Touse Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

This responds in full to the following enumerated interrogatories submitted for consideration in a letter, dated September 5, 1978, to the Attorney General and signed by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

"I. On what dates and for how long was Nosenko questioned by the PBI about Lee Harvey Oswald-from 1964 to present?"

The files of the FBI indicate that Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko was interviewed regarding Oswald and/or the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on February 26 and 27, 1964, and on March 3, 4 and 6, 1964. The FBI files do not record the specific duration in whole or in part as to topical discussions, of those five interviews; however, summary communications indicate the February 27, 1964 interview was conducted on the afternoon of that date and the March 4, 1964 discussion of Oswald occurred at the outset of an afternoon interview on that date.


*2. When Nosenko was questioned by the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, who did the questioning?

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The FBI interviews of Nosenko, during which he was questioned about Oswald and/or the assassination of President Kennedy, were conducted by Special Agents (SAs) Alekso Poptanich, Maurice A. Taylor and Donald E. Walter on February 26 and 27, 1964; by SAs Poptanich and W. Marvin Gheesling on March 3 and 4, 1964; and by SAs Poptanich, Taylor and Walter on March 6, 1964.

House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (MSCA)

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There are no retrievable FBI statistics upon which to base a quantification of the interrogatory experiences of the SA personnel who interviewed Nosenko on the five pertinent occasions. Suffice it to say, the techniques of cooperative and hostile interrogations are integral aspects of the training and almost daily duties of SA personnel. In that regard, it is noted that during the February and March, 1964 interviews SA Poptanich had almost 13 years of SA experience; SA Taylor had over 31 years of SA experience; SA Walter had completed almost 17 years of SA experience; and SA Gheesling had over 13 years of SA experience. Further, their respective personnel files disclose the following:

SA Poptanich was then fluent in the Russian language (Nosenko's native tongue). The Annual Report of Performance Rating, dated March 31, 1962, noted that SA Poptanich, during the previous twelve months, had participated in the interrogation of a Soviet defector and his knowledge of the Russian language and mores of the Russian people proved most helpful relative thereto.

SA Taylor, on September 11, 1962, received an incentive award in recognition of the superior fashion his responsibilities were discharged over an extended period of time. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Washington Field Office, in submitting a recommendation for the incentive award, commented that SA Taylor had demonstrated exceptional ability in the interrogation and debriefing of three Soviet defectors, all of whom were intelligence officers. SA Taylor's Performance Rating for the period April 1, 1963--March 31, 1964, noted he was recognized as the finest interrogator on the Soviet espionage squad in the Washington Field Office, which accounted for his assignments to interview Soviet defectors.

Bouse Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (ESCA)

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SA Walter was the recipient of a personal letter of commendation, dated October 3, 1963, from the Director, FBI, for his superior work in the handling of a very sensitive, complicated, fast moving, and highly publicized esplonage case. Previously (on November 7, 1954), he had received a meritorius salary increase for his outstanding work on another espionage case, successful interrogation being the key aspect of that investigation.

SA Gheesling, at the time of the pertinent Nosenko interviews, served as a Supervisor at FBI Headquarters and had considerable experience in espionage, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. SA Gheesling supervised the field investigation of Oswald (from the latter's return to the United States on June 13, 1962 until September, 1962, and from November 22, 1963 through mid-1964). He was assigned exclusively to supervisory responsibilities relative to the assassination of President Kennedy.

While the specific knowledge of Oswald's background, possessed by these SAs at the time of the Nosenko interviews, can be answered only by the SAs themselves, SA Gheesling's prior assignment to supervision of the Oswald investigation would tend to indicate that he, at least, was quite knowledgeable of data contained in FBI files concerning Oswald.

"4. On the dates that Nosenko was questioned about Oswald, does there now exist or did there ever exist:

- a. a tape of the questions asked and Nosenko's
- a transcript of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers;
- c. a summary of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers?"

As noted in FBI memorandum dated June 19, 1978, captioned as above, and which was prepared in response to HSCA letter, dated June 13, 1978, to the Attorney General, FBI records searches have not located any extant tape recordings

House Select Consittee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

er verbatim transcripts of FBI interviews with Nosenko that concerned Oswald and/or the assassination of President Kennedy. A document has been located which indicates that FBI personnel did record the February 26 and 27, 1964, interviews of Nosenko, among others. Since no recordings or transcripts have been located, it can be assumed that the recordings were used by the interviewing SAs to check the accuracy of their notes prior to dictating the results of the interviews. It is further assumed that, upon verifying the accuracy of summary reportings of the interviews, the recordings were disposed of since they had served the purpose for which they were made, although no record of such disposition can be found. Summary reportings of the five pertinent interviews are extant, and were delivered to the HSCA on March 21, 1978.

"5. What criteria, if any, was used to determine: a. what subjects to question Nosenko about; b. how much time to devote to each subject?"

FBI files do not contain a specific enumeration of criteria used to determine the particular subjects Nosenko was to be questioned about nor the amount of time to be devoted to each subject in the questioning.

