

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY *SP/AM/HP*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
FEB 23 1964

*Classified by 207/clh/mg*  
*Declassify on OADR*  
*Per CIA Ref. no 10/20/94*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

*yuri Nosenko*

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/779,852, dated  
5 February 1964.

2. Source reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a KGB agent  
recruited on the basis of sex and money. According to  
Source, the KGB mounted an operation against her when she  
came to the USSR as a tourist about 1957-58. Her sexual  
promiscuity was tested and exploited by the KGB who used  
two African students in Moscow (KGB agents) to seduce her.

3. According to Source, she is of interest to the  
KGB because she has natural social access to American  
Embassy personalities of greater interest than herself,  
particularly code clerks, and can be used to cultivate,  
assess and perhaps compromise them.

4. Subject's KGB cryptonym is [REDACTED]  
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

165-68530-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 FEB 26 1964

Classified by *SP/AM/HP*  
Declassify on: OADR

J. Angleton  
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-[REDACTED]

187590  
COPY  
10 FEB 25 1964

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED PER CIA ORDER OF SEP 27 1993

*(u)*  
*b1*  
*b3*

*ORIGINAL FILED*

*Source - Nosenko*  
*1/20/64*  
*2-20-64*

NR-37

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Lee

CLASS. & EXT. BY SPIC/STN/AM  
REASON FCIM II, 1-2.4.2.2  
DATE OF REVIEW 2/27/81

CLASS. & EXT. BY SPIC/MLW 2/27/81  
REASON FCIM II, 1-2.4.2.2, 3  
DATE OF REVIEW 2/27/81

(S) 100-41330

See addendum  
Classified by 100-109-103X1

BY LIAISON

Declassify on: OADR

page 1 - NOTE  
page 2 - photo  
downgraded classification CIA  
by 1259 28 P/CND 11/29/88

Date: February 20, 1964  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [REDACTED] (S)  
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259 JEP/CAJ 11/6/88  
REASON FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2.2, 3  
DATE OF REVIEW 2/27/81  
DECLASSIFICATION 2/27/81

Reference is made to your letter dated February 7, 1964, your CCI- [REDACTED] captioned [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY 3-289  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1  
1-26-81

You are referred to our memorandum dated November 6, 1962, at Washington, D. C., captioned [REDACTED] a copy of which has been furnished to you. The information contained in that memorandum apparently refers to the subject.

In the event additional information is obtained concerning this matter, this Bureau would appreciate being advised.

- 2 - WFO (100-41334) (Enclosure)
- 2 - New York (Enclosure)

NOTE FOR SACs, NEW YORK AND WFO:

New York is designated office of origin since the subject gave a New York address as her permanent address when she applied for her passport in August, 1962. New York should develop appropriate background information concerning the

① - (65-68530 (Sammy) [REDACTED]

JPL:PE  
(10)

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
~~SECRET~~

DO NOT FOR SACs CONTINUED  
PAGE TWO

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

NR-38

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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per CIA

b1  
b3

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S)  
DATE 12/27/78 JEP/gmk

DUPLICATE YELLOW

MAR 4 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE FOR SACs, NEW YORK AND WFO-CONTINUED:

subject and members of her family and determine the current activities of any members of the family living in the United States. WFO should check with the Department of State to determine if [redacted] is still in Moscow. It is noted that the information in the attached CIA letter stated that [redacted]

[redacted] The information in the attached letter was furnished by Yuri Nosenko, Soviet intelligence defector whose bona fides has not been established. (S) (A)

NOTE:

This is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since it refers to information so classified by CIA. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

Ag  
CIA  
b1  
b3

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

2-19-64 (S)(Y)

1 - J. P. Lee  
1 - W. M. Gheesling (S)(Y)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Airtel

65-282-195V1

To: SACs Washington Field (65-8742) Encls. (2)  
New York (65-22022) Enc. (1)

From: Director, FBI (65-87868)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY SLIP(S) (S)(Y)

b2  
b7D

[REDACTED] (S)(Y)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2/AM/DAE 12/21/88 JSA/ptt  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1  
PER CIA Review 126-91

Enclosed for recipient offices is copy of CIA letter  
2-14-64 captioned "BARRY." The source of this information is Yuri  
Nosenko, Soviet intelligence defector whose bona fides has not been  
established. (S)(Y)

b2  
b7D

It would appear likely that the Scientific and Technical  
(ST) agent referred to by Nosenko is subject. The Bureau is currently  
considering the desirability of interviewing subject, bearing in  
mind the absolute necessity for fully protecting [REDACTED] (S)(Y)

b2  
b7D

In WFO's forthcoming interview with Nosenko, WFO should  
develop all information in his possession concerning the ST agent  
referred to in enclosed letter, including full circumstances  
surrounding the manner and approximate date he acquired this information.  
If the ST agent referred to by Nosenko is subject and Nosenko's  
knowledge of him resulted from his official assignments, additional  
security would be afforded [REDACTED] in any interview conducted by  
the Bureau of subject. WFO should handle this matter during your  
first interview with Nosenko and immediately furnish results by airtel  
to Bureau and offices receiving copies of this communication. (S)(Y)

b1  
b3

For information, [REDACTED] referred to in the  
enclosed CIA letter. [REDACTED] (S)

Subsequently released. He is a U.S. citizen engaged as [REDACTED] (S)

After [REDACTED] returned to the U.S.,  
[REDACTED] refused to be interviewed by the Bureau but consented to a limited [REDACTED] (S)

1 - Newark (65-5480) Encls. (2)  
1 - Philadelphia (65-5675) Enc. (1)

WEG:hc (11)  
① - 65-68530 (Nosenko) SEE BUREAU NOTE PAGE TWO.  
① - 100-245228

65-68530-1

NOT RECORDED  
46 FEB 25 1964 (S)(Y)

7 MAR 2 1964 (S)(Y)

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY 253 [REDACTED]  
REASON FOR EXTENSION  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2+3  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION 7/19/84 (S)(Y)

