

*Freedom of Information  
and  
Privacy Acts*

*Subject: Yuri Nosenko*

*File Number: 65-68530 - Section 5*



*Federal Bureau of Investigation*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

*RW*  
*3/22*

*See Addendum*  
*190-709-10341*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau  
of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

*SECRET*

SUBJECT: SAMMY

REFERENCE: CSCI [redacted] dtd 19 Mar 64  
CSCI [redacted] dtd 26 Mar 64  
Bureau File No. (S) 65-68530

*(b)(3) CIA*

In response to your request for six more copies of our report on SAMMY's bona fides, we are only able to provide an additional three copies inasmuch as a strictly limited number of copies were made.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP7/eltang*  
ON *11/21/94*

*James R. Hunter*  
JAMES ANGLETON

*Per CIA review 10/27/94*

*65-68530-99*

EX-105 *9/1* REC-23

*4 [Apr 3 1964]*

3 ENCLOSURES

CSCI [redacted]

Attachment

1cc [unclear]  
1cc [unclear]  
1cc [unclear]

64 AUG 11 1963

*CLASSIFIED*

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CLASSIFIED PER CIA  
LETTER OF MAR 5 1984

*150*

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Section 552

Section 552a

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Section 552

Section 552a

*Per CIA*

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(b)(7)(A)

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50 USC

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

Section 403

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

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*pages 3-9  
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D 1-8*

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TABLE NO. 1

AMERICAN CITIZENS

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[REDACTED] KGB (S)

attempted to recruit him on basis of compromise with men, but he rejected all approaches by the KGB. Source believes Subject did not report KGB approach to his superiors.

Case fully reported by GOLITSYN except the name but including the name of the KGB case officer.

Known.

[REDACTED] The KGB (S) attempted to recruit [REDACTED] on the basis of his involvement with a Russian maid. Recruitment failed.

[REDACTED] reported the (S) attempted recruitment.

Known.

(S) [REDACTED] was the target of a KGB recruitment operation in 1954-56 due to his involvement with his maid, [REDACTED] refused the approach, [REDACTED] (S)

Confessed.

Known.

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~~SECRET~~

TABLE NO. 1

3.

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

American

Identified by FBI.

Known.

[REDACTED] In 1962 Source stated that two Americans [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moscow, one a [REDACTED] went to Poland on vacation where they were com-

promised with Polish girls.

In 1964 Source stated that an American [REDACTED] went to Warsaw where he was compromised with a Polish girl.

(b)(1) (b)(3) PER CIA

[REDACTED] was recruited by [REDACTED] the KGB during his four months [REDACTED]

(S) Identity confirmed. No derogatory information.

Not previously known. Should be investigated further.

Name Unknown. Circa 1962 the [REDACTED] residenttura in Paris recruited an American [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who provides the KGB with strategic information valuable to the Ministry of Defense.

(S) NOSENKO states that in 1963 Subject was promoted and lost his access to strategic information.

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~~SECRET~~

TABLE NO. 1

4.

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

Name Unknown, KGB cryptonym: [redacted]

Not identified.

See paragraph 9 of Tab "E".

[redacted] in Germany from 1955-1957 is a KGB agent. [redacted] returned to Germany as a [redacted] in late 1962 or early 1963.

(b)(1) (b)(3) PCH C-1A

[redacted] U.S. citizen, was a correspondent in Moscow. Was an agent of the KGB there, reporting on political writers. Refused to cooperate with the KGB in the U.S. or in Geneva later on.

His wife was [redacted] Numerous reports of Communist affiliations and suspicion that he was an informant for the Soviets.

[redacted] Thus [redacted] had been presumed to be in contact with the KGB.

[redacted] U.S. citizen and correspondent, is a willing agent of the KGB in Moscow. Details of recruitment unknown, but some pressure applied because of [redacted] and involvement with other Russian women.

[redacted] Mentioned in CHEREPANOV papers. This info was also received previously from GOLITSYN. Well-known case.

[redacted] in Moscow for one or two years was probably an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV.

Reported recruitment attempt and several meetings with KGB. Known.

~~TOP SECRET~~



5.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] a correspond-  
ent has long been a target of  
the KGB and probably has been  
recruited.

Served in Moscow from 1941  
to 1953. [redacted]

Assumed.  
(b)(7)(D) Per CIA  
(b)(7)(E)

[redacted] correspondent in Moscow, is  
a recruited KGB agent.

FBI traces indicate no  
derogatory FBI traces.

To retire soon.

[redacted] is an "old KGB  
agent." Crypt changed from  
[redacted] wife is  
also agent.

GOLITSYN had full infor-  
mation. CHEREPANOV papers  
mentioned him by crypto-  
nym known to GOLITSYN.

Known.

[redacted] correspondent  
was recruited by the KGB dur-  
ing his Moscow tour, but refused  
to work for KGB on return to  
USA. Source stated [redacted]  
wife, [redacted] is former  
KGB agent who suspected him of  
working for KGB.

KHOKLOV identified Subject's  
wife as an NKVD agent. --Suspected because  
of wife.