*6. What significance — with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides (sic)—did the FBI attach during the years 1964-1968 to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?**

The FBI, during the years 1964-1968, considered Nosenko's statements about Oswald to be very significant elements of his initial reportings, the veracity of which had to be assessed in relation to the totality of information furnished by him. The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about Oswald, depending upon a subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the most authoritative information available indicative of a lack of Soviet governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.



Rouse Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. Bouse of Representatives (KSCA)

"7. What significance — with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides (sie)—does the FBI attach today to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"

The FBI does not perceive any significant evidence of foreign involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, nor does the FBI perceive any credible evidence that Nosenko's defection was a Soviet ploy to mask Soviet governmental involvement in the assassination. Therefore, the FBI is satisfied that Nosenko reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"8. If the answer to question 6 is different from the response to question 7, when did the change occur and why?"

The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 until April 3, 1969, and therefore was not in a position to make an objective assessment of his bona fides nor of the veracity of information furnished by him. Thus, information provided by him, in early 1964, was accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which it was received. On October 1, 1968, the FBI advised the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that, based upon a review of material provided by CIA, the FBI found no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; however, the FBI did not reach any overall, definitive conclusions regarding his bona fides because of a lack of access to Nosenko and all collateral information pertinent to such an assessment. Effective May 11, 1977, the CIA and FBI concurred that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, based upon an assessment of the totality of information furnished by him.

*9. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on the question of whether Nosenko is bonefide (sic)?**

House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (ESCA)

The FBI, from 1964 to 1968, characterized Nosenko as a Soviet defector whose bona fides had not been established.

"IO. What is the FBI's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide (sic)?"

The FBI currently characterizes Nosenko as a former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer who has furnished reliable information in the past, and considers Nosenko to be a bona fide Soviet defector.

"II. If the answer to question 9 is different from the response to question 10, when did the change occur and why?"

The answer to question 8 is considered responsive to question 11.

T2. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?

The FBI did not take a position, from 1964 to 1968, on whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald. The statements were accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which they were received.

"13. What is the FBI's position today as to whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?"

The FBI is satisfied that Nosenko truthfully reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"14. If the answer to question 12 is different from the response to question 13, when did the change occur and why?"

House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (RSCA)

As indicated in the responses to questions 7 and 8, the FBI, as of October 1, 1968, found no substantial basis to conclude Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; as of May 11, 1977, accepted a CIA assessment that Nosenko was a bona fide defector; and has not perceived any significant evidence, defector; and has not perceived any significant evidence, from 1964 to date, that Nosenko reported other than the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"15. Did either the PBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald? If neither had primary responsibility, was there any division of responsibility?"

The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald that pertained to his (Oswald's) activities in the United States, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities abroad.

TIS. What communication, if any, existed between the FBI and CIA with respect to evaluating and/or investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

The FBI forwarded a letter, dated March 6, 1964, from the Director, FBI, to the Director, CIA, enclosing memoranda dated February 28, 1964, and March 4, 1964, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which summarized the results of FBI interviews of Nosenko regarding Oswald on February 26 and 27, 1964, and March 3 and 4, 1964. The results of a CIA interview of Nosenko on January 23, 1964, regarding Oswald were furnished to the FBI in a letter from the CIA dated were furnished to the FBI in a letter from the CIA dated while not setting forth any specific requests or investigative leads, were furnished for purposes of evaluation.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being furnished pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated January 8, 1979, captioned as above.

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this information in light of recent newspaper publicity concerning captioned committee.

Omaha is maintaining this information in 175-0 so that it could be retrieved under the assassination indices card.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1emorandum

The Director

DATE: 1/9/79

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Legal Counse

SUBJECT:

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

95TH CONGRESS

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise of receipt of a "Summary of Findings and Recommendations" of captioned Committee.

DETAILS:

On January 3, 1979, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, captioned Committee, caused to be delivered to the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, a "Summary of Findings and Recommendations" of captioned Committee. These findings were transmitted to the Clerk of the House by captioned Committee on December 29, 1978, (copy attached).

It is anticipated that the FBI and the Department of Justice will receive, from the Committee at an early date, an official draft of the final report of captioned Commanttee for comment.

It is requested that receiving Divisions review the "Summary of Findings and Recommendations," inasmuch as the FBI may be called upon by the Department, and House Judiciary Committee to comment on these recommendations in the near DE-36 62 · /172 future.

RECOMMENDATION:

22 MAR 26 1979

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For information. None.

Enclosure

APPROVED:

Director Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv.

Ident. Intell. Laboratory

Adm. Serv.

Crim. Inv.

Tech. Servs. Training Public Affs. Off

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc. 1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.

1 - Mr. Boynton - Enc.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.

1 - Mr. Cochran - Enc.

1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.

1 - Mr. Moore - Enc. V 1 - Laboratory - Enc.

2 - Mr. Coulson - Enc.