NR-39

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

b2  
b7D

Airtel to Washington Field (S) 4  
Re: [redacted] (S) 4  
65-57568

interview by the U.S. State Department. In that interview he advised that he had taken letters from the U.S. to Russia during his several visits to that country but would not give any details concerning the persons involved and no information was furnished by him to show he had contacted subject's relatives in the USSR. Enclosed for WFO and Newark is copy of State Department report dated 1-24-64 containing results of State's interview of [redacted] New York was previously furnished copy of that report. (S) 4

In an effort to further verify that subject is identical to the ST agent referred to by Nosenko, New York should review long distance telephone calls made from [redacted] residence and, if feasible, from his place of employment to determine whether he is acquainted with subject. (S) 4

b1  
b3

BUREAU NOTE: [redacted] is code name for [redacted] Soviet-born naturalized U.S. citizen employed at [redacted] (S) 4

[redacted] He has relatives residing in the USSR and he entered the U.S. after World War II as a displaced person. The enclosed CIA letter reports information from Nosenko to the effect that [redacted] had become acquainted with a valuable ST agent being run in the U.S. by the KGB; that this ST agent was urged to come to the USSR but refused, resulting in the KGB discontinuing contact with him. Nosenko described this ST agent - age as about 45 years old, probably lives in New York, was displaced person at end of World War II and has relatives residing near Sochi and that the information provided by this agent was highly valued by the KGB. This description is almost identical to the known facts surrounding subject and we should determine from Nosenko any information he has which might assist in further evaluating whether subject should be interviewed. CIA's letter reported that, according to Nosenko, [redacted] was acquainted with this ST agent; and during a trip to the USSR in summer of 1963, was to visit relatives of that ST agent near Sochi. (S) 4

b2  
b7C  
b7D =

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Per CIA 12649  
2-1-99  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/tp  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/10

RI  
Date: [2/24/64] (u)

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Declassify on: OADR

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-dead) (u)  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (u)  
ESPIONAGE - R

page 1 para 1  
declassification  
by SP5 JJP/CMS 11/29/1

Enclosed are six copies of a letterhead memorandum setting forth information concerning [REDACTED] in Moscow, USSR. (u)

The first confidential source mentioned in the letterhead memorandum is YURI NOSENKO, KGB agent who defected in Switzerland on 2/4/64. (u)

The second confidential source mentioned in the letterhead memorandum is [REDACTED] whose identity is being protected at his request. (u)

The letterhead memorandum is classified top secret since information attributed to NOSENKO is so classified by CIA. (u)

Bureau refer to NY airtel 2/24/64, captioned "[REDACTED] IS-R", with accompanying letterhead memorandum. Bureau also refer to Bureau airtel 2/13/64, under the [REDACTED] caption, which enclosed a CIA letter of 2/7/64, captioned [REDACTED] wherein NOSENKO advised that the [REDACTED] in Moscow is a KGB agent. (u)

- 3 - Bureau (Encls. 6) (RM) (u)
- 1 - New York (65-dead) (u)

RFL:lac  
(6)

NOT RECORDED  
FEB 26 1964  
EXTENDED BY 1259  
REASON FOR EXTENSION  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 2/24/84

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET SECTION

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ENCLOSED

b1  
b3  
[Handwritten notes and stamps on the left margin]

Classification  
DATE 12/12/78 JJP/tp  
[Handwritten notes and stamps on the right margin]

68569-

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

(NY [65-dead] (S)(U))

b1  
b3 CIA

Since there are [redacted] (S)  
in Moscow, a letterhead memorandum is being submitted  
on [redacted] as well as [redacted] in order  
that NOSENKO can be questioned as to which is the KGB  
agent. (S)(U)

[redacted] (S) advised that [redacted] (S) in NYC  
contain very little information concerning [redacted] (S)  
his file is maintained at his place of assignment. (S)

Indices, NY, contain no record of [redacted] (S)(U)

(S) NY is conducting no further investigation  
concerning [redacted] until further inquiry of NOSENKO develops  
more specific information. (S)(U)

(S)

~~SECRET~~ SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, New York  
February 24, 1964  
(S) (u) (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified by *SP2AKM/AD*  
Declassify on *OADR*

[REDACTED] (S)

In early 1964, a confidential source, contact  
with whom has been insufficient to determine his reliability,  
advised that the [REDACTED]

On February 20, 1964, a second confidential  
source, who has furnished reliable information in the  
past, advised that the [REDACTED]  
in Moscow, Russia. (S) (u) (C)

[REDACTED] is one of these [REDACTED] (S)  
and has been assigned to Moscow since [REDACTED] (S)  
joined [REDACTED] was born on  
December 9, 1925, at [REDACTED] (S)  
previous assignments in Berlin, Germany, and in Trenton  
and Newark, New Jersey. (S) (u) (C)

[REDACTED] has been married twice; his wife, name not  
known, resides in Paris, France. He has a son by his first  
marriage; the names of the wife and son are not known. (S) (u) (C)

031-99  
CLASSIFIED BY *SP2AKM/AD*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
*Re CIA 1-26-99*

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) (S)

Downgraded To *Secret*  
Upgraded Per *CIA letter 5/4/65 65-68530*  
Date *5/19/65 AM: awh*

DATE *12/12/78 JSP/jtt*

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY *1259 JSP/AD 12/12/78*  
REASON FOR *2.7.3*  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION *12/24/84 JSP*

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

*b1*  
*b3*  
*CIA*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2-3-99 BY SP/STW/STW

DATE: 2-24-64

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON BROADCAST  
STATION WTOP, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
6:40 P.M., FEBRUARY 22, 1964

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Basher

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

page 2 page 2 + 3  
declassification  
by 1259 JDP/CS 11/29/98

Drew Pearson's assistant, Jack Anderson, substituted for Pearson. No mention was made of the Director. The FBI was mentioned in connection with the Bobby Baker investigation.

