Communist Party Central Committee. On arrival each member of the committee received a note-book with the list of the films, documents, photographs, tapes, and other proofs of the charges against the USSR and the KGB. Mikhail Roy was included in them.

Raul declared that the anti-Castro activities had been carried out since mid-1966. The Soviets had managed to infiltrate into the Ministry of Industry, the newspaper GRANMA, Radio Havana, the university, the Academy of Sciences, the fruit and tobacco industries, the offices of the Central Committee, and even into the Armed Forces Ministry, itself, headed by Raul Castro. The principal agents of the USSR were the old communists who had escaped the Escalante purge.

John Barron writes, textually: "But Raul spoke with greater fury about the Soviet representatives who allied themselves with the anti-Castro faction, and named numerous KGB officers. Among them were Rudolf P. Shlyapnikov, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy; Mikhail Roy of NOVOSTI; another "journalist," Vadim Lestov; and various DGI advisers, whom Raul referred to only by their Spanish aliases.

"Relating that two Cuban communists had held meetings with KGB officer Roy" at a street corner in the Vedado (section of Havana) and had taken a long drive in the automobile of the Soviet "journalist," Raul declared: "If anybody wants to ask someone ordinary questions, he invites him to his home or goes to his, to his office, or some other place; but when someone is involved in conspiratorial activities...utilizing the classic method of collecting information, then one arranges a meeting on a street corner and then takes a long leisurely drive.

As a result of these street corner rendezvous, leisurely automobile drives, and other activities, Escalante, the pro-Soviet conspirator whom Castro had permitted to return, was sentenced to 15 years in jail; and Roy, Shlyapnikov, Lestov, and other Soviets were expelled at the end of 1967.

But Castro was destabilized. In the spring of 1968, the Soviets cut off his oil supply and he had to go to Moscow to submit. And the KGB has converted the DGI, which smashed its last plot, into one of its most powerful international weapons.

The "journalists" Roy and Lestov spent a few months in Moscow recharging their batteries. A short while later a new job opportunity opened up for them.

The Club of Expellees

In the last edition of the Diplomatic List of Torre Tagle there are 27 USSR representatives. Seven of them appear in Barron's book as KGB agents: Arseni Fedorovich Orlov, Boris Nicolaevich Voskoboykov, Sergei Alekseevich Yangaykin, Mikhail Roy, Vladislav Komushkin, Yuri A. Veselov and Alexander D. Morosov. According to Barron, Voskoboykov was expelled from Mexico, Yangaykin (in the photo) from Uruguay, Roy from Cuba, Veselov from the Congo and Morosov from Argentina.

In 52 appendix pages, John Barron includes a list of more than 2,000 KGB officers stationed all over the world with their career and service records. The author says that this file of agents was made up of all the names of Soviets whose clandestine operations have been detected by two or more sources. Some more than once. Official reports of expulsions and statements by former KGB spies, such as Yuri Nosenko and Petr Deriabin, permitted Barron to refine his roster.

Of special interest are the names of KGB agents with experience and service in Latin America. Particularly what could comprise an Expellees Club from Latin American countries. In that latter club are: ABILIEV, Mikhail S.: expelled from Venezuela 1952. AKSENOV, Nikolai Vasilevich Mexico 49-53 and 56-59; expelled 1959. ALTARYEV, Mikhail S.: expelled from Venezuela 1952. AMOSOV, Igor Alexandrovich; Cuba 1968; expelled


The list includes scores of other KGB officers, identified as such but who have not been expelled.

Several of them, as for example, Sergei ROMANOV, Alexander SHITOV (alias Alexander ALEXEEV, former ambassador to Cuba), Nikolai DUKOV, Vladimir KISELEV, Mikhail ROY, Sergei YANGYKIN, and Vadim LESTOV are serving in or have served in Peru.
BOOK REVIEWS

WELT AM SONNTAG, Hamburg
24 November 1974
REPORT ON THE KGB: THE SWORD OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

Review by Henk Ohnesorge of Book "KGB: Work and Organization of Soviet Intelligence Service in East and West" by John Barron

It is not too frequent that a book published abroad leads to an inquiry in the FRG Bundestag. John Barron's "KGB" is one such book because it contains a list of "Soviet citizens involved in secret assignments abroad." Some names on this list in turn surfaced as those of persons with diplomatic status in the FRG -- a fact noted by the opposition.

The book receives a permanent currency from the kind of espionage that has virtually become an everyday affair in our country. It offers visible proof for the discrepancy between the mouthing of detente from the east and the activity of eastern intelligence services, for the most credulous to see.

What is being spread before us here is apt to make the most cold-blooded contemporaries' flesh creep. Barron and his coworkers had the opportunity either to interview all postwar KGB defectors, except two, or to read their reports. Some "inserts" -- such as the killings of the Ukrainian exile politicians in the FRG -- did become widely known here but were forgotten just as fast. Here now, case follows case.

This probably unique material makes it possible for the author to trace and document, almost without a gap, the domestic and foreign policy objectives of the KGB until 1973. Simply stated, they are to penetrate the ideological enemy every day at any cost and by any means. For the approximately 500,000 members of the, probably, largest intelligence service in the world, the question of any kind of "sentimentalism" never even comes up.

The book is intentionally written for laymen, with dialogs, a great amount of detail and sometimes in the style of a spy thriller. Its readability does not vitiate its authenticity.

Another aspect is the presentation of the KGB as a state within a state, controlling everything, with its own spoilt caste of functionaries, practically directly responsible to the chairman of the Politburo. Foreign assignments are only a part, if an important part, of KGB activities. In contrast to the intelligence services of other dictatorships -- as Barron convincingly proves -- the KGB has managed to penetrate all domains of private and public life in the Soviet Union and also to bring it about, for example, that its members, under various kinds of cover, are attached to Soviet diplomatic posts abroad. (For that reason Soviet diplomatic posts abroad have much more personnel than have their host countries in Moscow).

Pensive thoughts especially also are roused by what has been called, with some dash, the "Secret KGB Textbook." These are regulations on recruiting Americans as spies against their own country, their use as unwitting informants, and the exploitation of any kind of human weakness as pressure. At least this chapter, one should wish to see become mandatory reading in the West for anyone in intelligence, no matter how insignificant his position.

Equally necessary seems to be to deal with what is said about the technique of disinformation and the poisoning of public opinion by the KGB -- techniques by which, time and again, experienced Western journalists and politicians get trapped.

This is a necessary and at the same time very frightening book, with one thing in it only that may cause a smile, that is to say, the list of agents on which one can suddenly discover Soviet journalists with whom one has indeed dealt on a colleague-to-colleague basis in the Press Club. Yet even this personal experience demonstrates something about the organization's being everywhere, seeing itself, with some justification, as the shield and sword of the CPSU and thus of a -- merely postponed -- world revolution.
Big brother
by EDWARD CRANKSHAW

KGB by John Barron
(Hodder and Stoughton £4.25)

MR BARRON is a senior editor of Readers Digest and this content is in the style and arrangement of his book. But what at first sight might appear to be a colourful compilation of Soviet cloak and dagger stories is, in fact, the product of a very serious investigation: a sober and admirable study of the extraterritorial activities of the largest and nastiest of all secret services. The sensationalism lies in the subject, not in Mr Barron’s treatment of it.

The KGB, lineal successor of Lenin’s Cheka and Stalin’s GPU, is the fine flower of a conspiratorial system of government, the instrument through which the Soviet leadership maintains itself in power. Its present chief, Mr Andropov, sits on the Politburo presided over by Mr Brezhnev. Before he became head of police, Andropov secured his niche in the hall of shame when, as Ambassador to Hungary in 1956, he double-crossed Imre Nagy and lured General Maleter with promises of negotiation and assurances of safe conduct to his death.

Mr Barron has performed a useful service by surveying in its entirety the huge and costly apparatus commanded by this disgusting man, thus exposing the organic connection between the bread and butter activity of his army of domestic operatives, which is straightforward repression, and the high fantasy which marks so many of the KGB’s exploits outside Russia.

Much of Mr Barron’s information has been available in bits and pieces before now but there is a very great deal that is new. He has had access to KGB defectors who have never before spoken openly, and he has been helped by the Intelligence Services of the Western Powers. He is so accurate where I myself have been able to check his facts that I accept as truth what I did not know before. For the general reader his book will be a revelation and a warning. Detente, yes, of course. But trust? No, not at all. Mr Brezhnev may beam but Mr Andropov is watching you.
The KGB's Resistance 
To Soviet Detente

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

When news of the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination of President Kennedy reached Soviet leaders and the boss of the dreaded KGB, the Soviet secret police apparatus, a bomber was immediately dispatched from Moscow to Klin by the frightened Kremlin.

The purpose: To retrieve Oswald's secret dossier in the KGB's office in Moscow where Oswald had lived before returning to the U.S. in June, 1962 and fly it to Moscow for inspection. Terrified Kremlin leaders feared that the dossier might conceivably disclose "some relationship" between the assassin and the KGB.

As it turned out to the Kremlin's vast relief, according to KGB defector Yuri Nosenko's version in a new, soon to be published book on Soviet secret intelligence, the file showed no link.

Nevertheless, this association between KGB and Oswald was another near miss when the independent operation of the mighty Soviet secret police threatened disruption of world peace against the Kremlin's announced policy—a danger more prevalent in today's era of detente.

Wrote author John Barron: "Nosenko states that two panels of psychiatrists independently examined Oswald at KGB behest and each concluded that, though not insane, he was abnormal. Accordingly, the KGB ordered that Oswald be watched but not recruited . . . ."

Oswald returned to the U.S. in June, 1962, then sought re-entry to the Soviet Union via the Soviet embassy in Cuba in September, 1963. When the KGB blocked his return, he went to Dallas to prepare for his terrible deed.

That episode is brought to light in Barron's authoritative expose of the pervasive, international spy network. "KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents" (Readers Digest Press) is the first definitive study of this foreign espionage and internal state police apparatus written with assistance of Western governments, including the U.S., West Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain.

The reason for this unaccustomed help is in itself significant. After years of shrouding the public from scrutiny of Soviet spying, Western governments have come to realize little if any national security of the Western powers is involved. Obviously, KGB has all the threads of its own operations and would learn nothing from disclosure.

There is, moreover, a second, more ominous reason for the new desire by Western security agencies to have more information made public on vast KGB operations. This is the fact that KGB, confronting internal resistance to the Communist system arising from the Kremlin's policy of detente and expanding contacts with the West, is growing larger, more opaque and more dangerous.

Consider these facts: The London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict reported in 1973 that Soviet agents in Western European countries increased from 1,485 ten years ago to 2,146 last year. Three out of every four accredited Soviet "diplomats" in NATO countries are entailed in some form of spying.

To protect the rapidly growing Soviet trade bureaucracy, from ideological tint, the Kremlin has installed as head of the Soviet chamber of commerce a top KGB official named Yevgeni Petrovich Pilovranov.

"The contradiction between the public politics of detente and the secret machinations of the KGB," writes Barron, "can be seen in the realm of trade. While the Soviet Union solicits broader commercial ties with the West, the KGB prepares to prevent these ties for its own familiar purposes by installing Pilovranov and other officers as overseers of the chamber of commerce."

Every Kremlinologist knows of the KGB's deep penetration into Soviet life. But disturbing questions about its Kremlin influence are raised by Barron's study, which has been commended by Ray S. Cline, former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency official and State Department intelligence boss, as "the most authentic account of the KGB I have ever seen."

Thus, on Sept. 6, 1964, Barron writes, KGB agents fired a poison-pistol at a West German technician, sent from Bonn to "cleanse" the Moscow embassy of KGB microphones. The technician almost died from the invisible injection of nitrogen mustard gas.

As a result of that attack, the Bonn government angrily cancelled an invitation to then Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev to visit West Germany, a visit expected to result in a Soviet bid for detente. Within five weeks, Khrushchev was fired and detente was delayed for nearly six years.

The connection between the event in Moscow and Khrushchev's downfall is conjectural, but KGB's power to thwart Khrushchev's step toward detente was indisputably clear.

That is one of Barron's chilling conclusions: KGB, pushing the hardest of hard lines, has an impact all its own on Kremlin actions abroad.

Yet argues Barron, it carries total immunity. 'Dismantlement of the KGB would remove the very foundation of Soviet society,' he writes, 'foundations laid by Lenin more than half a century ago.'
Behind the Lines

The Reader's Digest Press, in conjunction with E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., this month publishes a book that is remarkable: KGB: The Soviet Work of Soviet Secret Agents. Five times while the book was in progress, the Digest condensed chapters from it; we do so again on page 183 of this issue, where you will find one of the volume's many spine-tingling episodes, "The Sergeant Who Opened the Door."

Why a book about the KGB? Ever since the time of Lenin, the men in the Kremlin have relied on a vast clandestine apparatus to preserve their power inside the Soviet Union and to expand it on the outside. This apparatus is known today as the Committee for State Security, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti—the KGB. The military, the bureaucracy, the Communist Party itself all have a role in implementing Soviet policies. But the KGB provides the force that compels these institutions (and every Soviet citizen) to serve the interests of the leadership.

Since the KGB represents such a fundamental underpinning of Soviet power, its activities impinge, indirectly and often directly, upon the lives of all people affected by actions of the Soviet Union. The KGB thus merits illumination as a unique phenomenon of our times—a formidable but largely unseen force in world affairs.

Some five years ago, Reader's Digest editors began a study to assess the feasibility of writing a definitive book about the KGB. We concluded that we could strip away the propagandist secrecy surrounding it only if we could enlist the cooperation of two principal types of sources: former KGB officers and agents who could provide original, authentic data based on their own observations and experiences; and non-communist security and intelligence services which know about the KGB as a consequence of daily combat with it.

The problems of gaining access to these sources were enormous. Most of the former KGB personnel were scattered about the world, hiding under aliases. There was no assurance that we could even find them, much less induce them to confide in us. We also recognized that we could not in a serious work accept evidence provided by any one defector or service in the absence of independent corroboration.

Nevertheless, we set to work. The late Edgar Hoover allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to answer many of our questions. Cartha DeLoach, then assistant to the director of the FBI, briefed us about significant KGB operations against the United States and permitted us to meet an important former Soviet agent, Kassio Fottor. We also were able to talk to retired FBI agents involved in some of the cases narrated in the book.

The Central Intelligence Agency eventually fulfilled most of our requests for access to reports from all postwar KGB defectors except two. Not all of the foreign service security agencies were willing or able to help. Nearly two dozen contributed in some measure, however, and the contributions of several were substantial. In addition, the foreign offices of the Digest enabled us to monitor publications in 13 languages and to exploit leads, reports and scholarly writings. No one individual could have assembled.

Selected to direct the massive research and write the book was Senior Editor John Barron, who had served with U.S. Naval Intelligence before becoming an award-winning investigative newspaper reporter in Washington, D.C. Says Barron:

"Our contacts with former KGB personnel began with the mailing of a letter to a post-office box or some other accommodation address. Prolonged correspondence and negotiations frequently elapsed before we could arrange a meeting. From the outset, one of the officers we most wanted to meet was Yuri Ivanovich Noveska, a former KGB major who fled to the United States through Switzerland in 1954. Despite vigorous efforts, we were unable to locate him. Then, in May 1970, Noveska walked unannounced into our Washington office. He had read of our project in The Reader's Digest, he said, and wished to offer his assistance.