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of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ninety-Fifth Congress

Second Session

SUMMARY OF

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SELECT CONDUITEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

LOUIS STOKES, ONL, CAN-

BICEARDSON PRETER, North Carolina SANGEL L DEVINT, Onle WALTER E PAUNTROT, Displet of Columbia STEWART R. McKINNET, Goo TYONNE BRATHWAITE BUREZ, CHESTING CHARLES THONE, Nobridge CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Concession HABOLD & SAWYER, Michigan CERISTOPEEE J. DODD, Connections MAROLD L. FORD, Tenneme FLOYD J. FITTILLY, Ladines BOBERT W. EDGAR, Pressylvania

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Salamaka es de Assessination of John P. Krandy BICTLARDSON PRETER, CHAR YVONNE BRATRWAITE BUREE CHRISTOPHER J. DODD CHABLES TEONE MAROLD & SAWYER LOUTS STORES, es officie SANCEL L. DEVINE, or office

G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director

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II.	Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr
III.	Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations

I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963

· and about your

- A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F.
 Kennedy. The second and third shots he fired struck the President.
 The third shot he fired killed the President.
 - President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from behind him.
 - 2. The shots that struck President
 Kennedy from behind him were fired
 from the sixth floor window of the
 southeast corner of the Texas
 School Book Depository building.
 - 3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle that was used to fire the shots from the sixth floor window of the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository building.
 - 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination, had access to and was present on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building.
 - Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the conclusion that he assassinated President Kennedy.

- B. Scientific acoustical evidence established a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy. Other scientific evidence does not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence negates some specific conspiracy allegations.
- C. The Committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that President John F.

 Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The Committee is unable to identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy.
 - The Committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
 - 2. The Committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
 - 3. The Committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved.
 - 4. The Committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the national syndicate of organized crime, as a group, was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved.
 - of Investigation and Central
 Intelligence Agency were not
 involved in the assassination of

- Agencies and departments of the United States Government performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties. President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate protection. A thorough and reliable investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was conducted. The investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inadequate. The conclusions of the investigations were arrived at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too definitive.
 - The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of its duties.
 - (a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed, investigated or used by the Secret Service in connection with the President's trip to Dallas; in addition, Secret Service agents in the motorcade were inadequately prepared to protect the President from a sniper.
 - (b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination was terminated when the Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed primary investigative responsibility.
 - 2. The Department of Justice failed to exercise initiative in supervising and directing the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the assassination.

- 3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties.
 - (a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation adequately investigated Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination and properly evaluated the evidence it possessed to assess his potential to endanger the public safety in a national emergency.
 - (b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination.
 - (c) The Pederal Bureau of Investigation failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President.
 - (d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments.
 - 4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination.
 - 5. The Warren Commission performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties.
 - (a) The Warren Commission conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination.

- (b) The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the government.
- (c) The Warren Commission arrived at its conclusions, based on the evidence available to it, in good faith.
- (d) The Warren Commission presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive.



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- III. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations
- Prosecution of Assassinations and Federally Cognizable
 Homicides
 - A. Prohibition and Prevention
 - 1. The Judiciary Committee should process for early consideration by the House legislation that would make the assassination of a Chief of State of any country, or his political equivalent, a federal offense, if the offender is an American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen, or if the offender can be located in the United States.
 - early consideration by the House comprehensive legislation that would codify, revise and reform the federal law of homicide, paying special attention to assassinations. The Judiciary Committee should give appropriate attention to the related offenses of conspiracy, attempt, assault and kidnapping in the context of assassinations. Such legislation should be processed independently of the general processed for the codification, revision or reform of the Federal criminal law. The Committee should address the following issues in considering the legislation:
 - (a) Distinguishing between those persons who should receive the protection of federal law because of the official positions they occupy and those persons who should receive protection of federal law only in the performance of their official duties.
 - (b) Extending the protection of federal law to persons who occupy high judicial and executive positions, including Justices of the Supreme Court and Cabinet officers,
 - (c) The applicability of these laws to private individuals in the exercise of constitutional rights,
 - (d) The penalty to be provided for homicide and the related offenses.

- (e) The basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, including domestic and extraterritorial reach,
- (f) The pre-emption of state jurisdiction without the necessity of any action on the part of the Attorney General where the President is assassinated,
- (g) The circumstances under which federal jurisdiction should preempt state jurisdiction in other cases,
- (h) The power of federal investigative agencies to require autopsies to be performed,
- (i) The ability of federal investigative agencies to secure the assistance of other federal or state agencies, including the military, other laws notwithstanding,
- (j) The authority to offer rewards to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime,
- (k) A requirement of forfeiture of the instrumentalities of the crime,
- (1) The condemnation of personal or other effects of historical interest,
- (m) The advisability of providing, consistent with the first amendment, legal trust devices to hold for the benefit of victims, their families, or the general treasury, the profits realized from books, movie rights, or public appearances by the perpetrator of the crime, and
- (n) The applicability of threat and physical zone of protection legislation to persons under the physical protection of federal investigative or law enforcement agencies.
- 3. The appropriate Committees of the House should process for early consideration by the House charter legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Committees should address the following issues in

