

# Commission Asks Better Protection For Presidents

Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—A thorough shakeup of protection procedures for U.S. presidents was advocated by the Warren Commission, which blasted Secret Service and FBI procedures in effect before John F. Kennedy's fatal trip to Dallas.

The Secret Service, with primary responsibility for the President's safety, was criticized for lax procedures and vague directions to others while the FBI was flailed for taking "an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities."

Among its lengthy list of recommendations were proposals for a beefed-up and better supervised Secret Service and closer liaison between all federal intelligence units.

What triggered much of the criticism was that the FBI had Lee Harvey Oswald—Kennedy's assassin—under surveillance for more than a year and as late as 17 days before the Nov. 22 assassination but failed to relay any information to the Secret Service.

## SECRET SERVICE LOOPHOLES

Secret Service procedures, the commission found, were so lax as to leave loopholes for such

The commission, which released the results of its 10-month investigation Sunday, also found the Secret Service badly undermanned and using archaic methods in preventive intelligence work.

Specifically, the commission recommended:

1. A committee of cabinet members or the National Security Council to review and oversee the protective activities of the Secret Service and other federal agencies involved to "insure that the maximum resources of the federal government are fully engaged in the task of protecting the president."

## SPECIAL ASSISTANT

2. Appointment of a special assistant to the treasury secretary to supervise the Secret Service, especially the current effort to revise and modernize basic operating procedures.

3. A complete overhaul of protective research methods to define, detect and obtain data on possible or potential threats.

4. Revision of procedures on parade routes to provide for attention to buildings along the way.

5. Improved relations with local law enforcement agencies.

6. More manpower and funds for Secret Service.

7. Better liaison between the Secret Service and the FBI.

8. Closer proximity of the Pres-

12

dent's physician to the chief executive in all travels.

9. Federal legislation making assassinations of the president or vice president a federal crime.

10. Action by the State Department to inform all agencies of the return of defectors.

#### CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION

The commission left it to Congress to determine whether changes in existing law which defines Secret Service organization and duties are desirable.

"Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated," the commission found.

Few punches were pulled in comments on security arrangements prior to Kennedy's assassination. The commission noted that a basic element of security was preventive intelligence, but said the Secret Service's protective research division was so vague in its directions and instructions that only overt threats were investigated and catalogued.

"The arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient," the commission found.

#### FILES INADEQUATE

Its efforts, the commission added, were too largely directed at "crank" threats. The file for Dallas, it noted contained no names notwithstanding the incident a month earlier involving United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.

Vague directions by the Secret Service were blamed for shifting the responsibility of evaluating potential threats to other agencies which did not have primary responsibility for the President's safety.

The commission zeroed in on the FBI's failure to disclose its extensive file on Oswald to the Secret Service—including the fact he worked in a building overlooking Kennedy's motorcade route.

Oswald, it found, was first interviewed by the FBI on June 26, 1962 and an investigation—including several other interviews—was conducted at intervals, and was actively reopened in Dallas

Oct. 3, 1963, less than two months before Kennedy's visit.

The last FBI check on Oswald—one which discovered his employment in the Texas School Book Depository Building—was made Nov. 5, only 17 days before Kennedy's fatal visit. In Washington, the FBI learned on Nov. 18—only four days before the assassination—that Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy and forwarded the information to its Dallas field office.

None of this information was ever relayed by the FBI to the Secret Service, and both agencies differed on whether Oswald fell into the category of a potential threat.

"There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the vice president," FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover testified.

#### INFORMATION NOT RELAYED

Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of the Secret Service protective research section, testified that information available to the FBI—if relayed to the Secret Service—would have made Oswald a subject of concern to the service.

But the commission said the Secret Service itself was too often "a passive recipient" of intelligence data.

The Secret Service was also criticized for not spelling out the duties expected of the Dallas Police Department, the County Sheriff's Department, or the Texas Department of Public Safety.

#### DISPUTE UNRESOLVED

One dispute — whether FBI Agent James P. Hosty told Dallas Police Lt. Jack Revill that the FBI had information that Oswald was "capable of committing this assassination"—was not resolved.

Revill testified that Hosty made the remark and that he prepared a memorandum on it. Police Chief Jesse E. Curry and Dist. Atty.

Henry Wade testified they saw the memo.

Hosty unequivocally denied, first by affidavit and then in sworn testimony before the commission, that he had made such a remark or that the FBI had such information.

The only other witness to the conversation between the two men, Dallas Detective V. J. Brian, said he did not hear the remark but was not present during the entire conversation.

12