

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



Commission Exhibit No. 836

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Commission Exhibit No. 836

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 31, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rankin:

In response to your letter of March 24, 1964, the written materials which you requested are being forwarded with this communication.

With respect to a written description, existing at the time of the assassination, of criteria employed in determining what information coming to the attention of the Bureau should be furnished to the Secret Service, there are enclosed pertinent excerpts from the "Manual of Instructions" and the "FBI Handbook" which constitute instructions to FBI personnel. The Manual is in the possession of all Bureau officials and supervisory officials in our field divisions. Attachment one is a complete copy of Section 83K of the "Manual of Instructions" dealing with the handling of threats against the President, members of his immediate family, and others protected by the Secret Service. This material is exactly as it appeared in the Manual at the time of the assassination. The "FBI Handbook" is in the possession of every FBI Special Agent and contains a summary of the material appearing in the "Manual of Instructions." Attachment two is a complete copy of Part III, Chapter 63, I.B., from the "FBI Handbook" as it appeared at the time of the assassination. It is noted that this material is substantially the same as that appearing in the "Manual of Instructions."

These instructions have resulted in the day-to-day dissemination to the Secret Service of information received by the Bureau regarding threats to the safety of the President.

Honorable J. Lee Rankin

For example, following announcement of the intention of President Kennedy to visit Tampa, Florida, in November, 1963, our local office was able to inform the Secret Service concerning plans made by the Ku Klux Klan in Florida to picket the President and to engage in organized activities which could have resulted in violence. In addition, Cuban anti-Castro groups in Florida planned public activities in connection with the President's visit concerning which we were able to inform the Secret Service. That agency indicated, following the President's visit, that the information we had furnished to them was undoubtedly responsible for the successful completion of the President's trip to the Tampa area.

FBI Field Offices throughout the United States furnish Bureau Headquarters information by teletype for immediate dissemination to the Secret Service whenever there is any indication of activities of interest to that service, not only in connection with the President's travel but also in connection with his residence, as the White House is a frequent target for group picketing. In addition to data indicating specific activity in the President's vicinity we have, for a number of years, kept the Secret Service fully informed concerning the activities of certain groups such as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and the Nation of Islam, the membership of which has either discussed or indicated a possibility of physical action against Government authority.

Attachment three is a complete copy of Section 83I. of the "Manual of Instructions" dealing with the reporting to the Secret Service of information concerning the counterfeiting of United States coins, notes, and other obligations and securities of the Government. This matter is mentioned in the "FBI Handbook" by inclusion in a tabulation of matters within the jurisdiction of other Government departments and agencies in which Secret Service is designated as the agency to receive information concerning counterfeiting. The "Classification 55" appearing in the Manual is a reference to the means by which various matters are assigned numerical classification numbers for assistance in filing and indexing. The references to counterfeiting in the Manual and the Handbook, which existed prior to the assassination, remain unchanged as of March 27, 1964.

Honorable J. Lee Rankin

With respect to a written description, existing at the time of the assassination, of the procedures employed in carrying out liaison with the Secret Service in connection with safeguarding the President, attachment four is a complete copy of Section 102D. of the "Manual of Instructions" as it appeared at the time of the assassination. This section has remained unchanged and still appears in the Manual as of March 27, 1964. Liaison with the Secret Service in Dallas, Texas, was in effect pursuant to this policy prior to the assassination and, in anticipation of the visit of President Kennedy to that city, resulted in the discussion with and dissemination to the Secret Service there concerning which you have previously been informed. Our Dallas Office notified Secret Service on October 30, 1963, concerning an individual who had allegedly stated that if President Kennedy made a trip to Texas a "reception" was planned for him. We also furnished the Secret Service background information and a photograph of this individual, Norman Lee Elkins. On November 21, 1963, our Dallas Office notified the Secret Service of leaflets being distributed in Dallas containing criticism of President Kennedy's policies. On the same date our Dallas Office notified the Secret Service regarding picket signs being printed for use in picketing President Kennedy on the following day. On the evening of November 20, 1963, an Agent of our Dallas Office advised the head of the Dallas Secret Service Office that the FBI would do anything within its authority to be of assistance in connection with the President's visit and would continue to promptly furnish any pertinent information which might be received. Our Agent was thanked for this offer of cooperation and told that the Secret Service had no specific request to make of the FBI at that time.

In addition to liaison at the field level, a very close liaison relationship has been maintained for a number of years between the headquarters of the Secret Service and this Bureau. A Liaison Supervisor from Bureau Headquarters visits Secret Service Headquarters on a nearly daily basis to insure prompt handling of Secret Service requests and immediate attention to any problems which may arise. This Liaison Supervisor has on a number of occasions, at the request of the White House and the Secret Service, accompanied the President and his official party on trips outside the United States in order to coordinate and disseminate current data cabled to him from FBI Headquarters bearing on the safety of the President and other matters considered to be of special interest.