- (b) The relationship between the domestic intelligence functions and the interference with the exercise of individual constitutional rights,
- (c) The delineation of proper law enforcement functions and techniques including:
 - (i) the use of informants and electronic surveillance,
 - (ii) guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance to gather intelligence on, or investigate, groups that may be exercising first amendment freedoms, and
 - (iii) the proper response of intelligence or investigative agencies where information is developed that an informant has committed a crime.
- (d) Guidelines to consider the circumstances, if any, when an investigative agency or a component of that agency should be disqualified from taking an active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety growing out of a particular intelligence or investigative action,
- (e) Definitions of the legislative scope and extent of "sources and methods" and the "informant privilege" as a rationale for the executive branch withholding information in response to Congressional or judicial process or other demand for information,
- (f) Institutionalizing efforts to coordinate the gathering, sharing, and analysis of intelligence information,
- (g) Insuring those agencies that primarily gather intelligence perform their function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in physical protection, and

5. Prosecution

- The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provisions of law dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy trial as it applies to both the investigation and prosecution. of federally cognizable homicides.
- The Judiciary Committee should examine recently passed special prosecutor legislation to determine if its provisions should be modified to extend them to presidential assassinations and the circumstances, if any, under which they should be applicable to other federally cognizable homicides.

II. Administrative Recommendations to the Executive

The Department of Justice should re-examine its contingency plans for the handling of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides in light of the record and findings of the Committee. Such an examination should consider the following issues:

- A. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of inter and intraagency task forces and the strike force approach to investigations and prosecutions,
- B. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of the advances of science and technology, and determining when it should secure independent panels of scientists to review or perform necessary scientific tasks, or secure qualified independent forensic pathologists to perform a forensic autopsy,
- C. Insuring that its fair trial/free press guidelines, consistent with an alleged offender's right to a fair trial, allow information about the facts and circumstances surrounding an assassination promptly be made public, and promptly be corrected when erroneous information is mistakenly released, and
- D. Entering at the current time into negotiations with representatives of the media to secure voluntary agreements providing that photographs, audio tapes, television tapes and related

III. General Recommendations for Congressional Investigations

- A. The appropriate Committees of the House should consider amending the Rules of the House to provide for a right to appointive counsel in investigative hearings where a witness is unable to provide counsel from private funds.
- B. The appropriate Committees of the House should examine the Rules of the House governing the conduct of counsel in legislative and investigative hearings and consider delineating guidelines for professional conduct and ethics, including guidelines to deal with conflicts of interest in the representation of multiple witnesses before a Committee.
- C. The Judiciary Committee should examine the adequacy of federal law as it provides for the production of federal and state prisoners before legislative or investigative committees under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
- D. The appropriate Committees of the House should examine and clarify the applicability to Congressional subpoenas of recently enacted legislative restrictions on access to records and other documents.
- E. The appropriate Committees of the House should consider legislation that would authorize the establishment of a legislative counsel to conduct litigation on behalf of committees of the House incident to the investigative or legislative activities and confer jurisdiction on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hear such lawsuits.
- F. The appropriate committees of the House should consider if Rule 11 of the House should be amended, so as to restrict the current access by all Members of the House to the classified information in the possession of any committee.

IV. Recommendations for Further Investigation

A. The Department of Justice should contract for the examination of a film taken by Charles L. Bronson to determine its significance, if any, to the assassination of President Kennedy. C. The Department of Justice should review the Committee's findings and report in the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and after completion of the recommended investigation enumerated in Sections A and B, analyze whether further official investigation is warranted in either case. The Department of Justice should report its analysis to the Judiciary Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 JULY 1973 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

:Mr. Cochran (f/cm)

DATE: 1/11/79

:W. D. Campbell und m

SUBJECT/TESTIMONY ACOUSTICS EXPERTS BEFORE THE COUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Dep. AD fev. Asst. Dr. Legal Coun. Plen. & Insp. Rec. Met. S. & T. Serv. Spec. Inv. Training

Assac. Bir

Dep. AD Adm. ____

PURPOSE:

To respond to the Director's inquiry concerning "What do we know about the accuracy of this method of tracing?" used by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

SYNOPSIS:

This document presents a preliminary discussion and evaluation of the acoustic tests performed on a recording believed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to be that of the sequence of gunshots associated with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963. Contained herein is a description, to the extent possible in lay terms, of the acoustic tests performed, the nature of the material upon which the tests were performed; estimations of the validity and accuracy of the tests, where possible, and observations by the Engineering Section concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the analyses. addition, the prospect and impact associated with extending these tests to validate or refute, if such is possible, the opinions rendered in testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations are discussed. DE-70 62 - 1172

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- Mr. Campbell

Mr. Killion

CONTINUED-OVER

(Virginian)

DETAILS:

Overview:

On September 11, 1978, and again on December 29, 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) met in public session to hear expert testimony relative to scientific acoustic analyses performed on an audio recording, believed by the Committee to contain the sequence of gunshots associated with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dealy Plaza, Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. Initial analyses were performed by a team of scientists employed by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Incorporated, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The team leader and expert, who first testified on September 11, 1978, was Dr. James E. Barger.

