "SECRET." IN THE INTEREST OF CLARITY AND CONTINUITY, THIS INFORMATION IS BEING SET OUT AS RECEIVED WITH NO ATTEMPT MADE AT PARAPHRASING IT. THEREFORE, THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISSEMINATING ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. (u)

II.

BACKGROUND (u)

Extensive investigation has determined full particulars about [redacted] background. Briefly, [redacted] was born [redacted] in Los Angeles, California. His parents were both born in the Soviet Union. The majority of his immediate family continues to reside in the Los Angeles area. [redacted] has been married and divorced. No children issued from this marriage. He has not served in the Armed Forces. (u)

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NY [65-60531] (u)

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[redacted] NYC. He resides alone in an apartment at [redacted] near his present employment [redacted] is currently on the Special Section - Espionage, of the Security Index in the New York Office. (u)

[Comment] (u)

[redacted] birth was not officially recorded until [redacted] on the basis of a legal petition by the father, claiming that he was born in [redacted] on [redacted] (u)

2. When applying for admission to UCLA on 5/25/35, [redacted] claimed that he was born [redacted] In 1938 when applying for graduate study courses, he listed his birth date as [redacted] High school records circa 1930, indicate three completely different dates of birth. (u)

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III. PASSPORT INFORMATION (u)

[redacted] was first issued a US Passport at Los Angeles, California, on 6/14/38. This passport, number [redacted] was subsequently returned to the USDS on 1/15/40. (u)

[redacted] was next issued a US Passport, also at Los Angeles, on 6/12/61, (or 6/24/61.) This passport, which he utilized during his current travel is number [redacted] (u)

[Comment] (u)

1. [Based on the above passport information, it was assumed that between the dates 1/15/40, and 6/12/61, [redacted] was not in possession of a valid US passport. This becomes pertinent when it is related to information furnished by SAMTY, which will be disclosed later. (u)

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IV. PRIOR INTERVIEWS BY FBI

During July, 1946, [redacted] was interviewed by FBI personnel in Los Angeles on several occasions, regarding his knowledge of [redacted] admitted knowing [redacted] but denied knowledge of or participation in any [redacted] espionage activities. (u) He stated that because of his Russian heritage, he feels strongly sympathetic toward the Russian people, but not foolish enough to commit espionage on their behalf. (u)

[redacted] was next interviewed by FBI personnel of the New York Office on 2/23/49. This interview was again aimed at determining full and particular knowledge, which [redacted] might have concerning [redacted]. The interview met with the same response as previously given by [redacted] in 1946. (u)

[redacted] was next interviewed on 10/15/53, again by agent personnel of the New York Office. This interview was specifically directed at determining [redacted] knowledge regarding certain documents which were found in [redacted] possession. He denied any knowledge of these documents and became upset when this matter was brought up. (u)

Comment

1. It was the opinion of the interviewing agents, particularly during 1953 interview that [redacted] although permitting the interview, made little effort to cooperate. It is now known that he definitely lied during each of the above interviews. (u)

2. [redacted] became noticeably upset when the one tangible espionage connection between himself and [redacted] was brought up. (u)

V. FOREIGN TRAVEL

July, 1938 - January, 1940

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Having received his first passport in June, 1938, [redacted] travelled abroad during the period July, 1938 - January, 1940. Reportedly, this travel was for the purpose of studying economic geography and visiting industrial plants. In his original passport application, he did not enumerate Russia as one of the countries to be visited. However, his cancelled passport reflected that he entered Soviet Russia through Odessa on 5/13/39. (u)

June 8, 1956 - June 24, 1956 (u)

In June, 1959, [redacted] advised that [redacted] automobile contained what appeared to be a permit to enter Mexico, dated 6/3/56. Subsequent investigation determined that [redacted] entered Mexico on 6/8/56, and returned to the US on 6/24/56. [redacted] activities while in Mexico are unknown. (u)

[redacted] also advised that [redacted] auto contained various maps of the US and Canada. (u)

September 8, 1956 - September 23, 1956 (u)

On 9/8/56, [redacted] departed NYC via the "Queen of Bermuda" en route to Bermuda. He returned to NYC via Pan American Airlines on 9/23/56. (u)

December 24, 1956 - January 1, 1957 (u)

On 12/24/56, [redacted] departed NYC via BOAC en route to Nassau and returned to NYC on 1/1/57. (u)

July 3, 1961 - September, 1961 (u)

On July 3, 1961, [redacted] departed Los Angeles, California, en route to Europe. His travel companion was [redacted] returned to NYC in early September, 1961. [redacted] when interviewed by Special Agents of the Los Angeles Office on 1/7/63, advised that during this trip he was with [redacted] when [redacted] visited in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. (u)

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May 25, 1962 - September - October, 1962

On 5/25/62, [redacted] departed NYC via steamship en route to Europe and returned to NYC in either September or October, 1962.

