

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1963

The morning of Thursday, November 14, 1963, Chief J. E. Curry instructed Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor to be in his office that afternoon at a meeting with him and Mr. Lawson, the Washington representative of the Secret Service, and Mr. Forrest Sorrells, the Dallas Agent in charge of the Secret Service.

At that time, they told us that the route the President probably would take from Love Field through the city had not been finalized, and that the location of the luncheon would be either at the Trade Mart or the Womens Building in Fair Park. Mr. Lawson stated that he thought the route from Love Field would be Cedar Springs to Mockingbird Lane to Lemmon Avenue to Turtle Creek Boulevard to Cedar Springs to Harwood to Main Street. He stated that although this seemed to be their preference at the moment, the announcement of the definite route would be made in the press by the host committee. Mr. Lawson further informed us that because the route had not been finalized, no statement should be made by this department as to the route.

During this conference, Mr. Lawson briefly laid out the tentative number of vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be. He showed us samples of the various identifying badges and buttons which would be worn by authorized personnel of the Presidential party, the Secret Service and plainclothes officers.

He stated that they had tentatively selected the area at Love Field where the three planes of the presidential party would be located, but he was concerned about whether or not there was enough space to park the planes and have room for the convoy of vehicles to come on to the apron and pick up the presidential party, thus he could not be sure that this particular location at the south end of the field near the American Airlines Freight Building would be their final arrangement. He stated that they had Air Force personnel coming in to measure the area and tell them whether or not it was sufficient. Mr. Lawson stated that he liked the particular spot due to the fact that there was a chain link fence along the area behind which spectators could be contained.

At this time, arrangements were made for Assistant Chief Batchelor and Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson to meet with Mr. Lawson and Mr. Sorrells at the Trade Mart on Industrial and Stemmons Freeway, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, at 10:00 a.m.

... that it was thought the President had been shot. ... instructions of Chief Curry in the lead car, and Curry instructed Lumpkin to meet him at Parkland Hospital. Lumpkin proceeded to Parkland Hospital with the motorcycle escort, with the President's, Vice-President's and several other cars of the motorcade at a Code 3 speed.

Upon arrival at the hospital, it was observed the President was being taken from the car and into the hospital. At that time, Lumpkin suggested to Chief Curry that he take the Homicide Detectives back to Elm and Houston Streets from where it was thought that the shots were fired at the President and the Governor from the Texas School Book Depository, a six-story building located on the northwest corner of Elm and Houston Streets.

Upon arrival at the Texas School Book Depository, we found that Inspector J. H. Sawyer was in front of the building and, with assistance from other officers, was in the process of questioning everyone who had any knowledge of the shooting. This was discussed with Sawyer. He decided that we would get all persons in that category and be held for questioning them to the Sheriff's Office at Main and Houston. Homicide Detective F. M. Turner was sent to the Sheriff's Office to represent the Homicide and Robbery Bureau of the Dallas Police Department in interrogating these witnesses. Detective E.L. ... was released back to Captain Fritz to assist in the investigation.

... had placed guards on the building to prevent anyone from coming in or going out. Sawyer organized a detail to check all cars in the parking lot surrounding the Texas School Book Depository building, taking their names, telephone numbers, addresses, and license numbers, and later on in the afternoon those vehicles that were in the lot were checked for license number. Several members of the United States Marshal Tax Unit assisted in the search.

... Mr. Lumpkin entered the building and instructed that a ... be placed on the inner door of the building, and ... together with Detective H. H. Davis, Jr. and Detective ... and several other detectives, were instructed to ... of employees by office, and floor by floor.

... office and floor was cleared, the employees were stepped ... and Mr. Truly, manager of the firm, at the front door ...

their names, addresses and telephone numbers were written down, and they were identified by Mr. Truly as to their employment. As these employees were taken from their place of work, the area was searched by Revill's group and locked up, if the area could be locked.

Uniformed men were posted on the stairways and elevators to allow no one, with the exception of police officers, to pass. A few minutes after arrival at the building, Mr. Truly, building manager, went to Lumpkin and stated that he had some information that one of his employees that had been there until a few minutes earlier was now missing. Lumpkin took Mr. Truly to the sixth floor where he introduced him to Fritz, Homicide and Robbery Bureau. Mr. Truly related his story to Fritz.

As the building was cleared, it was determined by Fritz and several Homicide detectives that the shots were fired from a window on the southeast corner of the sixth floor, where three cartridge cases were found. Lumpkin then instructed Revill to organize his team against the east wall of the building on the sixth floor and make a systematic search from east to west, checking all boxes, crates, books, etc. A member of Revill's searching party, before completion of the search, found the rifle that was thought to have been used.

Dallas Police Department Crime Scene Search detail under Lieutenant Carl Day and Detective R. L. Studebaker arrived shortly and began processing the building for evidence. It was not known at this time whether or not the person firing the shots was hiding in the building or had escaped.

After the Crime Scene crew had taken over on the sixth floor, Lumpkin instructed Lieutenant J. F. Dyson to organize a search crew and begin on the roof with the aid of firemen's ladders and lights, making a complete and systematic search from the roof to the basement, posting a man on each floor after the search was completed to let no one back in except police officers.

Lumpkin instructed Revill to organize a search group, begin his search in the basement and search to the roof. Both search groups went over each other's area twice. It was ascertained that no suspect was hiding in the building.

Pierce Allman, Channel 8 photographer, had gotten into the building prior to our sealing it off and was allowed to stay. He did not get in the way and was very cooperative with the officers conducting the search. All other persons, including the press, was kept outside the building until

the complete systematic search was made for the suspect and until a search had been made for physical evidence.

At about 2:45 p.m., these searches were completed, however, the Crime Scene Search Section, Lieutenant Carl Day, Detective K. L. Studebaker and Detective J. H. Hicks, had several more hours of work in the building. At this time, Lumpkin had the news and press men assembled in one group on the outside of the building. They were accompanied by two police officers to the sixth floor, kept outside of a line where the Crime Scene Search was dusting for fingerprints, and allowed to take pictures. Lumpkin then had the police escort the newsmen back to the first floor where they interviewed Mr. Truly briefly, and escorted outside the building and the building was locked. No other requests were granted at that time. Guards were placed on all entrances of the building.

At that time, Lumpkin released all traffic and radio patrolmen guarding around the building, with the exception of the guards on the doors. Sawyer and Lumpkin returned to Police Headquarters.

At approximately 12:35 p.m., Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson, who was at the Trade Mart, was advised by Captain J. M. Souter and Dave Grant, Secret Service Agent, that the President had been hit. Stevenson asked where it occurred and they said near the Triple Underpass on Elm Street, and that they were enroute to Parkland Hospital with the President. Stevenson immediately notified Captain J. W. Fritz, Homicide Bureau, and two Homicide detectives, relieved them of their assignment and placed Fritz in charge of the investigation.

As soon as possible, Stevenson released fourteen (14) other detectives and supervisory personnel of the detectives office, instructed them to notify headquarters that they were on the air ready for assignments, and if not otherwise instructed from headquarters, to report to Elm and Houston Streets to assist in the search of the building, as it was reported at that time there was a possibility the suspect was still in the building.

As soon as it was determined definitely that the presidential party would not arrive at the Trade Mart, the announcement was made by Mr. Erich Johnson and the crowd began an orderly exit from the building. Stevenson contacted the Captains in charge on the various floors, instructing them to release security personnel under their command to report for duty, and to retain only what was necessary to assist in the orderly exit from the building of the crowd.

After the guests had exited from the Trade Mart, Stevenson and Batchelor decided to go to Parkland Hospital to check on the situation. They were approached by Dr. Luther Holcomb, Executive Secretary of the Greater Dallas Council of Churches, who stated he was a personal friend of Governor Connelly and his family and, if possible, he would like to go to the hospital and contact the family to do what he could to render spiritual comfort. Dr. Holcomb accompanied Batchelor and Stevenson to the hospital.