### Bobby Baker Investigation

Senator Hugh Scott (Republican - Pennsylvania) and Carl T. Curtis (Republican - Nebraska) tried behind closed doors to delay the public testimony of Bobby Baker. They want to drag out the Baker scandal into the election campaign. They were overruled by the Democrats, however, on a motion from Senator Howard W. Cannon (Democrat - Nevada). Meanwhile, investigators are checking into the background of the Republicans star witness Don Reynolds who made so many wild charges during the late Senator McCarthy's heyday that the FBI finally investigated Reynolds. The FBI found that Reynolds' charges were not only baseless but that he had committed many of the deeds he attributed to others. Reynolds went right on making charges, however, as an informer for Senator McCarthy. Now he has turned into an informer for Senator John J. William (Delaware - Republican).

DECLASSIFIED BY: see addendum  
ON: 190-709-103X1

### Comment

This is a continuation of Pearson's campaign to vilify Reynolds whom previous Bureau investigation has proven to be unreliable immoral and a dealer in the Black Market in Germany at the end of World War II.

### BOBBY BAKER (CONTINUED)

The eavesdropping device which Bobby Baker's attorney Edward Bennett William displayed to reporters was no surprise to the Senate Rules Committee. Senator Cannon of Nevada had learned that Government agents tapped the phone of Bobby Baker's gambler friend Ed Levinson. Cannon wanted to get all the facts in the Baker case but not by invading privacy. He protested personally to President Johnson who promised to instruct agents not to use wire taps promiscuously in the future.

PTB:mjh  
(11)  
60 MAR 3 1964

NOT RECORDED  
1964 FEB 27 1964

10 FEB 27 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN  
Class. & Ext. by 1259 JDP/CS  
Reason-FCIM II  
Date of Review 12/20/2005

NR-41

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DREW PEARSON RADIO BROADCAST ~~SECRET~~

Comment

We had no information indicating Cannon was in any way interested in the Bobby Baker matter at the time he conferred with President Johnson. It was apparent that his interest was on behalf of gamblers in Las Vegas who were attempting to thwart the Government's investigation of the hoodlum infiltration of Los Vegas.

Yuri Nosenko

Yuri Nosenko the Soviet Security officer who defected to the West in Geneva is now on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll for \$500 a month. The CIA is still scrutinizing his background, however, to make sure he isn't a double agent. X 4

Comment

CIA has previously acknowledged that they have serious doubts as to the bona fides of Nosenko. X 4

Warren Commission

Senator Richard B. Russell (Democrat - Georgia) has complained privately that Chief Justice Earl Warren is permitting too much publicity in their investigation into President Kennedy's assassination. Russell would rather wait until the investigation is completed before giving the press any of the details.

State Department

Secretary of State Rusk has cautioned the wives of foreign service officers to curb their tongue. He has sent written instructions urging wives not to compete with their diplomat husbands for the attention of foreign dignitaries and to be careful what they say to foreign diplomats.

Justice Department

Federal investigators are taking a sharp look at food practices and prices. The Justice Department now has 47 investigations underway of food processors and supermarket chains. A Federal Grand Jury is also investigating alleged collusion between the big steel companies.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan ~~SECRET~~  
RE: DREW PEARSON RADIO BROADCAST

Comment

We have a number of antitrust cases in which the investigation has been completed and which are in various stages of prosecutive action relating to food items and practices of retailers, wholesalers and other distributors of such items.

A special grand jury was empaneled in the Southern District of New York during December, 1963, to look into the pricing activities of the major steel companies. In December, 1963, we conducted investigation in New York City and Cincinnati, Ohio, at the request of the Anti Trust Division to obtain information at various hotels relative to the presence at these hotels by numerous officials of several steel companies over a six year period. The Special Grand Jury is still in session.

Central Intelligence Agency

Deputy Director John Bross is making a secret but searching investigation to find out what is wrong with CIA. He heads a task force that is trying to improve the reliability of our intelligence.

Comment

Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan 9/11/63 entitled "Response to Central Intelligence Agency Director John A. McCone memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and Chairman of the Atomic Commission 9/4/63" sets out the responsibilities of Bross. He was selected by McCone to review and evaluate for McCone, as Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board, the activities of U.S. Intelligence Board Committees.

Italy

U.S. narcotics agents have warned that the Italian governments crack down on the Mafia may send another wave of Sicilian racketeers into the United States. Several Mafia mobsters have already fled Italy and are reported heading for America.

Comment

We have received no information to substantiate this statement.

Cuba

**SECRET**

Government agents have compiled a secret black list of 195 ships that have docked at Cuban ports. These ships not only will be banned from carrying American cargo and passengers in the future but the countries which sent shipments to Cuba will be cut off from American aid.

France

President DeGaulle has sounded out the Soviets about a big 2 meeting between Premier Khrushchev and DeGaulle. DeGaulle has also followed up his recognition of Red China with quiet overtures to China's tiny European ally Albania. France has agreed to sell food, medicine, machinery, chemicals, cloth and other goods to Albania.

Red China

The experts on China have predicted in a recent memo to Secretary of State Rusk that the Chinese Communists will launch a hate Russia campaign among the masses. So far the attacks on Russia have been restricted to party publications but the experts are convinced that Mao Tse Tung is preparing a propaganda campaign to teach the Chinese people to hate their Russian comrades. This may reduce the volume if not the vituperation of the hate America campaign.

Action

None. For information.

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
A large stylized signature, possibly "JFK".  
A large circle with a dot inside.  
A signature that appears to be "Merrill".  
A small signature or initials "JS" to the left.

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - LSS

3-1-99  
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4  
FICIA Review 1-2-99

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY 1259 [redacted]  
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2+3  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION 2/26/94 [redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.  
page 2 para 1+2  
declassified classified CIA  
by 1259 JJP/CD 11/29/98

Date: February 26, 1964  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: [redacted] Yuri Nosenko  
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY  
DATE 12/1/80

Reference is made to your letter dated  
February 7, 1964, your GCI [redacted] captioned [redacted]  
NOT RECORDED  
176 FEB 27 1964

Our files show that [redacted] who was a member of the Marine Security Guard in the American Embassy in Moscow, was interviewed in August 1961. He identified [redacted] for the Marine Guards and said this [redacted] was also involved in black-market money trading.