[redacted] activities during this trip are unknown.

June 29, 1963 - August 21, 1964

On 6/29/63, [redacted] departed Los Angeles, California, en route to London, England. He returned to territorial US on 8/21/64, at Honolulu.

His travelling companion for a portion of this trip was [redacted].

During this trip [redacted] was on sabbatical leave. It has been ascertained that he visited the following countries:

- England
- Italy
- Russia
- Greece
- Pakistan
- India
- Egypt
- Malaya
- Japan

Comment

1. [redacted] trip to Mexico in 1956 has a possible intelligence significance on which further comment will be made later.

2. [redacted] travel to Bermuda, Nassau, and Mexico in 1956 could be readily performed without the benefit of a current US passport.

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NY (65-15896) (S)(U)

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3. [redacted] trips to Europe in 1961, 1962, and 1963 were also for intelligence purposes on which comment will be made later. (S)(U)

4. It is believed that [redacted] visit to the Soviet Union during 1963 most probably took place between early September and October 30, 1963. [redacted] who visited the Soviet Union with [redacted] during this trip returned to the US about 11/7/63. [redacted] sister-in-law, [redacted] who reportedly did not visit the Soviet Union with [redacted] but who was travelling with him, returned to the US in early September, 1963. (S)(U)

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5. On 11/14/63, a confidential source of the Los Angeles Office determined that [redacted] made a comment to [redacted] sister, [redacted] that she had visited Russia with [redacted] told [redacted] that she was surprised that she and [redacted] were able to gain access to many Russian cities, which are usually not open to American tourists. (S)(U)

6. [redacted] was born in San Francisco, California, on [redacted] and currently resides at [redacted]. Her father, [redacted] was born in San Francisco [redacted] her mother, [redacted] was born in Arizona [redacted]. In her passport application, dated 6/21/63, she advised that she would be absent from the US for two months for educational purposes. She did not indicate that the Soviet Union was to be one of her proposed visits. [redacted] reportedly is a friend of [redacted] wife of [redacted] and it was through this friendship that she became acquainted with the subject. There is no indication that [redacted] had known [redacted] prior to 1963. (S)(U)

VI. [INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)(U)

A. [redacted] (S)(U)

In 1945, IGOR GOUZENKO, a Soviet code clerk, defected in Canada. Subsequent to his defection he identified [redacted] as a Soviet illegal agent of the GRU, who was operating in California. (S)(U)

E-7 - [redacted] (S)(U)

NY 65-15896

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Located in the personal belongings of [redacted] was page 13, the last page, of an unclassified document, dated 1/28/45, pertaining to the electric hydraulic equipment utilized by the [redacted] San Francisco, California. Subsequent investigation determined that [redacted] who was a close friend and associate of [redacted] in Los Angeles, was one of a large group of individuals having access to this document. Of this group, [redacted] was the only common denominator between the document and [redacted]

In September, 1945, a highly confidential source located in [redacted] possession a letter containing [redacted] personal history. This letter was addressed to the China - American Council of Commerce and Industry. This letter is especially significant since [redacted] is known to have engaged in recruiting persons in the US to act as Soviet agents in the Orient

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[Comment] (u)

1. Based on the above and bolstered by [redacted] close association with [redacted] which was determined by investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Office prior to [redacted] disappearance in November, 1945, considerable attention was paid to [redacted] his background, and associates. After [redacted] disappearance, [redacted] was interviewed on several occasions and as previously noted, denied any knowledge of or participation in [redacted] illegal activities. [redacted] case was actively investigated from 1945 until early 1954, when investigation failed to disclose any evidence or activities on [redacted] part inimicable to the national security

[B. [redacted]] (u)

In August, 1955, [redacted] was furnished with the following information re [redacted] This information was furnished to the informant by his Soviet principal, [redacted]

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[redacted] worked [redacted] as an engineer. Gave documents, receiving some of those through his friends [redacted]. He worked as well with well known to you [redacted]. His address in 1946 was [redacted] telephone [redacted]. In case of disruption there was an agreement to phone [redacted] and ask, Is it [redacted] residence? [redacted] answers that it's a mistake. It means that the meeting must take place at the entrance of the church on La Rene Street (eastern part of Seattle) on Sunday at 11:00 a.m. Both must have green ties and green handkerchiefs in the breast pockets. Our man must ask: 'Don't you know where [redacted] lives now?' [redacted] must answer: 'In the past he lived on Grameron Drive.' (S) (U)