Known. Conflict  
on identity of  
recruiting officer.

[redacted] correspondent  
in Moscow is a KGB agent. He was  
cultivated and recruited by  
Vyacheslav A. KUSKOV.

[redacted] reported his recruit-  
ment by "SLAVA" KISLOV in  
October 1962, whom he stated  
he had known as a TASS re-  
porter at UN in New York.  
(This can only be Aleksandr  
K. KISLOV, friend of NOSENKO's.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] - contacted by KGB during Squaw Valley Olympics, but not yet recruited. To be recontacted in Switzerland.

[redacted]

Known.

(S) Identity confirmed.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
A-1-A

Presumed to be a KGB contact because of her promiscuous activities in the USSR and her ability to remain in Moscow when her contract expired.

[redacted] in Moscow, recruited on basis sexual involvements by KGB.

(S) Name Unknown, KGB cryptonym, [redacted] is an American agent of the KGB in Geneva where he is employed by the [redacted]. He has been an agent since at least 1962.

Not yet identified.

(S) [redacted] was recruited by the KGB through his numerous involvements with women during his tour in the USSR as [redacted]

Identified in U.S. Embassy phone lists as [redacted] in Moscow from May 1957 to about December 1960. Appears in CHEREPANOV papers.

Considered by NOSENKO as a poor agent who gave the KGB nothing of value. Because of long residence in Moscow, was presumed to be in contact with the KGB.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7.

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

Name Unknown. Konstantin SMIRNOV uses a former American correspondent as a source of political info in the U.S. In 1962 this agent was in Geneva for [redacted] and SMIRNOV went to Geneva [redacted] to meet him.

(b)(1) PCI-A  
(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

Not yet identified.

Name Unknown. S&T agent, circa 45 years old, post-war DP with relatives in Loo near Sochi, lives in New York where he was run by the KGB in New York.

FBI reported orally that this agent has been identified.

Known. NOSENKO states KGB considered this agent compromised through his contact with [redacted]

[redacted] was recruited in Moscow in 1958 or 1959 on ideological grounds. He is a valuable all-purpose agent.

Identified by [redacted] a [redacted] probably a KGB agent. Long history as intelligence agent for any flag.

Presumed to have special status with Soviet regime in view of his special residence arrangements in Moscow. Has been known as an intelligence agent for one side or another since before WW II. Defector identified him as probably an agent.

Name Unknown, U.S. citizen living in England, furrier, married to Soviet woman, who is long time KGB agent. When he visited USSR for Leningrad fur exhibits between 1950-1961, was recruited by KGB in USSR.

Not identified.

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] was the tar- (S)  
 get of a KGB op during her  
 1958 visit to the USSR. She  
 was approached because the  
 KGB knew she had had an affair  
 with a Soviet officer in Ger-  
 many. NOSENKO doesn't believe  
 the KGB is working with her  
 because she works in Salt Lake  
 City which is too far away and  
 her capabilities aren't too good.

FBI info indicates [redacted] (S)  
 bore a child in January  
 1953 to Soviet First Lt. [redacted] (S)  
 in Germany. Their plan to  
 defect to West was prevented  
 by [redacted] reassignment to  
 USSR. (S)

NOSENKO states case  
 is worthless.

(b) (1) Pet  
 (b) (3) CIA

[redacted] was recruited in  
 1960 in the USSR and has made  
 several trips to USSR since  
 then. [redacted] is used by KGB to (S)  
 spot tourists with intelligence  
 affiliation. NOSENKO stated  
 that KGB has received only one  
 message from [redacted] since recruit- (S)  
 ment.

[redacted] frequent traveller to  
 the USSR. (S)

Known. Allegations  
 of continued contact  
 with the KGB should  
 be investigated.

[redacted] were (S)  
 arrested in USSR in 1962 and  
 recruited by KGB, but then failed  
 to appear at the meeting site in  
 Denmark.

Identity confirmed.

Known.



~~TOP SECRET~~

10.

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

(S) [redacted] - American tour-  
ist, recruited Moscow June  
1963.

TRACES

Identified by FBI, as a  
former Russian citizen,  
former name [redacted] (S)  
Entered U.S. 6 July 1923  
from Harbin, China. 1963  
trip to USSR confirmed.  
Subject has a mother, two  
brothers and a sister liv-  
ing in the USSR.

COMMENTS

Not previously known  
to CIA.

(S) (S) Del  
(S) (S) CIA

Identity confirmed.

(S) [redacted] was assessed by the KGB during  
his 1959 visit to the USSR as  
a homosexual and the KGB has  
compromising material to use in  
a blackmail operation if [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] does return to the USSR.

(S) [redacted] room-  
mate during 1959  
Sokolniki Exhibit.  
(S) [redacted] has confessed,  
probably removing any  
real KGB hopes for  
(S) [redacted] No KGB  
recruitment claimed.

(S) [redacted] In 1946- (S)  
47 recruited in Poland by KGB  
but never contacted because  
KGB felt she was known to AIS.  
Story turned up in Archives dur-  
ing 1962 visit to USSR and KGB  
again recruited her in Sept.  
1962.