Based upon inconclusive results reached by Dr. Barger in certain critical areas of the analyses, particularly the "50-50" conclusion regarding the "third shot from the grassy knoll," Dr. Barger's results were referred for further analysis to Mr. Mark Weiss and Mr. Ernest Aschkenasy, both professors in the Computer Science Department, Queens College, Flushing, New York. It is understood that both Weiss and Asckenasy also provided some assistance and suggestions during the initial analysis of the Dealy Plaza gunshot recording by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc. According to the testimony of Dr. Barger, after Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., reached its inconclusive results regarding the third "shot," Weiss suggested to Barger a technique which Weiss felt could improve upon and extend the analysis. Weiss was instructed to proceed by the Committee. On December 29, 1978, he and Aschkenasy testified before the Committee that with a certainty of 95% or better the third sound on the Dealy Plaza recording was a rifle shot and that it originated from a specific point on the grassy

knoll. They further testified that this determination could be made with great positional accuracy, that is, within approximately 5 feet. Dr. Barger later testified that he agreed with the assertion of Weiss that the third sound originated from the grassy knoll but Barger could only ascribe an approximately 78% certainty that the sound was a rifle shot.

The following is a discussion of the analyses performed and the data which these experts believe supports their conclusions. It should be emphasized that the information upon which this discussion is based is derived only from the oral testimony offered in public hearings on September 11, and December 29, 1978, and in the case of the testimony of Weiss and Aschkenasy, also upon visual inspection of exhibits by Engineering Section personnel who observed the testimony on December 29.

The Engineering Section does not presently possess written reports or raw data pertaining to these analyses.

Many questions raised in this analysis may in fact be covered in the written reports of the experts.

The Experts:

Dr. James E. Barger is chief scientist for Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., a major acoustic consulting firm headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Dr. Barger possesses a PhD in Applied Physics from Harvard, is a Fellow of the Acoustical Society of America and has performed extensive work in sonar and underwater acoustics. He supervised, under the direction of Dr. Richard Bolt, the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., effort in the analysis of the 18 1/2 minute gap in the Watergate tapes and was project leader in the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., analysis of the recorded gunfire in the Kent State incident.

Dr. Barger identified his team members in the gunshot analysis as Dr. Jerry Wolf, Dr. Dan Calico, Dr. Ted Rine, Mr. Scott Robinson, Mr. Leo Slajeski, Miss Nancy McMahon, Mr. Joe Coleratello, and Mr. Ed Schmidt (phonetic spelling). The Engineering Section has no biographic information on these individuals other than it is believed Dr. Wolf and Mr. Robinson also worked on the Kent State analysis performed by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc.

Mr. Mark Weiss possesses a M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering, was a past vice president of Federal Scientific Corporation, a signal analysis and equipment manufacturing firm, and is presently a professor in the Department of Computer Science, Queens College, New York. He served as a member of a panel of experts appointed by Judge John J. Sirica to examine the White House tape recordings in connection with the Watergate investigations. He is a Fellow of the Acoustical Society of America and a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering.

Mr. Ernest Aschkenasy possesses a M.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering and is a research associate for the Department of Computer Science at Queens College where he presently serves as Mr. Weiss's assistant.

As the above biographies illustrate, the individuals who conducted the acoustical analyses of the Dealy Plaza recording possess considerable technical knowledge and experience in diverse areas of physics, acoustics and electrical engineering. So far as is known, they are highly regarded scientists in these diciplines.

Origin and Chain of Custody of the Recording:

Committee Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey testified that in September of 1977, the committee staff learned of the existence of a Dallas Police Department dispatch recording of the Dallas police transmissions covering the time period before, during and after the Kennedy Assassination. It is believed that the information which led the Committee staff to the recording was obtained from one Paul McCaren (phonetic spelling), retired Assistant Police Chief, who had been assigned to a Special Dallas Police Assassination investigation squad. The recording in question, a Dictaphone "dictabelt," described by Dr. Barger as a blue-colored continuous plastic belt, was a recording of a portion of the Dallas Police Department transmissions on Dallas Police channel 1.

It should be noted that the report of the Warren Commission made reference to this recording. Specifically, a Letterhead Memorandum dated August 11, 1964, Commission Exhibit Number 1974, contained in Volume 23 of the Report, describes the fact that an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Dallas reviewed dictabelts containing recordings of the Dallas Police radio transmissions on channel I from the period 10:00 AM to 3:00 PM, November 22, 1963. The stated purpose of the review was that the Warren Commission, by letter dated July 16, 1964, referred to the transcripts of Dallas Police Department radio transmissions covering November 22, 1963, and advised that in view of the importance of these transcripts, it was desired that the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtain the original recordings and prepare new transcripts. The letter requested that the name of the reporting police officer be listed alongside each message. The new transcript, included as a part of the Letterhead Memorandum, noted sometime after 12:26 PM the

following: "(Transmitters stuck on one of the mobile units; nothing readable for sometime after 38's (WOODROW) last transmission. Sirens audible. Garbled transmissions) (12:34)"

Later in the transcript, sometime between 12:35 and 12:36 PM the following occurs: "4 (Fisher), we have a mike button stuck open. We can't hear anything. (Garbled transmission)."

There is no indication in the transcript that the reviewer had detected noises which sounded like shots. If such noises were present, they were probably substantially masked by other audio noise and radio interference. In fact, Dr. Barger stated in his testimony that the recording had a good deal of crowd and motorcycle noise and the sounds of interest were not clearly audible. There is no indication that the recordings of the Dallas Police radio transmissions were ever sent to the FBI Laboratory for review or analysis.

