

Rep. Ford. In other words, every person recruited by Secret Service for any capacity is recruited in the first instance under Schedule A.

Mr. Rowley. Yes. If he hasn't -- if he is not on the register for Civil Service. We first go to the Civil Service, when we want to select somebody, to see if there is anyone on there that meets our qualifications. And then, if not, then we hire them under Schedule A, which is sort of a blanket exemption.

Rep. Ford. But I gather from what you have said, or I think you are intimating that most of your recruiting actually is from colleges, and they are under Schedule A.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. Yes, sir. Many of them from your state, sir -- Michigan State University.

Rep. Ford. It is a fine school.

Mr. Rowley. That is where it started, actually. They were the first ones. Now we also recruit particularly on the West Coast, in California, they have terrific schools out there.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I don't think you covered the Bolden matter as to whether you had an investigation made.

Did you?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, I did, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you find out anything about the conduct of your agents?

Mr. Rowley. I found out there were no -- there was no truth to the charges of misconduct. There were 11 charges lodged against us.

One charge, the ninth charge, a part of it was true. The boys did contribute for food. In other words up there in Hyannis, when they are up there for a week, or a weekend, they would be assigned to a house, which economically was beneficial to them. One shift, and some of the drivers would be in this house. This house was in a remote area from the shopping area, and so forth. So they agreed when they arrived there to contribute, to buy food for breakfast, it being an eight to four shift. Eight to four meant they would have breakfast there and dinner.

Mr. Rankin. What do you mean by that, Chief? Did they get a certain house and were able to live together there to reduce their expenses?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. And then they each contributed to that common expense?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. And did someone cook for them?

Mr. Rowley. One of the agents who enjoyed it as a hobby cooked the meals for them, while the others took care of the dishes.

Mr. Rankin. They did contribute to supporting that?

Mr. Rowley. They contributed to supporting that, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Was there criticism of that action?

Mr. Rowley. There was criticism of the action to this extent: That when they went shopping they bought two or three cases of beer which they had available in the ice box when the men came off duty in the evening.

Mr. Rankin. Now, were they on a travel status or subject to --

Mr. Rowley. Not on travel status under our regulations. They could be there a week, and they would be working their eight hours. They were not working any longer than their eight hours. It was comparable to their assignment here in Washington.

Mr. Rankin. So it was really a summer White House position?

Mr. Rowley. Summer White House is what we called it.

Mr. Rankin. And did you investigate the charges to see whether they were valid?

Mr. Rowley. I investigated. This portion was correct. There was substance to that portion.

There was some substance to other portions. He said he was left on post for a period of two hours and wasn't relieved.

That an agent had used this time to take care of his private car. We established there was no agent up there who had a private car.

Further, we established that he was left on post because according to our arrangements it was routine that whenever the President went out for a cruise, the agents on the outer perimeter at the time would remain on duty and the agents in the inner perimeter would accompany the President on the cruise in the follow-up boat. Naturally, when they were out on the boat there was no one available to start what we call the push, to rotate the men from one post to another. In other words, in the White House or any place where we establish posts, every half hour one man starts from the office and starts making the push. The first man is relieved and he relieves the next one so there is no monotony on their jobs. They each have a different area. They are conversant or acquainted with each and every phase of the physical area. But because he was on one post, and not relieved, he complained.

So the next day, to bend over backwards and to show there was no prejudice, the agent in charge took him on the cruise, so he would not feel he was being ignored.

Mr. Rankin. Now, from your investigation, did you find any violation at Hyannis of the regulations of the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Have you been informed of any other claims that Secret Service agents had been violating the regulations while on duty?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir, I haven't been informed of any others. And it seems in the last few days or few weeks we have been getting complaints that we haven't had in many years. And I think, as I mentioned earlier, because of the fact that we are very careful with the type of men we screen, their record has been above reproach over the years. They have conducted themselves in exemplary manner. My files are replete with commendations on behalf of the agents wherever they have travelled and worked with committees and individuals in connection with Presidential travels, both here and abroad, which testifies to the impression that they have made.

Mr. Rankin. Have you ever had a Secret Service agent indicted or a complaint filed against him, a criminal complaint, prior to this time?

Mr. Rowley. This is the first time I can remember anything like this happening since I have been with the Secret Service.

Rep. Ford. Mr. Rankin, I don't recall Chief Rowley saying precisely what the reprimands were specifically for these violations of the regulations in this one instance.

You spoke highly of their background, and you spoke very high in their praise. But I did not hear what reprimand, if any, had actually been lodged against them.

Mr. Rowley. There was no reprimand. You are talking about the current thing?

Rep. Ford. I am talking about the Dallas trip.