(S) Traces show contact  
between [redacted] (S)  
and Yuriy A. NIKIFOROV,  
Ass't. Manager, Intourist,  
New York City, and KGB  
officer.

She was fired from a  
sensitive job in  
August 1962 for secur-  
ity reasons.

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

American of ██████████ (S) background (S) an ██████████ (S) visited the USSR in November 1963, where he contacted the KGB and told them of an American Army Captain in Military Intelligence who asked ██████████ (S) to tell the KGB of AIS's use of Monterey Language School. The KGB plans to contact the American Captain whose name is possibly ██████████ (S)

(b)(1) Per A  
(b)(3)  
S

██████████ (S) was recruited by ██████████ (S) the KGB on a homosexual compromise during a 1961 trip to the USSR. ██████████ (S) had been in the USSR in 1959 and has made other visits since his recruitment.

Identity confirmed. ██████████ (S) Confessed.

Known.

██████████ (S) Professor from Tennessee, was recruited by the KGB in Minsk on homosexual grounds in 1959.

No identifiable traces.

NOSENKO stated the KGB dropped this case as of little value.

██████████ (S) led tourist groups to the USSR in 1959 where he was assessed as ██████████ (S)

██████████ (S) Confessed.

Known.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12.

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] was recruited by the KGB during a 1962 visit to the USSR with full knowledge that [redacted]

she returns to the USSR an attempt will be made to break [redacted]

If [redacted]

[redacted] report a recruitment approach and was considering return to the USSR as a student in 1964.

She did not [redacted]

Needs further investigation.

[redacted] came to the USSR in October-1959 with a delegation of American metallurgists, was recruited and handed over to the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted] identified as long-time and well-known Communist. [redacted] only close friend. Sister married to Soviet citizen who is a courier for RIS.

Known Communist.

[redacted] During a 1959 visit to the USSR his homosexuality was discovered, but no action was taken until January 1962 when [redacted] was recruited on a homosexual compromise.

No traces.

NOSENKO claimed that the KGB used this as a training medium for young case officers in U.S. because of limited information. NOSENKO does not claim this case has any value.

[redacted] visited the USSR as a tourist in 1959 where he was assessed as a homosexual. If he returns, he will be a recruitment target.

Not identified.

Not yet a case.

~~TOP SECRET~~



LEADS

[redacted] came to the USSR in 1957 or 1958 where operational contact was established between him and the KGB.

[redacted] came to USSR TDY from [redacted] upgrade and was photographed making blackmarket deal in a taxi. Case not completed because [redacted] did not return to the USSR.

[redacted] visited the USSR in 1957 and 1963 and was approached by the KGB both times. [redacted] although slippery, said that he would help in the USA, if approached.

[redacted] was the object of much interest to the KGB 15th Department during his 26 October - 1 November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover made contact with [redacted] and planned to continue this contact in the U.S.

TRACES

[redacted] reported the approach.

Identity confirmed as [redacted]

(S)(D) (S)(B) P-1 P-1 A

Known. NOSENKO states case returned to Archives by KGB.

NOSENKO reports this is not a going operation.

Identified in an FBI report as a well-known Communist sympathizer.

Source stated that the First Chief Directorate was afraid of [redacted] due to his slippery character. Therefore, this is not an active case.

FBI has identified as [redacted]

Not yet recruited.

[redacted]

LEADS

TRACES

CONTACTS

[redacted] a student at Harvard University was recruited on ideological grounds in 1961. The case was given to the First Chief Directorate.

No traces.

(b)(1) Per CIA  
(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[redacted] visited the USSR in 1959 where he was assessed as a homosexual. If he returns, he will be a KGB recruitment target.

No traces.

Not yet a case.

[redacted] was recruited by the KGB in 1960 on the basis of her love for a Soviet. Turned over to First Chief Directorate which allegedly helped her obtain employment [redacted]

Identity confirmed in 1960 [redacted] planned to defect to USSR because she was in love with [redacted]

Known.

[redacted] a construction company employee, was recruited by the KGB in the summer of 1962 in the USSR to be used in emigre ops.

No traces.

From FBI reports.

Soviet contacts known.

[redacted] was recruited in 1962 on ideological grounds. His mission is to spot suspicious tourists and use open code to notify the KGB.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] - former Soviet (S) who joined German Army during war. Afterwards came to U.S. and became citizen. During visit to USSR in 1962 KGB attempted to recruit, but he refused to cooperate.

No trace.

NOSENKO said KGB has dropped case.

*(S) (S) (S) PJA*

[redacted] relatives in USSR and was recruited on ideological grounds while there with a tourist group in 1960. has (S)

[redacted] GOLITSYN reported to [redacted] have been a Soviet agent in the 1920's and 30's, under KGB illegal Vasily ZARUBIN. He later came to the USSR to attempt to contact ZARUBIN. (S)

Known via GOLITSYN.