[redacted] United States Department of State employee in the American Embassy, Moscow, 1960-1961, identified [redacted] employed by the Marine Guard and stated that [redacted] exchanged rubles for dollars at black-market rates.

[redacted] employee of the United States State Department in Moscow in 1960-1960, identified [redacted] as a [redacted] for the United States Marine Guards who traded in illegal exchange of money. [redacted] admitted that when he [redacted] operated the American House in Moscow, he paid [redacted] in dollars and took his change in rubles at the black-market rate.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

In the event additional information is obtained concerning this individual by you, this Bureau would appreciate being advised.

DUPLICATE YELLOW  
NOTE FOR SAC  
WFO, PAGE TWO  
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Classification on: OADR

Downloaded Per CIA LAM Date 9/14/15 15:48:53

1 - New York (Enclosure)  
1 - 65-68530 (S)

GROUP 1  
downgrading and  
SECRET

NR-42

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

(S)

NOTE FOR SAC, WFO: *pr*

Two copies of the attached CIA letter are furnished to you for your information. Inasmuch as [redacted] is not in the United States and is not an American citizen, no investigation is being requested of your office. The information in the attached CIA letter was furnished by Yuri Nosenko, Soviet intelligence defector whose bona fides has not been established.

(S)  
(u)

b1  
b3  
CIA

NOTE:

This is classified "~~Secret~~" since it contains information so classified by CIA. [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)(u)

(S)

~~SECRET~~  
- 2 -

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

(S)

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(February 28, 1964) (u)

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/62  
ON 3-2-79  
85-1444

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Evans
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - D. E. Moore
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Lee

YURI IVANOVICH HOSHEKO  
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum containing information furnished by the confidential source referred to therein. In view of the extremely sensitive nature of our source, it is requested that this information be closely held. (u)

Upon removal of the classified enclosure this letter becomes unclassified.

Enclosure

1 - [105-104811] [REDACTED] (u)

JPL:pa  
(11) (u)

NOTE:

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY [REDACTED] 1258 JPL/CAJ/1/79  
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFICATION [REDACTED] 2/28/84 (u)

Memorandum classified "Top Secret" to protect our source [REDACTED] a defector in place, who represents most important penetration of Soviet intelligence and his compromise would result in exceptionally grave danger to the United States. (u)

See cover memo W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 2/26/64, prepared by JPL:pa 65-68530-18

FEB 28 11 49 AM '64

FBI REC'D-READING ROOM

MAILED 6  
FEB 28 1964  
COMM-FBI

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Evans \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

REC-17  
MAR 2-1964

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAB

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion:

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

50 USC Section 403

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  
65-68530-NR-43 dated 2-11-64

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X for this page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX



~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

Classified by *307/klh*  
Declassify on: OADR  
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY *25-29*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X *1/2*

7 FEB 1964

YURI NOSENKO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: KGB Recruitment Attempt: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/779,852, dated  
5 February 1964.

2. According to Source, [REDACTED]

was involved with a KGB agent known as [REDACTED] She was  
[REDACTED] and he had apparently fallen in love with  
her. The KGB attempted to compromise [REDACTED] by trying to  
have [REDACTED] take clandestine photographs, which did not  
turn out properly. Instead, they took photographs of  
[REDACTED] alone in [REDACTED] room, and then superimposed clan-  
destine photos of him (dubbed-in photos). At this point  
it was decided by the KGB to run a provocation against  
[REDACTED] on a blackmail basis.

3. A letter was written to [REDACTED] asking him to come  
to a meeting, which he in fact attended. According to  
Source, Subject "had a very strong soul search and they  
almost came to an agreement." The KGB did not question  
him about any sensitive matters, in order not to frighten  
him, but just posed general questions at first. They then  
let him go.

[REDACTED] was supposed to go to a second meeting,  
but he did not show up. [REDACTED] was queried on this matter,  
to which she stated that Subject had been up all night  
pacing up and down and talking to himself. [REDACTED] reportedly  
tried to talk him into going to the meeting and, according  
to her, he wavered constantly. First he would say, "Yes,  
maybe it would be better to go." Then he'd say, "No, I  
won't go; I hate them." According to Source, the KGB would

Downgraded  
Per CIA 5/14/65  
Date 5/14/65

64087-1178  
64087-1178  
64087-1178  
64087-1178

b1  
b3

copy in 65-48530

FEB 20 1964

Source - NOSENKO  
1974

RECORDED  
102 FEB 28 1964

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NR-44

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

slip Subject a letter in English, typed on an American typewriter; this was done through [redacted] who, according to Source, was still around because Subject had apparently fallen in love with her. The letter warned him that if he did not come he would be exposed; this was kept up for three days. And during these three days [redacted] continued to pace up and down, but, despite the entreaties of [redacted] he finally went to the Ambassador on the third day and confessed, and was immediately sent from Moscow.

b1  
b3  
CIA

(S)  
(S)  
(S)

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

*J. Angleton*  
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI: [redacted]

b3

2

5

\* ~~SECRET~~

187593  
COPY 11

~~SECRET~~

# ROUTE IN ENVELOP.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK (105-65721) DATE: 2/26/64

FROM: SA [REDACTED] (#342) *(u)*

SUBJECT: YURI I. NOSSENKO *b7c*  
IS - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[ *(u)*  
Source  
Date of Contact  
Contacted By  
  
Characterized ]

[ *(u)*  
[REDACTED] *(S) b*  
2/19/64  
SAS [REDACTED] and *b7c (u)*  
A confidential informant  
with whom there has been  
insufficient contact to  
judge the reliability of  
his information. ]

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)~~

~~DATE 12/11/78 *classification*~~

*2-18-99*  
CLASSIFIED BY *SP/AL/EP*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1  
*85-1444*

~~CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY *259 JAP/CAJ... 12/1/78*  
REASON FOR EXTENSION  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2... *2+3*  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION... *2/26/84*~~

1 - NY (105-65721) 1 - BU (105- ) (YURI I. NOSSENKO)

TJM:afb  
(2) *(u)*

*65-68530-*  
NOT RECORDED  
167 MAR 3 1964

*27*  
59 MAR 4 1964

~~SECRET~~

NR-45

NY 105-65721

~~SECRET~~

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination. X(4)

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information [redacted] can be adequately paraphrased. X(4) (S)

b1

When disseminating information received from [redacted] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively. X(4)

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source. X(4)

(S) IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [redacted] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY. X(4)

~~SECRET~~

NY 105-65721

YURI I. NOSSENKO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

b7D

The informant stated that if NOSSENKO is a member of the KGB, he should know many people in the KGB. As a result of this, NOSSENKO's defection would be a matter of special concern.