Mr. Rowley. I stated in considering what would be an appropriate punishment at the time, I felt that these men, by their conduct, had no bearing on the assassination of the President in Dallas. That to institute formal punishment or disciplinary action would inevitably lead the public to conclude that they were responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy.

I did not think in the light of history that they should be stigmatized with something like that, or their families or children. And, for that reason, I took the position that I did.

Rep. Ford. So there was no official reprimand or disciplinary action?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you talk to the agents, to indicate and make it plain to them that this was a violation of the regulations?

Mr. Rowley. I talked to some of the agents, as did my

inspector at the time, who interviewed each and every one of them.

Mr. Rankin. And I think the Commission would be interested in whether you can be assured, or assure them that the action you took was sufficient so that this would not happen again.

Mr. Rowley. Well, I am confident that it would not happen again, Mr. Rankin.

Mr. Rankin. Can you tell us why you think so?

Mr. Rowley. Because they realize the seriousness of their action.

Initially, I can understand the situation -- they thought^t they were going for a dinner, buffet, and they got into the place and it wasn't there.

I talked personally with the agents there, and they just thought while they were there, they would have a drink. It was one of those situations.

The important thing was that it was pointed out to them this was wrong, this was a violation. These men are young men with futures, they realize the true situation, innocent as they may have seemed to think it was.

But I am quite confident that we will not have a repetition of that.

And in talking to Mr. Behn -- I am confident too, in him, I know that he will see to it that they are well supervised.

Mr. Rankin. When they are out on a trip of this kind, Chief Rowley, as I understand your regulations, it is understood by the regulations and by the Secret Service that they are on duty all the time -- that is subject to call?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And even though it is late in the evening or they had gone to bed in the early hours of the morning, they could be called to go on duty and perform their responsibility of taking care of the President or the Vice President, or whoever they are charged with, is that right?

Mr. Rowley. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. So that do they understand that when they are out on that kind of a duty, they are subject to call at all times, and anything they do contrary to regulations is a violation, because they are subject to the call and must be ready at any moment to perform their duties.

Mr. Rowley. They certainly do, because there have been situations, whether or not they have had it with the Kennedy Administration I don't know -- but I know there have been situations where we have moved fast, all hours of the night. I remember one instance that has never been disclosed -- as

Mr. Dulles knows, you never advertise your successes, you just get the other things -- that I would like to give you as an example off the record, to answer your question, if I may.

The Chairman. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Chief, it seems to me that on an assignment of that kind, to be alert at all times is one of the necessities of the situation. And I just wonder if you believe that men who did what these men did, being out until early morning hours, doing a little -- even a small amount of drinking -- would be as alert the next day as men should be when they are charged with the tremendous responsibility of protecting the President.

Mr. Rowley. Well, we checked on that, Mr. Chief Justice, and the agent in charge reported that they were in good physical condition. I don't condone this late hours, no. But late hours are not unusual because of the activities of any travel such as the Presidents today make from one place to another, and maybe seven states in a weekend. This is constant going.

I don't condone that at all. But these men are young. They are of such age that I think that they responded in this instance adequately and sufficiently as anyone could under the circumstances.

The Chairman. Well, I am thinking of this. As you go along in the motorcade, you have men who are scanning the buildings along the way, don't you?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And they have submachineguns in one of the cars.

Mr. Rowley. No. For security reasons, I would like to -- we don't have machine guns now, sir.

The Chairman. I just thought I heard that from the record here, that they had some kind of guns.

Mr. Rowley. They had a weapon, a new weapon, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Well, whatever it is.

Now, other people, as they went along there, even some people in the crowds, saw a man with a rifle up in this building from which the President was shot. Now, don't you think that if a man went to bed reasonably early, and hadn't been drinking the night before, would be more alert to see those things as a Secret Service agent, than if they stayed up until three, four, five o'clock in the morning, going to beatnik joints and doing some drinking along the way?

Mr. Rowley. If I remember that witness' testimony -- and that was one of the first statements that he made -- that

witness was with his wife, and he happened to look up there, and I think he said, "There is a man with a rifle, it is a Secret Service man," and let it go at that. He didn't inform any of the authorities.

The Chairman. No, nobody did. But I say wouldn't an alert Secret Service man in this motorcade, who is supposed to observe such things, be more likely to observe something of that kind if he was free from any of the results of liquor or lack of sleep than he would otherwise?

Mr. Rowley. Well, yes, he would be. But then, on the other hand, Mr. Chief Justice, in some instances the men come in from a trip at 1:30 in the morning, which there have been cases on travels that I have made and have to be up at 3:30 or 4 o'clock, and out in time for a 5 o'clock departure. Then you go all that day until one or two o'clock the next morning. This is what has happened in the past.