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In addition to [redacted] the names and similar identifying data regarding six other individuals was furnished to the informant by [redacted] related to the informant that the individuals were Soviet agents with whom contacts had been disrupted. The informant was instructed to attempt to recontact these individuals in an effort to reactivate them. The informant, who came under the control of the San Francisco Office in late 1956 denied following these instructions and stated he had not contacted any of the individuals. (S) (U)

[redacted] in 1955 was the [redacted] NYC, NY. He has been identified as an agent of the GRU. (S) (U)

The information furnished [redacted] the informant was in code, and the exact decoded message reads as above. Omitting misspellings in the message, agent personnel familiar with the investigation at the time, noted obvious errors in the [redacted] information. It would appear that Soviets used the word Seattle where they should have used the word Los Angeles. If the city "Los Angeles" were inserted on each occasion that the city "Seattle" is mentioned, the information would be most accurate. (S) (U)

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Also, from the known background of [redacted] as well as the recognition, parole to be utilized in re-establishing contact, it was believed that [redacted] should have been identified as an agent of [redacted] and not [redacted] (S)(U)

Subsequent investigation by various field offices did not uncover a suspect for [redacted] however, [redacted] is believed to be [redacted] brother-in-law [redacted] whom [redacted] married on [redacted] (S)(U)

[redacted] was employed at [redacted] in the Los Angeles area from 1940 - 1944. (S)(U)

Comment

1. From the nature of the information furnished in [redacted] it would appear that as of August, 1955, the Soviets were not in contact with [redacted]. If [redacted] was an active agent at that time, the utilization of [redacted] as an intermediary would not have been necessary. (S)(U)

2. It is not known when or by what means [redacted] has been reactivated into the Soviet Intelligence apparatus; however, as previously noted, [redacted] travelled to Mexico in June, 1956, and remained there for over two weeks. This trip may have been Soviet directed when it is recalled that in May, 1959, [redacted] another [redacted] subject, was contacted. [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

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NY (65-15896) (S)(u)

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3. From the [redacted] information it was definitely established that [redacted] had been a GRU agent. He supplied the Soviets with documents presumably through [redacted] in turn had had two "friends", who knowingly or unwittingly also furnished documents. (S)(u)

4. Bearing in mind that one of the documents presumably furnished by [redacted] originated at [redacted] employment at [redacted] Los Angeles, California becomes pertinent. (S)(u)

On 6/5/45, [redacted] started his employment at this location. The employment was terminated in January, 1946. Investigation has determined that [redacted] obtained this employment by falsification of his employment application, regarding both his past employments and education. When the 12th US Civil Service Region Office at San Francisco, California became aware of these falsifications, they instructed the [redacted] to terminate subject's employment. On 1/2/46, [redacted] resignation was accepted in lieu of discharge for falsification of his application form at the time of his employment. (S)(u)

For the following reasons it is believed that [redacted] employment at [redacted] was in connection with his intelligence activities. (S)(u)

1. At the time [redacted] sought employment at [redacted] as an engineer he was already an educated man having received his Masters Degree in Business Administration. Other employments suitable to a man of his education and available without falsification of his background must have been available in his chosen field. (S)(u)

2. A page of a [redacted] document accessible to [redacted] during this employment was located in [redacted] possessions. (S)(u)

3. When questioned re this document [redacted] became noticeably upset and denied any knowledge of it. (S)(u)

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C. INFORMATION FURNISHED BY [redacted] (u)

(u) In August, 1963, [redacted] advised that a professor of Economy at NYU is a GRU agent. This professor had visited Bulgaria in August of 1962, and [redacted] (S)

As previously noted, [redacted] departed the US on 5/25/62, en route to Europe. He returned to NYC in either September or October, 1962. Also, as previously noted, [redacted] advised that during [redacted] 1961 trip to Europe, [redacted] visited various government offices in Bulgaria. (S) (u)

[redacted] (S)

In March, 1962, [redacted] advised that [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Also in 1962, the informant advised that another [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

In May, 1962, [redacted] identified without hesitation a photo of [redacted] as being identical [redacted] (S)

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NY (65-15896) (u)

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Investigation into the background and activities of [redacted] was initiated by the Bureau in September, 1954, due to [redacted] employment at the [redacted] Company, NYC, during the period 1939 - 1943. It was determined that [redacted] departed the US in 1948, reportedly to conduct business as the European sales representative of the [redacted]. No information was developed as to whether [redacted] ever returned to the US subsequent to 1948. (u)

At no point during the [redacted] investigation was [redacted] name uncovered. However, it is noted that [redacted] entered CCNY on 9/5/46, and graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of Electronics Engineering Degree on 2/1/48. [redacted] in early 1947, while in California stated that he was travelling to NYC by auto and planned to take a teaching position at CCNY. [redacted] was in fact an instructor of Business Administration at CCNY on a part-time basis from September, 1947 until at least February, 1953. (u)