[REDACTED]

The informant advised

[REDACTED]

The informant stated that he is of the personal opinion that certain reprisals will be instituted eventually as a result of the NOSSENKO case but where or when these reprisals will take place is a matter of conjecture.

X(u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  
65-68530-NR-45 dated 2-9-64 pg. 4

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X for this page X  
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XXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

F B I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP/AM/HP  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

Date: 2/24/64

Transmit the following in airtel (Type in plain text or code)

AIRTEL

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY 1259  
REASON: EXTENSION  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 2/24/84

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC NEW YORK (65-dead)  
SUBJECT: ESPIONAGE - R

Enclosed herewith are six copies of a  
letterhead memorandum setting forth information concerning

The first confidential source mentioned  
in the letterhead memorandum is YURI NOSENKO, KGB agent  
who defected in Switzerland on 2/4/64.

The second confidential source mentioned  
in the letterhead memorandum is [redacted] whose identity  
is concealed at his request.

The letterhead memorandum is classified  
top secret since information attributed to NOSENKO is  
so classified by CIA.

Bureau refer to NY airtel 2/24/64, captioned  
"IS-R" with accompanying letterhead  
memorandum.

Bureau airtel 2/13/64, under the  
caption, enclosed a CIA letter of 2/7/64, captioned  
[redacted] which stated that  
the [redacted] in Moscow is a KGB agent.

- 3 - Bureau (RM) (Encls 10)
- 1 - New York (65-dead)

65-68530

NOT RECORDED  
FEB 26 1964

Per PZ A letter 5/4/65  
Date 5/19/65

Approved: [Signature] Special Agent in Charge  
Sent SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[NY 65-dead] (u)

Since there are [redacted] a letterhead memorandum is being submitted on [redacted] as well as [redacted] in order that NOSENKO can be questioned as to which [redacted] is the KGB agent. (S)

[redacted] advised that the information on [redacted] is skimpy since his file is maintained at the place of his assignment. (S)

[redacted] Indices, NY, contain no record of [redacted] (S)

[redacted] NY is conducting no further investigation concerning [redacted] until further inquiry of NOSENKO develops more specific information. (u)

b1  
CIA  
b3

(u)  
(S)

(u)  
(S)

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York  
1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

2-18-99  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AMK/pe  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
Per CIA Review on 1-26-99  
ALL Subjects are classified Secret

[Redacted] (S)

In early 1964, a confidential source, contact  
with whom has been insufficient to determine his reliability,  
advised that the [Redacted]

On February 20, 1964, another confidential source,  
who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised  
that the [Redacted]

[Redacted] and has been  
assigned to Moscow since March 22, 1959.

[Redacted] and is expected to retire soon.  
Prior to his Moscow assignment he served in [Redacted]  
Paris, France and in India.

This source stated that [Redacted] is highly regarded

(S)  
CIA  
b1  
b3

Classified by [Redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR

page 1 para 1  
derivative classification  
by 1259 JSP/CAD 11/29/88

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) OF [Redacted]

DATE 12/11/78 JSP/jmk

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED REASON FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 2/24/84

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded To Secret  
Per CIA letter 5/4/65 to 65-6853  
Date 5/19/65 LHM:ah

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2/MLD ON 2-28-99 1 - Lee 1 - Linton

SAC, New York (65-22219) & (S)(U)

2/28/64 (S)(U)

Director, FBI (65-67854) & (S)(U)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259 REASON FCIM, II, 1-2.4 DATE OF REVIEW 2/28/84 DECLASSIFICATION

TOP - R

Reurlet 2/11/64. Reference also your letter 5/6/63 captioned as above and also captioned "Anatoli Mikhailovich Golitsyn" and [redacted]

Bureau feels that we should make an effort to develop information which might identify subject by discussing appropriate facts with Anatoli, Mikhailovich Golitsyn, and [redacted]

New York should prepare a letterhead memorandum captioned [redacted] and forward copies to Bureau for relay to CIA and to WFO for use by CIA and WFO in discussing background with Golitsyn, and Sammy.

Bureau agrees no mention should be made of the NSA code name for subject, [redacted]. You should include a terse summary of [redacted] intelligence activity in the U. S. and the general nature of his activity and known agents or sources. Particular emphasis should be placed on the [redacted] case. Both WFO and the Bureau should be furnished with representative photographs covering [redacted] entire period of service in the U. S. in order that these photographs can be displayed to Golitsyn and Sammy.

Bureau feels that such inquiry should be made and that the possibility exists that information from these two former NSA officers might in this and similar cases tend to protect [redacted]

Please handle promptly.

Copies of this letter are designated for New York file 105-53043 on Golitsyn, 105-41111 on [redacted] and a copy should be placed in the New York file on Sammy. One copy of this letter is designated for WFO file [redacted] 105-7835 on [redacted] and one copy for WFO file on Sammy.