Upon the arrival of Batchelor and Stevenson at the hospital, they found that Mr. Lawson of the Secret Service had arranged a convoy of people from the White House Staff and White House press to accompany the body of the President to Love Field. He had a motorcycle escort, but had no radio communication in the event of difficulty on the way. He asked if Batchelor and Stevenson would take him and lead the cars to Love Field. They agreed to do this.

Mr. Lawson and a member of the White House Staff rode in the car with Batchelor and Stevenson. Enroute to Love Field, Mr. Lawson became concerned because a bus which was supposed to contain members of the White House press did not leave with the group. Batchelor radiod a motorcycle officer who was at the rear of the cars to return to the hospital and await the departure of the bus.

The group arrived at Love Field where the President's body was placed aboard the plane by members of the Secret Service. Batchelor and Stevenson were advised at this time that Federal District Judge Sarah T. Hughes was on her way to Love Field to administer the oath of office to President Johnson. Arrangements were made for her admission to the field, with officers securing the driveway.

Batchelor and Stevenson left the field after the departure of the presidential plane. They returned to Parkland Hospital to survey the situation and to see if any further assistance or security was needed. They found the first floor of the hospital emergency area normal and no further emergency measures needed. The State Police had taken over the security of Governor Connelly who was still in the hospital.

Before Batchelor and Stevenson left the Trade Mart, they were advised that Police Officer J. D. Tippit, in attempting to question a suspect in the 400 block of East Tenth Street a short time after the President had been shot, had been slain, and that a suspect had been arrested and was in custody. This was verified by Stevenson by radio. Batchelor and Stevenson returned to Police Headquarters, arriving at about 4:30 p.m.

When they arrived at the City Hall, Stevenson went directly to the Homicide Bureau where he was advised that the suspect arrested in the slaying of Officer Tippit had been definitely identified as the one who had shot Officer Tippit, and from the evidence being accumulated, it appeared he was possibly the suspect who had slain the President also.

All bureaus of the Criminal Investigation Division were instructed to remain on duty to aid in any phase of the investigation in which they were needed. The third headquarters patrol platoon and the third traffic platoon had been called back for security for the various phases of the President's visit. After they had been relieved from these assignments, they reported to the Police Headquarters and relieved the second platoon of their normal assignments. The second platoon headquarters section and second platoon traffic plus available reservists reported to the Police Assembly Room for additional assignments.

When Batchelor and Stevenson arrived at Police Headquarters, it was noted that two (2) television cameras were set up in the hallway of Police Headquarters on the third floor and a large number of members of the press were present. There were two patrolmen and one sergeant who had been assigned in the hallway for order and security.

Batchelor noted a number of unauthorized people in the hallway, mostly city employees who apparently were there out of curiosity. He instructed the Sargeant to obtain more men from the pool and to remove persons who had no business on the floor. They were instructed to secure the elevator entrances and stairway entrance and to allow only authorized personnel to enter the floor. Two (2) uniformed officers were also assigned at the doorway of the Homicide Bureau to hold back members of the press for the entrance and exit of witnesses.

Stevenson remained on duty at Headquarters and in close touch with the investigation as it was conducted. At approximately 7:00 p.m., charges were filed against Lee H. Oswald for the murder of Police Officer J. D. Tippit. These charges were filed with a representative of the District Attorney's Office (Mr. Bill Alexander). Justice of the Peace David Johnson arraigned Oswald on the charge.

Shortly before midnight, Stevenson was advised by Homicide officers that sufficient evidence had been gathered that it was determined that Oswald was also responsible for the slaying of President Kennedy, that the evidence had been reviewed by District Attorney Henry Wade and Assistant

District Attorney Bill Alexander and charges were being preferred against Oswald in the death of President Kennedy. A short time after charges were filed, Oswald was taken to the Assembly Room in the basement of the Police Building for a showup. Justice of the Peace David Johnson arraigned Oswald at 1:35 a.m., November 23, 1963, in the Identification Bureau of the Police Department. Oswald was remanded without bond.

Prior to this time, Oswald had been shown up several times to witnesses who placed him in the building at the time the President was slain, and also to witnesses as the slayer of Officer Tippit. After the arraignment of Oswald, he was returned to the City Jail under guard where he remained for the night.

On November 22, 1963, Lumpkin, upon returning to Police Headquarters, between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., instructed the Identification Bureau, Crime Scene Search Section, to start work immediately on the Crime Scene Search scale sketch of both the area of Officer Tippit's murder and the shooting of the President. They were also instructed that persons seeking information would be referred to Captain King's office, and that the door of the Identification Bureau would be kept locked and all persons would be kept out except those officers on official duty so as not to interfere with the collection of evidence in these two cases.

The Platoon Lieutenant was instructed that there would be no reporters or photographers within the City Jail proper and the suspect, Lee Oswald, would be kept in a maximum security cell in F Block on the fifth floor with a police guard on the outside of the cell opposite the door, without any other prisoner in the vicinity of him, and that he would be stripped searched when brought up by the Homicide and Robbery officers. His belt and other items which he might use to do harm to himself would be taken.

It was suggested and granted that persons requesting permission to visit in the City Jail not be sent to the Criminal Investigation Division for passes, but that permission to visit be secured by telephone and the passes be written out in the Jail Office, sending the visitor directly to the fourth floor. This was to keep the public from the third floor during the investigation of Lee Oswald.

Captain George Doughty was also instructed to keep what personnel on duty as was necessary in the Crime Scene Search Section and the Identification Section to process evidence being brought in by the Criminal Investigation

Division. He was further instructed that the evidence would not be discussed with anyone except officers working on the case without permission from the chief officer.

The remainder of the evening, until 3:00 a.m., November 23, 1963, when Lumpkin closed his office to go home, was spent in rendering any assistance possible from a service standpoint.

Facilities of this department and the administrative offices were made available to the Secret Service and F.B.I. Agents. They remained on duty in Batchelor's office, leaving at approximately 3:40 a.m. Stevenson remained on duty at headquarters throughout the night with the detectives standing by to follow up or to check any information which might be received in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy or slaying of Officer Tippit. He left headquarters at approximately 12:35 p.m. on the 23rd. of November and returned at approximately 7:00 p.m. on November 23rd.

At approximately 12:01 a.m., Saturday, November 23, 1963, pertinent physical evidence in the case involving Oswald and the slaying of President Kennedy was turned over to Mr. Vince Drain of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be delivered in person to the F.B.I. Laboratory in Washington, D. C. for processing.

Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor remained on duty until 3:00 a.m. to render what assistance he could in the administrative offices.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1963

Early Saturday morning, November 23, 1963, the investigation was continued through the interrogation of witnesses and the collection of evidence within the Homicide Bureau.

Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin arrived at the office around 8:30 a.m. on November 23, checked with Captain George Doughty of the Identification Bureau, and instructed him to keep what men he needed processing photographs and sketching the evidence of Lee Oswald case. He also checked with the Platoon Commander to ascertain the proper security measures being taken in the jail and jail office, and to receive any reports of any nature involving the prisoner during the night.

He checked the Dispatcher's Office to ascertain whether or not they had enough personnel on duty to handle the great influx of telephone calls. He then remained on duty to be available for any assistance or assignment requested by the Chief of Police. He carried on such normal investigative duties as was necessary.

After checking the security of the prisoner in the jail with the Platoon Commander, Lumpkin went home about 9:30 p.m.

Saturday, November 23, 1963, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor reported to his quarters at about 8:30 a.m. to aid in normal administrative duties and to be available for whatever assignments were given him by Chief Curry. Batchelor remained on duty until about 9:30 p.m.