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During the [redacted] investigation, his friends, acquaintances, college instructors, and several students who were at CCNY with [redacted] during the period 1946 - 1948, were interviewed. As mentioned above, no information was developed that would link [redacted] to [redacted]. (u)

Comment

(u). Upon receipt of the [redacted] information the New York Office reopened the [redacted] investigation in late 1956. This case has been in a pending status to date. From 1956 to 1963, various investigative techniques including fisurs, tesurs, mail covers, monitoring of [redacted] bank account, and anonymous sources were utilized in an effort to determine if [redacted] was a Soviet agent. Although this investigation determined and identified [redacted] contacts, and friends, no [redacted] (u)

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NY 65-15896 (S)(U)

positive intelligence activity was uncovered and the only indication of possible intelligence significance was in connection with [redacted] trip to Mexico in 1956, and his travels to Europe in 1961, 1962, and 1963. (S)(U)

2. It is noted that [redacted] in August, 1963, used the present tense when describing [redacted] status as a GRU agent. (S)(U)

3. As noted above, [redacted] unhesitatingly identified a photo of [redacted] as being identical. (S) However, various discrepancies between the known background of [redacted] were noted. (S) These discrepancies are not being listed here, since as far as [redacted] is related to [redacted] they become academic. As far as the informant is concerned, [redacted] In August, 1963, when he would have been in a more advantageous position to determine if his identification had been erroneous he did not so advise. He made no amendment or correction to his original identification. (S)(U)

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4. It is noted with interest that the only two known Soviet contacts of [redacted] have been illegal agents, [redacted] This may give some basis for a working hypothesis that [redacted] intelligence assignment is in connection with the support or control of illegal agents. (S)(U)

5. It is recalled that previously in this memorandum (comment number 1 [redacted] the opinion was offered that [redacted] was not in contact with the Soviets in August, 1955. According to the [redacted] information, [redacted] last address known to the Soviets was in California, thus indicating that [redacted] was inactive between 1946 - August, 1955. [redacted] maintained permanent residence and employment in NYC from late 1947 until the present time. If [redacted] was working with [redacted] during the period 1947 - 1948 [redacted] departed the US in 1948) why was only [redacted] 1946 address known to the Soviets? The following explanations are offered: (S)(U)

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NY (65-15896)

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(a) The Soviets were aware of [redacted] 1955 address in NYC but furnished false information to [redacted] to test his reliability. (S)

(b) [redacted] (S)

(c) [redacted] (S)

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D. INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY SAMMY (S)

SAMMY is the code name of a CIA informant, a high ranking KGB officer who openly defected to the West in early 1964 and whose bona fides has not yet been established. (S)

In early February, 1964, SAMMY reported that one [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

Per

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CIA

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(b)(3)

50 USC Section 403

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

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(k)(3)

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Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

_____ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

_____ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

_____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

65-68530-NR dated 12/11/64 pgs. 16-17

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
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NY (65-15896) (u)

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[REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] (S)

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5. Comment 3(e) above, offers to the other informants in this case, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] a certain amount of immunity should [REDACTED] be interviewed and the interview then be brought to the attention of the GRU. [REDACTED] SAMMY could easily be made the scapegoat for much of our information. (u)

VII. CURRENT STATUS (u)

[REDACTED] has returned to NYC from his sabbatical leave. He re-entered US territory at Honolulu on 8/21/64; re-entered continental US at Los Angeles, California, on 8/24/64, and was first observed in NYC on 9/28/64. He resides alone, as in the past, in Apartment [REDACTED]. He is employed as a [REDACTED] Washington Square, NYC. His exact schedule has been previously furnished the Bureau (NY letter 11/3/64.) (u)

VIII. PROPOSED FUTURE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES (u)

[REDACTED] activities as a GRU agent are for the most part an unknown quantity. With the exception of the [REDACTED] information to the effect that "he furnished documents" to the Soviets circa 1945, no other intelligence activity is known. This unknown quantity continues to exist in spite of the fact that [REDACTED] activities have been followed and investigated almost continually for the last nineteen years. (u)

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NY (65-15896) (S)(u)

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The one major area where [redacted] activities have (u) not been followed is during his trips abroad. In this connection it is noted that SAMMY and most probably [redacted] have both identified [redacted] as a GRU agent precisely because of his activities abroad. (S)(u)

By letter dated 9/17/63, the Bureau pointed out that because of [redacted] frequent trips abroad it is entirely possible that he has no personal contacts with Soviets in the US, but his contacts are made abroad. (S)(u)