- 5 - WFO, P, U, N
- 1 - 105-105608 (A. N. Golitsyn)
- 1 - 105-91242
- 1 - 65-68530 (Sammy)

LML:gew (16)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

NR-47

ALSO INCLUDE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IN YOUR CORRESPONDENCE WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-67854-1078

b2 b7C b7D

NOT RECORDED

Letter to New York ~~JOE M~~ ~~SECRET~~  
Re: [redacted] ~~SRU~~  
65-67854

**NOTE:**

[redacted] is code word for investigation to identify  
formerly handled by [redacted]

Our latest information is that a KGB officer, unidentified, will recontact subject during the summer of 1964. It is felt that letterhead memorandum should be furnished to CIA in order that CIA can discuss [redacted] with Golitsyn and the same memorandum will serve to enable WFO to discuss [redacted] with Sammy. Information which we might be able to develop from these two defectors will tend to add security to the informant and might expedite our identification of the subject.

b2  
b7D  
—  
[initials]

4  
[initials]

[initials]

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

2-18-44  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-1/MLP  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-1  
Declassify on: 25X-1  
1-3-44  
see classification

Dependent  
10-120-102X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: SAMMY

10/25/44  
Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR  
Revoked 10/25/44

1. The following information comes from a Soviet Intelligence defector whose bona fides have not been established.

2. Source reported that the Soviets had arrested an American man and his wife with the surname [redacted] while they were in the USSR in 1962, who after arrest the KGB recruited. The [redacted] were at this time, according to Source, living in a dacha outside of Moscow and after arrested, [redacted] admitted that he was on an intelligence mission, which involved spotting various installations such as airfields by recording the kilometer markings where these airfields were located.

3. After the [redacted] were released by the Soviets, they travelled to Denmark, where [redacted] was to be contacted by an officer of the KGB. He had, according to Source, given the KGB an address in Denmark, but failed to appear at the pre-planned meeting site on the appointed day.

4. According to Source, [redacted] never came to any further meetings, but that he did confess a lot when the KGB initially recruited him. Source advised that the KGB does not plan to contact [redacted] in the future because they feel that he has probably reported the matter to the American authorities. He later said, however, that even though the KGB had failed to establish contact with [redacted] in Denmark, they intended to have illegal agents try to contact him in the United States. We cannot explain this discrepancy.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-67025

b1  
b3  
CIA

3/24/64  
3/24/64

See SA [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]  
2/24/64

REC-54 65-68530-19

10 FEB 26 1964

~~SECRET~~

EX 104

~~SECRET~~

5. Source described [REDACTED] (S)  
who the KGB was very interested in since he had the opportunity of joining a very high level firm involved in the manufacturing of [REDACTED] (S)

b1

b3

6. These individuals are identical with [REDACTED] (S)

7. It is requested that no dissemination of this material be made outside your Bureau without prior consultation with this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

AC1  
CTA

*J. Angleton*  
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-[REDACTED] b3

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

12 FEB 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: SAMMY

*Handwritten notes:*  
Classified by 602 kkk/haf  
Declassify on OADR  
per CIA letter 10/20/84

*Handwritten:* [Briefing] (u)

The following information comes from a Soviet intelligence defector whose bona fides has not been established.

2. Source reported that there is an American with the cryptonym [redacted] who is a KGB agent, and who was a member of a delegation in Geneva in 1962. [redacted] was described by Source as an employee of [redacted] who was in contact with the KGB while in Geneva in 1962.

*Handwritten:* b1, b3

3. Source believed, from remarks he overheard in Geneva, that [redacted] is still in contact with the KGB residentura in Geneva.

*Handwritten:* (S) K

4. It is requested that no dissemination of this material be made outside your Bureau without prior consultation with this Agency.

*Handwritten:* CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

2-1899  
CLASSIFIED BY 582A/MLH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

J. Angleton  
JAMES ANGLETON

b3 CSCI [redacted]  
*Handwritten:* [copy in tickler file] (u)

EX-114 REC-5

65-68530-20  
22 MAR 2 1964

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED PER CIA LETTER OF SEP 27 1983

~~SECRET~~

EX-114

Classified by SP7/led/mos  
Declassify on: OADR  
REC- ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) OF Classification  
DATE 12/28/83

1 - Liaison  
1 - SP2/CM/KP  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2/CM/KP  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
Per CIA/Gen  
1-26-99

Date: February 28, 1964  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
[Attention: Deputy Director, Plans]  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: [SAMMY] h  
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

ST  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

page 1  
derivator classification CIA/Gen  
by 1259 JOP/CAD 11/28/78

Reference is made to your letter dated  
February 18, 1964, your CSCI [redacted]

You are requested to advise if you have  
received additional information from Sammy which would  
serve to identify the individual known by the cover name  
[redacted] In the event you have any suspects or receive  
additional information which might identify this individual,  
it is requested that you advise this Bureau and appropriate  
investigation will be conducted in the United States.

- 1 - WFO (Enclosures 2 - [two copies of reCIAlet])
- 1 - New York (Enclosure - [copy of reCIAlet])

JPL:pa  
(7)

MAILED 4  
FEB 28 1964  
COMM-FBI

CLASSIFIED BY 1259 JOP/CAD  
EXTENDED BY 1259 JOP/CAD  
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW 2/28/84  
DECLASSIFICATION 2/28/84

NOTE:

One copy of this letter is furnished to WFO for  
its information since it is interviewing Yuri Nosenko. Sammy  
is the code name for Nosenko. CIA reported that Sammy stated  
there was an American with the cover name [redacted] who was a  
member of a delegation in Geneva in 1962 and who was KGB agent  
He described him as an employee of [redacted]  
[redacted] contact [redacted] with the KGB in Geneva in 1962.  
Classified "Secret" since [redacted] it repeats information so  
classified by CIA.