Acoustic Analysis Performed by Dr. Barger and Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc.:

Dr. Barger's testimony on September 11, 1978, described the objectives and methods used by the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman Inc., team to analyze the Dealy Plaza recording. He discussed 6 questions the team addressed:

- 1) Was the motorcycle in Dealy Plaza?
- 2) Were the sounds of shots detectable?
- 3) How many shots?

- 4) What was the timing of the shots?
- 5) From what location were the shots fired?
- 6) What weapon or weapons fired the shots?

The approach utilized by the team in an attempt to answer the above questions was a detailed analysis of the pattern of the shot-like sounds on the recording in question, an analysis of the echo characteristics of such sounds in Dealy Plaza and a comparison of the patterns in question to known shot and echo patterns recorded from test shots fired by different weapons from the positions of the School Book Depository Building and the grassy knoll.

At the outset Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., had little substantive information upon which to base any conclusion as to where the sounds recorded on the dictabelt originated. It was assumed, based upon the nature and loudness of the noise on the recording that the open microphone was on a motorcycle. It was assumed that due to the presence of impulsive type sounds that might be gunshots, the motorcycle was somewhere in the vicinity of Dealy Plaza. It was not known which police motorcycle it was, whether the motorcycle was in the Presidential motorcade or whether in fact the motorcycle was definitely in or near Dealy Plaza at the time of the shooting. It was hoped by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., that a series of test recordings made in Dealy Plaza would resolve these and other questions.

In August, 1978, the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., team went to Dealy Plaza to conduct and record a series of test shots from the School Book Depository Building and from the grassy knoll. An array of microphones and recorders adjusted to laboratory standards was positioned at 36 locations along the motorcade route, beginning at the turn onto Houston Street, turning the corner onto Elm Street and continuing down Elm Street past the spot where the Zapruder film of the motorcade showed Kennedy being struck by the fatal head shot. Sand-bagged targets were placed on the street at locations believed or known to be the impact points of the shots and these targets were fired at by

shooters using 3 weapons, a Mannlicher Carcano rifle similar to the Oswald weapon, an M1 rifle and a pistol. The first 2 weapons were fired to obtain sounds of weapons firing supersonic projectiles, the last weapon was fired for the purposes of obtaining sounds of a weapon firing a subsonic projectile. The significance of the projectile speed will be discussed later. In all, 432 test "events" were recorded, a test event being a shot fired at a particular target using a particular weapon from a particular location and picked up and recorded by one of the 36 microphone positions.

The rationale behind all this testing was as The muzzle blast of a weapon when fired produces a very loud, very brief (commonly called "impulsive") sound which radiates outward in all directions and due to its loudness carries for considerable distances. The muzzle blast impulsive noise travels at the speed of sound essentially in straight lines past an observer, for example a person or a microphone, which detects or "hears" the sound. This is called the "direct" sound. The sound also travels until it meets a hard surface which reflects the sound off in some other direction. The reflected sound may then continue on past the observer, where it is also "heard," or it may reflect off another surface and then past the observer, The reflected sounds, because they always have to travel farther than the direct sound, always arrive some time after the direct sound, resulting in the condition we call echoes.

If the reflecting surfaces are far apart, for example, on the order of thousands of feet, the observer will hear a series of well defined, individual echoes. If, as was the case in Dealy Plaza, the reflecting surfaces, namely the building, signs, bridge abutments, etc., are spaced apart on the order of a few hundred feet, the echoes

usually arrive too quickly after the direct sound to be discerned by the listener as individual echoes. Instead of the listener hearing a series of brief impulsive sounds, he hears one sound which seems to be drawn out in duration. However, the individual echoes are still present and through proper analytical techniques and under appropriate conditions, can be detected. The statement "appropriate conditions" is significant from the standpoint that this detection is fairly easy and straightforward to do when the original sound is brief and loud, the reflecting surfaces are substantial and spaced far enough apart, and there is little other noise interference which masks the direct sound and echoes. transmission and recording characteristics deteriorate, and other noise begins to mask the impulsive sounds the task becomes increasingly difficult. Evidently the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., analysts encountered a poor quality recording in the original, for Dr. Barger described two techniques which Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., employed to assist in the analysis of the noises. These techniques were the "adaptive filter" and the "matched filter."

The adaptive filter is technically too complex a device to describe in any detail in this document. In brief, it is a method used to reduce the loudness of repetitive noise interference such as the engine noise from a motorcycle. It is a relatively recent development, having been described in principle in the literature about 10 years ago, and applied on a practical basis only in the last few years. Evidently Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., were somewhat successful in reducing the motorcycle noise interference using the adaptive filter technique.

The second method used by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., the "matched filter," may be described more easily and is a straightforward scheme for detecting the presence of signals buried in interference. The matched filter concept has been used for years in radar, sonar, and

other signal detection applications. However, in order for it to work, the characteristics of the signal being looked for must be well known. In the analysis of the Dealy Plaza Recording, the matched filters used were the various direct sound and echo pattern test shots recorded in Dealy Plaza in August, 1978. In other words, Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., recorded a known series of direct sound and echo patterns representing different test circumstances and they compared the patterns to those patterns on the motorcycle recording to determine whether any shots "matched". comparison was done by computer as it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make all the comparisons by hand in a reasonable period of time. constituted a "match" in the opinion of the analysts was based upon a statistical determination of the presence or absence of impulsive sounds corresponding to what might be echoes at the correct points in time. The process is somewhat akin to aligning the pickets on two picket fences when the pickets are spaced according to some pattern. the patterns are different, the fences will not line up.