The primary aim of the proposed investigation in this case will be the penetration of [redacted] intelligence activities by all means available. Obviously, the most optimistic end result would be the "doubling" of [redacted] and having him act in place under our direction. (S)(u)

NY letter to the Bureau, 11/3/64, stated that to date the [redacted] case does offer prosecutive potential. The following is the documentation of [redacted] known connections with Soviet Intelligence. (S)(u)

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Allegation

Source

Availability For Court Testimony

Page 13 of an unclassified Naval document was located among [redacted] possessions. (S)(u)

[redacted] (1946)

The chain of evidence with regard to the location and identification of this document could be produced in court. However, there is no evidence to substantiate that [redacted] did give this document to [redacted] only that [redacted] would have access to it. (S)(u)

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Allegation

Source

Availability For Court Testimony

A letter located in [redacted] possessions contained the personal background and history of [redacted]. It was addressed to the China - America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., San Francisco. (S)(u)

[redacted] (anonymous), Los Angeles report of SAA [redacted] dated 11/21/51 page [redacted].

Unavailable for court production.

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[redacted] is a Soviet Agent on the West Coast with whom the Soviets have most contact. (S)(u)

[redacted] who furnished this information orally to [redacted] in August, 1955. (S)(u)

Obviously, [redacted] is not available to testify. As far as the New York Office is aware, [redacted] is also not available to testify. (S)(u)

[redacted] gave documents to the Soviets and worked with [redacted] (The full information contained on the microfilm located in the shaving brush and described previously in this communication.) (S)(u)

Microfilm furnished to [redacted] by [redacted] in August, 1955. (S)(u)

Same objections as above.

E-20 - [redacted] (u)

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NY (65-15896) (S)(U)

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Allegation

Source

Availability For Court Testimony

(Unsub

[redacted] is a GRU agent. (S)(U)

[redacted]

Unavailable to testify.

[redacted] was in contact with an unnamed GRU officer in Moscow sometime during the period 1958-1960. (S)(U)

SAMMY

As far as is known, SAMMY is not available to testify. Even if available, this information is at best heresay and circumstantial. (U)

The New York Office does not believe that future investigation should be restricted to those avenues of approach which would produce admissible evidence. The fact that [redacted] is a US citizen and thus opened to prosecution will be borne in mind, and every effort will be made to obtain admissible evidence. (S)(U)

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The following coverage is being and/or will be afforded to [redacted] (S)(U)

1. Physical Surveillance (U) *

(U) Extensive discreet physical surveillances of [redacted] are not feasible. He is presumedly an accomplished intelligence agent of long experience who would be ever conscious to the presence of a surveillance. (S)(U)

Also, the physical area of [redacted] residence does not offer discreet vantage points to monitor his comings and goings. (S)(U)

The immediate area of [redacted] residence and nearby employment is inundated with [redacted] and students. (S)(U)

E-21 - 7/8 (U)

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NY (65-15896) (S) (u)

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Within one block of his residence is the residence and employment of the subject of the [redacted] case, a KGB operation. It is anticipated that physical surveillances will be utilized only when a specific purpose is expected to be accomplished. (S) (u)

(S) (u)

A survey of buildings in the area of [redacted] residence suitable for a permanent confidential lookout has determined that only one building has vacancies. The only suitable available apartment would rent for \$350 per month. (The above survey was conducted without the Agent personnel identifying themselves.) (S) (u)

The New York Office will be alert for any available location suitable to be utilized as a confidential lookout. (S) (u)

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2. Financial Coverage (S) (u)

[redacted] bank account maintained at the Chase Manhattan Bank, 799 Broadway, NYC, is being monitored on a monthly basis through the cooperation of [redacted]. In addition to furnishing information regarding [redacted] banking activities, [redacted] has developed a personal relationship with [redacted]. NY airtel 11/6/64 advised the Bureau of the fact that [redacted] has taken this informant out to lunch. (S) (u)

This account monitoring has been in effect for many years and has been instrumental in identifying certain of [redacted] associations. (S) (u)

3. Technical Coverage (S) (u)

Effective 11/18/64, contact was established with [redacted]. This informant, on a daily basis, furnishes information within a certain sphere of [redacted] field of contacts. The particular individuals on whom this informant furnishes information will be made the subject of a separate communication. However, to date it has been noted that a majority of these people have been females. (S) (u)

E-22 (S) (u)

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The New York Office will develop pertinent background information on individuals identified by this informant. ~~(S)~~(u)

[The establishment of contact with [redacted] is very important since the [redacted] information details that the procedure to be used to recontact [redacted] was to have been a method which would be within the scope of [redacted]'s coverage. ~~(S)~~(u)