- KGB cryptonym (S)

[redacted] son of Russian emigrés, was recruited in 1962 on ideological grounds. Was an employee of a tourist agency in New York, but left it. Inactive. KGB is waiting for Subject to open up his own tourist agency.

No traces.

[redacted] KGB cryptonym: recruited in Moscow in 1956 on homosexual grounds. (S)

Subject confessed his compromise. Contact broken by Subject and case dead since July 1957.

Known and dead case.

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

~~██████████~~ - U.S. citizen of ~~(S)~~ Armenian origin was recruited in April 1963 by the KGB of the Armenian SSR, with sanction of KGB of the USSR. Ideological motivation. Access to info on military installation in New York suburbs. Subject is supposed to return to the USSR in 1964 at which time KGB will attempt to firm up the recruitment.

No traces.

Requires further investigation.

(b)(1) Per CIA  
(b)(3) S

~~██████████~~ - Professor in Philadelphia. Frequent visitor to USSR. KGB hoped to recruit him on ideological basis and through a female agent they have been using against him. Because of sister's problem, Subject was also refused a visa in 1963 just because of relationship with her. KGB in Leningrad finally fixed this so if he applies again he will be allowed in.

Identity confirmed. Has sister who trying to marry Soviet citizen. Soviets finally refused her a visa.

Not yet recruited.

~~██████████~~ - an American, is a valuable first Chief Directorate agent who traveled overtly to Western Europe, where he obtained a visa from Soviet contacts and went on to the USSR clandestinely.

Not identified.

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] U.S. citizen, traveled to the USSR in 1963 and was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi. He was thought to be AIS.

No traces.

Not a recruitment.

[redacted] U.S. citizen, was recruited by the Soviets in 1960 on compromising material. He again visited the USSR in 1961 and told other tourists he was detained by the Soviets in 1960 for black marketeering.

No traces.

[redacted] was recruited by the Bulgarians in 1961 on a homosexual compromise.

Identity confirmed as [redacted]

Known.

[redacted] was the object of an unsuccessful KGB homosexual compromise operation during his 1959 visit to the USSR.

According to NOSENKO the operation failed, and [redacted] never approached by KGB officer.

(S) (1) A4  
(6) (3) 5  
AIF

~~TOP SECRET~~

18.

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] was suspected of having homosexual tendencies during his 1959 visit to the USSR. Will be a target for recruitment if he returns to USSR.

Identity confirmed.

Not yet a case.

(b)(1) PEI  
(b)(3) CIA  
5

[redacted] student at Vienna University, recruited in 1961 on ideological grounds in Odessa. Now handled by the First Chief Directorate

No traces.

[redacted] American citizen of Russian parentage, recruited in 1961. Spots tourists of CE interest.

Well-known Communist. Identified as Soviet agent by [redacted] in 1953

See traces.

[redacted] KGB surveillance spotted [redacted] in a GRU car circa 1959-61 and through inquiry to GRU, learned [redacted] was GRU agent. [redacted] was again in the Soviet Union in 1963.

Identified by FBI as GRU agent.

Known.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

19.

TABLE NO. 1

LEADS

TRACES

COMMENTS

[redacted] (phonetic), cryp-  
forym [redacted], a student, was  
recruited during his 1960 visit  
to the USSR on basis of involve-  
ment in black marketeering.

Not identified.

Source stated Subject  
had not returned to  
USSR since recruitment.  
Apparently no case.

[redacted] was recruited by  
the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Confessed.

Known.

[redacted] recruited on  
homosexual compromise in Sochi  
end 1962, turned over to First  
Chief Directorate for continued  
handling in U.S. NOSENKO stated  
that officer in the U.S. hastily  
recalled due to [redacted] confes-  
sion which leaked to KGB.

Confessed and debriefed  
by FBI fall 1962.

Known.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

PLH  
LTH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE NO. 2, FOREIGN AGENT LEADS

TOURISTS

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

[REDACTED] (S) (S) KUB cryptonym  
[REDACTED] (S) businesswoman in  
[REDACTED] (S) relatives in Odessa  
Has recruited in 1963. Case turned  
over to the First Chief Directorate.

No identifiable traces.

Source brought out extensive notes on this agent.

(b)(1) (b)(3) PC 1 A

(S)

[REDACTED] (S) came to USSR  
as tourist in 1960. Contacted at request  
of First Chief Directorate. Agreed to  
cooperate. Not an agent, but an  
operational contact.

No traces.

Not a recruited agent.

[REDACTED] (S) Cryptonym  
[REDACTED] (S) Has  
[REDACTED] (S) (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

Known.

Given material.

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP I  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] Cryptonym [redacted] Tourist bus driver. Recruited 14 July 1962. Used as spotter. Employed [redacted] Tourist Agency.

(S) No identifiable information. Tourist Agency is [redacted]

(S) All employees of the [redacted] Tourist Agency have been under suspicion following [redacted] confession which indicated that the KGB had other penetrations of this firm.

(S) [redacted] Cryptonym [redacted] 11 Aug 1962. Works for [redacted] Recruits [redacted]

(S) Identified, guide/secretary at [redacted] Travel Agency.