"He did so at personal risk. I was told later that the KGB had long hunted him, with the intention of killing him. By coming to our office, less than four blocks from the Soviet embassy, he created consternation among U.S. authorities responsible for his security. But we saw Noveska on many subsequent occasions, and his contributions were invaluable.

"Throughout the research, we looked for stories that would dramatize a distinct facet of the KGB and its activities. And with both a KGB agent and an old and respected friend, I remembered that we needed one great, fresh case that could illustrate all the techniques of contemporary KGB espionage. "Ask about the case of Johnson and Minneman, "my friend said. "The real story has never been told. If you can get it, you'll have a tale that has everything."

"Reconstructed on the basis of military and other official records during more than 50 interviews spanning several months, that story became "The Sergeant Who Opened the Door."

We commend both this selection and the book itself to your attention. Soviet leaders today employ the KGB with less brutality and more sophistication than did Stalin. But the agency, despite the easy promises of defectives and the brave defiance of dissidents within the Soviet heartland, continues with undiminished vigor its fundamental and extraordinary role as a divisive force abroad and as an apparatus for the perpetuation of tyranny at home. Ultimately, its demise will come only through that which the KGB fears most: the unrelenting light of exposure."

—The Editors

THE SCHOALING OF A SOVIET SPY. April 79. "The Spy Who Changed His Mind."

DAILY TELEGRAPH
27 December 1973

TEACHER GETS FOUR YEARS IN LABOUR CAMP

A Moscow technical school teacher, Valery Balakin, has been sentenced to four years in a labor camp on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, disseminating subversive and traitorous literature and ideas, and instigating the destruction of the national economy." The teacher said—Reuter.
**Investigations: Oswald and the U-2**

Among the countless questions left unanswered in 1964 when the Warren commission wound up its ten-month investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy was one that piqued scholars and assassination buffs alike: Did Lee Harvey Oswald, when he defected to the Soviet Union, deliver any secrets about America's U-2 spy planes?

In its史上 Report and Hearings, comprising nearly 10.7 million words, the commission dismissed, on good evidence, the notion that Oswald was ever Soviet agent. If the Russians had recruited him as a spy, the reasoning ran, they would have advised him to stay in the U.S. Oswald, in 1958, served as a radar operator and two bases from which U-2 planes operated—Atsugi, Japan, and Cubi Point, near Manila, and, and, and, when he first visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he intimated he knew "something of special interest" that he planned to tell the Russians.

One paper among the 1,555 numbered documents in the Warren commission files was obviously addressed to that question. Commission Document No. 831, a memorandum from CIA director Richard Helms to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, was indexed "where he would have access to classified information about the U-2." But the memo itself was labeled "secret" and locked in the vault-like "Classified Records Area" of the National Archives.

Helms, who was disturbed by the pique he has provoked, doesn't show it. "I'm a stickler for accuracy," he told Newsweek's Nancy Ball evenly, and he claims to have passed what might be regarded as the acid test of his accomplishments—the recent, brief return of Jacqueline Kennedy to the White House—unscathed to the White House at one time only to put a higher price tag on it."

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Helms maintained "there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe" that Oswald obtained "factual knowledge" of the U-2 or its mission.

**Oswald and wife in Russia: No secrets**

Helms' contention that Oswald was "unlikely" to understand the implications of the U-2 is itself unlikely to satisfy critics of the Warren commission. Neither will now tidbits of information in the other declassified papers. One long-anticipated "secret" CIA report on "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping" is little more than a reaffirmation of known murders and abductions by the Soviet security police in the 1950s, with a conclusion by one ex-KGB agent that it was "highly unlikely" Moscow would order the liquidation of a U.S. President.

Grisly Reminders: Along with transcripts of four of the commission's eleven meetings, some 300 documents remain classified—kept in a room behind a combination lock that only three archivists are permitted to open. One, a CIA report, bears the intriguing title "Soviet Brainwashing Techniques." Another is a report on the FBI's interrogation of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who defected to the U.S. ten weeks after the assassination. Also on the green metal shelves are "Scratched" Last week, more than six years after the Warren commission was disbanded, the Helms-to-Hoover memo finally surfaced as the National Archives, after a year-long review with the CIA, FBI and other agencies, quietly scratched the "secret" and "confidential" labels from 83 commission documents. The newly declassified material, examined by Newsweek's Charles Roberts, shed little light on the assassination but did provide an answer to sorts of the U-2 riddle.

In the memo to Hoover, dated May 13, 1964, Helms tartly dismissed a letter from the FBI director suggesting that Oswald may have compromised the CIA's U-2 planes. His rejection of Hoover's inquiry, however, was based almost entirely on his assertion that U-2s operated at Atsugi and Cubi Point from hangar areas that were inaccessible to Oswald. Conceding that "there were rumors and gossip" about the U-2s and that Oswald "could have heard such gossip," Helms maintained "there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe" that Oswald obtained "factual knowledge" of the U-2 or its mission.

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On the heels of the bizarre Garrison Case collapse the New York Times Magazine of April 20 carried an article by JFK assassination author Edward Jay Epstein titled "The Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy?" Epstein concluded that this ends the investigation era of the Kennedy killing and that future speculation will rest with authors and historians.

Amazingly, one key factor in the case has never come before the public, and has been effectively hushed even within official circles. That factor is the reason why Jack Ruby was given the run of the Dallas police headquarters, even during the top-security attempt to move Lee Harvey Oswald to a safer haven.

From the moment Ruby fired the fatal bullet into Lee Harvey Oswald's gut the world press and opinion makers came down on the Dallas cops with the most vindictive wrath. They were accused of total incompetence and worse, the scornful attacks continuing to this day.

Chief Curry and Chief Inspector Fritz, among other key members of the Dallas police force (considered one of the better law enforcement bodies in the nation) sat in enraged frustration as the attacks poured in. For they knew why Ruby was allowed free run of the police station.

Jack Ruby's role in that traumatic November, 1963, weekend began approximately a year and a half earlier, in New Orleans. At that time the FBI agent assigned to the French Quarter had become involved with a local lady of pleasure. In such cases the Bureau yanks the agent and relocates him as soon as the situation becomes known in Washington.

The agent was shifted to Dallas, and shortly thereafter a memo was sent to the Dallas office instructing that each agent cultivate four new informants. The ex-New Orleanian man, possibly because of his French Quarter background, gravitated to Dallas' Commerce Street, the center of the city's strip joints and cheap bars.

He of course cruised the Carousel Club, owned by the Chicago-born cop buff and self-styled tough character, Jack Ruby. The agent cultivated Ruby and eventually felt him out on becoming an unpaid FBI informant. Ruby jumped at the chance.

In early 1963 Ruby was given final approval, and assigned an informant's number and file (Dallas is DL-1234, New York NY-1234, etc.). This was made known to the Dallas police, and the already familiar Ruby became a privileged personage with the local boys in blue.

In Washington, Ruby's informant file was immediately pulled, and all evidence that he was associated with the FBI at the time he shot Oswald was destroyed.

It must be emphasized that the FBI was not at fault here, and was caught in a situation that would not have been in the national interest had it come to light in those trying days. The FBI and every like agency throughout history has had to deal with the shady likes of Jack Ruby in order to retain its effectiveness. Sometimes these contacts go sour, and then they must be completely disavowed.

But over five years have elapsed since that weekend of bloodshed and hysteria, and in all fairness to the Dallas police the truth of Jack Ruby's unmolested presence deserves to be known. Also, it is a part of history, and it is the job of every journalist to tell what he knows when the national interest can no longer be prejudiced.

This is why Washington Observer Newsletter believes it is in the national interest to break this exclusive and significant story—another "first" for WO.
U. S. Will Let Russians See Defector Nossenko

Moscow Seeks Details of Desertion; Authorities Here Puzzled by Furor

BY the Associated Press

The Soviet Union has asked that its officials be permitted to see Yuri I. Nossenko, a Soviet secret police officer who defected to the United States, and State Department officials said today that arrangements will be made to meet the Soviet request.

The Moscow government has now protested against Mr. Nossenko's defection and has also asked the United States for information as to how it happened.

The protest was registered in Moscow today by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko with United States Ambassador Foy D. Kohler.

Mr. Kohler promptly reported to Washington. Authorities here declined to release details but indicated that Mr. Gromyko had taken the line that the United States Government was responsible for Mr. Nossenko's behavior.

Washington Puzzled

Washington authorities privately concede they are puzzled by the excitement which the Soviet government appears to be building up over what Washington officials had considered an interesting but not especially extraordinary defection case.

Some wonder whether the Soviets may be using the Nossenko incident at a takeoff point for an attack on the 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference. Mr. Nossenko was on assignment as a member of the Soviet delegation at Geneva when he defected.

In Geneva, a Soviet spokes-
The Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy?

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

up until the time of the trial itself, newspapers and commentators were more accommodating about allowing Garrison the sort of prominent coverage he so eagerly sought. To be sure; it is in the best tradition of objective journalism to report the news and give equal space to both sides in a controversy, and no doubt many reporters, who were personally skeptical about Garrison's motives, saw it as their duty to report the official statements (or mimeographed handouts, as they often were) of a duly elected district attorney, even if it meant providing a public forum for a demagogue.

But more important for the purposes of assessing the present state of the assassination controversy is the fact that Garrison was aided by a number of critics of the Warren Report as well as by publications which had taken what amounted to an editorial policy against the Warren Commission. In evaluating the validity of the various charges which have been leveled against the commission, it is worthwhile to consider the extent to which those who made the charges aligned themselves with Garrison and the New Orleans fiasco.

The example of Mark Lane, the New York lawyer who, by dint of his one-man crusade in defense of Lee Harvey Oswald, has deservedly claimed chief credit for having drawn public attention to questions about the assassination, is an instructive case in point.

A MONTH after the assassination, well before the Warren Commission had even begun to examine the evidence, Lane published a 10,000-word defense brief in Oswald's behalf in The National Guardian. Then, assuming the role of lawyer for Oswald's ghost, Lane became something of a latter-day lyceum type, addressing ever-increasing audiences in nightclubs, theaters, college lecture halls and the like, drawing ominous inferences and posing puzzling questions about the evidence. After the publication of The Warren Report in September, 1964, Lane expanded his a conjectural essay originally pub-
It was not Oswald but another New Orleans lawyer, television comedian Mark Lane, who used his television show to promote Mark Lane and the controversy, subsequently blaming the Johnson Administration for the loss of his program and becoming an "investigator" for Garrison.

Like Lane, each of the critics claimed to have access to at least part of Garrison's "secret evidence," and on this basis they warned the public that the Johnson Administration would face dire consequences if Garrison were ever allowed to bring his evidence to court. For his part, Garrison paid homage to the critics and their theories in most of his own appearances and sought to confirm the validity of their speculations by incorporating them into his case. When Garrison was challenged to reveal the grounds for his allegations, that President Johnson was somehow involved, he would characteristically reply, as he did on the Johnny Carson show, "I am not allowed, as an attorney, to come up with evidence until the case comes to trial." The mysterious "secret evidence" never materialized in court and these criticisms of the Warren Commission, who had claimed to have access to it, were left holding the bag.

Garrison's cause was also championed by far-out periodicals like The Los Angeles Free Press and the white citizen's Councillor as well as journals like The New York Review of Books and Ramparts. These publications had previously rejected the conclusion of the Warren Commission ostensively because they had found the commission's investigation defective (not for "political" reasons, i.e., because it had been issued under the auspices of the Johnson Administration), yet these same magazines embraced the New Orleans investigation wholeheartedly, choosing to pass by its glaring mistakes and Garrison's own transparent flimflamery.

The New York Review, which, for its first book-publishing venture, brought out Popkin's theory about the "second Oswald" in a separate paperback edition and whose editor, Robert Silvers, helped arrange a forum on the assassination at the Theater for the New York Review of Books, sent Popkin to New Orleans to interview himself, to have access to the district attorney at a preserved his "day in court," additionally a curious tack for liberals to be taking in defense of a prosecutor. Ramparts put Garrison's portrait on the cover of its January, 1968, issue and in an accompanying editorial declared that "staff writer William Turner's nine-month investigation into the case of New Orleans D.A. Jim Garrison has convinced us, that something is terribly, and even unusually, rotten in Washington. Turner has had full access to Garrison's files, and has logged 80,000 miles double-checking every factual assertion in Garrison's astonishing reconstruction of President Kennedy's murder, told for the first time in this issue. It fulfills, sadly, many of our most paranoid nightmares about the C.I.A., the Minutemen, Dallas fascists and the American Nazis. It also raises ultimately serious questions about the responsibility of this Government and the honesty of our current President." (Popkin had also cited in The New York Review of Books rumors that President Johnson was somehow suspect because of defects in the Warren Report.) The "double-checked" evidence never showed up at the trial of Clay Shaw, making the "paranoid nightmare" seem an apt description for what remained unsubstantiated.

That these magazines accepted Garrison's claims on blind faith leads one to wonder whether the Warren Report was not similarly rejected in blind contempt for the President who succeeded Kennedy, for reasons more political than evidentiary. In any case, by appearing virtually empty-handed at the trial, Garrison exposed a bluff larger than his own; he left many critics who were instrumental in discrediting the Warren Report looking like something less than the disinterested factfinders they pretended to be. And in view of the discredit he brought them, it is not particularly surprising that now some disgruntled critics have even advanced the theory that Garrison himself was in fact a C.I.A. agent provocateur. Surely there was among many critics a measure of guiltlessness at least, of outright dishonesty at most. But not everyone who registered reservations about the Warren Commission's methods and conclusions rallied to Garrison's defense. To consider the possibility of doubts still lingering in the minds of those critics of the commission who on the assassination at the Theater for the New York Review of Books, sent Popkin to New Orleans, where he was given, and his cause, to ask what questions by prior arrangement, access to the about the assassination of President Johnson's key witness and other Kennedy still do remain unanswered, the "secret evidence." Popkin then wrote it is worthwhile to recall the history, insisting that the district attorney at a preserved his "day in court," additionally a curious tack for liberals to be taking in defense of a prosecutor. Ramparts put Garrison's portrait on the cover of its January, 1968, issue and in an accompanying editorial declared that "staff writer William Turner's nine-month investigation into the case of New Orleans D.A. Jim Garrison has convinced us, that something is terribly, and even unusually, rotten in Washington. Turner has had full access to Garrison's files, and has logged 80,000 miles double-checking every factual assertion in Garrison's astonishing reconstruction of President Kennedy's murder, told for the first time in this issue. It fulfills, sadly, many of our most paranoid nightmares about the C.I.A., the Minutemen, Dallas fascists and the American Nazis. It also raises ultimately serious questions about the responsibility of this Government and the honesty of our current President." (Popkin had also cited in The New York Review of Books rumors that President Johnson was somehow suspect because of defects in the Warren Report.) The "double-checked" evidence never showed up at the trial of Clay Shaw, making the "paranoid nightmare" seem an apt description for what remained unsubstantiated.