4. Mail and Trash Coverage ~~(S)~~(u)

These types of coverages, although desirable, are not applicable at this time. ~~(S)~~(u)

5. Informant Coverage ~~(S)~~(u)

[redacted] in addition to furnishing information concerning [redacted] banking transactions, may be able to develop a personal friendship with [redacted]. This avenue of approach will be further explored. ~~(S)~~(u)

The New York Office is also in the process of developing background data on three individuals as PSIs to be directed against [redacted]. These individuals are: ~~(S)~~(u)

[redacted] - [redacted] residence who also lives in an adjoining building. ~~(S)~~(u)

[redacted] - [redacted] resides in [redacted] immediately next door to [redacted]. ~~(S)~~(u)

[redacted] - [redacted] resides in an adjacent building to [redacted]. ~~(S)~~(u)

- 23 - ~~(S)~~(u)

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If nothing precludes the utilization of the above three individuals they should be in a position to furnish some information pertaining to [redacted] activities in and around his residence as well as possibly identifying any visitors to [redacted] apartment. (S) (u)

[redacted] in particular, because of the proximity of her residence to [redacted], would be very valuable in this regard. Also, the utilization of her residence in other types of coverage on [redacted] is also possible. (S) (u)

As indicated above, there is presently no source in contact with [redacted] at his employment, [redacted] It is anticipated that every effort will be made to develop a PSI at [redacted] place of employment. This will necessitate the utilization of a member of [redacted] Bureau policy in this regard will be kept in mind. (u)

[redacted] (S) (u)

[redacted] (S) (u)

Through recontact with [redacted] it is hoped that this informant can be logically placed in contact with [redacted] (S) (u)

6. To date, neither [redacted] name nor photograph have been exhibited to [redacted]. The New York Office believes that [redacted] name and photograph (1961 passport photograph) should be exhibited to [redacted] although this informant's scope of knowledge is not within the area of [redacted] activity, the fact that [redacted] has in recent years visited Moscow on two occasions may have come to this informant's attention. (S) (u)

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NY (65-15896) (S)(u)

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7. Travel Coverage (S)(u)

As noted herein, frequent travel outside continental US has had intelligence significance. Little coverage has been afforded during these trips. It is anticipated that as any future travel plans are uncovered the New York Office will make specific recommendations for a more intensive type of coverage. (S)(u)

IX. REINTERVIEW WITH (S)(u)

The secondary purpose of the preceding review of the investigation is to explore the possibility of a productive interview with in the near future. (S)(u)

Within the past year there have been various recommendations made as to an interview with subsequent to return from his most recent trip abroad. (S)(u)

(a) Bureau letter to San Francisco dated 11/12/63, entitled, "ESPIONAGE - R" instructed that the reactivation potential of should no longer be a deterrent to logical active investigations originating with or relating to the case. (S)(u)

(b) San Francisco letter to the Bureau 12/31/64, entitled, "ESPIONAGE - R" recommended that and principal suspect for UNSUB; be simultaneously interviewed upon return to NYC in "mid - 1964." (S)(u)

San Francisco further recommended that any interviews should be conducted without reference to the shaving brush or to and data furnished by any interviews regarding should be accepted and explored in a manner which would preclude any assumption that is a cooperative source. This procedure is felt necessary in view of the residence of son in the USSR. (S)(u)

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San Francisco suggested that it would be very unlikely that a routine interview of the [redacted] subjects would result in a voluntary admission of involvement in Soviet Espionage. (This is particularly true in [redacted] case.) It was further suggested that should the interviewee deny involvement in Soviet Espionage, they be confronted with a paraphrased synopsis of the information in the shaving brush sufficiently detailed to allow the subject to realize that the interviewing Agents are not on a fishing expedition, but are aware of his past cooperation with the Soviets and are also aware that arrangements had been made for his recontact by Soviet Intelligence. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

San Francisco realized that if this line of questioning became known to the Soviets, it would be conceivable that [redacted] could be identified as our source, but this calculated risk appeared warranted to assure any degree of success in the interviews. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

(c) NY letter to the Bureau dated 12/27/63, entitled, "UNSUB; aka [redacted], ESPIONAGE - R" offered the opinion that in view of the highly sensitive nature of [redacted] and the course of events which have already placed this informant under extreme heavy burdens" it was not then believed that an interview of [redacted] and [redacted] would produce anything of sufficient value which would justify the risk to the informant. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

This communication further pointed out that personal contact with [redacted] was anticipated by 1965, at which time further information relating to [redacted] could be developed. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

In short, this communication expressed two reasons for not interviewing [redacted] upon his return to the US. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