Dr. Barger testified that based upon the above analysis and comparison process, the analysis team had determined that the recording had come from the open microphone of a motorcycle which was a part of the Presidential motorcade and they had established the position of the motorcycle on Elm Street to an error radius of 9 feet (1/2 the distance of the 18 foot spacing of the microphones). Further, they had established that the motorcycle was moving at a speed of about 11 miles per hour and that it's position changed with each shot. Dr. Barger testified they had accurately measured the timing between the shots and if there were 4 shots, the time between the first and second was 1.6 seconds, between the second and the third 5.9 seconds and between the third and fourth 0.5 seconds. He

testified that there was a high probability that there were two shots, both from the School Book Depository Building, a slightly lesser probability that there was a 3rd shot (the fourth sound in the sequence), also from the School Book Depository, and a lesser still probability that there was a 4th shot from the grassy knoll (the third sound in the sequence). When pressed on this issue, he stated he could reach only a "50-50" decision on the third "shot" in the sequence. It is noteworthy that Chairman Stokes asked Dr. Barger in cross-examination "Can I come to a conclusion from what I appear to be hearing?" To this question, Dr. Barger responded, "I think not."

ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY MR. MARK WEISS AND MR. ERNEST ASCHKENASY

As previously set forth, Dr. Barger's acoustic analysis resulted in a 50-50 possibility that the third sound on the Dealy Plaza recording was a shot fired from the grassy knoll. After the September, 1978, public hearing where Dr. Barger set forth these results, the Committee contacted Mr. Weiss and Mr. Aschkenasy in an attempt to refine Dr. Barger's test results, and to establish with greater certainty whether or not a shot had been fired from the grassy knoll. On December 29, 1978, Mr. Weiss and Mr. Aschkenasy appeared before the Committee and publicly testified to the results of their study pertaining to the alleged shot from the grassy knoll. Mr. Weiss testified that after careful analysis he had determined with an accuracy of 95% or better, that a gun shot was fired from the grassy knoll in the direction of the Presidential motorcade on November 22, 1963. To reach this conclusion, Mr. Weiss analyzed a copy of the dictabelt recorded by the Dallas Police Department using an oscilloscope, a plotter, a hand calculator, a long graduated scale and a large survey

map of Dealy Plaza. Mr. Weiss justified his analysis based on what he claimed were three (3) well established principals of physics:

- 1. Sound from a point source radiates in all directions
- 2. When radiating sound waves encounter reflecting surfaces, echoes occur
- 3. The speed of sound is constant at a given atmospheric temperature and can be accurately determined.

Mr. Weiss assumed that Dr. Barger's tests had determined the approximate location of the sound source on the grassy knoll and the approximate location of the transmitting motorcycle in the Presidential motorcade. Mr. Weiss utilized the principal that the microphone on the motorcycle would receive the direct impulse sound followed by a series of echoes created by this original impulse reflecting off the nearby buildings and structures.

To perform this analysis, Mr. Weiss played a copy of the Dallas Police Department radio recording into an oscilloscope which produced a visual graph depicting loudness variations of this suspected gunshot sound. Using the plotter he made a hard copy graph of these loudness variations for further study. He assumed that the first high level impulse sound was generated by the original sound wave traveling directly to the microphone. He measured and catalogued the 14 short time lapses between this first impulse signal and each successive high level impulse (assumed to be echoes). Knowing the time interval between the first impulse sound and each successive impulse and the speed of sound, Mr. Weiss calculated the distance a sound (echo) would travel during each of these time intervals.

Knowing the exact distance traveled by each echo he constructed what he described as a unique acoustic pattern for this set of impulse sounds (echoes). He manually attempted to match this set of distances traveled by each echo to the predicted set of distances the sounds would travel in Dealy Plaza by changing the position of the sound source (gunshot) and the motorcycle along the parade route. Using this procedure, Mr. Weiss matched 10 known echo paths on the survey map to the measured distances of the echoes plotted from the copy of the recording of the Dallas Police Department radio transmissions. It should be noted that Mr. Weiss could not match 4 of the 14 impulse sounds recorded on the Dallas police department tape to his predicted echo paths. In addition, Mr. Weiss predicted there would be 12 echo impulse reflection echoes and only ten were found on the plotted graph of the Dallas Police Department tape recording. Statistically, according to Mr. Weiss, this translates into a 95% or better probability that an impulse sound originated on the grassy knoll and was received by the motorcycle in Then by examining signals the Presidential motorcade. buried in the noise, Mr. Weiss believed he could see an "N" wave generated by a supersonic projectile (whenever an object exceeds the speed of sound it generates a shock wave, known as an "N" wave). Rifle bullets usually exceed the speed of sound and therefore generate these "N" waves. Mr. Weiss believes that since an "N" wave was present, the sound from the grassy knoll was generated by a supersonic bullet.