See above.

(b) (1) A-1  
(b) (3) CIA  
5

(S) [redacted] cryptonym [redacted] Leader of tourist groups for [redacted] Recruited 29 July 1962. Contact maintained by Capt. ROMANOVICH.

(S) Identified. Husband, a stateless engineer, has visited Czechoslovakian Embassy [redacted] Two children.

See above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3.

LEAD

TRACES

~~SECRET~~  
601 Per  
(b3) CIA  
COMMENTS

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] of Russian origin. Egypt [REDACTED] Interpreter for [REDACTED] Husband Armenian [REDACTED] chemical engineer and member of [REDACTED] recruited in 1961 but refused to meet with her case officers when returned USSR in 1962. Case will probably be retired to archives.

No identifiable information.

Case admittedly was no good from KIB point of view, according to ROSENKO.

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] Russian emigre, now [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] tourist firm, recruited 1963.

Identity confirmed. Long suspected as KIB agent.

Was already suspect.

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] composer [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] conductor recruited in Moscow in August 1957.

No traces.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
4.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) (S) 1959 was known to have been involved in homosexual activity. KGB will attempt to recruit him if he returns.

Not identified.

Not yet recruited.

(b)(1)(D) Ad  
(b)(3) CIA

[REDACTED] Recruited by KGB in Oct 1963 while in Baltic states.

Identity confirmed. No derogatory information. No record of travel in 1963.

[REDACTED] Tourist to USSR in Dec 1963. Not fully recruited, but came to an agreement with KGB officer.

Not identified.

Not yet recruited.

[REDACTED] Works for firm and also for tourists association. Recruited.

No identifiable traces. Not in phonebook.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

5.

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] Works in [redacted] Cryptonym [redacted] Travel (S) Bureau. Recruited 1959.

No traces.

(b)(1) A4  
(b)(3) CIA

(S) [redacted] Cryptonym [redacted] agency (S) Bus driver for [redacted] Recruited (S)

Ident with [redacted] chauffeur. Company listed in [redacted] phonebook. (S)

According to NOSENKO, KGB believed AIB was interested in [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted] Cryptonym [redacted] Conflicting information provided, but it appears she works for [redacted] agency. Resides [redacted] either 1958 or 61. Recruited (S)

Possible telephone book trace in [redacted] Tourist (S) agency checks out.

(S) [redacted] Worked for tourist agency "Recruited 1961 but left agency in 1963. Case in archives. (S)

No preliminary traces. There is [redacted] travel agency which is Communist owned. (S)

According to NOSENKO, admittedly of no value.

~~TOP SECRET~~



AP SYSTEM

7.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] (S) Teacher of Geography and history in some colleges who works in the summers for the National Tourist Center, [redacted] Recruited in 1959. (S) Not identified.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)  
AP  
CIA

[redacted] (S) Works as Guide and Interpreter for various tourist agencies. Recruited in 1963. Cryptonym [redacted] (S) No traces.

[redacted] (S) Cryptonym [redacted] Head of a section in the [redacted] tourist firm (S) No traces.

(S) [redacted] (S) Interpreter for tourist groups (S) 1957-59. Recruited 1959. Inactive case. Husband meteorologist at [redacted] airports. (S) No traces.

Inactive case.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted]

Director of the

cryptonym

Recruited in 1960.

No traces.

(S) DCI  
(S) CIA  
(S) CIA

(S) [redacted]  
Cryptonym [redacted]  
for [redacted] fourist agency.  
Recruited 16 Aug 1962.

Bus driver

No traces.

(S) [redacted] (S) [redacted]  
much biographic detail, [redacted] tour leader, was formerly KMB agent in KAZAKHSTAN, recruited in 1963.

Identity confirmed, immigrated from the USSR in 1953. Admitted she had been an informant of the MVD. Discharged from [redacted] job in [redacted] in 1961 as security risk.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] Ilyes (S)  
employed by Tourist  
agency Recruited in 1963. (S)

No traces.

(S)(C) PC1  
(S)(C) CIA  
S

[redacted] Director of [redacted] (S)  
tourist agency. KMB agent.

Identity confirmed. Long  
suspected by [redacted] (S)  
Soviet agent. Extensive file.

Already suspect. Communist  
firm.

[redacted] owner of [redacted] (S)  
travel agency. Recruited in 1962.


Identity confirmed. Extensive  
file. Assumed to be Soviet  
agent.

Already known. Communist  
firm.

[redacted] employee  
of [redacted] travel agency. Recruited  
in 1905. (S)

No traces.

~~TOP SECRET~~





LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) Per  
CIA

(S) [redacted] was KTB Re-recruited. No identifiable traces.  
Informant as [redacted] on visit to USSR in 1963. Works in [redacted] municipal government.

(S) [redacted] Lives in [redacted] Visited USSR in 1959. KTB suspects he is a homosexual and will attempt to recruit him if he returns. No identifiable traces. Not recruited KTB agent.