Sunday, November 20, 1963, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor was called at his home about 6:30 a.m. by Captain C. E. Talbert, and informed that a threat had been received to the effect that "about 100 men were going to take the prisoner Oswald and they did not want any policemen to be hurt".

Batchelor instructed Talbert to inform Chief J. E. Curry. Curry, Batchelor and Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson arrived at the Police Headquarters around 8:00 a.m. or shortly after.

As Batchelor and Stevenson came from the basement of the Police Building, they noted a television camera on the left hand side of the arcway entrance to the basement of the Police Building.

About 8:45 a.m., Curry, Batchelor and Stevenson met in the basement to survey security needs. The attendants of the television cameras were instructed they would have to move the cameras across the basement driveway. The cameras were moved. Lieutenant W. Wiggins was instructed to move a patrol wagon and a plain police car out of spaces 1 and 2 immediately north of the drive into the basement parking area. These were spaces directly in line with the jail entrance.

Curry checked by telephone with Captain J. W. Fritz to see if and when he would be ready to transfer the prisoner. Fritz informed Curry that they were interrogating Oswald, but he thought that they would be ready by around 10:00 a.m. Curry telephoned Sheriff J. E. Decker and informed him we thought we would be ready to turn over the prisoner around 10:00 a.m. Sheriff Decker said that he thought that we were going to transfer the prisoner. Curry told the Sheriff that if this was his wish, we would do it.

After this conversation, Curry and Batchelor discussed the advisability of obtaining an armored motor truck to transport the prisoner in. Curry instructed Batchelor to see if one could be obtained. Batchelor made arrangements with Mr. Fleming, Vice-President of Armored Motor Car Service, for such a vehicle. Mr. Fleming said that he had an overland armored truck available which had seats on either side where guards could ride, that it was considerably larger than the ordinary armored motor car which was not arranged for this type of transport, and he would prefer to use this truck. Batchelor informed Mr. Fleming that the bottom of the ramp

into the basement of the Police Building was of such height that he doubted the large truck could enter, but would find out the exact measurements and call Mr. Fleming back. Batchelor determined from Deputy Chief Lumpkin that the height at the bottom of the ramp was 7 feet 5 inches, and so informed Mr. Fleming. Mr. Fleming said he would send both the small and the large truck and we could take our choice. Mr. Fleming stated that he would obtain drivers and go to their offices immediately and make arrangements for the trucks, and that he would call Batchelor when they were ready.

After this conversation with Mr. Fleming, Batchelor and Stevenson advised Chief Curry they would go to the basement of the Police Building to check security. They found that Captain Talbert on his own initiative had deployed both police officers and police reservists in the basement to isolate the Jail Office and the basement parking area. We checked and found officers stationed in the basement at the Jail corridor and on the stairway from the first floor. Inside the garage area of the basement, we found an officer stationed on the City Hall elevators and could see one at the top of the Main Street ramp. Batchelor went to the top of the Commerce Street ramp and observed a number of officers in front of this ramp and in front of the Police and Courts Building. He was told by a Reserve supervisor, believed to have been Captain Arnett, that they had moved all spectators to the south side of Commerce Street. He observed that this had been done. Batchelor and Stevenson returned to the Administrative Offices.

At approximately 10:00 a.m., Stevenson instructed the Bureau Commanders in the Criminal Investigation Division that all detectives on duty in all assignments would stand by in their bureau for possible use in security measures in transferring Oswald. Lumpkin and Stevenson then went to the second floor, the Patrol Captain's office, drank a cup of coffee with Captain C. E. Talbert. Talbert asked the route the prisoner transfer was going to take to the County Jail. He was told that they would probably go east on Commerce to Central, north on Central to Main, west on Main to the County Jail, that this decision had not definitely been determined. Talbert suggested that an officer be placed at each intersection on the route to the County Jail. Talbert stated that he would have ten (10) men picked up and assigned at these intersections.

After drinking the coffee, Lumpkin and Stevenson returned to the third floor where they learned from Chief Curry that the route to be followed

was east on Commerce to Central, north on Central to Elm, west on Elm to Houston, south on Houston to the rear of the County Jail where arrangements had been made with the Sheriff's Office to have the steel gates opened to the driveway leading to the back door of the Jail. Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday was at the County Jail with a detail of men holding the spectators to the west side of Houston Street.

Mr. Fleming called about 10:45 a.m. and said they were ready with the armored cars. Batchelor asked Mr. Fleming to bring the trucks to the Commerce Street side of the Police Building, back them into the exit ramp to the basement. After Mr. Fleming had called, Batchelor and Stevenson returned to the basement.

At this time Stevenson instructed Captain O. A. Jones to go to the Commerce Street ramp and have two (2) officers to assist the armored truck in backing down the ramp as far as it could go. He also instructed Captain Jones to take any detectives available on the third floor to the basement and assign them wherever he thought they were needed. Captain Jones contacted Patrolmen Jez and Patterson and passed on the instructions he had received. He turned and went back down the ramp and met Captain Talbert. He told Talbert what he had done so that these officers would not be moved.

Upon returning to the basement, Batchelor and Stevenson were asked by Jones if the photographers in the Jail Office should be there. Batchelor said no and caused them to be moved across the driveway.

Guards were placed on the exit doors from the Jail Office with instructions that photographers would not be allowed in that area. As the photographers moved into the ramp area, some drifted to the right and some to the left. At this time, Jones asked Batchelor if it would not be advisable to move all of the newsmen to the north ramp or behind the railing on the east side of the driveway. Batchelor agreed that this would be best. The remaining detectives that were not assigned were told to form a line on either side of the Jail door. This was for the purpose of getting the prisoner into the armored truck. The newsmen were instructed not to attempt to move close to the prisoner for the purpose of talking to him or to take photographs.

Chief Curry's car had been taken from the basement and double parked east of the exit ramp to lead the truck to the County Jail. Assistant Chief Batchelor then took his car from the basement, double parked it west of the exit ramp. Shortly thereafter, the armored trucks arrived. It was decided that the large overland truck would be best due to its accommodation of officers accompanying the prisoner. It was backed into the ramp, which is a rather steep grade. After the driver backed the truck

into the ramp with the front wheels and cab of the truck on the outside, he recommended to Batchelor that it not be taken clear down to the bottom. He said the engine was cold and the truck was extremely heavy, and he feared in pulling out he would kill the motor. Batchelor looked at the space between the walls of the ramp and the sides of the truck and found that on the right side there was less than 1 foot of space and on the left side about 2 feet of space. It was decided that with officers placed in these spaces, it would be impossible for anyone to enter or leave, and it was decided that this would be the best method. The truck was left with the back wheels on the sloping ramp and the front wheels on the level sidewalk. Batchelor and Lieutenant Smart opened the back doors of the truck and searched it. They found two empty cold drink bottles and a loose bolt. They removed these items. An officer was placed on the right side of the truck between the wall and two officers on the left side of the truck between the wall.

Batchelor remained in the basement and Stevenson returned to the third floor and went to the Homicide Bureau where he was advised by Chief Curry that due to the threats, they had decided to use the truck as a decoy. It was decided to use three detective cars for the transporting and guarding of the prisoner. The truck was to go east on Commerce to Central Expressway, north on Central to Elm and west on Elm to Houston and south on Houston. It was not to enter the Jail, but continue past. The car bearing Oswald would cut off at Main Street on Central and proceed to the County Jail west on Main. Lieutenant Pierce was also in the Homicide office. He was instructed to take a car, park it in front of the armored truck and when given the signal, he was to lead the armored truck over the Elm Street route as had been originally planned. Lieutenant Pierce went to the basement, obtained his car, picked up Sergeant Putnam and Sergeant Maxey and drove around the City Hall to park his car in front of the armored truck on Commerce Street.