1. The security of [redacted] might be jeopardized. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)
2. Recontact with [redacted] at a later date would develop further information about [redacted] without alerting him to our continued interest. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ (u)

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(d) San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 1/6/64 entitled [redacted] ESPIONAGE - R" concurred in the recommendations expressed in New York Office letter dated 12/27/63, that neither [redacted] nor [redacted] be interviewed (S)(u)

The above communications synopsise the recommendations and objections to an interview with [redacted] upon his return to the US in 1964. The main objections being the security of [redacted] and the fact that subsequent recontact with that informant offered a better avenue of approach. (S)(u)

It is felt that recent events have materially minimized the above objections (S)(u)

The recent open defection of SAMMY, with his official knowledge of [redacted] offers another source of information about [redacted] which does not jeopardize either [redacted] (S)(u)

As previously pointed out, there is a distinct possibility (the Soviets are already aware of the fact that American Intelligence knows about [redacted] current connection with the GRU through SAMMY's disclosures. [redacted] (S)(u)

[redacted] suggests that even if the Soviets are not now aware of our knowledge of [redacted] should we (FBI) conduct investigation which then became known to the Soviets, it would be "highly probable that the Soviets would attribute our investigations to information supplied by SAMMY. (S)(u)

As far as recontact with [redacted] is concerned, recent public revelations in the [redacted] trial have not enhanced the probability of recontact with this informant in the near future. (S)(u)

E-27-7 (S)(u)

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It is felt that there are three main considerations to be evaluated in proposing an interview with [redacted] in the near future: (u)

1. The security of the informants involved. (u)
2. Is this the best approach available to attain the end purpose of this investigation - the penetration of this particular aspect of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus. (u)
3. What are the chances of this interview being productive. (u)

1. It is not believed that an interview with [redacted] would jeopardize [redacted]. His information did not name [redacted] per se, although there is little doubt that he was referring to [redacted]. We have knowledge, through the interview with [redacted] that [redacted] did visit Bulgaria in 1961, at which time he also visited the USSR. We also have unrestricted information that [redacted] travelled to Europe in 1962 and 1963. The only thing of a restricted nature in the information furnished by [redacted] is that [redacted]. (u)

The specific utilization of SAMMY's information would have to be first discussed with a CIA representative. CIA has requested that no dissemination of the SAMMY information be made outside the Bureau without a prior consultation. (u)

The San Francisco Office has suggested the method of approaching the subject with a paraphrased synopsis of the "shaving brush information," acknowledging that this is a calculated risk to their informant [redacted] but it is warranted to assure any degree of success in the interview. (u)

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2. Is an interview the best avenue of approach to achieve our goal of penetration? (S) (U)

As noted before, [redacted] has been under active investigation almost continually for the last 19 years. This investigation has included all types of coverage including interview. The results have been a good insight into [redacted] the person. Information concerning [redacted] connection with Soviet Intelligence has come to us through our informants. It has been corroborated in some degree by investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Office during their investigation of [redacted]. Can we expect our future coverage, even more limited in nature, to be more successful than our prior coverage? This is doubtful, unless [redacted] should make a serious blunder. (S) (U) This is not to be construed as a criticism of past coverage nor as taking a defeatist attitude towards future coverage proposed above. Intelligence knowledge may be absent for the simple reason the intelligence activities by [redacted] in the US are nil. It has been suggested several times in the [redacted] investigation that his value to the Soviets may be directly related to his frequent travel outside continental US. He may do nothing in this country to in any way compromise his position. His may be the classic "third country" operation. (S) (U)

3. What are the chances of an interview with [redacted] being productive? (S) (U)

An interview, as the best avenue of approach, can only be considered if that interview can have some logical chance of success. An integral part of any interview is the nature and personality of the person to be interviewed. These are the intangibles and cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. There are some known facts available upon which conjecture can be offered, but it remains only that - conjecture. (S) (U)

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NY(65-15896] ~~S~~(u)

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Briefly, those facts which mitigate against a successful interview are:

1. We have no prosecutable case against [redacted] ~~S~~(u). Thus, this cannot be used as a lever to insure his cooperation. X(u)
2. [redacted] an educated American citizen, must be aware that any admissions on his part as to a guilty involvement in Soviet espionage would subject him to possible prosecution. ~~S~~(u)
3. [redacted] has been totally uncooperative in prior interviews. ~~S~~(u)
4. He must have a strong feeling of security since during prior interviews he has said nothing and there have been no repercussions. He would have every reason to believe that silence would be his best weapon. X(u)
5. Finally, (if [redacted] were interviewed and remained uncooperative, we would have alerted him to our current interest. ~~S~~(u)