Name unknown, cryptonym [redacted] construction firm owner and architect, recruited in 1960. No traces

Insufficient data. Will be difficult to identify.

(S) [redacted] travel agency director, recruited in 1962. KTB suspects he may be a double agent.

ROSENKO admits the case is of no value to KTB. Known.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] (S)  
Name unknown, cryptonym [redacted] Russian emigre.  
Director [redacted] Tourist Agency. (S)  
Recruited in Oct 1962.

No traces.

(b)(1) Per  
(b)(3) CIA  
S

(S) [redacted] (S)  
One of group of tourists in 1963 detected  
mailing [redacted] Detained, confessed (S)  
to being American agent, was doubled  
and released.

Identified. Reported recruit- Well-known case.  
ment to [redacted] and  
separately to [redacted] whose agent (S)  
he was.

(S) [redacted] (S)  
Cryptonym [redacted] (S)  
Recruited in USSR in 1961. Guide and  
interpreter for tourist groups and at  
Italian exhibitions.

Identified. Background data  
confirmed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
12.

IRAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] Cryptonym  
Professor of history at University of [redacted]  
(S) Recruited in 1962 on basis of  
homosexual compromise.

Identified. Was in USSR in  
1961 also. Basic data  
confirmed.

(b)(1) (b)(3) Per  
S CIA

(S) [redacted] (S)  
Cryptonym [redacted] (S)  
citizen of Russian origin, owns restaurant  
which is frequented by [redacted] (S)

Believed to be [redacted] (S)  
co-owner of [redacted] (S)  
origin is Russian.

Long suspect as Soviet  
informant on U.S. military  
personnel. [redacted] (S)  
questioned by Soviets stationed  
in [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] publisher, writer  
close friend of [redacted] president, (S)  
recruited as tourist in 1961. Very  
valuable agent.

Not yet identified, but  
[redacted] fits this (S)  
description. No derogatory  
traces on her.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
13.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(b)(1) Ae1  
(b)(3) CIA  
5

[REDACTED] (S)  
Cryptonym [REDACTED] (S)  
Bus driver for [REDACTED] firm [REDACTED] (S)  
Recruited July 1963 (S)  
Has provided no material. (S)

None. No record of [REDACTED] film [REDACTED] (S)  
Non-productive.

(S) [REDACTED] (S)  
Cryptonym [REDACTED] (S)  
Recruited 1959 in Zaporozhe on sexual compromise in park. (S)  
Lives with husband in [REDACTED] (S)  
Husband an important electrical engineer with good ties to [REDACTED] intelligentsia. (S)  
Good case, of distinct interest to KGB. (S)  
First Chief Directorate. (S)

No record of [REDACTED] (S)  
assumed [REDACTED] (S)  
Engineer of same name resident in [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)  
Traveled to USSR in 1959 as tourist. (S)  
Photographed in homosexual activity. Not recruited, but will be if he returns. (S)

No identifiable information. (S)  
Not a recruited agent. (S)

[REDACTED] (S)  
[REDACTED] (S)  
pendent, came to USSR and was recruited by KGB on basis of compromise with a woman. KGB has not attempted to recontact him since his return to [REDACTED] (S)  
because upon his return he wrote a story about how the Communists had tried to compromise him and make an approach to him. (S)

correl [REDACTED] (S)  
No traces (S)  
According to NOSENKO, KGB dropped case. (S)

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

15.

~~(S)~~

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(b)(1) A21  
(b)(3) CIA  
5

Name unknown. Young female [redacted] (S)  
tourist who works for the police in [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] was contacted by the (S)  
KIB on her complaint of stolen money,  
which the KIB arranged to return to  
her. She was assessed and the lead passed  
to the First Chief Directorate.

Not yet identified.

(S) [redacted] (S)  
(S) [redacted] (S)  
(S) [redacted] (S)  
Has contacts to Americans.  
Resident in 1959 and given to the  
Residentura. (S)

Identical with [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] No derogatory  
information.

Contradictory information  
given. At first claimed she  
was illegal, then changed to  
current version.

Name unknown. Crypt [redacted] (S)  
works in [redacted] Ministry of Interior. (S)  
Recruited as tourist in 1960. (S)

Not identified.

[redacted] (S)  
Crypt [redacted] (S)  
owns tourist buses. Recruited 16 July  
1962. Used as spotter. (S)

No identifiable traces.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

16.

(b)(1) A-2  
(b)(3) CIA  
S

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

Name unknown. Female. Cryptonym [redacted] suspected of working for [redacted] intelligence.

(b) No traces.

NOSENKO admits that this operation did not succeed.

In June 1959 in Leningrad on homosexual grounds. KIB has had no further contact, either because he refused or the Soviets suspected a trap.

Recruited (S) No traces.

Not an active case.

In July 1959 in Moscow on homosexual grounds. KIB has had no further contact, for one of the two reasons cited above. Source is confused as to which reason applies to which case.

Recruited (S) Not identified.