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
~~SECRET~~

b1 per  
b3 CIA

NR-48

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Route Envelope

- Tolson
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

~~SECRET~~

TO : W. C. Sullivan *wcs*

DATE: 2/26/64 *JW*

FROM : W. A. Branigan *wab*

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Evans
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - D. E. Moore
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Lee

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO  
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA *as a defector*

~~Security Classification~~

This memorandum recommends the dissemination of information furnished by the [redacted] informant relating to the [redacted] defection of Yuri Nosenko on 2/5/64 in Geneva, Switzerland. *JW*

During the interview of 2/20/64 [redacted] advised that

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*b2*  
*b7D*

[redacted] *JW*

[redacted] *JW*

[redacted] *JW*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP6 SJS/CC*  
ON *3/19/88* (JFK)

65-68530  
1 - 105-104811  
Enclosures *2-38*  
JPL:pa  
(9)

MAR 6 1964

*(u) REC-26*

*EX-104*

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY *SP6 SJS/CC*  
EXTENSION  
REASON FOR EXTENSION  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION *2/26/88*



~~SECRET~~

Memo W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan  
Re: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO  
65-68530

[REDACTED]

b7D

said that he does not feel that the defection is a trick and he does feel that an attempt will be made to assassinate Nosenko. (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval are letters of dissemination to the Attorney General, Special Assistant to the President Jenkins, Secretary of State Rusk, and CIA Director McCone. (u)

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
A  
Wes  
Q  
OK  
K  
V. H. ...  
APL  
GPI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/AP 17 February 1964  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1  
*PR CIA letter 1-26-99*

SUBJECT: SAMMY  
Conclusions and Recommendations

REFERENCE: Memorandum, dtd 10 February 1964,  
Meeting with SAMMY in Germany

1. Based on the trip described in the reference memorandum, the events since Subject's arrival in the U. S. on 12 February including confrontation with the Swiss and the Soviets, and a review of all of the information available to me bearing on this case since its inception, I have reached these conclusions:

a. Subject is not a bona fide defector but is rather a KGB agent on a mission to the West from which he fully expects to return. Our reasons for this view are:

(1) [REDACTED] (S)

(2) [REDACTED] (S)

(3) [REDACTED] (S)

(4) [REDACTED] (S)

(5) [REDACTED] (S)

*12/14/94*  
Classified by SP7/elebna  
Declassify on: OADR  
*PR CIA letter*  
*10/28/94*

*See addendum*  
Classified by SP-709-1031  
Declassify on: OADR

REC-23 65-68530-22

*copy to WFO 2/19/64*  
*57 MAR 5 1964*

EX 104

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CLASSIFIED PER CIA LETTER OF SEP 17 1983

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

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(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

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(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

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(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

50 USC Section 403

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

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(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

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Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

\_\_\_\_\_ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  
65-68530-22 pg. 2

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[REDACTED] (S)

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b. While we are not able now to describe all aspects of Subject's mission, we believe these are important elements of it:

(1) To persuade us that a whole series of important agents were lost through specific kinds of surveillance methods and techniques employed in Moscow. These agents include

[REDACTED] (S)

Penkovskiy; and others. The greatest attention along these lines is devoted to telling us precisely how POPOV and PENKOVSKIY were lost because they were by far the most productive and important agents.

(2) To discourage us from pursuing investigation of at least one suspect who could have compromised the cases noted above by making it appear that the suspect,

[REDACTED] (S) was not and never could have been recruited. There are many other ways in which Subject's information could have served to confuse us regarding [REDACTED] but this is most easily seen in a detailed chronology of the [REDACTED] case which is a separate report. (S)

(3) To account for leads from GOLITSYN to possible suspects in U. S. intelligence services by attributing the same cryptonyms (such as

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(3) [redacted] and same similar background to other alleged KGB agents. If accepted by us, this new information would have the effect of closing the books on the investigations of the GOLITSYN leads on the grounds that we now have them pinned down or "explained away" through Subject.

(4) To penetrate our Soviet operations by having us accept him as a consultant on the pattern of Deryabin and Rostvorov, both KGB defectors of 1954 vintage. Subject's bona fides would be established through the arrests or confirmatory investigations of the numerous agents on whom he has given names or identifying data. Subject is very eager to get on with his formal acceptance as an employee and since arriving in the U. S. has pushed this very hard.

(5) Through penetration to elicit information on our knowledge of KGB operations against us and on our own personnel, methods, techniques and operations. Since arrival in the U. S. he has elicited constantly and will continue to do so.

(6) Through elicitation to determine exactly how much GOLITSYN gave us and what we have done with it. Here are some examples of his concentration on GOLITSYN:

(a) [redacted] (S)

(b) [redacted] (S)

(c) [redacted] (S)

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(7) As a penetration agent to assist us in recruiting sources already controlled by KGB. These sources will tie up manpower and serve as excellent channels for disinformation. I am virtually certain that [redacted] belongs in this category and his action last October and November in suddenly making himself attractive to our man was part of this overall program.

(8) There are probably additional long-range elements in KGB planning of Subject's mission which could involve such things as Subject's serving as fingerman in an assassination operation aimed at GOLITSYN or re-defecting and providing a usable information base for more attacks on CIA. This latter possibility is seen as a more certain last phase objective in light of the Soviet publicity and their insistence on the confrontation. By these actions, the Soviets have contributed handsomely to Subject's bona fides and they probably expect it will only be a matter of time, hopefully very short, before Subject is taken on as a CI consultant. When this happens, they can pull him out any time they choose and use him under the lable "A Soviet Defector on CIA's Payroll" to uncork a massive press attack on the Agency.

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[REDACTED]

c. We do not believe that Subject's mission is an isolated activity but rather the culmination of other KGB actions some or all of which may have been geared to the same objectives described for Subject operation. The degree to which we can be certain of a link between previous actions and Subject varies with each case and we will so indicate:

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(2) It is just conceivable that [redacted] was the first phase of the high-level deception operation of which GOLITSYN heard while still in the KGB. GOLITSYN thought that Penkovskiy might be the deception operation but the sheer volume of Penkovskiy reporting in the military and related fields would require some explanation. Also, Subject has really hit hard on the fact Penkovskiy was apprehended through surveillance.

[redacted] and contained in the CHEREPANOV papers. This does not mean that there could not have been a deception operation of some kind underway. One possible explanation may lie in the [redacted] case.