After talking with Chief Curry in the Homicide Bureau, Stevenson left the bureau, met Lumpkin at about 11:15 a.m. They both boarded the elevator and went to the basement. Lumpkin was advised of the change in plans on the way to the basement. On arrival in the basement, Stevenson also informed Batchelor and Jones of the change in plans, of transporting Oswald to the County Jail. Stevenson then proceeded across the driveway to the entrance to the garage where Detective C. W. Brown, driving one car, and Detective C. H. Dhority, driving a second car, were preparing to pull these cars onto the ramp behind the armored truck. Stevenson advised the officers on security detail in the basement and across the driveway to

open up and make room for the two cars to pull up onto the ramp. Detective Brown pulled up onto the ramp. Detective Dhority pulled the car he was driving onto the ramp behind Detective Brown's car. As he pulled onto the ramp, Stevenson stepped to the west side of the south ramp. Dhority backed his car into position to pick up the prisoner with the rear of the car about one (1) foot north of the south Jail entrance wall.

Stevenson was standing about even with the hinges of the right front door, Lumpkin was standing at the front of the right front fender. As the car backed into position, Stephenson observed Captain Fritz coming from the Jail Office door. He immediately cast his eyes to the overall security of the officers in the basement.

Just prior to this time, Lieutenant W. Wiggins had received a telephone call from Lieutenant Baker to the effect that they were leaving the third floor with the prisoner. Wiggins observed his Jail elevator descending and stopping, and Captain Fritz, the prisoner and the detectives emerging. Wiggins stepped to the Jail Office door, into the corridor outside and stepped to the north side of the door. Between the elevator and the door the question was asked "is everything alright". Wiggins stated that if he answered at all, he stated that everything was alright. He does not specifically recall answering.

Before the officers escorting Oswald reached the back door of the car, Stevenson heard a shot. Neither Stevenson or Lumpkin observed who fired the shot. Batchelor was standing on the east side of the cars that were to carry the detectives and the prisoner, with the intention of running to the truck and closing the doors immediately that the prisoner came down. As he stood there, someone shouted, "here they come" and Batchelor started toward the truck. When he heard a shot fired, he turned around to see a mass of men holding someone on the floor. Someone ran from this group up the Main Street ramp. He was followed by several others, either following or chasing him. The officer at the top of the Main Street ramp pulled his pistol, waved it from side to side and said, "get back down that ramp".

At the sound of the shot, Stevenson again directed his attention to the detectives who had custody of the suspect and observed several officers subduing a person. He also observed Detective Graves rise from the group of officers with a gun clasped in his hand. The person who was subdued by the officers at that time was immediately moved into the Jail Office.

Stevenson stepped inside the Jail to determine that the prisoner was taken into custody, and that Oswald had been moved into the Jail Office. Wiggins ordered an ambulance called. Stevenson then went back out onto the ramp, told the officers who were containing the crowd that the party who did the shooting was in custody and that there was no further trouble.

The person who did the shooting was taken to the fifth floor jail where he was stripped and searched completely. After the suspect was taken into the Jail Office, Stevenson heard an officer make the remark "it's Jack Ruby". Oswald was transported to Parkland Hospital accompanied by Homicide officers and additional officers followed to set up security at Parkland Hospital.

Charges were filed against Ruby Sunday evening for the murder of Oswald. He was arraigned before Justice of the Peace Pierce McBride in the Homicide office. He was transferred to County Jail at approximately 11:45 a.m., Monday morning, November 25, 1963 by Captain J. W. Fritz and officers of the Homicide Bureau.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles Eatchelor
Charles Eatchelor
Assistant Chief of Police

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George L. Lumpkin
George L. Lumpkin
Deputy Chief of Police
Service Division

J. W. Stevenson
J. W. Stevenson
Deputy Chief of Police
Criminal Investigation Division

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1963

Friday afternoon, November 15, 1963, about 3:00 p.m., Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor met with the host committee in the Baker Hotel, Room 434. Mr. Bob Cullum presided at the meeting and Mr. Lawson and another member of the Washington Secret Service staff was present. Most of the discussion at this meeting pertained to arrangements for the guests at the luncheon, publicity and coordination of this type of activity. The only thing mentioned that pertained to the police was the possible route of the motorcade.

Batchelor was asked for his opinion of the best route to take from the police stand point, and he stated that of the three possible routes, Lemmon Avenue to Central Expressway to Main Street would be the route requiring the least manpower for traffic, but it was immaterial to the department and we would police any route that the committee and the Secret Service selected.

One member of the committee suggested that the closest route would be straight out of Love Field via Cedar Springs to Harwood, but the objections were raised that the surface of Cedar Springs at this point was rough. There was no mention at this meeting which would be the final selection. It was also pointed out that the route via Lemmon Avenue to Turtle Creek to Cedar Springs to Harwood to Main would generate the greatest number of spectators. (Ultimately this was the route that was announced.) This meeting lasted about one hour.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1963

At 10:00 a.m., Monday, November 18, 1963, Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday and Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor met Mr. Lawson and Mr. Forrest Sorrells of the Secret Service at Love Field near the large employees' parking lot at the south end of the field. We drove from this point onto the apron at Love Field where it was believed the presidential planes might be parked. We briefly looked over the surroundings and the expected route which the convoy would follow off the apron and out of Love Field. It was decided that the point at which this roadway intersects Cedar Springs immediately north of the Ramada Inn was to be the beginning point at which Lunday would be responsible for the assignment of men on the parade route.

Lunday was driving the car occupied by Batchelor, Mr. Sorrells and Mr. Lawson. We ran the parade route at the speeds suggested by Mr. Lawson, timing the route in its entirety. As we passed each signalized intersection, Batchelor wrote down the number of men to be assigned. Mr. Lawson suggested that at all points at which the convoy would turn, additional manpower be assigned. He stated that his experience had been that at these turning points, there were usually large crowds.

He also stated that we should have men on each railroad and traffic overpass that the presidential party would go under, and that these people should be instructed not to let anyone stand over the immediate path of the presidential party. Mr. Lawson also requested that a man be placed under the underpass at Hines and Inwood Lane for security. Batchelor listed every intersection where there was a signal light, every railroad overpass and every traffic overpass on the route. There were from two to four men assigned at each of these points.

Our total running time for the route from Love Field to the Trade Mart was 38 minutes. In some open areas, we drove as fast as 30 MPH. In areas we believed would have large crowds of people, the speed was reduced to 10 MPH. We ran traffic controls with red lights and siren until we got to Ross and Harwood. We then began to observe traffic control. We returned to Love Field and dropped Mr. Sorrells and Mr. Lawson off at their car.

Monday afternoon, Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin and Chief J. E. Curry discussed the motorcade. Curry stated that Lumpkin would drive his car. At that time it was suggested that there be a pilot car well out in front to be on the alert for accidents, fires or other things that would have a bearing on whether or not the main motorcade would change its route before reaching any spot where trouble might arise.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1963

About 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 19, 1963, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor, Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson and Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin left the Police Department and drove to the Trade Mart where they met with Mr. Lawson, Mr. Grant and Mr. Sorrells of the Secret Service and Battalion Fire Chief Raymond Burress. They proceeded to the third floor office of Mr. William E. Cooper, Vice-President and General Manager of the Trade Mart. Also present was Mr. Bill Dawson, Mr. Cooper's Assistant, and Mr. Frantz H. Sherman. All sat in Mr. Cooper's office for several minutes discussing the overall plans for the security of the building. Mr. Cooper produced photographs of the interior of the building and stated that he had floor plans of each floor if we would like to have copies of them. Batchelor stated that we would like to have those copies and asked Mr. Cooper if he had a plat of the entire layout of the building and outside grounds. Mr. Cooper requested one of his assistants to bring these plats to his office.