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Through our Liaison representatives abroad the FBI has established friendly relationships with the principal officials of many foreign police and law enforcement agencies. In connection with Presidential trips to the countries in which those agencies are located, the FBI Liaison representative has been able to smooth the way for the Secret Service by introducing them to our contacts and assisting in establishing the cooperation which is so necessary to the President's security abroad. Between 1955 and 1963 a Bureau Liaison representative accompanied the Presidential Party on seventeen such trips, visiting a total of thirty-two countries. Whenever we learn of the President's intention to travel outside of the United States, we immediately alert all Bureau Field Offices and Liaison representatives abroad. A Bureau Supervisor is assigned the responsibility for coordinating the information which may be received and arrangements are made for the Liaison Supervisor traveling with the Presidential Party to be furnished this information by cable for passage to the Secret Service. Following the visit of President Kennedy to Costa Rica in March, 1963, Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley addressed a special letter of commendation to one of our offices expressing appreciation for their cooperation in checking 400 names through their files in connection with the Costa Rica visit.

The Secret Service is now submitting a large number of names to us for checking through our files in connection with travel by the President within the United States. For example, we checked 1025 names, including 800 hotel employees, in connection with the President's visit to St. Louis, Missouri, on February 14, 1964. On forty-eight hours' notice we reviewed more than 1900 files. Whenever we learn of the President's intention to travel within the United States, we immediately inform pertinent FBI Field Offices in order that they may be particularly alert to information bearing on the President's security.

Since the assassination, we have reiterated procedures already in effect and have realerted all of our field offices and Liaison representatives abroad. The current instructions are enclosed as attachments five and six. Considering the possibility of mental aberration on the part of any of our more than 190 million United States residents, it is manifestly impossible to pinpoint all potential risks to the President.

Honorable J. Lee Rankin

In the absence of an actual threat to the President or of activity directed against his security, however, we have attempted to delineate, within practical limits, the categories of persons coming to our attention which might be inimical to the safety of the President even though those persons have made no overt threat. These criteria are set forth in the current instructions, which were prepared on December 26, 1963.

Attachment seven is an instruction which was sent to all FBI Field Offices on December 19, 1963. This requested that the Secret Service be furnished specific information concerning possible violence in connection with bombing, racial and similar matters for its use in determining possible danger spots with respect to the safety of the President.

Attachment eight is a copy of a letter to all SACs (Special Agents in Charge of our local field offices) dated February 19, 1964, advising them that they may be called upon by the Secret Service to provide personnel to assist in protection of the President and issuing specific instructions with regard to such requests. This communication was occasioned by the fact that the Secret Service, on a number of occasions since the assassination, has asked the FBI to provide Agent personnel as indicated in the attachment and as no such request had been made prior to the assassination, it was deemed advisable to alert all our field offices concerning this activity. It is noted that since November 25, 1963, the FBI, at the request of Secret Service, has furnished a total of 139 Special Agents to that agency on a total of sixteen dates.

In response to your inquiry as to recommendations for possible improvement in any aspect of Presidential protection, after careful consideration of this problem, our suggestions were made available to the Secret Service on November 30, 1963. Inasmuch as the protection of the President is the primary responsibility of that agency, it is suggested that you consult with the Secret Service relative thereto.

I have withheld editorial comments concerning the attached materials to a bare minimum as I consider that they speak for themselves.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosures (8)

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 83. REFERENCE MATTERS - VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

K. THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT

Investigation of threats against the President of the United States, members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service. Therefore, any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President, members of the immediate family of the President, the President-elect, or the Vice-President must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest office of the U. S. Secret Service. The Bureau should be advised at the same time by teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been so disseminated. The above action should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation of the information should be attempted. When the threat is in the form of a written communication, a copy should be given to local Secret Service and the original should be forwarded to the Bureau where it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in Washington. The referral of the copy to local Secret Service should not delay the immediate referral of the information by the fastest available means of communication to Secret Service locally.

The teletype to the Bureau should include as much of the following information as is available without investigation:

1. Name and address of subject
2. Nature of the threat made, verbatim if possible
3. Date or approximate date when made
4. Identity of informant
5. Names and addresses of any witnesses
6. Identity of Secret Service officer notified and date and time of notification, together with a statement concerning the referral of the threat communication locally and to Bureau headquarters, when there is a written threatening communication

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Upon the receipt of such information from the field, the Bureau will advise the Washington headquarters of the Secret Service and when applicable will refer to it the original threat communication if it has no further use in the Bureau.