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conspiracies, to advertise. Magazines, including Life and The Saturday Evening Post, not unawares of the growing public interest in the assassination controversy, demanded a investigation in editorial as well as cover stories. These, in turn, encouraged the District Attorney of New Orleans to set off on his own fishing expedition. (Simultaneously with the opening of his investigation into Oswald s activities in New Orleans, Garrison proposed an exchange of information deal with Life which amounted to giving the magazine exclusive coverage.)

Unlike the other critics, Garrison could make news at will by arresting people. In acting out his (and other critics') theories, turning his office into a sort of Living Theater, he proceeded to arrest or file charges against more than a dozen persons. And the D.A.'s newsmaking potential was something that couldn't be overlooked by the mass-circulation magazines, facing the problem of lead time and having to plan newsworthy articles months in advance of publication. In a memorandum to Hugh Hefner, the publisher of Playboy, a senior editor summed up the reasons for publishing a 20-page interview with Garrison (which was partly written by Garrison himself) as follows:

Even if he's wrong (which is possible), even if he's insincere (which I doubt), even if the accusations about his impropriety are true (which seems not to be the case), Shaw is going to trial in October [1967] and the interview (coming out two or three weeks before it begins) will be very big news.

Much of the rhetoric on the talk shows and in magazine interviews was not designed to enlighten the public. Mark Lane made a practice of introducing pseudoscientific evidence, such as paraffin tests (misinterpreted to "prove" Oswald's innocence), which could only confuse audiences not versed in the nuances of forensic science. Jim Garrison characterized dwelt on missing evidence, which was being kept "secret" by the Government but of which he vaguely seemed to know the contents. For example, noting that four frames of the famous film of the assassination taken by a spectator Abraham Zapruder numbers 208-211 were missing from the frame-by-frame reproduction of the film in the testimony and evidence published by the Warren Commission, Garrison claimed in his Playboy interview that these missing frames "revealed signs of stress appearing suddenly on the sign." But the "missing frames into which Garrison glibly read stray bullets, while missing from the Warren Report volumes, were not missing from a copy of the film held by Life magazine, which bought the film, and these frames, which were published after the Playboy interview, show no signs of "stress" or stray bullets.

A third technique, of obfuscatory rhetoric, which Harold Weisberg frequently employed in his talk-show appearances, was that of citing irrelevant coincidences prefaced by "Isn't it strange—?" He would demand to know why the commission hadn't investigated the coincidences he postulated. Although this technique no doubt stimulates curiosity, it produces confusion in the audience. It can, moreover, be turned in any direction, isn't it strange, one might ask, for example, that Harold Weisberg himself once worked for the lawyer Oswald had asked for when he was apprehended in Dallas? Isn't it strange also that Weisberg's stepbrother once treated Ferrie, Garrison's prime suspect, for a disease that caused his hair to fall out? Such rhetoric, common among street agitators, can excite imaginations but provide no answers.

Somewhat obscured by the efforts of the headline seekers and proselytizers for Garrison's cause were a number of serious attempts to clarify problems in the Warren Commission's evidence by critics such as Sylvia Meagher and Prof. Josiah Thompson Jr., who clearly disassociated themselves from the antics of Garrison and his followers. These serious critiques must be considered on their own merits. Mrs. Meagher's book ("Accessories After the Fact") and Thompson's ("Six Seconds in Dallas") contain, as far as I can see, only two substantial arguments that, if true, would preclude the possibility that Oswald fired all the shots.

First, there is the argument that the commission's single-bullet theory—that President Kennedy and Governor Connally were both hit by the same bullet—is controverted by the evidence. The importance of this theory lies in the fact that the commission's staff concluded, from an analysis of the Zapruder film, that there was not time, between the earliest point on the film when the President could have seen first hit and the latest point at which the Governor could have been hit, for a single rifleman to have fired two shots. Therefore, it was argued, either both men were hit by the same bullet or there must have been two riflemen firing.

Second argument asserts that the Zapruder film reveals that the President's head, when hit, moved forward for a split second, then sharply backward. Professor Thompson concludes from microanalysis of the film that this change of direction was caused, first, by a shot hitting the President's head from behind (as the Warren Commission concluded), then a tenth of a second later by another bullet, which hit the President's head in the front. This would obviously mean that there were two assassins.

Deducing a cause from an effect (i.e., the motion of the President's head as it appears on film) presents difficulty. Other analyses
a split-second or a neurological reaction—could account for the effect. If the President was indeed hit most simultaneously by two rifles, an firing from two different directions, as Thompson argues, one would expect to find evidence of this in the X-rays and photographs taken at the President's autopsy. This material, however, had not been examined by the commission or its staff—it was turned over to the Kennedy family which, in turn, consigned it to the National Archives with the condition that it could not be open to examination for five years (that is, until 1971).

This means that the key to the mystery of the head movement was thus unavailable to Thompson when he wrote his book in 1967. Recently, when pressed for the autopsy material by Garrison (who claimed it was relevant to his case), the Justice Department released an evaluation of it by two respected forensic pathologists. Both doctors concluded that the X-rays and photographs indicated that the President's head was hit from only one direction—from behind.

Here are still a great number of inconsistencies, as Mrs. Meagher points out in her book, between the assertions in the Warren Report and the data in the accompanying 26 volumes of testimony and evidence, and unresolved questions about Oswald's life and activities before the assassination. (Many of the questions left outstanding by the commission, however, were resolved subsequently by Elmer Gertz in his book, "Moment of Madness," which dealt with Ruby's activities, and by Professor Thompson in the appendix to his book.)

Unfortunately, there is no formula for adding up inconsistencies and arriving at the truth. For example, if hundreds of errors and inconsistencies were found in the report of a commission formed to determine whether the earth is round or flat, it might mean that the commission was hasty or sloppy in performing its task or, if all the errors went in one direction, tendentious, but it would not in itself prove that the earth is flat. Nor, given the contingent nature of reality, can it be assumed that what was probable has material.

When it was shown that the Warren Commission had conducted a less than exhaustive investigation, a great many people assumed that a new investigation, not predisposed to the single-assassin theory, would uncover new evidence. Garrison, however, assisted initially by Life magazine and later by many critics of the Warren Report, searched for two years without finding any relevant new evidence of a conspiracy. At present there are no leads outstanding, nor is there any substantial evidence that I know of that indicates there was more than one rifleman firing.

It is, of course, possible that new evidence may yet develop to challenge the single-assassin theory. The lesson that Garrison has made abundantly clear is that the credibility of evidence cannot be divorced from the credibility of the investigator who presents it. Since there seems to be little prospect of a new investigation in the near future, and many of the critics have been discredited as investigators by the New Orleans episode, it appears likely that Garrison may be the final chapter in the Assassination Controversy.

Mark Lane, lawyer and early champion of Oswald...author of a best-seller questioning the assassination evidence...worked with Gar-.... the two years..."predicted his findings.
HOMICIDE REPORT

CITY OF DF.

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B. Brown

Witnessed by Physician

Kemp Clark, IPM, Parkland Hospital

Witnesses Affidavits are in Homicide Office.

POLICE REPORT—The Dallas Police Department's record of President Kennedy's assassination.

"There is no formula for adding up inconsistencies and arriving at the truth. That questions about the assassination remain does not necessarily mean that answers can be found for them."
JIM GARRISON, New Orleans District Attorney, hinted at a murder plot involving the C.I.A. and Johnson Administration... arrested 11 persons in a two-year investigation... lost case when he failed to produce any significant evidence.
Another ride on the assassination merry-go-round

The Washington Post Book World
23 February 1969

COUNTERPLOT, by Edward Jay Epstein. Viking. 192 pp. $4.95.

By Edwin M. Yoder Jr.

At this writing, New Orleans District Attorney Earl Long was ready to trial a "suspect" in the alleged conspiracy to murder President Kennedy. The accused is a prominent New Orleans entrepreneur, Clay Shaw. He is said to be smoking a lot these days, and no wonder.

For Mr. Epstein's incisive study is right. Mr. Shaw may be the victim of one of the great American legal frauds.

Sifted of its red herrings, bleached of shadowy New Orleans intrigue, Garrison's case is easily summed up. In late 1956 Mr. Garrison accompanied Senator Russell Long on a plane ride from New Orleans to New York. Senator Long being no slouch at conspiracy theories, they muscled skeptically together about the Warren Report's "single-assassin" theory and the conversation inspired Garrison to go back and reopen his file on Lee Oswald's New Orleans activities. From that probe sprang a lot of theory and even more publicity, but only one arrest—Mr. Shaw.

By Epstein's account the district attorney seems to have run up several blind alleys and indeed had almost called it quits when in February 1967 the New Orleans press broke the story to the world. Not long afterwards Garrison arrested Shaw and impounded many of his personal papers and effects— including a sinister-looking Mardi Gras costume and an address book with which Garrison can do more exercises in number mysticism than a medieval alchemist.

Mr. Epstein, while researching a piece for The New Yorker (where portions of this book appeared), grew skeptical when Garrison allowed him in violation of a court order to rifle the largely unexplored Shaw papers. Why, he wondered, would the D.A. "risk having his case thrown out of court on a technicality by letting outsiders go freely through the evidence?" Was it in hopes that free-lance sleuths, who had swarmed around Garrison in plenty, would find a damning clue?

Mr. Garrison needs clues, all right. For unless Mr. Clay Shaw is the shadowy "Clay Bertrand," who has never materialized, the case collapses. And the chief witness to that effect, a confidential informer named Perry Russo, did not say so in his initial deposition of March 1966; on April 3 until Russo was hypnotized on the stand after Shaw's arrest (March 2, 1967) did he mention Shaw or the alleged meeting at which "Bertrand," Oswald and another plotted to kill the 35th President. It was a very helpful hypnosis, to say the least.

A transcript of Russo's first hypnosis session reveals that many of the details of Russo's story were developed under hypnosis... Dr. Esmond Fatter instructed Russo to let his "mind go completely blank" and again "notice the picture on the television screen." Dr. Fatter suggested, "There will be Bertrand, Ferrie and Oswald and they are going to discuss a very important matter and there is another man and girl there and they are talking about assassinating somebody. Look at it and describe it to me." The story that Russo then told is similar to the one he told in court about overhearing an assassination plot.

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If Garrison's case depends on coached witnesses, why has it come to trial? A technicality of law permitted a three-judge court to find "there was evidence that merited judgment" but in no sense did this finding suggest the legitimacy of the evidence.

It is now almost two years since Clay Shaw's arrest. As skeptical taunts arose, as the New Orleans spectacle came under attack, Garrison passionately defended himself, boldly evolving the theory that the government and the "establishment" press are out to foil him. He has outragedously traduced President Johnson as "the man who profited most from the murder." He has charged that the C.I.A. was "deeply involved in the assassination." He has cavalierly misrepresented the federal establishment's whole attitude towards certain assassination documents placed in the National Archives. By Mr. Epstein's count he has alleged that as many as 16 gunmen were operating that awful day in Dallas, one from a sewermans.

If the D.A. is caught up in Fu Manchu—Mr. Shaw, after reading it one feels the real mystery is not what happened in Dallas or New Orleans but what has happened inside the public mind to give Garrison an audience. Mr. Epstein, borrowing from Edward Shils, suggests that it has much to do with a profound fear of secrecy in the higher reaches of public life, ready to be tapped by a Garrison now as it was tapped in the early Fifties by a Senator Joe McCarthy.

To that astute speculation, I would add one other: what has been missing all along in responsible probes of the assassination is the presence of a good historian or two, schooled in modes of disciplined inquiry at once more wide-ranging and less formally conclusive than that of lawyers. A historian, strategically placed on the Warren Commission, would certainly have recalled the suspicion of skullduggery in high places that lingered after Lincoln's assassination. And I suspect he would have been less likely than lawyers and statesmen to forget subtle factors of public skepticism that must be satisfied if a horrendous event is not to feed endless speculation and, in New Orleans, self-promoting demagoguery.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.

By Edwin M. Yoder Jr.

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For example, Philosophy Professor Richard Popkin of the University of California at San Diego, author of the book The Second Oswald (propounding the theory of an Oswald double) and "Garrison's Case" in The New York Review of Books (September 14, 1967), recently commented on the article:

"I found it a queer mix of facts, half-facts, rumors and very dubious information from people hostile to Garrison. Epstein has compressed all this to make it look like everything on the same level. I think it would take an awful lot of work to disentangle what he's saying on any almost page as to how much of it has a factual base, how much of it is rumor that he has heard from people, how much of it are charges that have been made by people like [William] Gurvich [who volunteered to work on the investigation without pay, passed himself off as the Chief Investigator, then turned on Garrison] against Garrison, which haven't been substantiated anywhere except by Gurvich's statement of them. And also that he tends to take facts and information and rumors and so on, that occurred over a year and a half's period, and compress them all into simultaneous events so that a statement made by Garrison at one time is pounced upon on the basis of information or statements he made a year and a half later in a totally different context.

So I think it's a quite unfair presentation, which has some factual base, but which also has a lot of very dubious elements in it."

"One of the doubtful elements is Epstein's version of the testimony of Dean Andrews Jr., a colorful attorney who numbers among his former clients Oswald (who wanted his undesirable discharge from the Marine Corps rectified) and the late David William Ferris, a colorful attorney who claims he encountered Oswald. Andrews told the Commission he received a phone call from a man he knew as Clay Bertrand, whom he described as "a lawyer without a briefcase" for local homosexuals. Bertrand asked him to go to Dallas and defend Oswald. Garrison contends Bertrand is Clay Shaw, whom he has charged with conspiracy.

According to Epstein, Andrews initially gave the FBI "several different descriptions" of Bertrand, and finally admitted that Bertrand "was merely a figment of his imagination." Later, before the Commission, Andrews stated that he had recently seen Bertrand in the bar, and Epstein says, described him as "tall, and the late David William Ferris, a colorful attorney who claims he encountered Oswald."

One of the most fascinating characters in the conspiracy drama is Richard Case Nagell, a former U.S. Intelligence agent who claims he encountered Oswald in Mexico City in 1963, and had been instructed by his superiors to determine if the rumors of an assassination attempt had any foundation. Nagell says he learned that the first attempt against Kennedy was scheduled for September 25 in Washington, D.C., and that Oswald (who crossed the border into Mexico the day before) was to be set up as the "patsy" and shot in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. When the anti-Castro paramilitary team could not penetrate the Presidential security in Washington, Oswald got a reprieve. But Nagell, who says he was sure the attempt would come off but failed to get the FBI to listen, faked a bank robbery in El Paso on September 20 so that he would be arrested and in federal custody when the assassination occurred.

Epstein dismisses Nagell as being mentally unbalanced, noting that "court
in 1947" and that, following the tank episode, he was "an inmate of a
institution for the criminally insane... Springfield, Missouri." As he does so
frequently throughout the article, Epstein delivers a version which if devel-
oped fully would throw a different light on the matter. Nagell was in a plane
crash, but he was given Intelligence training after his recovery, indicating
that he had no permanent brain injury. Moreover, the fact that he stood trial
implies that he was legally sane. Recently, he was released from Leaven-
worth Penitentiary—he had been at Springfield only temporarily.