When they were delivered, Batchelor asked Stevenson if he would like to have a copy of the floor plans to work from. Stevenson replied that he would. These floor plans were handed to Batchelor who in turn gave them to Stevenson. Batchelor retained the plat of the grounds and a photograph of the grounds.

We then left Mr. Cooper's office and went to the entrance of the building at which the President was to enter, which was the first entrance into the building off Industrial Boulevard after leaving Stemmons Expressway. At the first side entrance, Mr. Lawson stated that immediately adjacent to this entrance on the sidewalk would be a barricaded area where all news media and photographers would be allowed to congregate after their credentials were checked, and that they would be permitted to enter after the President's party had gone in.

At this time, Mr. Lawson also outlined the area on the Industrial Street side of the building that would be roped off and barricaded and reserved for the vehicles of the presidential party.

Mr. William Cooper agreed to put his security personnel on the roof of the Market Hall Building located across Industrial Boulevard and north of the Trade Mart. He also agreed to place some of his personnel on the roof of the Furniture Mart located south of the Trade Mart. A police officer would be assigned on the roof of the Trade Mart itself.

At this time we started on a tour of the building. Mr. Lawson requested two men outside the entrance the President would use, two men inside and one man on each stair landing of the four floors. We then continued on through the hall on the route the President would take. Mr. Lawson pointed out the spots or locations at which he felt security officers were needed. Notes were taken by Stevenson of the locations for assignment of police officers.

He went throughout the entire first and second floors pointing out where he wanted security officers stationed. Notes were taken and placed on the floor plans where he had requested security. (See attached floor plans.)

When we reached the kitchen on the first floor, the problem of screening the kitchen help was discussed. Arrangements with Mr. John S. Saich, the caterer, representing Crotty Food Service, Mr. Frantz H. Sherman, formerly with the City of Dallas, and Mr. Lawson were made to secure the outside door leading into the kitchen at 7:00 a.m. One officer was to be placed outside the door and a second officer inside the kitchen. All employees entering the kitchen were to be identified before being admitted. All those who were in the kitchen at that time were to be cleared also. We also discussed identifying badges which would be worn by the kitchen help.

After completely covering the first floor, we went to the second floor and covered it, with Mr. Lawson laying out his plans as to where security officers would be needed. Since the third and fourth floors were the same as the second floor in their physical layout, with the exception of one less corridor leading into the courtyard, Mr. Lawson stated he would need the same security measures duplicated on those floors as he had on the second floor. Batchelor instructed Stevenson to ascertain the number of personnel, both patrolmen and detectives, needed to properly secure these positions. It was decided that Stevenson's command would extend to the securing of the outside entrances of the Trade Mart.

The only persons to be allowed in the building after 7:00 a.m. would be the occupants of the building and buyers. They would be excluded from the dining area and they would not be permitted to bring guests for the purpose of seeing the President at the luncheon. It was also discussed that as near as possible, the officers on the outside parking area would screen the early parkers to limit parking to building occupants and buyers.

Battalion Chief Raymon Burress agreed to furnish men and fire extinguishers to supplement fire prevention throughout the building.

Lumpkin returned to the Police Building for a previous appointment. The rest of the party had luncheon in the private dining room and left the Trade Mart about 1:30 p.m.

Upon returning to the Police Building, Batchelor recommended to Curry that Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday of the Traffic Division be placed in charge of traffic and security along the parade route, that Captain J. M. Souter be put in command of the crowd control and security around the outside of the Trade Mart, and that Batchelor coordinate these two operations. To this he agreed.

Tuesday afternoon, November 19, 1963, Chief Curry informed Lumpkin that he would drive the pilot car some one-half (1/2) mile ahead of the President's party and keep them informed as to the condition of the route, the crowds, accidents, fires and anything else that might cause the presidential party to stop or place it in danger. Stevenson would assign two detectives to ride in the car with Lumpkin.

Chief Curry had already placed Stevenson in charge of the security of the Trade Mart, and Deputy Chief N. T. Fisher in charge of the security and crowd control at Love Field. Assistant Chief Batchelor then had a conference with Lunday and Captain P. W. Lawrence of the Traffic Division. The handwritten list of locations and number of men to be assigned was turned over to Lawrence, and he was instructed to make a detail sheet covering not only these assignments, but placing additional men in mid-block and providing for a presidential motorcade escort with men on either side of the motorcade, with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1963

An appointment had been made for Deputy Chief N. T. Fisher and Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor to meet with Mr. Lawson and Mr. Sorrells on Wednesday afternoon, November 20, 1963 to plan the security and crowd control at Love Field. This appointment was later cancelled with Chief J. E. Curry by Mr. Lawson because Air Force personnel had not arrived to check the location.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1963

On Thursday, November 21, 1963, Chief J. E. Curry, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor and Deputy Chief N. T. Fisher met with Mr. Lawson, Mr. Sorrells and Mr. Grant of the Secret Service, and Mr. M. Howard Megreedy, Assistant Director of Love Field, at Love Field at 10:00 a.m. to finalize plans for the security of the field. We were told by Mr. Lawson that the Air Force had informed them that there was ample room at the location for the parking of the planes and the handling of the convoy of vehicles.

We went over all gates leading to the field from the Love Field Building Concourse and the fenced-in area. We examined the divided roadway that led onto the field. This actually was two roadways divided by a large grassy area about 100 feet in width, and was for service vehicles to enter the field.

Mr. Lawson directed points at which he wanted the roadway barricaded. A certain portion of one of the roadways was set aside for the parking of vehicles of the members of the reception committee. Mr. Megreedy agreed to take out a section of fence that surrounded a large employees' parking lot at the south end of the field in order that vehicles might be parked without bringing them down the roadway near the area where the presidential planes would arrive.

He also agreed to take out a section of fence immediately in front of the roadway that led to Cedar Springs in order that the presidential party could leave the field by following a roadway along an interior fence and cut across directly onto Cedar Springs. This would avoid bringing the presidential party down a roadway which would be used by the public. (See attached map.) During all of these arrangements, Fisher took notes of planes needing personnel, and barricades that would be needed.

Mr. Lawson pointed out to the group places at the gates where telephones would be installed for presidential use, and where the press could communicate. We also discussed plans for roping off an area for the press outside the fence away from the crowd. This was to be arranged for by Love Field.

Thursday morning, November 21, 1963, about 10:00 a.m., Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson, accompanied by Captains J. C. Nichols, W. C. Fannin and O. A. Jones returned to the Trade Mart where they were met by Captains W. P. Gannaway and J. W. Fritz. The entire four floors of the building were

again covered, and each Captain was given responsibility of security on a floor, with Captain J. W. Fritz and Captain W. P. Gannaway assigned on the first floor, Captain Nichols on the second floor, Captain Fannin on the third floor and Captain Jones on the fourth floor.

Each point which had been pointed out by Mr. Lawson on our previous visit was also gone over with the Captains and pointed out to them. The Captains were charged with the responsibility of supervision of the patrolmen and detectives working their respective floors with the exception of Fritz. He was specifically assigned to the area immediately behind the head table where, with additional men, he would secure that position from any approach by unauthorized persons.

Radio Technician John Smith of Radio Station WRR stood by on Thursday, November 21, and Friday, November 22, in the Radio Room to make any necessary repairs to radio equipment that should be needed. John Smith and a representative from RCA Radio Repair Department inspected police radio equipment prior to that, tuning it and making sure it was in good working order.

Tuesday, November 19, 1963, four walkie-talkie radios were checked, tested and new batteries installed for use on Friday, November 22, at the Trade Mart.