No KIB follow-up.

prominent figure and big industrialist. Recruited in Moscow in 1960 at the request of the Illegals Directorate, then turned over to them for handling in [redacted]

(S) Cryptonym [redacted]

Probably identical with [redacted] who visited USSR in 1959.

Known Communist.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

17.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

Dentist in [redacted] in 1959.

[redacted] Recruited as tourist

TS

Several possible traces. Some derogatory.

(b)(1) PCL  
(b)(3) PCL  
S

~~TOP SECRET~~



GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

[REDACTED] (S) (S) MA in Moscow is old KGB agent.

Identity confirmed. Was MA in Moscow from 1956-63. Now Lt. Gen. and Chief of [REDACTED] military academy.

Long suspected as a KGB agent due to his long tour in Moscow, pro-Soviet attitudes, ability to conduct large scale black market activities in Moscow, etc.

(6) (D) (6) (3) (5) P 21 A

[REDACTED] (S) (S) diplomat recruited in Moscow in 1962 on homosexual grounds.

Identified as [REDACTED] (S) administrative employee of the [REDACTED] Embassy in Moscow who confessed to his superiors on 5 Dec 1961 that he had been recruited by the KGB on homosexual grounds.

Known.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S)(X)(b)(3) S P. 21A

(S) [redacted] MA in Moscow, [redacted] was possibly recruited after an extensive effort over the period 1960-61. (S)

Identified as [redacted] MA in Moscow from 1957-62. Since Feb 1962, chief of [redacted] Military Intelligence. No derogatory information. (S)

NOSENKO was vague about whether or not [redacted] was actually recruited. (S)

The code clerk at the [redacted] Embassy in 1962 is a KGB agent. He is over 50. NOSENKO later confirmed him to be [redacted] after reviewing our material. (S)

Our files reflect that [redacted] code clerk in Moscow in the late fifties. He became involved with a young Russian girl and was questioned about this by his superiors who suspected KGB sponsorship of the relationship. In 1961 he was moved out of crypto work to a non-sensitive job. NOSENKO recognized the name as the agent he was describing. (S)

Agent was already suspected and lost access to classified information in 1961. Conflict of dates - NOSENKO describes events in 1962 and case terminated 1961. (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) (S) (S) A-1  
(S) (S) (S) A-1  
(S) (S) (S) A-1

(S) [redacted] Embassy code (S)  
Name Unknown - [redacted] was recruited about  
clerk in Moscow was recruited to Warsaw  
(1957. Later the agent went to Warsaw  
and was contacted there by KGB  
officer on TDY.

Identified as [redacted] (S)  
Embassy guard who confessed  
the whole operation. NOSENKO  
has confirmed that this is  
the same operation.

Already known.

(S) [redacted] former (S)  
Ambassador in Moscow. (S)  
recruited not earlier than 1955 on  
homosexual grounds.

GOLITSYN reported identical Known.  
recruitment but states it took  
place in 1948-1949.

(S) [redacted] (S)  
Ambassador to  
Moscow. Reported by NOSENKO in 1962  
to be a recruited agent of KGB. In  
1962 NOSENKO was not certain if  
[redacted] was actively working for the  
KGB. (S)

Identity confirmed. Also  
reported by [redacted] (S)  
Identical story from  
another defector.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

*GPD Per  
(b)(3) CIA*

(S) In 1960 or 61 a KGB planned to recruit  
an audio-technician who came from  
from [redacted] A woman was used.

[redacted] audio-technician  
confessed that he had been  
recruited by the KGB in  
1963 (he had been regularly  
going into the USSR since  
1956.)

(S) NOSENKO believes this  
may be the same case we  
know about. Known.

(S) Name unknown, cipher clerk in the  
[redacted] Embassy in Moscow,  
recruited in 1961.

Not identified.

(S) [redacted] director of [redacted]  
[redacted] Ministry  
of External Affairs is either KGB agent  
or solid contact. Originally handled  
by Yu. I. GUK, now by KGB residentura  
in [redacted]

(S) Identity and position  
confirmed. Very close  
friend of [redacted]  
No other derog.

(S) Another GUK lead. Could  
have served as channel  
between Soviets and  
[redacted] Would be  
valuable agent in any  
case.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

[REDACTED] Embassy, Moscow, from 1957 to 1961 was a KGB agent.

Name and position confirmed. Now a deputy secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No derogatory information.

(S) (S) (S) S ParCIA  
Further investigation required.

[REDACTED] Military Attache, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but who had already been recruited in 1961 by the KGB. NOSENKO named this [REDACTED] in 1962 as [REDACTED] and in 1964 as [REDACTED] both of the [REDACTED] Military Attache Office.

[REDACTED] Both [REDACTED] have been in Moscow. Case referred to also in Tourist Dept papers brought out by NOSENKO.

The [REDACTED] Embassy in Moscow is known to be particularly vulnerable. This lead is considered to be of little value.

A member of the [REDACTED] Embassy is a KGB agent. No details.

None. We know of two [REDACTED] Embassy employees recruited in Moscow, one in 1958, the other in 1962. The name [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] diplomat list, evokes some reaction from NOSENKO. Same name appears in CHEREPANOV paper on surveillance of [REDACTED] May-June 1960.