After Mr. Weiss and Mr. Aschkenasy completed their testimony, Dr. Barger was recalled before the HSCA. Dr. Barger testified he agreed with the refinement made in his data by Mr. Weiss and that he would agree that the possibility that the third impulsive sound came from the grassy knoll was better than 95%. However, he stated in his opinion,

the possibility that the sound was a supersonic gunshot was 78%. This was because the recording had numerous other random impulses which had the characteristics of "N" waves, yet could not possibly be supersonic shock waves.

Observations by the Engineering Section:

At the present time there has been little precedent for the kinds of application of acoustic analysis to forensic situations as described by Dr. Barger, Mr. Weiss, and Mr. Aschkenasy. Specifically those applications are to determine, given a sound recording of a shooting incident, the location from which the shots originated and the type of weapons fired. In fact, the work done by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., on the recordings of the Kent State incident was the first significant application in this area, with the recent work on the Kennedy Assassination being only the second to our knowledge. This apparent lack of foundation has been simply due to the lack of demand for this kind of service. Consequently, it is easier to comment upon the basic scientific principles involved than it is to determine whether those principles were correctly applied and the proper conclusions were drawn. It is, however, fundamental that the real forensic environment is often very different from the controlled situation of a laboratory.







The basic physical principles of sound propogation, reflection and detection as described by Dr. Barger, Mr. Weiss and Mr. Aschkenasy are valid.



When questioned regarding why the "N" wave, the supersonic shock wave which indicates a rifle has been fired, was not observable on the graphs of the first two shots fired from the School Book Depository Building, yet was observed on the last shot, Dr. Barger stated he would not have expected to have seen the "N" wave on the first two shots because the motorcycle was not in the proper position.

The test recordings conducted by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., were made using very high quality, calibrated equipment and not using the same kind of equipment-radios, microphones, repeaters, receivers, and dictabelt recordersused by the Dallas Police Department in 1963. The reasons given by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., that they were only interested in the time spacing of the echo pattern which would be represented on either system and therefore, they required a more reliable system





Mr. Weiss and Mr. Aschkenasy concluded that the sound from the grassy knoll was a rifle shot. According to Mr. Weiss, this conclusion was drawn because the sound was very loud (although he did not describe how loud it was) and also because they observed an "N" wave type sound which seemed to have the right shape and was about at the right spot in the graph.

(BX5)

Further, Dr. Barger had earlier described that numerous impulsive events on the tape had characteristics of "N" waves, yet they were not supersonic shock waves.

Dr. Barger concluded that the observed wave was probably an "N" wave and not noise


the observed wave was probably an "N" wave and not noise because - simply put - it was in the right place on the graph.

Mr. Weiss' statement that his work was based upon simple physical principles taught at the high school or freshman college level and that his calculations were based on simple mathematic and geometry performed by hand belies the real complexity of the task.

(6)(5)

Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., applied a number of powerful analytical techniques, not all of which were available in 1963, to sift through a prodigious amount of data.

The Prospect of Additional Analysis:





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
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The New York Office did not open a separate investigative file on "The Militant" until 9/1/72. Such file NY 100-177142 was closed on 10/16/73 and was not reviewed in this matter.

NYO Indices is negative in this matter.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT *lemorandum*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 2/23/79

Attn: Mr. Heller

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Ryan 1 - Mr. Foster

1 - Mr. Bassett

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Mr. Bassett

SUBJECT:

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

PURPOSE: To provide information received from Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, former HSCA, and to furnish suggestions for planning purposes based upon Blakey's information.

DETAILS: On 2/22/79, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, former HSCA, advised that he hoped to have approximately 1,500 pages of the HSCA's final report ready for informal review by the FBI during the week of 2/26-3/4/79. He desired that Special Agents (SAs) John T. Aldhizer and Drew J. Clark review this material in former Committee staff space when it was available.

Informal review of the HSCA's preliminary draft of its findings and recommendations was accomplished during December, 1978, by 12 Special Agents from Divisions IV, V, VI, VII and IX.

Blakey advised that the new material would be similar to that which was previously reviewed in December, with additions and modifications. He also stated that it may not be available for review until Saturday and Sunday, 3/3-4/79. **REC-112**

Based on the experience of the December, 1978, review, it is suggested that reviewing Agents should consist of no less than SAs Aldhizer, Clark, Tron W. Brekke, John S. Giaquinto, Ronald Heller, Richard D. Davidson and Kurk I. Klossner, for a total of seven reviewing Agents. It is suggested that it would also be desirable to have 54 MAR 12 1979 Danny O. Coulson participate if he is available.

Based on the fact that the former Committee staff has had since December, 1978, to prepare this material, it is suggested what there may be little justification to honor any request that seven or eight Agents work through a weekend to accommodate a former Committee staff's self-imposed deadline.

DJC:mel (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Bassett
RE: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RECOMMENDATION: That a representative of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit contact G. Robert Blakey during the week of 2/26-3/2/79 to negotiate acceptable procedures for review of the former HSCA's material and, thereafter, arrange for any subsequent review deemed appropriate.


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