A meeting was called on Thursday, November 21, 1963, at 3:00 p.m. by Chief J. E. Curry in the Police Conference Room. Present at this meeting were Chief of Police J. E. Curry, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs G. L. Lumpkin, M. W. Stevenson, R. H. Lunday and N. T. Fisher, Captains J. M. Souter, W. P. Gannaway, P. W. Lawrence, G. D. King, Inspector J. H. Sawyer, Mr. Forrest Sorrells, Mr. Dave Grant and Mr. Lawson, Secret Service. This meeting was for the purpose of discussing and coordinating the entire operational plan concerning the President's visit to Dallas.

At this time Curry announced that Batchelor would coordinate this operation between the various elements and agencies to be used. Curry stated that Stevenson was charged with the responsibility of security within the Trade Mart proper, including the guards on exterior doors. Fisher was charged with security and crowd control at Love Field Air Terminal. Lunday was charged with traffic control on the entire route.

Curry restated the route that the presidential party would take to the Trade Mart from the American Air Lines Freight Building near Gate 28, off the field, out the service road to Cedar Springs, Cedar Springs to Mockingbird Lane, Mockingbird Lane to Turtle Creek, Turtle Creek to

Cedar Springs, Cedar Springs to Harwood, Harwood to Main, Main to Houston, Houston to Elm, Elm to Stemmons Expressway, Stemmons Expressway to the service road at Industrial, thence to Industrial entering the Industrial Boulevard side of the Trade Mart parking area.

Curry stated that the presidential party would depart at approximately 2:00 p.m. from the Trade Mart, from the parking lot on the Industrial side of the Trade Mart, to Industrial, Industrial to Harry Hines Boulevard, Harry Hines Boulevard to Mockingbird Lane, Mockingbird Lane to Cedar Springs, Cedar Springs to the first service road north of the Ramada Inn and back to the vicinity of Gate 28 at the American Air Lines Freight Building where the presidential planes would be parked prior to departure. Mr. Lawson verified the routes as set out by Chief Curry.

Curry stated that Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin would precede the motorcade by several minutes in the pilot car. Mr. Lawson then gave the order of vehicles in the President's motorcade, and Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor wrote them on the blackboard so that the entire group could see them. This was as follows: pilot car, some one-fourth (1/4) mile ahead of the motorcade. The motorcade lead car containing Chief J. E. Curry, Sheriff Bill Decker and Secret Service Agents. The President's car, a Secret Service Car. The Vice-President's car, a Secret Service car. A car designated as Car No. 1 with Mayor Cabell, Mrs. Cabell, Congressman Roberts. A telephone company car. A Chevrolet Convertible carrying photographers, a Chevrolet Convertible carrying camera men, a Chevrolet Convertible with press representatives. A car designated as Car No. 2 with four (4) Congressmen in it. A car designated as Car No. 3 with Congressmen in it. A car designated as Car No. 4 with Congressmen in it. A bus with the official party, two buses with White House press representatives, a Pontiac automobile with the United States Signal Corps, a Western Union car, two extra cars to be used in case of a breakdown and the rear police vehicle.

After Mr. Lawson had completed this line up, Stevenson stated that he had planned for a car behind the Vice-President. At this point Curry stated that "I thought we had planned that Captain Fritz would be in the motorcade behind the Vice-President's car," at which time Mr. Sorrells said, "No, nothing was discussed on that." Mr. Lawson spoke up and said, "Mr. Johnson will have the Secret Service Agents assigned to him following the Vice-President's car." Mr. Lawson then said, "We would like to have a police car bring up the rear of the motorcade," to which Lumpkin remarked, "We can assign Captain Fritz and some detectives to bring up the rear." Mr. Lawson stated, "We would like to have a marked or white police car with flashing red lights and uniformed officers to bring up

the rear of the motorcade." Curry then instructed Lunday to arrange for a white traffic car to bring up the rear of the motorcade.

Lawrence was asked to outline the arrangement of the motorcycles for the motorcade, and Batchelor wrote them on the blackboard. Lawrence stated that there would be a motorcycle Sergeant and two (2) motorcycle officers between the motorcade and the pilot car for the purpose of making the officers on the route aware of the advance of the motorcade, and to assist in any traffic control or security measures that might be present. A motorcycle Sergeant and four (4) motorcycle officers would immediately precede the lead car.

At this point, the advisability of five (5) motorcycles in front was questioned. Batchelor suggested that we lay out the complete motorcycle arrangement and then either delete or add as we thought proper.

Lawrence then said there would be four (4) motorcycles on either side of the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated that this was too many, that he thought two (2) motorcycles on either side would be sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the rear.

The motorcade was to be followed by two motorcycles. It was explained that in order to hold traffic back on Stemmons Expressway to let the motorcade proceed without any vehicles passing it, it would be necessary for five (5) motorcycles, toward the end of the route, to proceed ahead, cut the five lanes of Expressway traffic and hold it until the motorcade got on the Expressway. They were then to follow the motorcade to the rear to allow the traffic to proceed at the same speed.

Lawrence further explained that he had arranged for three-wheel motorcycles which were assigned along Lomon Avenue at the beginning of the route to pick up officers and proceed immediately after the motorcade had passed to Stemmons Expressway and be prepared to cut traffic at all entrances when the motorcade entered the Expressway. Additional men from along the beginning of the route were also to be moved to the Trade Mart to assist with crowd control.

Mr. Lawson then showed us the invitation that would admit guests to the luncheon, the various identifying tags that the press and staff would wear, and the various pins that the Secret Service and White House staff would wear. He gave us a card showing the buttons and badges in colors.

Stevenson advised him that he would have seventy (70) plainclothes men. Mr. Lawson stated that he probably did not have sufficient buttons for that many, if he did not have, those assigned in the immediate vicinity of the President should wear these identification buttons in order that Secret Service and other members of the President's party could recognize them as officers.

Mr. Lawson requested two plain cars with drivers to meet Secret Service Agents who would arrive at Love Field a few minutes prior to the presidential party, and transport them immediately to the Trade Mart so that they could arrive well ahead of the President. (This was provided by Stevenson.) Mr. Lawson also requested motorcycle escorts for two trucks to carry paraphernalia and the Presidential Seal from the planes to the Trade Mart.

Lumpkin pointed out that the police vehicles in the motorcade would operate on the Channel 11 radio, and that he would have Souter at the Trade Mart notified when the motorcade reached downtown Dallas.

Batchelor announced that telephone extension 357, the Public Works Department, had informed him that they would have a Public Works truck and a supervisor in a car with a radio for the purpose of moving any obstructions along the route or in aiding in any way they could.

Lawrence announced that he had arranged with the railroads crossing the presidential route that they would not have trains crossing at the time of the President's passing.

On Wednesday, November 20, 1963, after Chief Curry had been advised of what would be needed at the Trade Mart by Stevenson, he contacted Major Guy Smith of the Department of Public Safety and Mr. J. E. Decker, Sheriff of Dallas County, about furnishing some personnel. Major Guy Smith agreed to furnish approximately 50 men and Sheriff Decker agreed to furnish approximately 15 men, which were to be assigned to Stevenson.

On Thursday, November 21, 1963, shortly after the meeting called by Chief J. L. Curry in the Police Conference Room, Mrs. Snow called from the Trade Mart and asked for two ambulances to stand by on the Industrial Boulevard side of the Trade Mart. Dudley Hughes Funeral Home was contacted and arrangements made for ambulances. (One ambulance reported directly to the Trade Mart around 10:00 a.m., and one emergency ambulance reported to Gate 20 at Love Field to stand by in case of an emergency during the arrival of the presidential party. Upon the arrival, the ambulance left Love Field and reported directly to the Trade Mart to stand by as a second ambulance.)