FBI HANDBOOK
Part III
Chapter 63

1. VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

B. Threats against the President of the U. S., members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President. Investigation of threats against the President of the United States, members of his immediate family, the President-Elect, and the Vice-President is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U. S. Secret Service. Any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President, members of the immediate family of the President, the President-Elect or the Vice-President must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest office of the U. S. Secret Service. Advise the Bureau at the same time by teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been so disseminated. The above action should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation of the information should be attempted. When the threat is in the form of a written communication, give a copy to local Secret Service and forward the original to the Bureau where it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in Washington. The referral of the copy to local Secret Service should not delay the immediate referral of the information by the fastest available means of communication to Secret Service locally.

Set out in the teletype to the Bureau as much of the following information as is available without investigation: (1) name and address of subject; (2) nature of the threat made, verbatim if possible; (3) date or approximate date when made; (4) identity of informant; (5) names and addresses of any witnesses; (6) identity of Secret Service officer notified and date and time of notification, together with a statement concerning the referral of the threat communication locally and to Bureau headquarters, when there is a written threatening communication.

Upon the receipt of such information from the field the Bureau will advise the Washington headquarters of the Secret Service and when applicable will refer to it the original threat communication if it has no further use in the Bureau.

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Attachment 3
In effect Nov 22, 1969
at the CIA office

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 83. REFERENCE MATTERS - VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

I. COUNTERFEITING - Classification 85

The U. S. Secret Service, which is a branch of the Treasury Department, is empowered to suppress the counterfeiting of U. S. coins, notes, and other obligations and securities of the Government. Violations of this nature which are reported to the Bureau are referred to the Chief, U. S. Secret Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. Information of a similar nature received by Bureau divisions should be reported to the nearest office of the U. S. Secret Service.

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Attachment 4
In effect Nov 22 1963
and still in effect
JAN 12

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 102

COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

D. LIAISON WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

To insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements, each SAC should specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other Federal Agencies. This liaison should take into consideration FBI-agency community of interests, location of agency headquarters, and the responsiveness of agency representatives. In each instance, liaison contacts should be developed to include a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding of FBI and agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness by the agency representative to coordinate activities and to discuss problems of mutual interest. Each field office should determine those Federal agencies which are represented locally and with which liaison should be conducted.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 83. REFERENCE MATTERS - VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PERSONS PROTECTED BY THE SECRET SERVICE

1. Dissemination of information re threats
Title 18, USC, 3056, authorizes the Secret Service, subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to protect the person of the President of the U. S., the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice-President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice-President-elect, together with a former President, at his request, for a reasonable period after he leaves office. Therefore, any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President or the other persons aforementioned, must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest office of the U. S. Secret Service. The Bureau should be advised at the same time by teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been so disseminated. The above action should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation of the information should be attempted. A letterhead memorandum setting forth the full details of the threat should be prepared at once. This memorandum should also set out the identity of the Secret Service officer notified and the date and time of notification. The memorandum should be promptly forwarded to the nearest office of Secret Service in confirmation of the oral dissemination and sufficient copies should be forwarded to the Bureau at the same time to permit dissemination at the SOG. When the threat is in the form of a written communication, a copy should be given to local Secret Service and the original should be forwarded to the Bureau where it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in Washington. The referral of the copy to local Secret Service should not delay the immediate referral of the information by the fastest available means of communication to Secret Service locally.

The teletype to the Bureau should include as much of the following information as is available without investigation:

- a. Name and address of subject
- b. Nature of the threat made, verbatim if possible
- c. Date or approximate date when made
- d. Identity of informant
- e. Names and addresses of any witnesses
- f. Identity of Secret Service officer notified and date and time of notification, together with a statement concerning the referral of the threat communication locally and to Bureau headquarters, when there is a written threatening communication
- g. A statement that a letterhead memorandum or other communication suitable for dissemination is being forwarded promptly to Bureau headquarters

Upon the receipt of such information from the field, the Bureau will advise the Washington headquarters of the Secret Service and when applicable will refer to it the original threat communication if it has no further use in the Bureau.

2. Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, state, or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.

If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum under the individual caption setting forth pertinent background data and a succinct statement of facts forming the basis for the determination that he falls within one or more of the categories listed herein.

The information furnished Secret Service should to the greatest extent possible be limited to a succinct statement of facts forming the basis for the determination that a subject falls within one or more of the four categories listed above. If it becomes necessary to include information concerning a subject's affiliation with a subversive movement or other movement in order to establish the fact that he does fall within one of the four categories, the information set forth regarding the affiliation should be as brief as possible.