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There are other factors however, which would act as an indication that an interview may be successful: ~~S~~(u)

1. Although uncooperative, [redacted] has nevertheless permitted the interviews in the past, thus we can anticipate success as to merely gaining an entree. ~~S~~(u)
2. Even though immunity to prosecution cannot be promised or inferred, it could be pointed out to [redacted] that in other similar cases, the US Government has expressed the opinion that the full cooperation of an individual like himself with the Government has been assessed as a greater value to the country than an isolated prosecution. ~~S~~(u)

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3. In past interviews, he has become noticeably upset and unnerved when he has been questioned about the [REDACTED]. Confronting him with the paraphrased "shaving brush" information may break his resistance. ~~(S)~~ (U)
4. Also, as a possible follow-up to the "shaving brush" information, SAMMY's information may be related to him thusly: "A recent high ranking Soviet defector has told us that as recently as 1963, you [REDACTED] have been in contact with Soviet Intelligence in Moscow." ~~(S)~~ (U)
5. [REDACTED] has no way of knowing exactly what information we possess. To a man who has exhibited nervousness in the past, the assumption that we know much more than we actually do, might be very possible. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In summary, if an interview with [REDACTED] was unproductive, we would have made our current interest known to him, and we would have alerted him to the information we do possess. However, because of SAMMY's open defection, our current interest may very easily be already known, if not to [REDACTED] at least to the Soviets. ~~(S)~~ (U)

On the other hand should the interview be productive we will gain an insight into some phases of GRU activity as it is known to an agent of long standing who has just recently returned from Moscow. ~~(S)~~ (U)

It would appear that the potential gain outweighs the inherent risk always present in an interview of this nature. Even in an unproductive interview, it would be impressed upon [REDACTED] that the alternate method would be an intensive open investigation. If accomplishing nothing else, an open investigation may destroy his usefulness to the Soviets. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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NY(65-15896) (S)(u)

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Similarly, should [redacted] prove uncooperative, it could be forcefully pointed out to him that such cases as his, have in the past, been afforded publicity through some legal hearings or procedures. Such disclosures, particularly attributed to the "recent defector" would not, to say the least, further his career in his chosen field. (S)(u)

X. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE (S)(u)

The following are the recommendations of the New York Office: (S)(u)

1. The above described proposed activities will be put into effect. (S)(u)
2. The New York Office will closely follow information furnished by [redacted] (S)(u)
3. Bureau authority will be requested to interview the three PSIs previously mentioned. (S)(u)
4. Efforts will be made to further establish the relationship existing between [redacted] and [redacted] (S)(u)
5. Efforts will be made to logically place [redacted] (S)
6. The New York Office will be alert to develop anonymous sources. (S)(u)

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These investigative steps and any other logical investigation will be continued in effect until it has been reasonably established that [redacted] has returned to his normal pattern of activities as established by prior investigation. Should [redacted] return to his usual pattern, and in the absence of any further specific intelligence information, it is anticipated that the New York Office will request Bureau authority to interview [redacted]. If this authority is requested, full particulars regarding the interview along with a definite interview approach plan will be furnished to the Bureau for its approval. (S)(u)

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NY 65-15896

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XI. REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

Bureau authority is requested for the New York Office to furnish to [redacted] name and photograph for possible identification. (S)(U)

Offices receiving copies of this communication are those offices which presently have an active interest in the [redacted] or related investigations, and comments or suggestions from them are welcome. (S)(U)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC-9

LEGAT, BERN (S) (U)

SECRET

January 11, 1965 (U)

DIRECTOR, FBI

b3
per
CIA

[REDACTED] (S) (U) Sammy (S) (U)
IDENTIFICATION MATTERS
NO L

There are enclosed the fingerprints of the above-captioned subject. It is requested that the fingerprints be checked through the files of the Austrian police for any record. (S) (U)

Furnish Bureau, attention Identification Division, results of your inquiry. (S) (U)

MAY 09 2000
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AUM/AR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X I
PER CIA/ETH dated 08-29-99

1 - Bonn - Encl. - [fp cd of subj] (S) (U)

It is requested the fingerprints be checked through the files of the German police for any record. (S) (U)

Furnish Bureau, attention Identification Division, results of inquiry. (S) (U)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2AUM/AR
ON 7-25-2000
85-1499

1 - Rome - Encl. - [fp cd of subj] (S) (U)

It is requested the fingerprints be checked through the files of the Italian police for any record. (S) (U)

Furnish Bureau, attention Identification Division, results of inquiry. (S) (U)

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REC-9 65-68530-311
EX-117 JAN 13 1965

Foreign Liaison Section (Route through Foreign Liaison Section)

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FCIM, II, 26.4
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 11/1/85

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