The publication of the Epstein article came at an opportune time for Clay
Shaw. Obtaining advance copies, his attorneys entered it as evidence before a
three-judge federal panel which was hearing arguments that the DA was "con-
ducting a reign of terror" and "persecuting" the defendant. Apparently the
panel was unimpressed, for it unanimously rejected the defense’s argument
and ordered the case to trial.

If Garrison does get his day in court—a day Epstein has struggled to deny him
—chances are his case will hold up better than The New Yorker’s brief for the
defense. —WILLIAM TURNER
Warren Panel Critic Scores Garrison

By PETER KIHS

Edward Jay Epstein, one of the first best-selling critics of the Warren commission's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, has written a 25,000-word attack on District Attorney Jim Garrison's inquiry and charges of conspiracy at the President's death.

Mr. Epstein's report said that "in the year I have been studying Garrison's investigation and have had access to his office, the only evidence I have seen or heard about that could connect Clay Shaw with the assassination has been fraudulent...some devised by Garrison himself and some cynically culled from criminals for the emotionally unstable." The new report by Mr. Epstein, whose book, "Inquest," first came out in June, 1966, was published yesterday in The New Yorker magazine dated July 13.

In Cambridge, Mass., the 32-year-old author, who is teaching urban politics at Harvard University this summer, said he was expanding it for December publication as "The Tangled Web." In New Orleans, Mr. Garrison was reported as not immediately available for comment yesterday when an effort was made to reach him by telephone.

A 'Pyrrhic Victory'

Mr. Epstein wrote that he had been "prepared to believe that District Attorney Garrison's claims might have some substance" when the Shaw arrest was first announced. This was because of his own view that Chief Justice Earl Warren's commission had been constrained by "bureaucratic pressures" and "limits of time."

He said he had been welcomed by Mr. Garrison in mid-April, 1967, and, with Jones Harris, a New York independent investigator, he had been "allowed to examine objects seized from Mr. Shaw's home and designated 'evidence' despite a judge's order against disclosures."

Mr. Harris, he said, found a five-digit number, "19016," in a Shaw address book identical to a number preceded by two Cyrillic letters in an address book owned by Lee Harvey Oswald. The man the Warren Commission concluded was the sole Kennedy assassin, Mr. Garrison had "constructed a piece of evidence by an alleged code seeking to link the two."

The case on which a three-judge panel ruled Mr. Shaw could be held for trial, Mr. Epstein wrote, "was based on the allegations of two witnesses who had both waited four years before disclosing uncorroborated stories and who Mr. Garrison had cited as linking Lee Harvey Oswald and David W. Ferrie, now dead, discussing the planned assassination, and Vernon E. Bundy, who testified he saw Mr. Shaw meet Oswald on a lakefront.

A "Pyrrhic Victory"

Mr. Epstein asserted a perjury conviction of Dean Andrews, a lawyer, was a "pyrrhic victory" for Mr. Garrison because of a prosecution charge that Mr. Andrews had "hoaxed on the world" the name of "Clay Bertrand." This, Mr. Epstein said, raised a question as to Mr. Russo's story "foisting on the world" Mr. Shaw by that name after his memory had been jogged by "truth serum."

Mr. Epstein wrote that Mr. Garrison's statements had built up to a theory of a 16-man team of assassins at five spots. The sixteenth, Mr. Epstein asserted, was "extrapolated from two photographs" interpreted by Mr. Garrison as showing that a .45-caliber bullet that killed the President wound up in mail-tossed grass. He said the prosecutor had cited this to support "the theory that an assassin was in a sewer."

A man, Mr. Garrison theorized, was diverting attention from the assassins by simulating an epileptic fit has been identified, Mr. Epstein said, as an employee of The Dallas Morning News who fainted 20 minutes before the Kennedy motorcade arrived.

Analyzes 'Eight Items'

Mr. Epstein quoted Thomas Bethell, a Garrison aide, as reporting "concern among the staff members" when Mr. Garrison ordered a warrant of arrest for "conspiracy" against Edgar Eugene Bradley, a Los Angeles radio fund-raiser. Mr. Epstein said "there was nothing in the file on Bradley except [an] anonymous letter" alleging that a Eugene Bradley once made "inflammatory comments on President Kennedy."

Mr. Epstein analyzed "eight specific items" that he said Mr. Garrison had cited as linking the Central Intelligence Agency...
with a Kennedy assassination conspiracy.

Three of these, he said, were "unverifiable" claims of (1) a picture of Oswald with an agent in Mexico City, (2) files on Mr. Ferrie and (3) Kennedy autopsy pictures: and "other vital evidence."

A fourth item, he held, was a misinterpretation of a document title to suggest that Oswald was involved in a spy plane project. A fifth, he went on, was a contention that the C.I.A. had destroyed a memorandum on Oswald's activities, although a copy appears in Volume XVIII of the Warren documents.

A sixth item — the contention that Oswald had a "C.I.A. babysitter" — refers, Mr. Epstein asserted, to a New Orleans order of Jan. 20, 1961 for 10 trucks for a purchaser named "Osvald," accompanied by a "Joseph Moore." Mr. Epstein said Lee Harvey Oswald was then in the Soviet Union.

A seventh item — a reference to a "C.I.A. courier" involves a convicted bank embezzler whose story of delivering $50,000 to "a dead ringer for Oswald" in Mexico in 1962 has been rejected by the Garrison staff, Mr. Epstein said.

And the eighth item, Mr. Epstein said, was Federal refusal to provide Mr. Garrison with "any information" on a C.I.A. assassination role.

Assertions Challenged

Mr. Epstein accused Mr. Garrison of giving "false or capriocous" examples of alleged news suppression. As for a statement that there were no Oswald fingerprints on the alleged assassination gun, Mr. Epstein said that there were fingerprints that "could not be positively identified" but that a fingerprint on the barrel's underside had been identified by three experts as Oswald's.

An assertion that "nitrate tests exonerated Lee Oswald" was "questionable," Mr. Epstein said. He reported paraffin casts found nitrates on both Oswald's hands although not on his check and none on a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who had fired the rifle three times.

A contention that it was "virtually impossible for Oswald" to go down four floors before being seen after the assassination was "specious," Mr. Epstein said, because the time was uncertain and "could have been as long as five minutes."

Mr. Epstein said that Mr. Garrison had charged in a Texas telecast that President Johnson had "issued the Executive order concealing vital evidence for 75 years." Mr. Epstein asserted there was "no such Executive order," although many investigative files had been withheld for this period as exceeding "the lifespan of persons likely to be mentioned."

As for the Warren Commission documents, Mr. Epstein said McGeorge Bundy, acting for the President, had asked the Archivist of the United States to waive the 75-year ban "wherever possible."

He said virtually all documents that could be declassified by Bundy guidelines had been opened to public scrutiny by the time Mr. Garrison started his investigation.
"John Smith’s” Real Name Is Yuri P. Nossenko

From CURRENT’s Delhi Bureau

NEW DELHI: “Comrade JOHN SMITH” is no other than the high powered Soviet functionary, YURI P. NOSSENKO, who visited India in June-July this year. The label ‘John Smith’ was attached on him by some Indian employees of the Soviet Information Centre. These Indian employees believe that Nossenko wrote the “disclosures” of the former CIA code clerk.

Nossenko’s presence here has been a subject of speculation because of the undue secrecy attached to his work. He was paraded as a professor of history who had come here ostensibly to write about “the political development in India since 1947”.

Ever since Nossenko landed in the Information Centre to work on his project, he was put in a special room, out of bounds for Indian employees. All the research material he needed was handled by a few chosen Soviet personnel, generally associated with KGB in India. Every morning Nossenko had a one hour exclusive session with KGB chief MOROZOV, head of the Information Department, before starting work on his “book”.

The Indians then wondered, why? Why would a man wanting to write on Indian politics keep away from Indians or not seek their help in his research? Why meet Morozov every morning behind closed doors? The Indians working for the Russians felt certain that Nossenko’s mission was much more important than he pretended.

Nossenko left India in August and few weeks later the John Smith “disclosures” were in the Russian propaganda channels. If John Smith were the Russians’ James Bond, could Nossenko be his IAN FLEMING?

Although CURRENT’s contact was not willing to bet “his life” on it, he said the hunch among them in the Soviet Centre is that Nossenko was working on research material of the period when Smith was here as a code clerk piecing together his fantastic story that has thrown mud at everybody in India who is opposed to Communism.

Surely, argued the contact, if Smith had all this material at his command why did he not disclose it earlier. Smith certainly has been in the Soviet Union for some years now.
THE CIA INFORMED Mr. Big that Russia's security defector, Yuri Nosenko, "is the biggest spy goldmine the U.S. ever had." His little black book lists almost every Soviet spy drop in the world... The King of Greece will decorate NEC chief Robert P. Kintner with the highest civilian honor medal. Almost every member of the Warren Commission investigating the assassination of JFK, has an offer to write a book...
TIP ON EMBASSY 'BUGS'?  

U.S. Silent on Role of Russian Defector

WASHINGTON (UPI) — U.S. officials declined Wednesday to clear up speculation that Yuri Nossenko, a former member of the Soviet secret police, may have provided the tip that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was "bugged" with more than 40 hidden microphones.

Nossenko defected to the United States Feb. 4 of this year. It was in February that the State Department recalled one of its security technicians from Moscow for conferences which led to the decision that a room in the U.S. Embassy should be demolished and searched. The microphone network was discovered as a result.

On Geneva Mission

At the time of his defection, the 36-year-old Nossenko was attached to the Soviet disarmament delegation in Geneva. It later was revealed that he was an agent on the KGB, the Russian security police.

He was taken to Washington soon after his defection for questioning.

When asked about his possible connection with the discovery of the microphones, authorized U.S. officials would say only that it is routine practice to question defectors about attempts to penetrate U.S. security.

Protest Delivered

A stiff protest on the matter was delivered to the Russians Tuesday by U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler in Moscow. Embassy sources there said Wednesday that Soviet Dep. Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov had promised to "look into" the U.S. charges.

Officials here also said Wednesday that Soviet listening devices have been discovered in other Allied embassies in Moscow. They said attempts to "bug" these embassies have been made over the years, but they declined to identify the Allied countries, the types of devices or the dates of their discovery.

In London Wednesday, a British Foreign Office spokesman declined to discuss the affair on the grounds "we do not comment on security matters."
In Moscow, Walls Have Ears (40)

U. S. Embassy Finds Microphones Deep in Closed Areas

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 19 — The United States has uncovered a network of more than 40 microphones embedded 11 years ago in the structural walls of the American Embassy in Moscow.

The microphones were rigged to pick up conversations in many of the private embassy offices, from which Soviet citizens are normally barred, and in some of the apartments of embassy personnel in the same building. An undisclosed number of the microphones were still in good working order when found during the last month.

Officials said the listening devices had survived dozens of electronic and other security investigations. They were found only after a wrecking crew had demolished an entire room in the embassy.

Several clues were said to have led to such a drastic search. These clues apparently included a tip from Yuri I. Nosanov, a staff officer of the Soviet secret police, who defected last February.

The State Department refused to speculate about the benefit of the devices to the Soviet Union. Officials said American diplomats always assumed that the embassy in Moscow was not secure against eavesdropping. They hold their most sensitive discussions inside several small rooms within buildings installed by Americans for security reasons.

Nonetheless, a detailed study is being made to determine whether there has been any significant compromise of sensitive information.

Ambassador Fay D. Kohler delivered this morning what was described here as a strong protest note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Presumably, he demanded assurances against future attempts to plant microphones.

However, the United States has always assumed that the security of its embassies abroad, especially in Communist countries, required constant vigilance.

The wired sound system made the network different from the 19 American officials most widely discussed listening device, the State Department's device ever found in Moscow. New Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, said that the Great Seal of the United States more than 120 listening devices were found, presented to W. Averell Harriman in 1945, when he was in United States embassies in Moscow, the ambassador to the Soviet Union, it hung in a room in the Spaso House. The Ambassadorial residence in Moscow, until it was detected by a security check in 1963. The carving of the eagle was found to contain a listening device that could be activated by an electronic beam. It required no wires to a remote listening room.

The wall was displayed at a session of the United Nations Security Council by Henry Cabot Lodge, then United States representative at the United Nations. Mr. Lodge cited it as an example of Soviet espionage during a debate at Soviet charges of United States espionage flights over Soviet territory.

The embassy, where microphones were found

Listening devices such as one were embedded in walls.

U.S. Occupied Building in 1953

A microfilm of an article discussing the discovery of the microphones and their placement in the supporting walls of the building. The article indicates that they were set in place before the United States Government took occupancy in the spring of 1953, as the building's first tenant.

The embassy moved to the Embassy, on Tolstovsky Street, from a building on Manse Square, overlooking the Kremlin. The new structure, designed as an apartment house, was selected in 1952 and specially renovated for the United States by a team of American engineers.

At the request of the United States, Soviet workmen added three floors to the central portion of the original one-story structure. The microphones were found on the upper floors, which have been used for offices for three United States ambassadors and their staffs, as well as for code and communications rooms.

That section of the building is guarded at all times by a detachment of United States marines. A special military escort is assigned to the occasional Soviet diplomatic who is given access to the offices. None of the embassy's Soviet employees is admitted to the top three floors.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk worked in that section during his visit to Moscow last summer, as have other special visitors.

Officials here refused to disclose the exact sites of the microphones, but they exhibited one of the devices and described the general operation of the network.

The microphones resemble small cylinders used for beating a kettle drum. They consist of metal cylinders, about an inch deep and two inches in diameter, attached to thin wires that were from 8 to 10 inches long.

Low-impedance microphones were originally used — the cylinders — the low impedance meaning that they could transmit sound through wires for long distances without intermediate amplification. The cylinders were embedded in the concrete supporting walls of the embassy and only the wooden casing protruded to within a fraction of an inch of the plaster skin of the embassy rooms.

Microphones Sensitive

Each microphone was capable of picking up conversations from as far as 10 to 15 feet away. One in a room would have sufficed to transmit most of the whispered talk in that room, officials said.

The wires connecting the microphones to a central trunk line ran through the walls of the building and along the outside walls beneath a coat of other stucco. The main line ran...
into the ground and out of the
embassy area beyond the reach
of American investigators.

The wooden stems of the
microphones enabled them to
escape detection by electronic
"sweeps" of the walls, ceilings
and floors of the embassy. These
tests are conducted at least
three times a year to seek out
metallic objects in the wall.

Last February, shortly after
the Nossenko defection, officials
began to think of a more-thor-
ough search. They had appar-
ently been alerted to several
unexplained information leaks.

Mr. Nossenko is thought to have
c completamente wrecked.