Later, Chief Curry informed Lumpkin that Secret Service men would bring the President's car and another car to the basement of the City Hall, they were to be placed in the southeast corner of the parking area and a police guard placed on them to prevent anyone from tampering with the cars. This guard was to be left on continuously until the cars were picked up by Secret Service men Friday morning. Lumpkin instructed Lt. B. L. Bailey to provide this guard in the basement. Lumpkin checked with Bailey about 6:30 p.m. Bailey stated that Mr. Sorrells, Secret Service, had called him and stated there had been some delay in the unloading of the presidential cars, and that they were being placed in the parking area in the basement of the Love Field Air Terminal. He requested Bailey to send the guard to Love Field. A guard was sent to Love Field and kept on continuously until taken over by the Secret Service Agents.

On the evening of November 21, 1963, Lumpkin rode the entire presidential route, checking radio communications on Channel 11. Reception was especially good at that time.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20 1963

The morning was cloudy and drizzling rain with heavy overcast. The rain stopped and the clouds broke away about 9:30 a.m. The rest of the day was clear and bright.

Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson reported to the Trade Mart at 7:00 a.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963. Seventeen (17) patrol officers reported to Stevenson at that time. These men were used to seal off areas which Mr. Lawson had requested in the early security survey. Men were placed inside the kitchen, a man on the kitchen door, men were placed on each of the outside doors, on the roof and on the door which the President would enter and on the stairway nearby.

When those men reported, Stevenson took each man to his post of assignment, and there instructed the men assigned to the outside doors that no one would be permitted to enter unless they had the proper badge or identification, that none of the tenants in the building would be permitted to enter the outside doors, that they would be required to enter the building through the front door so that they could be screened. Stevenson also placed one man on the inside of the freight area. The men assigned in the kitchen area were instructed to permit no one to enter the kitchen area until they had been identified by the caterer, Mr. Saich, or his representative.

One man was placed at the receptionist's desk in the front lobby to assist in checking and screening people who entered the building from the front door. The officer assigned in the freight area was instructed that no one would leave the freight area proper and enter the court yard unless properly identified by the maintenance manager or was wearing a maintenance badge.

At 9:00 a.m., Captains W. C. Fannin, O. A. Jones, J. C. Nichols and W. P. Gainaway reported to Stevenson at the Trade Mart. They were assigned, as officers in charge, as follows: Gainaway to the first floor, Nichols to the second floor, Fannin to the third floor and Jones to the fourth floor.

At approximately 9:30 a.m., four (4) supervisors and fifty (50) patrolmen from the Dallas Police Department reported to Stevenson at the Trade Mart for assignment. These men were assigned by the Captain who had been given the responsibility of securing the various points on the four floors.

At approximately 9:35 a.m., fifty-six (56) detectives and five (5) supervisory officers reported to Stevenson at the Trade Mart for security assignments.

At approximately 9:45 a.m., eleven (11) patrolmen, one (1) captain and one (1) sergeant from the Dallas Sheriff's Office reported to Stevenson at the Trade Mart for security assignments. All of these men were assigned under the Captains in charge of the respective floors. The heaviest concentration of officers was assigned to the more vulnerable spots on the first and second floors.

Mr. Lawson had informed us that members of the Secret Service would be assigned posts immediately in front of the head table, that no local security officers would be required in that particular area. He did request that we assign officers to the rear of the head table, in the aisles and on the ropes on each side. These assignments were made as requested. Mr. Lawson also asked Stevenson if we had men who were familiar with explosives and the handling of explosives to search the head table at approximately 11:00 a.m. and seal it off. Stevenson advised him that we did, that Captain Fritz, an experienced officer, would be assigned in the vicinity of the head table, that Gannaway was an experienced officer and would also be assigned on the first floor, that we would search the head table. This was done as requested under the direction of Captain Fritz, who was assigned in the area immediately behind the head table, and was done in the presence of Secret Service Agents.

Lt. Jack Revill, head of the Dallas Police Intelligence Section, and two (2) of his men were assigned in the front lobby of the Trade Mart just inside the door. The purpose of this assignment was to observe each individual who entered the building, and if there was any possibility anyone entering should be someone they believed to be in their subversive files, they would survey and check them further. A tenant of the Trade Mart was observed by Detective Roy Westphal to have a small Cuban flag in his coat pocket. Westphal and Revill talked with this individual. Stevenson talked with him a little later in the presence of Westphal. At this time he stated he was anti-Castro. Stevenson instructed him that under a City Ordinance, he would not be permitted to display the flag in any manner as it could be interpreted and would be interpreted as intimidating or embarrassing the President or anyone making a public appearance or a public speech.

At 7:00 a.m. Friday, November 22, Captain J. M. Souter reported to the Trade Mart to take command and make assignments of the outside area including the parking lots and the area to be secured for the presidential motorcade.

At this same hour, one (1) Lieutenant, three (3) Sergeants and seventeen (17) men from the Patrol Division, and one (1) three-wheel motorcycle Sergeant and five (5) three-wheel motorcycle officers from the Traffic Division reported. Souter directed that barricades be placed across the driveways at both the east and west ends of the north parking area of the Trade Mart, and that rope be strung along the sidewalk area isolating the parking from the public. He also assigned officers to each of the entrances to the parking area along Stemmons Service Road and Industrial Boulevard for the purpose of screening persons entering to park. His instructions were that only tenants and buyers were to be allowed to enter as the space was to be reserved for the later arrival of guests to the luncheon.

He dispersed the rest of the assignments around the perimeter of the north parking area to be secured for the presidential motorcade. It was discovered that temporary "No Parking" signs which had been placed along both sides of Industrial Boulevard and the Stemmons Service Road the night before had been removed by unknown persons. The parking sign detail of the Traffic Division was notified and they replaced the signs.

At 9:00 a.m., twenty-nine (29) additional men and three (3) Sergeants from the Patrol Division plus one (1) Solo Motorcycle Sergeant and two (2) motorcycle officers from the Traffic Division reported for assignment. These men were assigned in the interior of the parking areas to direct traffic through the various lanes and islands. From this group some were assigned to reinforce the number securing the north parking area. They were also assigned across Industrial Boulevard to contain the spectators on the opposite side of the street from the Trade Mart.

No one was allowed to stand on the south side of Industrial Boulevard or along the Stemmons Service Road next to the north parking area. Those men who were assigned near the north door of the Trade Mart where the President would enter were given special instructions about the entry of the President upon his arrival and about the containment of the press behind barricades which had been put in place at the door. No one would be allowed through this door except the presidential party and his security.

A three-wheel motorcycle officer was stationed at Industrial Boulevard and lines for the purpose of stopping all west-bound traffic immediately prior to the approach of the presidential motorcade. Two (2) officers were stationed at the Stemmons East Service Road and Industrial Boulevard to stop all east-bound traffic on Industrial and to move out any north-bound traffic on East Stemmons Service Road. Two (2) other motorcycle officers were allotted the mission of simultaneously preventing traffic

on Oak Lawn from entering the East Service Road of Stemmons Expressway from Oak Lawn. Another officer was assigned the mission of preventing the traffic from entering the East Service Road from Stemmons Expressway proper at the north-bound Industrial exit.

Batchelor arrived at the Trade Mart at about 9:30 a.m. At this time the rain had stopped. Upon arrival, he checked with Souter to determine if assignments had been carried out according to plan.

He discovered that the barricades across the driveways at the east and west end of the north parking lot did not extend to the corners of the building. The barricades were rearranged to completely isolate the area from both vehicles and pedestrians by extending the barricades from the building corner to the roped area at each end.

He also had the barricades for the press at the doorway rearranged to contain the press to one side of the door only, as had been suggested by Mr. Lawson of the Secret Service.

Souter's car was parked in the head-in parking area immediately west of the doorway where the President was to enter. A patrolman was assigned to the car to listen to the radio on Channel 11. Batchelor parked his car immediately to the right of this vehicle and put his radio on Channel 1. He turned the volume up so that the officer assigned to Souter's car could hear both channels.