This Iranian lead requires further questioning of Nosenko.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S)(D)(S)(S)S Acl  
Acl

(S) [redacted] cryptonym [redacted] Deputy Chief of a [redacted] Intelligence Unit working against Soviet Union. Recruited in 1961 in USSR.

(S) Identity confirmed. [redacted] sidized by the [redacted] Government. No derogatory information.

(S) His intelligence association is overt information. Thus he would be a natural target for the KGB, when he traveled to the USSR.

Name unknown. Code clerk in [redacted] Embassy in Moscow in 1962 was a KGB agent.

(S) Probably indetical with a known case which fits this description. Confessed.

Known.

(S) [redacted] diplomat in Moscow from 1960-1962 is a KGB agent.

(S) Identity confirmed. Now third man in [redacted] Foreign Office. Was in Moscow in 1957-58. Notorious Communist and Soviet sympathizer. Has close social contacts with Soviets in [redacted]

(S) Known Soviet sympathizer and assumed to be KGB agent or informant.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7.

R/S

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [REDACTED]

Name unknown. KGB cryptonym [REDACTED] Not identified.

first or second deputy to head of [REDACTED] CI coordination, is an agent of the [REDACTED] residentura. Recruited in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

Name unknown. Middle [REDACTED] routine official of [REDACTED] Police [REDACTED] residentura is in contact with him for study and assessment. Not yet recruited.

Not identified.

Not yet a recruited agent.

(S) [REDACTED]

Officer who attended tank academy in Moscow from 1958-62. Detailed biographic data. Recruited by NOSENKO in Summer 1961. Case retired when [REDACTED] returned to [REDACTED] in April 1962

No traces [REDACTED]

According to NOSENKO this case is not active or valuable to KGB.

(S) [REDACTED] MA in MOSCOW 1958-60, is a valuable KGB agent.

Identity confirmed. Upon return from Moscow became chief of [REDACTED] Army Signal Corps. He was retired in August 1962.

We have been investigating him as suspect KGB agent since April 63. Considerable circumstantial evidence but no positive proof. Retired before NOSENKO gave this lead.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8.

(601)  
(623) S  
Per CIA

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(S) [redacted] former first (S) Secretary to [redacted] Embassy in Moscow. Believes he is a KGB agent. Has details.

Identity confirmed. No derogatory traces. Currently second secretary in [redacted] (S)

Manner in which NOSENKO gave this lead requires that he be questioned for further details.

Name unknown. Member of [redacted] (S) Recruited on homosexual basis in Moscow in 1957. This information was given in June 1962.

Identical with [redacted] (S) who was arrested in Sept 1962. He had already been tentatively identified on the basis of GOLITSYN information.

NOSENKO's information speeded up the investigation. However, GOLITSYN's info on [redacted] (S) was such that the KGB must have considered that he had been or would be involved.

Name unknown, [redacted] (S) audio-technician who came to the [redacted] Embassy about 1961. Seduced by [redacted] KGB female agent. Preparations were made for recruitment attempt which was never realized.

No identified. (S)

Not recruited or approached.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

OTHERS

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

DD(S)S  
A41  
2/27

[REDACTED] (S) East-West trader in  
[REDACTED] (S) NOSENKO provided voluminous  
biographic data.

Identity confirmed. Long Known.  
assumed to be a Soviet agent.  
Unsavory history. Communist  
sympathizer. Subject of several  
denunciations as Soviet agent.  
Offered his Services to  
American intelligence in March  
1961 and was turned down.

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) businessman,  
KGB agent, also used in operations  
in Moscow, specifically against a  
certain American. Great detail given  
by NOSENKO.

Identity confirmed. Entire  
story known from GOLITSYN.

All information pre-  
viously received from  
GOLITSYN.

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) citizen, corres-  
pondent for [REDACTED] (S)  
is a long time KGB agent.

Identified as [REDACTED] (S)  
in Moscow since about 1923.  
Was married to Soviet  
woman and has a son who is  
a Soviet citizen.

As a correspondent  
residing in Moscow for  
over 35 years, he would  
automatically be sus-  
pected of cooperating  
with the KGB.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

LEAD

TRACES

COMMENTS

(b)(1)(b)(3)S  
De  
CIA

(S) [redacted] cook in [redacted] Embassy Moscow in late 1950's. A KGB agent now in [redacted] While in Moscow he provided personality info on [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted] Businessman. Recruited 1956-58. Handled by GRIBANOV personally. (S)

Identified. [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Identified. Reported on [redacted] without name by [redacted] Mentioned by GOLITSYN. Was [redacted] after war [redacted] of these activities. (S)

[redacted] In 1963 listed as technical counselor in [redacted] cabinet in [redacted] (S)

(S) [redacted] ship owner who comes to USSR every year. Not recruited because NOSENKO too hasty. Is still surrounded by KGB agents on every visit. (S)

No traces.

NOSENKO admitted this not a successful recruitment.

~~TOP SECRET~~