Security technicians were
called to Washington in Feb-
ruary and plans were made
to demolish an entire room in
the embassy, and more of its
basic structure if necessary. The
demolition began in April and
on April 23, after one room had
been completely wrecked, of-
ficials said, the first microphone
was found. The connecting wire
led investigators to the others,
which were removed.

Officials said they were sat-
sfied that the network had been
destroyed. They acknowledged,
however, that only demolition
of the entire building could de-
termine whether there were
similar networks.

They continue to assume,
they said, that the embassy is
not safe for the discussion of
secret or sensitive information.

"Knowing now what we do,"
one official said, "we should
have done it years ago." But
he noted that the embassy did
not normally have the man-
power or materials needed for
demolition work. The lesson of
the new discovery, he added,
was that American diplomats
must continue to assume the
worst while occupying foreign
quarters abroad.

Special plans are also being
prepared, he said, to provide
greater security in a new Mos-
cow embassy if Soviet officials
ever consent to its construction.

Negotiations for a new embas-
sy have been held up because
citizens' groups here have pre-
vented the Soviet Union from
moving its embassy to an estate
in the Chevy Chase section of
Washington.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, an official attached to the Swiss Consulate in Geneva, defected to the West on Feb. 3 and was subsequently granted political asylum in the United States.

The first announcement that Mr. Nosenko was "missing" was made on Feb. 4 by the Soviet delegation in Geneva, who described him as an "expert" serving with the delegation. It was subsequently learned that he had disappeared from his Geneva hotel on Feb. 1, a day before he was due to return to Moscow, and had apparently left Switzerland via France for the United States. His disappearance was reported to the Swiss police on Feb. 3 by the Soviet delegation, 28 hours after they had discovered it.

The State Department spokesman, Mr. Richard Phillips, announced on Feb. 10 that Mr. Nosenko had asked for political asylum in the United States "prior to Feb. 3, the date of his scheduled recall to Moscow," and that his request was under consideration. He also stated that Mr. Nosenko had resigned from his position in the Soviet Union and had left for Switzerland on Jan. 26. Mr. Phillips declared that it was necessary to give further information as to the date when Mr. Nosenko had left the Soviet Union, and that his absence would be noted.

Mr. Nosenko, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, made the following statement to the Press on Feb. 12 to the Press, in which he strongly criticized the Swiss authorities:

"Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko ... went to have his lunch on 25 hours after Nosenko's disappearance. After discovering Nosenko's absence, the Swiss authorities took all the necessary measures to find him. They have also been in communication with the Swiss authorities in Switzerland, and they have been making every effort to establish the whereabouts of Nosenko. However, to this day no reply has been given by the Swiss authorities.

"It is extremely surprising that the Swiss authorities have failed to provide any information as to the whereabouts of Nosenko. What is more, if Nosenko is indeed in the hands of the United States authorities, he can only mean that the Swiss authorities, far from ensuring the elementary security of those taking part in international conferences, tolerate provocative activities by foreign intelligence services on their territory.

"The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the Swiss authorities will take all the necessary measures to find him. The Samara official, who has been reported missing, must be found, and the Swiss authorities must be held responsible for his disappearance."

Immediately after Mr. Nosenko's statement, the head of the Swiss Political Department, Professor Friedrich Waldem, summoned the Swiss Ambassador in Bern and made a strong protest against Mr. Nosenko's allegations, which he described as "absolutely untrue, and incompatible with normal diplomatic relations."

Professor Waldem stated at a subsequent news conference that the Swiss delegation had only informed the Geneva police of Nosenko's disappearance, asking that the matter be kept "a secret." He also stated that no photograph of Nosenko's official identity card had been supplied to the police, and that no indication was given as to his whereabouts.

Professor Waldem rejected as "purely a lie" Mr. Nosenko's statement that the Swiss delegation had repeatedly asked the Swiss authorities in Geneva to take the necessary steps to prevent the defector from leaving the country. He also denied that any Press photographs had been taken at the reception at the Swiss Embassy on Feb. 5.

Professor Waldem warned that any further attempts to contact Mr. Nosenko would be considered "irresponsible" by the Swiss authorities and that the matter would be investigated accordingly.

Mr. Nosenko's request for political asylum in the United States was granted on Feb. 14 by the United States State Department. The United States had agreed to grant Mr. Nosenko political asylum, it was revealed, because he had been a member of the Soviet Embassy in Switzerland and had not been instructed to return to the Soviet Union. In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Nosenko stated that he had been instructed by the Soviet authorities to return to the Soviet Union.

B. UNITED KINGDOM. - New Data for August Bank Holiday in 1955 and 1956.

Mr. Edward Heath informed the House of Commons on March 4 that the Government had decided, as an experiment in 1955 and 1956, to move August Bank Holiday to the last Monday of the month in the period May 1955 and 1956. If, as a result, it was decided that "the experiment of moving the August Bank Holiday should be made permanent," the Government would also "consider removing the present Whit Bank Holiday by a fixed spring holiday on the last Monday in May." Mr. Heath explained that the views expressed by a wide variety of organizations and by individual members of the public had shown a general desire that every possible week to 1955 and 1956. If, as a result, it was decided that "the experiment of moving the August Bank Holiday should be made permanent," the Government would also "consider removing the present Whit Bank Holiday by a fixed spring holiday on the last Monday in May," as a result of the wide-ranging interests concerned.

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The Government's statement was welcomed by the Labour and Liberal parties and by industry, management, and trade unions generally, and was given effect by a Royal Proclamation issued on April 2.

Carthage Holidays were introduced in 1871 by Sir John Lubbock (later Lord Avebury), grandfather of the present Liberal M.P. for Oxford, Mr. Eric Lubbock. - Times - Daily Telegraph (Guardian)

C. IRAISH REPUBLIC. - Religious Denomination.

Figures published in Dublin on May 5 showed that according to the 1951 census the proportion of Roman Catholics was 90.9 per cent, compared with 94.3 per cent in 1936. The percentages for other religious persuasions were as follows: Presbyterians, 3.4 per cent; Methodists, 0.7 per cent; Jews, 0.1 per cent; and Muslims, 0.1 per cent (unclassified).

Out of a total population of 9,210,815, Roman Catholics numbered 2,073,658 against 2,784,023 in 1911, and Chart of Ireland numbered 104,016 against 124,839. (Irish Times Dublin)

D. SOUTHERN RHODESIA. - New Flag.

Mr. Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, announced on April 8 a new flag for the country, consisting of a sky-blue background with the Union Jack in the center, surrounded by a yellow ring with a red Rhodesia badge – a lion passant between two thistles and a pickel-head below. He explained that this flag was to be flown where all Federal flags had previously been flown alongside the Union Jack.
SUBJECT: Testimony of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, recent Soviet Defector

The testimony of Nosenko is contained in documents carrying Commission Nos. 434 and 451, insofar as we have received information to date. Of special interest to your sections are the following statements by Nosenko in regard to Oswald's marksmanship:

"Following President Kennedy's assassination Nosenko ascertained from Oswald's file that he had had access to a gun which he used to hunt game with fellow employees in the U.S.S.R. He could not describe the gun used by Oswald but did remember that it was used to shoot rabbits. Nosenko stated that Western newspaper reports describe Oswald as an expert shot; however, Oswald's file contained a statement from fellow hunters that Oswald was an extremely poor shot and that it was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to provide him with game."

Nosenko purports to have been a high official in the counter-intelligence division of the KGB, the Russian Secret Police. He also purports to have been the person who supervised the examination and treatment of Lee Harvey Oswald for the KGB, both when Oswald first entered Russia in 1959 and after the assassination of President Kennedy, when Oswald's file was reexamined by the KGB to determine whether he had ever been used as an agent by that organization. Nosenko states that the KGB at no time used Oswald as an agent.
Will More Secret Agents Flee?

By LEON DENNEN
Newspaper Enterprise Analyst

Premier Khrushchev is reported to be having spy trouble in addition to Russia's usual economic and agricultural difficulties.

There is increasing evidence that the recent defection to the West of Russia's secret agent Yuri Nosenko was merely the latest incident in a series of failures that have disrupted Moscow's global espionage network.

Nosenko doubled as an agent of the secret police and adviser to the Russian delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. He is also believed to be an expert on Soviet atomic weapons.

Western intelligence officials regard as significant the fact that Nosenko's defection came at a time when the Soviet government decided to clean house in its espionage setup.

It is now known that shortly before Nosenko requested asylum in the United States, Gen. P. I. Ivashutin was appointed chief of Soviet intelligence. He replaced the notorious Gen. Ivan Serov, who vanished into obscurity after the execution last year of Col. Oleg Penkovsky.

Penkovsky, a brilliant scientist and military expert, was a member of the highest circles in Red society. He was the son-in-law of a top Soviet general and the nephew of another general. Nevertheless, he supplied the West with valuable information for two years before he was finally tracked down by the Russian secret police.

Soviet intelligence had been previously hurt by the unmasking of one of its most valuable agents in the West, Swedish Col. Stig Wennerstrom.

Wennerstrom, now on trial in Stockholm, had been supplying NATO military secrets to Moscow for more than 15 years. From 1953 to 1957, he was Sweden's top attache in the United States. At the time of his arrest as a Russian spy, Wennerstrom was a high official of Sweden's Defense Department.

Before Wennerstrom's arrest, another top Soviet agent known as Anatoli Dolnytsin defected to the West, going by the way of Finland to London.

Dolnytsin is reported to have given the West such detailed information on Soviet espionage organizations that they are still paralyzed in many parts of the world as a result of his disclosures.

Premier Khrushchev's appointment of Gen. Ivashutin as chief of intelligence is thus seen as more evidence that the reorganization of Russia's badly crippled espionage network is far from completed. The serious internal personnel problems of the secret police are apparently still unresolved.

Ivashutin is not an intelligence expert but a security officer who received his training in the notorious SMERSH organization, the Red Army's counter espionage agency. SMERSH, known to all Ian Fleming readers, are the Russian initials for Death to Spies.

This, in the view of Western Intelligence officials, clearly indicates that Ivashutin's job is primarily to spy on Russia's spies rather than gather intelligence. They report that the general has already begun to put under scrutiny intelligence operations conducted abroad through the United Nations, Soviet embassies, and other diplomatic missions.

Yuri Nosenko defected because he feared to return to Russia after Ivashutin's appointment. He is believed to be the first of the agents ready to seek asylum in the West before being caught in the large-scale purge of the Russian espionage network.
other 25 to 30 off-shore along the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico.

A solution came when President Johnson announced that the government would require at least 50 per cent of the wheat bound for the U.S.S.R. to be carried in ships flying the U.S. flag. The agreement did not include a commitment about wheat going to other Communist bloc countries. Negotiations will continue to determine future policy on these shipments.

Details of the agreement were worked out in Miami, Fla., between union heads and Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz. [For background on U.S.-Soviet wheat deal, see Oct. 25 issue.]

ALBANIA

Flea Bites Bear

The flea has bitten the bear again. Or, in world political terms, tiny Albania again has been nipping at a Communist giant, the Soviet Union. In the latest bite, Albania seized four Soviet Embassy buildings in its capital, Tirana. According to Izvestia, the official Soviet government newspaper, Albania also expelled three Soviet caretakers, left behind when Soviet diplomats pulled out in December 1961. (Albania and the U.S.S.R. broke off diplomatic relations when Albania sided with Red China.)

To add an ironic touch, the Izvestia article said water and electricity for the embassy compound had been cut off. (Just a few weeks ago, Castro made headlines by shutting off Cuban water to the U.S. base at Guantanamo.) Communist Albania has been a thorn in the side of the Soviet Union since 1981. In 1961 the famine-stricken Chinese not only sent grain to Albania, but loaned her $125,000,000—at a time when Red China owed the U.S.S.R. $300,000,000.

RED CHINA—PAKISTAN

Kashmir Backing

The controversy between India and Pakistan as to which one of them has claim to the huge territory of Kashmir has raged for 16 years. During that time, the most populous country in Asia, Communist China, avoided taking sides—until now.

During a recent visit to Pakistan by Red China's Premier Chou En-lai, the Chinese threw their support behind the Pakistani position. Pakistan maintains that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to decide the controversy in a plebiscite. Pakistan is a Moslem nation, and most of the people in Kashmir also are Moslems. Predominantly Hindu India opposes a plebiscite, and has blocked U.N. efforts to hold one.

The Communist Chinese move was viewed as aggravating China's border dispute with India. Many observers also noted that Communist China's support of Pakistan is likely to widen the Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet Union is supporting India in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. [For background on Kashmir rift, see World Perspectives feature in Oct. 18, '63 issue.]

COLD WAR

A Key Defector

Yuri I. Nosenko, a high-ranking staff officer of the Soviet secret police, defect ed in Switzerland and has been granted political asylum in the U.S.

Nosenko had been attending the 17nation disarmament conference in Geneva as a member of the Soviet delegation. He is believed to possess top-secret information on Soviet nuclear weapons, defense plans, intelligence operations, and disarmament policies.

Nosenko, 36, had been missing from Geneva for almost a week before the Soviets acknowledged his defection. Semyon K. Tsarapkin, head of the Soviet disarmament delegation, accused Switzerland of permitting "foreign agents" to engineer Nosenko's disappearance. Tsarapkin demanded that the Swiss recover Nosenko and hand him over to Soviet custody.

The Swiss government lodged a strong protest against Tsarapkin's charges. One Swiss official commented curtly: "Delegates at the disarmament conference are free to come and go as they please. We are not their nurses."

SEVERAL DAYS later, a Soviet diplomat was allowed to visit Nosenko at an undisclosed place in Washington. In the presence of U.S. authorities, Nosenko told his Soviet visitor that he did not wish to return to the Soviet Union, and that his defection had been voluntary. In another private confrontation, Nosenko also told a Swiss diplomat that his defection had been voluntary.

Western officials noted that the Soviets did not accuse the U.S. directly of complicity in Nosenko's defection. This was an indication, they said, that the Soviets did not want the Nosenko case to wreck the current round of disarmament talks. Another suggested reason for the Soviets' soft-pedaling of the issue: they were embarrassed that one of their so-called "disarmament experts" had been exposed as a member of the secret police.

Nosenko's defection came hard on the heels of another series of defections from the Communist way of life. In neighboring Austria, 28 spectators and a tobogganist from Iron Curtain countries decided not to return home after attending the Winter Olympics. This was particularly embarrassing to the Communists, since only "politically reliable" people had been permitted to attend the games in the first place.
WASHINGTON — The family of Yuri Nossenko, the important Russian secret police official who defected in Geneva last month, is putting U.S. authorities on the horns of a major foreign policy dilemma.

His attractive wife and mother are demanding a private interview with U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, apparently to discuss the possibility of their conferring personally with Nossenko.

This unprecedented request, being carefully studied by Secretary of State Rusk, was made by the two women when they showed up unexpectedly at the U.S. embassy in Moscow following Nossenko's defection.

According to reliable State Department sources, Ambassador Kohler has diplomatically avoided a direct confrontation with the women, pending instructions from Secretary Rusk.

These are expected this week when Rusk meets with Ambassador Kohler, who returned to Washington last Thursday for a round of conferences on the impact the Nossenko defection may have on future U.S.-Soviet relations.