Copies of the letterhead memoranda directed to Secret Service should be retained in a control file in your office. It is the responsibility of each SAC to insure that these instructions are administered with good judgment in each instance. Do not advise the Bureau of the identities of these individuals unless they fall within section 1 above dealing with the handling of a specific threat against the President, members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President. Matters brought to the Bureau's attention under the instructions contained in section 1 above should be under the caption "Threat Against the President" or "Threat Against the Vice-President," etc., as the case may be.

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Attachment 6
prepared Dec. 26, 1963.
CNPB.

FBI HANDBOOK

Chapter 63 - Reference Matters

1. Violations Within the Jurisdiction of Other Federal Agencies

B. THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PERSONS PROTECTED BY THE SECRET SERVICE

1. Dissemination of information re threats

Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 authorizes the Secret Service, subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to protect the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect, together with a former President, at his request, for a reasonable period after he leaves office. Therefore, any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President or the other persons afore-mentioned, must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest office of the U. S. Secret Service. The Bureau should be advised at the same time by teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been so disseminated. The above action should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation of the information should be attempted. A letterhead memorandum setting forth the full details of the threat should be prepared at once. This memorandum should also set out the identity of the Secret Service officer notified and the date and time of notification. The memorandum should be promptly forwarded to the nearest office of Secret Service in confirmation of the oral dissemination and sufficient copies should be forwarded to the Bureau at the same time to permit dissemination at the Seat of Government. When the threat is in the form of a written communication, a copy should be given to local Secret Service and the original should be forwarded to the Bureau where it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in Washington. The referral of the copy to local Secret Service should not delay the immediate referral of the information by the fastest available means of communication to Secret Service locally.

The teletype to the Bureau should include as much of the following information as is available without investigation:

- a. Name and address of subject
- b. Nature of the threat made, verbatim if possible
- c. Date or approximate date when made
- d. Identity of informant

- e. Names and addresses of any witnesses
- f. Identity of Secret Service officer notified and date and time of notification, together with a statement concerning the referral of the threat communication locally and to Bureau headquarters, when there is a written threatening communication
- g. A statement that a letterhead memorandum or other communication suitable for dissemination is being forwarded promptly to Bureau headquarters

Upon the receipt of such information from the field, the Bureau will advise the Washington headquarters of the Secret Service and when applicable will refer to it the original threat communication if it has no further use in the Bureau.

FBI HANDBOOK
Part III
Chapter 63

1. VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

- B. Threats against the President of the U. S., members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President
2. Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President

All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, state, or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.

If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum under the individual caption setting forth pertinent background data and a succinct statement of facts forming the basis for the determination that he falls within one or more of the categories listed herein. If it becomes necessary to include information concerning a subject's affiliation with a subversive movement or other movement to establish the fact that he does fall within one of the four categories, the information set forth regarding the affiliation should be as brief as possible.

Copies of the letterhead memoranda directed to Secret Service should be retained in a control file in your office. Do not advise the Bureau of the identities of these individuals unless they fall within section 1 above dealing with the handling of a specific threat against the President, members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President. Matters brought to the Bureau's attention under the instructions contained in section 1 above should be under the caption "Threat Against the President" or "Threat Against the Vice-President," etc., as the case may be.

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Attachment 7

QNB

December 19, 1963

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

**DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
TO U.S. SECRET SERVICE
RACIAL MATTERS; BOMBING MATTERS**

In order to assist the U. S. Secret Service in determining possible danger spots in connection with its function of protecting the President, the Vice President and members of their families, particularly with regard to travel by the President, it is desired that copies of letterhead memoranda containing specific information concerning possible violence in connection with bombing matters, general racial matters and Klan and hate groups be disseminated to the local Secret Service office covering the territory in which the submitting Bureau office is located. A notation to the effect that this has been done should appear in the cover airtel submitting the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau.

2 - ALL OFFICES



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Commission Exhibit No. 836

February 19, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Attachment 8 Q143
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 64-11

(A) PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT -- From time to time you may be called upon by Secret Service to provide personnel to assist in the protection of the President during his visits to a city or area within your territory.

Any such requests received locally should be referred immediately to Bureau Headquarters advising the date, length of time and number of personnel requested by Secret Service. The Bureau will issue the necessary authority to you.

You are instructed that, in the selection of personnel for such assignment, the Special Agents selected must be experienced, mature and of excellent appearance and dress.

Any Special Agents selected for such assignment will, of course, be placed at the disposal of the local head of Secret Service and receive their instructions from him as the responsibility for protection of the President remains with Secret Service. Advise Bureau promptly if any instructions to our Special Agents are not in full consonance with this objective.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director