

TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH

Continuation of articles concerning the assassination of President Kennedy appearing in the November 1, 1966, No. 157 issue of "Politica."

"Brennan Was Near-Sighted"

This fact is only vaguely expressed in the summary of the report; and it is completely absent from the testimonies. Brennan was near-sighted. All of his declarations that could be verified were proven false. The fact that he could not recognize Oswald in the ipolice station shows that there are valid reasons to doubt that he could have given a precise description of the man. Moreover, the description attributed to him was not sufficiently detailed to permit Tippit to recognize Oswald, who was in the middle of a crowd, several kilometers from the scene of the assassination. This leads us to the conclusion that if Tippit intended to arrest Oswald as suspect number one, his actions were based on evidence that has not been discovered by the Commission.

I am setting forth the principal reasons, although not the only ones, that convinced me that the Warren Report is weak and prejudiced. After arriving at these conclusions, I published my opinion in two articles that appeared in the Sunday Times in London. These articles did not contribute to my popularity. My arguments were refuted by lawyers, judges, and journalists. Since my detractors based their arguments solely on the report, without taking into account the 26 volumes of testimonies that formed the basis for the report, I considered their criticisms to be unfounded. They deliberately ignored my basic argument: The report was not a summary of the testimonies.

"Who Was To Blame?"

Must I accuse Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; his eminent colleagues; and the lawyers who worked with them of being involved in a conspiracy or of being dishonest? If I am right, the adulteration of the evidence could not have been the result of a simple error; it is

TRANSLATED BY: *CSH d*
ROSALIE A. GIACCHINO: trs *tr*
December 8, 1966

65-109060-4324

present throughout the investigation. At this time, many people presented me with a dilemma. I think this is precisely the main reason why many reasonable, liberal, down-to-earth, and well-read men refused to confront the problems. It was impossible for them to accept the only reasonable alternative.

I don't think, however, that the dilemma was well stated. The alternative to the unconditional acceptance of the report does not have to be the dishonesty of the Commission. There must be an explanation if it can be shown that the report is incorrect. This explanation will have to be sought in the structure and in the procedure of this commission and not in the conscious motivation of its members. In the final analysis, it is the only way possible for an historian to approach his historical document. He cannot start his analysis by doubting the morality of the document's authors. He must ask himself what circumstances, what purposes, what procedure, and what events were involved in the writing of this work. The Germans call this *Kwellenkritik*, a criticism of the sources.

Some answers are evident in the case of the Warren Report. First of all, let us consider the structure of the Commission. All of the members were very active public figures. It is inconceivable that they could have delved deeply into the details of an investigation based on 552 interviews and 25,000 documents. They could only give the investigation irregular attention and a limited amount of their time. The real work had to be done by lawyers who assisted them. But how could the lawyers coordinate the work? Did they have investigative powers and the authority to assume cross-examinations and confrontations? Weren't they subject to pressure: political pressure, lack of time, and the need for positive results that would satisfy the whole world? These are a historian's natural questions. I don't think that these questions were raised by journalists. They enthusiastically accepted the report, putting great emphasis on the caliber of men who served as members of the Commission and on the quantity of documents, the majority of which were never examined.

Two of the pressures mentioned are evident. They were obvious and were revealed in the testimonies. The first of these is the pressure of time. The Commission had to complete its report within a few months, and, although the date was extended, the report was published before all of the files could be examined. Another one was: the pressure of the FBI.

From the beginning, the Commission did not have the means necessary to carry out an independent investigation. It was totally at the mercy of established institutions. Which institutions were these? The Dallas police and the secret services of the FBI. Even before the Commission had begun its work, the FBI had drawn its own conclusions about the assassination and had published a five-volume report on a group of documents. The statement of the FBI's director, J. Edgar Hoover, that was included in the 26 volumes, is particularly revealing. In a very authoritative tone, Hoover informed Warren of the conclusions that his services had reached. He also supplied him with a list of witnesses to be considered important. It made no difference how much the Commission manifested its desire for independence, since it already was, in some respects, a prisoner of the organization that held the advantage of time and upon which it depended for its operations.

Caught between these two pressures - the pressure of time and of the considerations already given - it is easy to see which course of action the Commission would take if it were not under powerful, independent, and undivided control. It would unconsciously tend to examine the evidence as material that had already been elaborated upon, and that had a designated meaning, rather than raw material that could lead in any direction.

In this regard, it is necessary to find an explanation for the inadequateness of the Warren Report. Neither dishonesty nor the proposed political goal have to be considered. It is sufficient to examine the workings of the Commission, its internal structure, and the pressures that existed. All of this will determine the final result. Unfortunately, an analysis like this was not possible in 1964.

Today it is. During the last two years, the Bible's critics have begun to work not only on the text of the Bible but also on the history of this text. During the course of this operation the Holy Spirit disappeared, and it is now possible to find defects in the Book of Judges without being accused of trapping God. This is principally due to the patience and courage of three North American writers whose works will finally receive the imprimatur.

When I was reading the 26 volumes of testimonies during the winter of 1964-1965, I knew that others would devote themselves to this same task, perhaps delving deeper into the problem. One of them, Mark Lane, a lawyer with avant-garde ideas, questioned the objectivity of this Commission from

the onset of the investigation. To no avail, he attempted to defend Oswald's interests before this organization. This defense attorney was determined to expose all the errors and contradictions in the affair, so that it would not be filed away. Another one, Richard Popkin, was a very different type of person. He was a philosophy professor at the University of California. He had written a very interesting book on an appropriate topic: The Tradition of Scepticism in Europe. He examined the evidence without any political prejudices and with the rabbinical thoroughness of an exegete.

The third one, Edward Jay Epstein, also affiliated with a university, but much younger, approached the topic from a different angle. He entitled his graduation (sic) thesis: "The Nature and Activity of the Warren Commission as an Extraordinary Governmental Organization." In this way, I was able to accurately examine the workings of the commission which, as I have already suggested, explained the final form in which the evidence was presented.

(To be continued)

Then why was Oswald arrested? Evidently, it is one of those great mysteries. It is one of the first that made me doubt the truth of the Report. Why does the Report indicate that Oswald was arrested in a movie theater not for the assassination of the President, but rather for killing the policeman, J. D. Tippit. Only after his arrest for the above-indicated reason and after discovering his rifle in the student library, did he become the presumed assassin of the President. Other questions arise at this point: Why did Oswald kill Tippit? (If he is the one who killed him); Why did he take the risk of being arrested for doing it? And how did Tippit and Oswald happen to meet that day?

The Report suggests that Tippit intended to arrest Oswald suspecting that he was the President's assassin, and that Oswald killed him to keep from being arrested. From this, we can ask ourselves what reasons Tippit had for suspecting Oswald. According to the summary of the Report that was printed and published before the Report itself, Tippit could have identified Oswald from a police description. This description was "principally" taken from data given by a certain Howard L. Brennan who, from a position in the street, claimed to have seen the assassin who was behind a window on the sixth floor of the student library.