The meeting with Kohler was needed, because Secretary Rusk and his key advisers are sharply split over the strategy to be followed should the women seek to come to the U.S. to talk with Nossenko.

In backstage deliberations, these State Department "experts" on Russia have been unable to agree on the purpose behind the women's strange request—other than it would never have been permitted without Kremlin approval.

Ambassador Kohler's vivid reports on the visit clearly indicated that the women, who arrived at the embassy attired in fur coats, had the blessing of the highest Soviet officials in their undertaking.

INSIDE STORY

The ambassador reported that the women sashayed into the U.S. embassy unannounced, asking that they be taken immediately to see him after giving their identity.

When an embassy aide told them this would be impossible because the ambassador was too busy, the two women indignantly said they would wait until he was free to talk to them.

After a series of emergency staff conferences, Ambassador Kohler said he sent another aide to tell the women he would tie up all day.

On that note, the women ended their "sit-in," announcing that they would return at a later date. As embassy officials watched, an official car waiting nearby picked up the two women as they departed.

U.S. intelligence authorities believe the women's appearance to the embassy was a desperate Russian effort to try to get Nossenko, the son of a late Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding, to return to the Soviet Union.

As reported in this column last week, Nossenko has revealed the names of more than 150 espionage agents in this country and abroad to U.S. authorities.

His sensational disclosures put the finger on at least five spy rings, one reputedly in a highly sensitive U.S. agency. Among those named by the former ranking KGB officer is an employee who had served in the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

While Nossenko was listed as a "disarmament expert" by the Soviet before his defection, he has revealed to U.S. officials that he held a key post in the "American section" of the KGB.

The KGB is responsible for the collection of intelligence abroad and counter-intelligence within the Soviet Union; for guarding against internal subversion; and detecting major economic crimes, such as smuggling, currency speculation and embezzlement.

According to Nossenko, the KGB employs 400,000 and has undercover agents in every country in the world, including Communist China.

He reported that this network of agents is controlled by a series of main directorates for each of the organization's main functions. These are supplemented by specialized groups concerned with various tasks, such as communications, forging passports and gold coins, providing special weapons, guarding the Kremlin and training guerrillas. This worldwide network has more than 10,000 women agents.

WACHING CUBA

Key refugee groups are now channeling their intelligence information on Cuba to the Federal Bureau of Investigation rather than to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The voluntary shift, which has come about in recent months, is reportedly due to the refugees' disappointment over the way the CIA was handling their reports.

According to one official of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which has been compiling reports on the continued Soviet buildup in Cuba, the CIA is again downgrading their information as it did before the Cuban missile crisis.

The council's most recent report to the FBI covers an American scientist once suspected of peddling atomic secrets to Russia.

It warns that he has set up a nuclear experimental laboratory in Cuba. The report identifies the scientist as Robert Braun Walder, 61, formerly of Detroit. It claims that the laboratory is located in a Pinar del Rio Province cave, and Walder is working there with Russian scientists.


ALLEN-SCOTT REPORT

By ROBERT S. ALLEN and PAUL SCOTT

Phyllis Nossenko's Wife, Mother Appear at U.S. Embassy in Moscow to Try for Interview Here With Russian Defector

WASHINGTON — The family of Yuri Nossenko, the important Russian secret police official who defected in Geneva last month, is putting U.S. authorities on the horns of a major foreign policy dilemma.

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Soviet scientists are reported in technical publications to be secretly working on a plan to place ballistic missiles in underwater canisters within range of U.S. targets. That would accomplish what the Cuban missile buildup failed to achieve.

Top policy makers in the U.S. appear to have issued a "stop order" to lower officials when it comes to discussing Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere with people outside the Government.

Yuri Nosenko, the Soviet secret-police official who defected to the U.S., is feared by the Russians to be about to expose the Soviet disarmament proposals as propaganda to trap "neutral" nations. Said one Western diplomat: "Nosenko might well produce cables from Moscow with embarrassing disclosures such as instructions to the Geneva delegation on how to fool gullible 'neutrals' like Krishna Mepon."
What Nosenko Is Now Going Through Is Revealed by Another Who Defected

By Peter Deriabin

The recent defection of Soviet intelligence officer Yuri Nosenko has again focused the attention of the world on the subject of defectors from communism. As a former Soviet intelligence officer, now a United States citizen, and a resident of the United States for the last ten years, I naturally have more than a passing interest in such events. I vicariously relive each new defection as each one takes me back to the time, almost exactly 10 years ago, when I made my own final, irrevocable decision to reject communism, the Soviet system and the Soviet way of life. I remember, so well that feeling of deep loneliness which accompanied the decision to leave all that I knew and embrace the unknown. It was some comfort that the unknown West had at last been explored by me somewhat during my stay in Vienna. I knew that it might hold hardship for me in the future, but it could hold no horrors comparable to those I was leaving.

Yet I was leaving much that was good and much that I loved. This knowledge only made me more bitterly hate the inhuman regime which had made it impossible for me to retain both my heritage and my self-respect. I think that Nosenko must be experiencing similar feelings. Even now I vividly remember, in the weeks following my own defection, how I was alternately depressed and elated; now filled with a tremendous drive to unburden myself, to cleanse myself of the filth which had forced me to break away, now lethargic, disinterested, overcome by "weltschmerz."

The most difficult transition of all was to realize the freedom with which Americans criticize themselves and their institutions. In the controlled state society of the Soviet Union, criticism is either an undercurrent, dangerous to express, or it is used as a device of the regime—either official self-criticism designed to relieve tension, in a sensitive area or the sort of provocation intended to ferret out "troublesome" people. Suspicion within the highest levels of the Soviet state is intense, and half your waking hours are spent speculating on the real motives behind relatively simple acts; you begin to worry about the infection of casual greetings. So it was deeply unsettling, to me, at first, to hear the normal comments of Americans about everything from the Presidency to the price of eggs. At first, trying to fit American outbackness-into the norms of Soviet society, I brooded about "provocations" or "counter-propaganda." It took me almost a year to realize the differences between a society where free speech is taken for granted and the statist society which I had left. I would venture to say that the experience of a free speech society is the most difficult adjustment any Soviet defector must make.

Certainly Nosenko's immediate value to the American counter-intelligence services will be great. However, his long-range value to the West is infinitely greater and longer-lasting. Essentially Nosenko as a Soviet intelligence officer personifies the elite of the Soviet Union. As an intelligence officer he was first a political realist who, due to his privileged access to information and right to travel abroad, best understood conditions as they really were in the Soviet Union without the gloss put on them by the Soviet propaganda machine.

As a member of the KGB, which is the primary instrument for implementing Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy abroad, he best understood the inherent hypocrisy of...
Soviet foreign policy. As he was a Communist party member, he experienced the moral and spiritual bankruptcy of the ruling political party in the Soviet Union. As a member of the KGB, charged with maintaining the iron-fisted subjugation of his own people, he was not deceived by "Potemkin Villages" and other fancy showplaces erected to deceive and delude the foreign tourists who make the "borscht circuit" tour through the USSR.

Nosenko probably was daily confronted with and revolted by the Soviet government's need to suppress the impatience and frustration of its own people, ranking under 46 years of broken promises. He doubtless often wondered how long Khrushchev could distract the attention of his citizens from these broken-promises with saber-rattling and denunciations of alleged capitalist encirclement of the USSR. But finally Nosenko and a growing segment of Soviet society came to realize the simple fact that the Soviet system simply does not work. It cannot even feed its own citizens!

Thus, in welcoming Yuri I. Nosenko to our shores, let us think of him as a window in the false front, a hole in the facade, which will permit us a view of the reality behind the wall of Soviet propaganda. The reality which he, as a member of the Soviet elite, can reveal to us, is never seen and seldom appreciated by Westerners.

THE RED APPARATUS

Our Kremlinologists might also learn from Nosenko that the Soviet phenomenon cannot be intelligently studied or understood without a thorough understanding of the Soviet security and espionage apparatus. For it is this punitive apparatus which makes up an inordinate portion of Soviet official bureaucracy and is directly and solely responsible for the continued existence of the Communist system in Russia. It is this punitive espionage and subversive apparatus which is most directly charged with the implementation of Khrushchev's foreign policy abroad.

In this regard I would be derelict if I did not note that in the more than 70 countries outside the Communist bloc where the USSR has official diplomatic representation, more than 65 per cent of the alleged "diplomats" are actually Soviet intelligence officers. In addition to these staff intelligence officers, another 25 per cent of the officially accredited Soviet diplomats are "co-opted," or forced to collaborate in the conduct of espionage or subversion operations. This leaves a very small percentage of those accredited who actually are bona-fide diplomats.

In fact even I was surprised to learn recently that I can recognize and identify at least 20 Soviet ambassadors now serving outside the USSR as former colleagues who, when I knew them, were experienced staff officers of the Soviet intelligence service. Five such ambassadors now serve in Brazil, Striganov in Uruguay, Nikolay Aleksanyev in Argentina, and Aleksander Aleksanyev in Casa. No doubt Nosenko will know others.

I am convinced that we should not view Nosenko's defection as a spectacular or unique incident of the Cold War, but rather as a visible symptom of a more deep-seated and serious disease which is epidemic within the Soviet body politic. For Nosenko's defection is certainly not an isolated case. Only recently we learned of the case of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed for working for Western intelligence services inside the Soviet Union for over three years. Who was Col. Penkovsky?

TOP STRATA OF SOCIETY

First, he was a senior Soviet military intelligence officer. To any present or former Soviet citizens, this simple statement of fact conveys a world of information about the status in Soviet society of Col. Penkovsky. It places him unmistakably among the chosen few near the top of the pyramid. Second, he was the son-in-law of a prominent Soviet general, who had been a member of the Moscow Military Council during World War II and who was a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Thus, his marriage pulled him higher up the pyramid, into contact with the actual ruling class of the Soviet Union. Finally, he was the close family friend and protege of the Soviet marshal in charge of tactical rockets for the entire Soviet army. Thus, by virtue of his profession, his marriage, and his friendships, he was confirmed and reconfirmed as a member of the privileged elite which occupies the top strata of Soviet society.

Yuri Nosenko, too, unquestionably belonged to the highest levels, the "creme de la creme," of Soviet society. He was a respected member of the sacrosanct punitive organ—the KGB—which even polices the Soviet ruling class.

Now, ironically, the Soviet system, which for years has labored to obliterate individuality, conscience, religion and morality, is suddenly haunted by the specter of a super ruling class revolted by its own excesses.

It is vital to our national security and possibly even to our national survival that we leave the welcome mat out for future defectors. There should never be any question as to their motive or value to the Free World. While adjusting to this new and unbelievably free society, Nosenko can be comforted by the fact that he is not alone. There have been over 150 defections from the USSR in recent years. I personally know many other defectors from the Soviet security services who, like me, have made the transition and are living happy and productive lives as American citizens.
PETER DERIABIN, defector, speaking. The author of this exclusive article was a major in Vienna for Soviet State Security (KGB) when he defected to the West in February of 1954. Now, 10 years later, Deriabin writes about the changes that have taken place in his life, about the things he left behind and the things that took their place. He lives somewhere in the United States, is a writer and scholar of political science, and has attended American universities. The picture at right shows him in profile, his face hidden in shadows. Of course, it is still a shadowy life he leads, but the editor who discussed this article with him described Deriabin as "very well adjusted." Oddly, Deriabin held almost the same job in Vienna that Yuri Nosenko, the recently defected Soviet officer, held in Geneva. Both were in charge of surveillance for large Soviet missions.
TO REDS, HE SEEMED PEERLESS SPY UNTIL...

By Seymour Freidin
Executive Editor, Foreign News

ROME.

These teleype messages clicked out commandingly in Soviet diplomatic missions around the world the last fortnight. They were recall orders—"consultation" was the official explanation.

Taciturn young men, neatly dressed and pressed, flew off in pairs to Moscow. Another mammoth self-examination of Soviet state security had been launched, the second in less than a year.

It all started with the disappearance and resurfacing in of all places, Washington, of dack-complexioned, handsome, multilingual Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. His development as a trouble-shooting officer for the KGB—the Russian's security branch that combines counter-espionage, spy recruitment, sabotage and our own Federal Bureau of Investigation functions—had been classic.

Classic is that, in the Soviet sense of molding a top agent from schoolboy callowness. He had been, as quite a few others spotted by KGB talent scouts at school. There was their flair for languages, ease in assimilating in strange conditions and an impeccable comradey background. Nosenko's father had been a ranking party member.

There was nothing in his demeanor and in his operational work to suggest that Nosenko thought of defecting. This suspicion must persist—in ours or their security apparatus. Moreover, his wife is young and attractive. They have two small children on whom the state lavished more in worldly goods than accrues to even a vast section of the professional classes.

Only 36 and a KGB man for 14 years, Nosenko would seem to his superiors the perfectly molded, mid-twentieth century trusted Soviet agent. He had been on trips to London where he reported on activities of his colleagues and in Geneva on international conference panels.

EDUCATED FOE

His reports, as far as any one can learn now, met with favor at home. Nosenko could act the sophisticated when policy so demanded. Or, he could be the coldest, most calculating agent when directives called for ruthlessness.

In a way, he was a James Bond enemy, with an education.

The KGB and other Soviet civilian and military security agencies were grateful to young men like Nosenko, especially after last year's Penkovsky case. That was perhaps the most publicly and sensationally successful project United States Intelligence ever ran. It involved Col. Oleg Penkovsky, who had direct access to Soviet officials of the first military rank.

Penkovsky was much older than Nosenko, and this led to obtaining Soviet reasoning that the colonel was therefore prone to corruption. Yet the blueprints of Russian rocketry, military thinking and political strategy were conveyed through Penkovsky to the West for four years, as through a smooth pipeline.

In a quick court martial, Penkovsky was condemned and executed. Top Red Army officers were forcibly retired. A great deal of even guilt by association rubbed off on ranking Soviet personalities. Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Premier Khrushchev's Defense Minister, personally led the inquiry. His order came right from a ruffled Khrushchev, whom East European Communists quoted as saying:

"You are not a Soviet marshal. You are an idiot."

Mr. Khrushchev's opinion of marshals, his and any one else's, is low. At the time the Poles almost went to the barricades in the hectic fall of 1956, he turned on Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, whom Stalin installed as Polish Minister of Defense.

"You are not a marshal," roared Mr. Khrushchev before Polish eyewitnesses. "You are a — a gutter epithet!"

A RAGING MARK

Marshal Malinovsky, after the Penkovsky episode that shook up the Red Army and ridded all security services, reported all loopholes closed. So did the security chiefs. In person, from accounts that have been checked, they reassured Mr. Khrushchev.

Suddenly, the Nosenko affair. The spate of fury that stung a highly experienced, unemotional Soviet negotiator into "near-hysteria" in Geneva could only have washed angrily from the Kremlin to the conference table.

When the curt announcement came from Washington that Nosenko was already there, asking for asylum, Mr. Khrushchev apparently blew his top. His reaction has been reported by comrades in the bloc. Soviet security chiefs were called on the carpet and heard names Mr. Khrushchev uses at his earhest.