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(3) [redacted]



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


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(5) In October 1963, Subject personally directed the provocation operation directed at  interrogated  long enough for the latter to be able to identify positively a photograph of Subject when debriefed by us in Washington. (S)

(6) On 4 November 1963, an ostensible Soviet International Book Organization (MEZHKNIKA) employee named ~~CHEREPANOV~~ passed to an RUSSIAN American visitor a package of KGB documents. These documents were given to the Embassy FORMER KGB OFFICER where they were photographed and returned. The documents, dating back before August 1960, strongly suggested that surveillance was the cause of our losses and that the KGB had given up any thoughts of recruiting  When Subject was asked about the ~~CHEREPANOV~~ papers, he had ready a complete story confirming the "validity" of the documents, together with background on ~~CHEREPANOV~~, himself, a former KGB officer, and on the hunt throughout the USSR for ~~CHEREPANOV~~ in which Subject himself claimed to have participated, "proving" this by bringing to Geneva with him

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copies of the TDY orders he reportedly received when he too took part in the hunt for CHEREPANOV.

Recommendations:

2. First, while there may be areas we have overlooked, or improperly assessed, I believe the evidence that Subject represents part of a large-scale KGB deception operation to be overwhelming and therefore our recommendations will be made on this basis. Furthermore, the way in which the Soviets handled the publicity and the confrontation has only served to reinforce this view.

3. Second, 

4. If we are to succeed, proper timing will be most essential. Finally, it will be necessary to maintain an effective degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge of Subject's true status and our plans to try to secure from him a full confession. If Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our intentions, we will probably be forced to act prematurely.

5. The following immediate steps are suggested:

- a. Debriefing on those matters about which Subject will talk freely should be continued under conditions which will not cause Subject to suspect our intentions. We should recognize that
- (1) we cannot prevent Subject's escape unless we take measures to control him which would immediately indicate our distrust.
  - (2) we cannot prevent entirely his communicating with the KGB.

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- b. This memorandum and the reference should be shown to and discussed with the FBI with a view to their designating an officer to conduct debriefings of interest to the FBI but within the framework we establish with them for determining the full scope of this KGB operation.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

10 February 1964

SUBJECT: Meeting with SAMMY in Germany

1. Set forth below is a description of my meetings with Subject in Germany on 8 and 9 February together with my impressions of the case as a whole

2. I arrived in Frankfurt the afternoon of 8 February and first conferred with the officers handling the case. They described the movement from Geneva to Frankfurt as without incident

3. During the first two days in Germany, Subject was relaxed and confident and it was possible to review with him parts of his notes taken from KGB studies which covered such topics as:

- a. A review of U. S. intelligence operations into the Soviet Union from 1950 - 1962.
- b. Analysis of the operations of U. S. service attaches in the USSR, emphasizing technical collection methods.
- c. Study of measures taken to counter intelligence activities by Western tourists, members of delegations, etc.
- d. Selection and use of Soviet citizens as agents in CI operations against foreign intelligence personnel operating in the USSR.

4. By the evening of 7 February, Subject began to show signs of concern at what he conceived to be our delay in demonstrating our full acceptance of him and his story. When he was told a senior officer was en route to meet him, his anxiety increased but this did not interfere with his taking a physical examination the morning of 8 February.

5. Both the officer in charge, with whom I spoke at length when he came back to Headquarters briefly after the initial Geneva meeting, and his assistant

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(S) [redacted] were unanimous in their view that Subject was not a genuine defector. His contact with us in Geneva and subsequent defection were, according to these officers, clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB. I was particularly interested in the assistant's statement that he had suspected Subject from the very first meeting on the basis of Subject's emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect.

6. Despite their conviction that Subject was under KGB control and was consequently providing us only that information which the KGB wanted us to have, both case officers felt that much of value could be derived from continuing to debrief Subject as though we accepted him fully.

7 [redacted]

per CIA b1 b3

(S) 8. By the end of the evening, I had come to the same conclusions reached by the case officers. The totality of our conclusions are treated in detail in a separate memorandum.

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11. Finally, I told Subject I had brought

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12. Sunday afternoon we drove down [REDACTED] (S)  
 [REDACTED] had lunch and returned. This is a lovely  
 drive through vineyards and charming villages. I was  
 struck by the fact that neither the landscape nor the  
 sight of Fasching costumes and parades in the villages  
 caused Subject to venture a single comment pro or con about  
 Germany or Germans. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the trip, we did (S)  
 talk about these matters:

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a. [REDACTED] (S)

b. After agreeing with my contention that the agri-  
 cultural situation in the USSR was chaotic,  
 Subject's reasons why and suggestions for im-  
 provement were unconvincing and immature. He  
 seems to feel that all one needs to improve  
 agriculture, and other sectors of the economy,  
 is better Party cadres.

c. [REDACTED] (S)

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d. A long discussion of the Sino-Soviet split had Subject intent on persuading me that the split was growing deeper and could not be healed. I expressed the view which I attributed to many students of Marxism that the split was illusionary, arranged to confuse the West. Subject disagreed and reiterated that the split was getting deeper. When I remarked that the logic of this was for the USSR and the USA to cooperate against a common enemy, particularly in the intelligence field, he looked surprised and protested that this wouldn't work because two conflicting ideologies were involved. I countered by saying there were really three and Subject quickly added that the Chinese version was "false".

e.

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what are these notes? (S)

f.

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g. The eventual fate of Subject's family was raised with him. He advanced the view that since his wife had no knowledge of his plans, she would be subjected to only cursory interrogation and then left alone in her six-room flat. I expressed doubts on this score

[REDACTED]

h.

[REDACTED]

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13. After the ride, I stopped off to see [REDACTED] to thank him for [REDACTED] marvelous assistance and to tell him something of the status of the case. I said we were still of the opinion that Subject had been sent to us but were persuaded that before an attempt is made to break him, we must take down all that he is prepared to tell us in response to our questions. When this is done, and when we hopefully will have more evidence on the exact nature of his mission, we will proceed to try to break him. I

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asked [redacted] two questions in this regard. [redacted]

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14. Before leaving [redacted] I learned that Subject had become a bit uneasy over the long and searching discussions held with him during the drive [redacted] We agreed that my final visit would avoid any further probing. Therefore, the last visit went off smoothly with Subject entertaining us with fascinating anecdotes from the operations of the Second Chief Directorate directed at the compromise of foreigners in the USSR. I left Subject at 2300 on 9 February and returned to Washington on 10 February.

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