He obtained a three-wheel motorcycle and made an inspection of the entire parking area to see the placement of men. He also conferred with Stevenson in the Trade Mart in the overall security of the building.

At about 12 noon, a few press photographers (no more than four or five) arrived and took their places behind the barricades. Because of a canopy which extended over the door, they objected that they could not get a good view of the President and the barricades, which were on the curb line, were moved about two feet into the street to allow them to step down and get below the canopy to take their pictures.

These photographers were not members of the presidential press staff. They asked if they could follow the President in upon his arrival and were instructed to go to the front door for entrance. No objection was voiced.

From about 9:30 a.m. to 12 noon, persons, including tenants and guests, who had parked on the east side of the building were allowed to cross the

secured parking lot to get to the front door. At about 12 noon, the officers manning the barricade at the east end of the building were instructed to let no more pedestrians pass.

At this time some of the officers who had been assigned in the interior of the parking area were reassigned to the north parking lot for security. A crowd of spectators about four (4) deep had assembled along the barricade which ran from the northwest corner of the building to Stemmons Service Road.

Around 11:30 a.m., a man came to the front area of the building and began to distribute small placards on sticks which read, "Hurray for President Kennedy". Upon observation, it was noted that this man was selling these placards on the property of the Trade Mart. He was contacted by Sergeant Sam Varner upon the instructions of Batchelor and told that he could not sell placards on the property. About this time, there were also two (2) men who showed up carrying placards which were anti-Kennedy in nature. They were on the property of the Trade Mart. Mr. William Cooper, Manager of the Trade Mart, objected to them being on his property and Batchelor went with Mr. Cooper and contacted these men. Mr. Cooper told them they could not carry the placards on their private property. Batchelor advised them that they must get on public property or they would be trespassing. They left the property and went across the street on Industrial Boulevard. Later, when it had been announced on the radio that the President had been shot, these men and three others got into an argument with spectators across the street. They all were arrested and taken to jail. These men were: William Lee Cummings, age 17, 2502 Waldon Dr.; Gary Dwayne Joiner, 2502 Waldrum, age 17; Bobby Savelle Joiner, 1725 Armstead, Grand Prairie, age 34; Gene Audra Guinn, 636 Lacwood, age 31; Roy Eugene Joiner, 2413 Christopher, Grand Prairie, age 17. These men were arrested by Officers T. T. Wardlaw and M. H. Brumley and charged with Investigation Conspiracy to Commit a Felony: To Wit Murder, which charge was changed to Trespassing.

Personnel assigned to the parade reported at 9:30 a.m. in the Assembly Room at Police Headquarters. This operation was under the command of Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday, aided by Inspector J. H. Sawyer and Captain P. W. Lawrence. The detail was one hundred sixty-eight (168) men composed of one hundred nine (109) Dallas Police supervisors and patrolmen, fifteen (15) detectives, eighteen (18) motorcycle officers for the presidential escort and twenty-six (26) Dallas Police Reservists. Additionally, at 7:00 a.m., a three-wheel motorcycle Sergeant and four (4) three-wheel motorcycle officers had reported for the purpose of placing "No Parking" signs at necessary areas along the route. All signalized intersections,

railroad overpasses and traffic overpasses had men assigned according to plan. The twenty-six (26) reservists, five (5) patrolmen and fifteen (15) detectives were assigned to patrol mid-block for security. Thirty-eight (38) officers, among which were three-wheel motorcycle officers and officers having cars who were assigned to the parade route from Mockingbird Lane and Cedar Springs to Pacific and Harwood, had assignments to report to the Trade Mart immediately after the motorcade had passed. This was for the purpose of containing what was expected to be large crowds of people along the bank of Stemmons Freeway Service Road and Industrial Boulevard. These same officers had third assignments after the luncheon at the Trade Mart along Hines and Mockingbird Lane which was the return route to Love Field.

About 9:30 a.m., November 22, 1963, Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin, joined by Homicide Detectives F. M. Turner and B. L. Senkel and Lt. Colonel George Whitmeyer, U. S. Army, Dallas Sub-section Commander, proceeded to Love Field over the route, as pilot car, to be taken by the President on the return trip. At this time, Detectives Senkel and Turner and Colonel Whitmeyer were told that our mission would be to travel the motorcade route from Love Field to the Trade Mart. They were instructed we would travel approximately one-fourth (1/4) mile ahead of the motorcade, and that we would be alert for motor vehicle accidents, fires and obstructions along the route. We would report anything we observed in the crowd or along the route that would be detrimental to the main party.

We would observe buildings and other points as security measures and should anything arise that, in our opinion, might cause the motorcade to be stopped or to be placed in danger, it was to be immediately radiod by Channel 11 to the lead car occupied by Chief J. E. Curry, Sheriff J. E. Decker and two Secret Service agents.

Upon arrival at Gate 28 at Love Field, we found a crowd of several thousand people congregated behind a chain link fence separating the field proper from the service entrances. We found that there had been an area roped off outside of the fence where a number of newspaper photographers had congregated.

We contacted Mr. Forrest Sorrells and Mr. Lawson and were introduced to Mr. Jack Puterbaugh, a member of the White House Staff, whom Mr. Lawson had requested to ride in the pilot car. About this time, the Vice-President's planes landed and taxied into position in front of Gate 26. A few minutes later, the presidential plane landed and taxied into position in the vicinity of Gate 28. The presidential party alighted and, at that time, Lumpkin instructed Turner to ride in the right front seat where he

could observe from the right front of the car, Detective Senkel to ride in the left rear seat to observe from the left rear of the car. White House Staff Member Puterbaugh was seated in the right rear seat to assist in the observations, and Lieutenant Colonel Whitmeyer in the center in the rear seat to observe. At this time, we moved the pilot car to the field exit nearest Cedar Springs, and awaited word from Chief J. E. Curry that the presidential party had started moving out. Upon receiving word from Chief Curry that the motorcade was moving at about 15 MPH, we proceeded to keep a distance of about one-fourth (1/4) mile or about 3 minutes ahead of the motorcade.

Upon reaching Mockingbird Lane, we radiod for a motorcycle as there was a slight traffic congestion, which was cleared up. We proceeded Mockingbird Lane to Lemmon Avenue. At Lemmon Avenue and Mahon, we radiod that we needed a traffic man to work the signal light, and requested a motorcycle. We reported that there was quite a crowd along the streets and all seemed to be well behaved.

We proceeded Lemmon Avenue to Turtle Creek. The crowd increased considerably. This information was radiod to the lead car. Then from Turtle Creek to Cedar Springs, Cedar Springs to Harwood, where all parking had been removed from the streets and the considerable crowd was very orderly. Harwood Street to Main Street. At this time we were maintaining about 3 minutes ahead of the motorcade. The crowd was increasing considerably along Main Street, but at this time were standing well back on the curb. We saw nothing that would indicate any disturbance.

Deputy Chief G. L. Lumpkin turned Main Street to Houston Street, stopped momentarily at the corner of Houston and Elm Street and notified the man working traffic at that corner that the motorcade was about 2 or 3 minutes behind us.

We proceeded to Elm Street, to Stemmons Expressway. There were cars parked on the shoulder on Stemmons Expressway and some spectators. Mr. Puterbaugh remarked that the motorcade was 2 or 3 minutes behind time, but staying on schedule remarkably well.

About halfway to the Trade Mart on Stemmons Expressway, at 12:31 p.m., Chief J. E. Curry transmitted on Channel 11, "Go to the hospital, Parkland Hospital, have them to stand by". "Get a man on top of the overpass and see what happened up there." Radio traffic was heavy at this point. We slowed the pilot car down in preparation of taking whatever action was deemed necessary by the Chief.