Out went the instructions to Semyon K. Tsarapkin to make all possible charges and raise inordinate suspicions. The lantern-jawed Tsarapkin is chief Soviet delegate to the 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference. For years he worked on the nuclear test-ban treaty, before that at East-West negotiations all over the world.

His misfortune was to have so polished and trusted a KGB man as Nosenko as a watchdog—listed as an "expert"—on his own delegation.

There were three other young men flanking Nosenko listed also as experts. On what? The assumption is they were in the same business as their defected comrade.

Even if he was only a security counsel—and Nosenko was definitely more than that—his disappearance turned the whole Soviet negotiations posture upside-down. Codes had to be switched overnight, and papers had to be abandoned and the mental-psychological behavior pattern towards detail had to be recast.

Back home, Mr. Khrushchev turned from the farm for a couple of days to issue orders directly to Mr. Tsarapkin. It accounts for Mr. Tsarapkin's psychotic press conference in Geneva, demanding Nosenko's return, and his bitter charges against the Swiss.

FLAWLESS SYSTEM

As an experienced, wily hand, especially in Switzerland, Mr. Tsarapkin knows on his own not to blame the Swiss for such a defection. They permitted, he cried, espionage—something the Swiss know full well that East and West run all the time.

What they resented most was Mr. Tsarapkin's accusation that Swiss authorities looked the other way, since the
the Soviet line was clear: Nosenko had been kidnapped by American agents.

At this stage, the Russians didn't want to prejudice disarmament negotiations. But they—at the direct behest of Mr. Khrushchev—are determined to prove within the Soviet Union that there is no flaw in the system. Thus, nobody could voluntarily decamp, especially if he had so confidential an assignment as Nosenko:

Many other defections for assorted reasons in the past have shown how chimerical this line is. Yet the question persists in Nosenko's case. Why did he do it? Mum is the word generally among Westerners engaged in the no-reward for success, humiliation for failure, of the never-ending silent war.

The only suggestion brought forward to date has Nosenko linked to the Penkovsky apparatus. A relentless Soviet search, one thesis goes, began to breathe heavily on Nosenko. So; he defected, using his diplomatic passport to cross into France, Germany or Italy. Thereupon, he made contact with Americans and was sped to Washington.

Afterwards, a meticulous procedure that takes upwards of six months of interrogation ensued. It is known to the trade as "deb briefing." In other words, American agents question Nosenko in minute detail about his past, his work, his travel, his acquaintances, his family and his knowledge of KGB operations.

It could be a treasure trove of information—or, Nosenko could be a long-time Soviet plant who deliberately defected under orders to infiltrate American intelligence: "It won't be the first time this has been tried."

On balance, the assessment is that Nosenko may be at least as big a catch as was the ill-fated Col. Penkovsky. If he is a plant, the reasoning argues, Mr. Khrushchev would not have behaved in the irascible, near-public manner he did.

BIG SOVIET LEAK

Already, there have been changes of KGB personnel throughout the world. Most were men who knew Nosenko, even briefly. They all were people who worked on specific assignments with him. Suspicion has ripped through the Soviet espionage table of organization, so long regarded in the West as impenetrable.

A little porous in the past, Soviet security has become quite leaky. "Much-maligned for malfeasance and operative mistakes, the Central Intelligence Agency has never been given credit for amazing coups as in the Penkovsky case."

The feeling today is that Nosenko's defection is almost as big. It exposes a world-wide Soviet network, its operations, personnel and latter-day thinking. "On that, you can frequently base given government policy."

With all the boo-boos ascribed in reality or fancy to the American intelligence system, it has been able to prove that the Russians aren't f2-feet tall and impenetrable. They have been penetrated—in a big way: Section chiefs demoted, replacements in key and sensitive assignments and others held at home pending further investigation.

In his own way, Premier Khrushchev has admitted as much himself. It is a Western victory in the no-quarter war of the shadow, but the war goes on relentlessly, because there is no end in this kind of competition. The men involved know—how and why—best. They keep looking for new Nosenkos.
Fed Detector
May Be Son
Of Minister

LONDON—A behavior change by
recently retired Soviet defector
KGB Colonel Yuri Nosenko, Ihe
United States learned, has led to
the suspicion that Nosenko
may have important information
about Soviet spy activities in this
country. According to a story in
Pravda, the defector's behavior
change occurred because he has
become acquainted with "some
important American military
officers," according to a source
in Washington. The story, which
was picked up by the Associated
Press, said that Nosenko has
begun to cooperate with United
States intelligence agencies.

The New York Times reported
that a Soviet defector, identified
as "Yuri Nosenko," has said that
there is a "great deal of
intelligence information in the
United States that is not known
to the Soviet Union.

The Times also reported that
Nosenko, who is now living in
Moscow, has told American
intelligence officials that he
was born in Nikolsk, a town in
the former Tsarist Empire. He
has been identified as the son
of a Soviet naval officer.

The Washington Post reported
that the story of Nosenko's
behavior change was published
in Pravda on February 26, the
same day that the New York
Times story appeared. The
report said that Nosenko had
been a Soviet naval officer
and had been stationed in the
United States.

The Times story said that
Nosenko had been a member
of the Soviet intelligence
organization but had been
suspended from active duty
because of his behavior.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATESEE ATTACHMENT BY 3:01 PM
197-01-10
MYSTERY OF A RUSSIAN WHO FLED TO THE WEST

Yuri I. Nossenko, an agent of Russia's state security agency, left Communism behind on February 4 and defected to the United States.

In Moscow and in Geneva—where Nossenko had been a member of the Soviet arms-talks delegation—the Russians raised an uproar.

Switzerland was accused of laxity in protecting delegates.

The U.S., it was hinted, either lured Nossenko away or kidnapped him.

The Kremlin summoned U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler to protest against Nossenko's defection and to ask how it had happened.

In Washington, the U.S. announced on February 14 that it would grant asylum to Nossenko. Officials said he had arrived in the capital. They said he had been interviewed by a Soviet diplomat and had stated he did not wish to return to Russia.

The 38-year-old Nossenko left a wife and two children in Russia when he fled from Geneva and asked the United States for asylum.

Behind the flurry of diplomatic activity was a mystery: Never before had Russia protested when a Soviet citizen defected. Why now?

Some reports said Nossenko carried away important secrets of Russia's military or disarmament plans.

And some authorities also saw a chance that the Nossenko affair would be built into an excuse for Russia to walk out on the arms conference.
The De-Briefing
Process for the U.S.S.R's Defectors

The Hotel Rex is a stodgy, third-rate establishment on Geneva's Avenue Wendt. Behind its dingy, yellow-stucco walls, clean but unluxurious rooms serve as home away from home for middle-class businessmen and second-string diplomats. Four weeks ago, ten Russians checked in at the Rex. They were in town for the disarmament conference, and hotel staffers remember them as a surly lot—all except for the guest in Room 207. Handsome Yuri I. Nosenko, always had a smile and a cheery word for the maids, and given any opportunity would proudly show them the crayoned drawings of houses and animals that his two young children had sent him from home. "I'll be back with them soon," he would say. But the day before the guest in 207 was due to leave for Moscow, he tucked a bulging briefcase under his arm, walked jauntily out of the Hotel Rex, and never returned. Yuri I. Nosenko, trusted officer in the KGB, Russia's security police and counterintelligence service, had defected to the West.

The Russians first missed Nosenko when he failed to show for an afternoon session of the disarmament conference. When they found his briefcase was missing, the hunt was on. "Provoctive Activity": Red agents scoured Geneva, and kept the airport and all border crossing points under tight surveillance. Only when it was obviously too late did the Russians call in the Swiss for help, and then chief Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin had the effrontery to blame Swiss authorities for the defection. Despite his obvious anger, Tsarapkin seemed determined not to allow the affair to disrupt the tranquil atmosphere of the disarmament talks.

Even when the U.S. State Department openly admitted that Nosenko was in safe hands and had asked for asylum, Tsarapkin still refrained from delivering an anti-American diatribe.

But the loss was obviously grievous. Though he was listed as a disarmament "expert" on the delegation roster, Nosenko's actual function was presumably to act as the KGB's watchdog over the rest of the Soviet delegation. He certainly knew the identity of a number of Soviet espionage agents around the world, and on top of that he presumably was privy to many of the inner secrets of Soviet disarmament strategy. In fact, only a few days after his defection, the Russian delega-
tion, without warning, changed its order of disarmament priorities. Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territory, previously first on the list, was switched with reduction of military budgets. A likely explanation: Nosenko probably knew a thing or two about the strength of Soviet forces stationed outside Russia.

Contented Smiles: Obviously, a defector with this kind of knowledge was a valuable prize indeed, and some Washingtonians reported seeing old CIA friends walking around with contented smiles. In fact, at the very moment that Tsarapkin was demanding Nosenko's return, the KGB agent was already on American soil.

The details of his escape may never be known. But late last week when a Soviet official was allowed to interview Nosenko in the U.S, the defector told him that he had left Switzerland voluntarily on the night of Feb. 4. Certainly, once Nosenko had made his initial contact with U.S. officials, it was essential to get him out of Geneva fast. Most likely, he was rushed across the border into France and then driven to a "safe house" in Paris.

What happened to Nosenko from then on is uncertain, but presumably he underwent the standard CIA processing of intelligence defectors. In a comfortably furnished room, wired with microphones and tape recorder, a Russian-speaking interrogator begins the initial debriefing—checking the defector's identity and determining the reasons behind his defection, or, in the lingo of the trade, "establishing the bona fides." Within an hour, the interrogator leaves to make his first report to local CIA headquarters, while the original contact man keeps up the chatter and sees to it that the defector is well supplied with cigarettes, food, and, above all, assurances that the KGB won't get him.

Friendly Questions: After the first few sessions, the interrogator suggests a lie-detector test—"going on the box," in CIA jargon. By this time, everything is pretty casual—coats off, ties loosened. There are no tough interrogation devices—strong lights, round-the-clock questioning. If the defector's good faith is doubted, these could come later.

If the initial screening suggests that the defector is "clean," he is asked to sign a request for asylum, and is then moved from the "safe house" to a secret CIA site in the U.S. There, he may stay months, telling all he knows while every angle is checked to ensure he is not a Soviet "plant."

During this time, if Nosenko follows the typical route, he will room with one or two American intelligence agents, who will question him, eat and drink with him, and repeatedly assure him of his safety. Occasionally, he will be taken on trips into everyday America, and his guides will help confirm his own image of the U.S. with their answers to questions about supermarkets, prices, and workers' salaries.

When Nosenko is through telling his story and spilling his information, the probability is that he will be given a rest for six to eight months. He will receive a regular monthly pay of $500 to $600, will live in a guarded apartment, and be given Russian books (Trotsky, Pasternak, memoirs of other defectors) that will confirm his image of Soviet tyranny and help allay his inevitable doubts that he did the right thing by turning traitor.

Fading Star: Once his information is checked out, he may remain for a while in the U.S. intelligence service, commenting on reports, reading the Soviet press, writing biographies of former colleagues. At first, he will be a star attraction. But in most cases, this lasts only as long as his firsthand information, and gradually, as his knowledge of current Soviet affairs fades, so does his usefulness to American intelligence. In time, this turns many defectors bitter, and finally convinces them that their only future lies in breaking away from intelligence work into ordinary American society.

But for most Soviet intelligence defectors that hasn't worked out too well, either—anymore than it has for their Western counterparts such as Britain's Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean. Unlike other defectors from Iron Curtain countries, most of whom quickly adapt to new lives in the West, defecting intelligence officers tend to be a psychologically troubled lot.

The CIA does its best to help them adjust. But such men find it hard to communicate with ordinary Americans and seem lost outside their normal trade of espionage. Since they are all firmly convinced that an automatic order for their assassination went out the moment they deserted the Soviet service, they are often reduced to behaving more like frightened animals than human beings. Some examples:

Gouzenko: Freedom and fear

Officer ever to defect to the West. Today, 26 years after his defection. Orlov is still convinced that the KGB will get him one day. He lives on a farm "somewhere" in the U.S. Only a few CIA and FBI agents know exactly where he is.

Nikolai E. Khokhlov, who was sent abroad by the KGB in 1954 to kill a Russian émigré leader and instead defected to the West. Later, he wrote a book and even gave several lectures—at which he always insisted on speaking with his back to the wall and having the windows boarded up. Six years ago, Khokhlov went to Europe for a vacation. While he was there, he suffered what he thought was attempted poisoning in a restaurant and went into permanent hiding.

Igor Gouzenko, hero of the famous 1945 Canadian spy affair. He walked out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with 109 files on Russian agents. Books, films, and articles brought Gouzenko and his family (wife and two children) money, farms, and cars. But the fear of the Soviet secret police which led him to testify before a Canadian Royal Commission with a sack over his head, still haunts him. He moves constantly from one farm to another, talks only with government officials, and has yet to tell his children their real surname.

The reason Yuri Nosenko defected must have been powerful indeed, for he could not be sure he would fare better than the others. He knew his family would be deprived of all rights as Soviet citizens, and that his only momento of his children would be a crumpled crayon drawing. And always there would be the fear that some day his former comrades would ferret him out.
The Defector

Twice weekly in Geneva's Palais des Nations, a stocky, dark-haired Russian named Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko took his seat among the other secretaries, clerks, aids and technicians in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. But though Nosenko was billeted with other low-ranking Soviet staffers in Geneva's Hotel Rex, it was obvious that he enjoyed special status. He roomed alone, spoke fluent English, had a different work schedule from that of his colleagues, often came home alone late at night after all the others were in. The reason was that, unknown to his fellow delegates, Nosenko's specialty was espionage. He was a ranking officer in the K.G.B., the Soviet agency that combines the functions of the C.I.A. and F.B.I.

Forthnight ago, the day before he was scheduled to return to Moscow, Nosenko told colleagues he was going off for lunch at a downtown restaurant. When he failed to return next morning, frantic Soviet officials ordered all the remaining Russians at the hotel into a delegation compound and stripped Nosenko's room of all his personal effects. They seemed particularly agitated when they could not find his valise. At last, the Russians called in the Swiss police. In vain, the cops checked Switzerland's hospitals, morgues, hotels, railroad stations, airports and border outposts. Nosenko had totally vanished.

Last week the U.S. State Department tersely reported that Nosenko had defected to the West and was "somewhere in the U.S." In fact, he was in Washington, where officials permitted Soviet and Swiss diplomats to interview him. Refuting Moscow's allegations of "improper" U.S. behavior, Nosenko declared that he had voluntarily decided not to return to Russia.

U.S. officials plainly regarded Nosenko, 36, as the biggest spy catch since Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet military scientist who funneled military secrets to the West before being arrested and executed by the Russians last year. Nosenko apparently had brought with him invaluable operational and organizational details about the Soviet intelligence network, and officials hinted that his defection had already caused a shake-up within the Russian espionage system.
Defector or Plant?

Soviets agent Yuri I. Nosenko's Geneva defection pinpoints high-level espionage's most difficult problem: Is a defector a defector or a plant?

We're safe in the Nosenko case because, unfortunately, he isn't returning to Russia, but skill in answering the agonizing question is the magic ingredient required for the penetration work that extends into all capitals.

We get more Russian defectors thru Geneva, Switzerland, than any place in the world—many more than thru West Berlin. Most defectors thru Germany are Poles, Czechs, East Germans—brother-satellite people who are informative but can't help us penetrate the Kremlin. Geneva's international conferences offer the opportunity for Soviet officials of the desired level to come to where we are waiting.

Meanwhile, the thunderclap you heard in the Alps was courageous Swiss Foreign Minister Friedrich T. Wahlen boxing the ears of Soviet Ambassador A. I. Loshchakov in Bern for Moscow's charge that Swiss police were negligent in Nosenko's runaway. The Swiss take no nonsense from anybody and least of all does Dr. Wahlen.

Switzerland's Nachrichtendienst, her counter-espionage organization, is famous in intelligence circles throughout the world. Her federal police establishment, under Attorney General Hans Furth in Bern, is as famous for its efficiency and good judgment. But it is not their function to keep Soviet defectors from flying the Kremlin coop. Their task, well performed, is to protect Switzerland's neutrality and block anti-Swiss activity.

In truth, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Khrushchev's delegation chief, probably did not intend to report Nosenko's disappearance to the Swiss. There, as in the U.S., Soviet gestapo units conduct their own heavy-handed apprehending and do not want the embarrassing fact of defection handled by anyone else.

The far better guess would be that Tsarapkin had a fit when he learned the Geneva police were informed. So Tsarapkin went thru the motions of notifying the authorities and turned his plight into a blast against the neutral Swiss. His tirade will go over like a lead balloon and he'll be lucky if the Bern Federal Council doesn't kick him out of the country for it.

Defectors, while valuable, have a limited usefulness if they seek asylum. Our objective in Geneva and elsewhere is to persuade a Soviet defector to go back "in place" in Russia and work there for us. Yet the Kremlin continually feeds us plants in the guise of defectors.

Often the choice about a Geneva defector must be made in a matter of days. The Soviet delegation may be in Geneva only briefly. If the defector is going back to Moscow at all, he must go back with it. Deciding the defector's authenticity calls for intelligence's hardest single talent.

You can be sure we urged Nosenko to return home with Tsarapkin's delegation. Or that Nosenko refused and we had to accept him as a defector or that we didn't trust him entirely and are thus using him only in a safe way. Or, lastly, that he had been our agent "in place," faced apprehension and managed to jump before the Kremlin could put the arm on him.

By Henry J. Taylor
New Sex-Spy Scandal

By GUY RICHARDS

A new spy scandal is brewing in the State Dept. which involves "several Americans" in our embassy in Warsaw.

By GUY RICHARDS

The latest defector from the Soviet Secret Police, Yuri I. Nosenko, already has cleared by the Russians through a number of our diplomatic representatives in Poland's capital.

Their downfall, it was reliably determined, was the work in all but one instance of women agents of the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police.

The number of Americans involved and the damage to our defense, diplomatic and communications secrets is now the subject of secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Similar investigations are also under way in the State Dept. and the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA is holding Nosenko in protective custody as a prize package of information in danger of becoming a clay pigeon for KGB assassins.

Spokesmen for both State and CIA said they would not comment on the matter at the present time.

A spokesman for the Senate subcommittee confirmed that the Warsaw scandal was an issue on which testimony was now being taken. He would make no further comment.

The State Dept. employees involved in the case are still in service.

The case has roots to— and similarities with— that of Irving C. Scarbeck, the Brooklyn-born former aide in our Warsaw embassy. He was convicted three years ago of turning U.S. secrets over to Communist agents. He is now serving a 10-year prison sentence.

Scarbeck, industrious, married and the father of three children, fell under the spell of a blackmailing Polish blonde who was an agent of the secret police.

He was 40 at the time.

NEW YORK
JOURNAL AMERICAN

FEB 10 1964

THREAT YIELDS DATA

Under threat of exposing their affair, his Polish mistress got him to turn over many classified documents to Communist agents. Through Scarbeck, the Reds gained the equivalent of a looking-glass, a camera and a sounding-board for all important business transacted inside the embassy.

Unfortunately for the State Dept., its own security program was relaxed about the time of the Scarbeck affair. Otherwise the department might have discovered then that Scarbeck wasn't the only source of leaks through the highlife-baited trap which the Reds created for Americans in Warsaw.

It now appears that our Warsaw post, instead of being fumigated following Scarbeck's arrest, has been the same old glass house for the KGB almost ever since.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee got wind of the affair several weeks ago. It took testimony from a State Dept. security officer.

He presented some evidence willingly enough, it was learned, but when the questioning got tougher he balked and told the Senators he couldn't answer any further questions until he consulted his seniors.

Yuri Nosenko

BUT IT'S CONFIRMED

Shortly thereafter the Senate investigators got word of Nosenko's defection. One of them met him the day he arrived in Washington last week. He confirmed that the Warsaw embassy had been an open book to his organization, this reporter has been informed.

The whole affair is a vindication of the contentions of Otto F. Otpka, once the State Dept's top-ranking loyalty checker, that there were "leaking security deficiencies" at State.

Mr. Otpka was fired (he even had his phone tapped) by State for making such remarks to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
Reds Seek To Halt Asylum To Defectors, Dulles Says

Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that Russian protests over last week's defection of Yuri I. Nossenko, Soviet intelligence agent, are designed to "steer the United States away from accepting other defectors."

They are obviously seriously disturbed by the defection," he asserted. "The reason for the terrible fuss about it is because they know that if there are defections from the bowels of their super-secret intelligence agency, the KGB, there will be more."

Mr. Dulles defended the United States decision to allow Russian authorities to question their agent in this country after his defection, because, he said, "a defector should be able to stand up to questioning."

In a speech at the Johns Hopkins University's Shriver Hall, however, the former CIA director criticized the agency's recent disclosure of Soviet economic data.

Reports Denied

"It was the right and duty of the CIA to collect the data," he said, "but I'd prefer to see it given out through some other channel."

The CIA has been criticized for stepping out of its normal role of secrecy and for not releasing the downgrading assessment of the Soviet economy through another Government agency.

Mr. Dulles emphatically denied reports of a split between the State Department and the CIA in American policy toward South Vietnam before last November's coup d'état.

"There often are disputes between individuals," he declared, "but as far as a policy split—that is nonsense. There might have been individual policy differences between individual people."

Mr. Dulles advised caution in exchanging Soviet and American spies, while approving the exchange of Col. Rudolf I. Abel, Russian master spy, for Francis Gary Powers, downed American U-2 pilot.

"Abel was tried and convicted," he said. "I would like to see these spies go through a trial. Exchanges ought to be done with great care. I wouldn't want to do it before the trial. Justice should have its day."

Active in intelligence in both world wars and eight years head of the CIA, Mr. Dulles described "the secret war of insurrection" waged by the Communists in unstable societies as the "most difficult and serious issue we face today."

Recollecting his experience in the CIA, which he called an effective remedy to a second Pearl Harbor, Mr. Dulles said that his agency had "good information as to the capabilities" and "not anbard estimate of Chinese intentions" before the Chinese entrance into the Korean War.

"Both General (Douglas) MacArthur and President (Harry) Truman took pieces of it (the CIA information) to justify their positions," which he said "were later on not quite the same."

Appointed by President Johnson to the Warren Commission, Mr. Dulles predicted that all relevant data concerning the assassination of President Kennedy would be released to the public.

The commission has received no "sensational" evidence, he said, to counter the opinion that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered the former Chief Executive.
Mysterious
Soviet Deaths

By ROBERT S. ALLEN
AND PAUL SCOTT

Two high-level Soviet officials have, suddenly "died" since Yuri
I. Nossenko, a ranking secret police official, defected in Geneva
and requested U.S. asylum.

Dead under mysterious circumstances are Pavel M. Zernov,
deputy minister of medium machinery buildings and V.
V. Borisoglebskii, chairman of the military tribunal which han-
dled the trial of former U-2 pilot Francis Powers after he
was shot down over Russia.

Both Soviet officials had been superiors of Nossenko before
his assignment as chief KGB officer with the Soviet disarma-
ment delegation in Geneva.

Only the most trusted KGB agents are permitted to operate
outside of Russia.

U.S. Intelligence authorities handling the Nossenko case are
taking for granted that Zernov and Borisoglebskii were put to
death on orders from the Kremlin because of their roles in pro-
moting the defector within the KGB.

At the time of his defection, 35-year-old Nossenko was on spe-
cial assignment in Geneva from the "American section" of the
KGB. The initials KGB stand for the "Committee for State Se-
curity," current designation of the Russian secret police.

Nossenko is now in the U.S. under the "protective custody" of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

If he lives to tell his full story, these Intelligence experts point
out, Nossenko is in a position to give details from the KGB file
on Lee Harvey Oswald, accused assassin of the late Presi-
dent Kennedy, and Mrs. Marina Oswald, his widow.

Nossenko's high-level assignment in the "American section" of
the KGB gave him access to plans and information on Soviet
secret police operations in the U.S.—including details of any
possible Kremlin involvement in the Kennedy assassination.

As top security assistant of Zernov, Nossenko also was in
a position—as the book as a year and a half ago—to know the
innermost secrets of Russian nuclear weapons production.

His information could alert U.S. officials to the Soviet's
status as compared to the U.S. in the development and testing of
60-megaton super-bombs. He could also supply reliable data
on whether the Russians have cheated on the nuclear test ban
since signing the treaty in Moscow last July.

"Nossenko can give us the in-
formation to determine if the U.S. acted wisely in signing the
nuclear test ban," one military Intelligence officer reported. "He
can reveal how right or wrong our policies toward Russia have
been during the past four or five years."

Nossenko's revelations could also blow sky-high the U.S.-So-
viet cultural exchange negotiations now going on in Moscow.

As a former KGB agent who worked closely with cultural ex-
change officials, Nossenko is put-
ing his finger on a number of Russian scientists and artists who
actually were KGB agents sent to the U.S. to spy under this
program.

Already Representative Mi-
chael Feighan, D-Ohio, chairman
of the House Judiciary subcom-
mittee investigating the U.S.-So-
viet exchange program, has asked
the State Department to submit
a full report on Nossenko and
his revelations.

Feighan has requested details
of a State Department visa
granted Nossenko "several
years ago" to visit the U.S. as
a member of one of the indus-
trial exchange groups. Depar-
tment records show that Nos-
senko never used the visa.

While not all the reasons be-
hind Nossenko's decision to de-
fect are known at this time, one
intelligence summary of inter-
views with the former KGB
agent quoted him as saying he
was afraid that he would be
shot.

Nossenko pointed out that sev-
eral of his close KGB friends
were killed after being linked
with Lieutenant Colonel Cole V.
Penkovsky, a Soviet official who
was executed in 1963 for being
charged with spying for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

BY TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public.

The department said that information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Swiss delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Swiss Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities.

Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.
A Shush Job
By The Swiss

THE SWISS with their impeccable diplomacy have shown once again they know how to handle the big bad Russian bear.

When Yuri Nossenko, member of the Soviet disarmament delegation at Geneva, defected to the West the Russians were badly shaken. In typical bullying fashion they looked around for a scapegoat and decided to pick on the Swiss. They charged proper protection had not been given Nossenko by the Geneva police and Switzerland would be held strictly accountable if they did not get him back.

Although possessing not a single rocket or gunboat the Swiss calmly told the Russians they were talking nonsense and they as well as the Swiss knew it. The Russians simply shut up and took another tack.

It always seems to work when the Communists come up with some fantastic claim or threat. When their hand is called, as the Swiss did in the Nossenko case, they back down. If not they push on to another advantage. The Swiss should give lessons.
Defectors And Their Worth

The fuss being kicked up by Moscow over defection of Yuri I. Nossenko, 36-year-old Soviet intelligence officer, attached to the Russian delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference, conveys the impression that the West has scored heavily in the cold war and the continuing effort of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to ferret out information about each other.

We are willing to accept the defection at its face value. In itself it makes excellent propaganda material. Heavily played up in news media of this country and the other Western nations, it had not been reported in the Russian press at the time of this writing. Doubtless will be at the proper time with a Kremlin version which will center its fire at the United States and Switzerland, since the incident occurred at Geneva.

We should of course make the most of any source of Soviet information available. Already Nossenko has been flown to Washington where he is being subjected to prolonged examination by State Department and U.S. intelligence agencies. Significantly, but not unexpectedly, his exact whereabouts have not been revealed; nor is there any indication when he will be permitted to undergo press questioning. It is both pertinent and notable, however, that Russian and Swiss officials have been allowed to converse with him in the presence of State Department personnel. It has also been announced that his request for asylum in this country has been granted.

But, while not discrediting the plum which appears to have fallen into U.S. hands, we confess to lingering doubts about many of these "defectors" who come over to our side. There is always the possibility that they may be plants; that they are dispatched to try to worm their way into our confidence and to pick up information which the Soviets might not otherwise obtain; that the fuss in Moscow is part of the cover-up; that we might be given misinformation; and that even a few true tips might be given against expendables in further effort to make our intelligence agencies believe the defection and the defector genuine.

All these doubts must be prevalent in CIA's and other intelligence agencies' minds. Even as we exult outwardly over Nossenko's coming over to our side, behind-the-scenes developments must include close scrutiny of his background, his possible motives, every bit of information which he passes along and ultimate determination of how to use it.

Espionage is dangerous, tricky, messy and even dirty business, so labyrinthian that we often wonder if even those directing it are fully aware of what is going on and its effective interpretation.
Defector

Yuri I. Nosenko, the youthful KGB (Russian secret police) operator, is the most important Soviet defector to the West since the end of World War II.

If he lives to tell his full story — he is number one on the Kremlin's assassination list — he can supply many answers which even our CIA does not have.

For example, Mr. Nosenko was in position to have top-secret inside information on such matters as:

— The innermost secrets of Russian nuclear weapons production.

— The truth as to whether the Russians have cheated on the nuclear test ban treaty, signed in Moscow last July.

— The number of so-called cultural exchange “students” who actually are KGB agents.

— Details of the KGB penetration of U.S. intelligence forces.

— The full story of the Soviet files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

In short, Mr. Nosenko can give us some very valuable information, perhaps even enough to re-evaluate our policy towards the Soviet Union in recent years.
Defector

Yuri Nasserko, the Soviet secret police officer who has defected to the United States, may have brought with him the microfilm of the Kremlin's war plans, or only the memory of a nagging wife. Such is the secrecy in which these matters run that the American public may never know whether the American government has on its hands a prize or a pest. Wishful thinking and faith in freedom are enough, of course, to support almost any extravagant estimate of Nasserko's worth. By the same token, we prefer to believe that a Mitchell or Martin, defectors in the other direction, really knew nothing at all.

It should be borne in mind, too, that the security and strength of a great modern power do not depend primarily on information or intelligence which is beyond the technology or the imagination of an adversary power. A defector can carry secrets, of course, but in the age of the photo satellite and the computer, they are likely to be little secrets, not large ones.