The Chairman. I am not talking about the past. We are talking about nine men here who were out until rather unusual hours of the morning.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. They were to be on duty the next day.

The next day -- or if not sooner.

The next day they were supposed to be alert to anything that might occur along the line of march. Don't you think that they would have been much more alert, sharper, had they not been doing these things?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir, but I don't believe they could have prevented the assassination.

The Chairman, Isn't it a substantial violation of these rules to do a thing of that kind?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir -- on the basis of this section here.

The Chairman. Yes.

Now, Chief, I noticed, also, in reading some of the reports that some of these men, these nine men whom you speak of, were actually on night duty, protecting the life of the President. And around 4 o'clock in the morning, when they were protecting him at the Texas hotel, they said that they had a coffee break, and they went from that hotel over to the beatnik joint.

Now is that consistent with your regulations?

Mr. Rowley. In this case, I talked to the three agents on duty. Nine were not on duty. The three were relieved at different times -- because their posts are in the corridor of a stuffy hotel --

The Chairman. Of the what?

Mr. Rowley. The corridor that they were on post outside the President's suite was a stuffy one, and they went downstairs to get a breath of fresh air. And they walked -- it was a

block -- and out of curiosity they went into this place. One fellow looked in and left, he didn't buy any coffee. Another fellow went in and felt, I suppose, when he went in that he would buy a cup of coffee. But they were on what we call reliefs, the same as we relieve them around the White House. There are only so many posts, but you have a group of men in one of the rooms of the hotel where they are available, like an alert squad, and they relieve everyone on post every half hour. It is a part of the rotation of positions we have.

The Chairman. Do you have any regulations concerning where they shall remain when they are relieved for this short period of time?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

The Chairman. They can go any place they want?

Mr. Rowley. No, not any place. They usually stay within the immediate confines. That is understood.

The hotel or the residence.

The Chairman. Well, they didn't do that here, did they?

Mr. Rowley, No, sir.

The Chairman. They went to the beatnik joint.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Now, is that consistent with their duty?

Mr. Rowley. No, it is not consistent or inconsistent with their duty. But as they explained to me, they wanted to get a breath of fresh air. If they are at a residence in a remote place, and they want to walk around the area, they might walk maybe a city block or so, which is what they do on a lot of these assignments -- particularly in hotels. This was not an air-conditioned hotel.

The Chairman. It would seem to me that a beatnik joint is a place where queer people of all kinds gather anyway, and that the mere fact that these men did leave their post of duty might be an indication to someone that the President was not being protected, and might leave an opening for them to go there and try to do something.

Mr. Rowley. They were relieved, Mr. Chief Justice. They didn't leave their post of duty. They would not leave their post of duty until they were relieved by someone.

The Chairman. As I understood the report, they said they left for a coffee break.

Mr. Rowley. Well, it is an expression. They left to have coffee, sir.

The Chairman. Was there any place for coffee in the hotel?

Mr. Rowley. I think there was a coffee shop in the hotel, yes, sir.

The Chairman. That was the only place in town, as I

understood, from the reports, outside of the beatnik place they could. But they went down to the beatnik place. Did they do that by prearrangement with the other agents?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir. It was curiosity on their part. They hadn't seen the other agents. There was no arrangement of any nature at all, sir.

The Chairman. But they did there meet other agents?

Mr. Rowley. They saw other agents -- those that were in the place at the time they looked in. I think they came in after most had left though.

Mr. Dulles. Were these men off duty for the night or were they going back on duty immediately after this break?

Mr. Rowley. No, they were on duty. They were the midnight shift, Mr. Dulles, from 12 to 8 a.m.

Mr. Dulles. They were going back on duty?

Mr. Rowley. They were going back on duty, yes, sir, in ten minutes, 15 minutes.

Mr. Dulles. I see.

Rep. Ford. And they did go back on duty and relieve somebody subsequent to this?

Mr. Rowley. That is right, yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you give the Commission a letter as of May 5 of this year in regard to this Dallas matter concerning the Press Club and the Cellar?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And is that letter correct in regard to what happened as far as you know?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And did you make available to the Commission the statements of each agent signed by the agent?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. I think you said Dallas.

Did you not mean Fort Worth?

Mr. Rankin. Yes - it should be Fort Worth, I am sorry.

Thank you.

I hand you Commission's Exhibit 1019 and ask you if that is your letter of May 5 that we have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit 1019 for identification.)

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1019.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit 1019 was received in evidence.)

The Chairman. Chief, I notice in the report that was made that while your inspector found that no one -- no member

of the Secret Service was intoxicated at the club -- but that there was someone connected with the group who was intoxicated.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I wonder if that also wasn't a violation of that portion of the rule which says, "In interpreting the words excessive and improper slight evidence tending to indicate unusual or questionable conduct will be considered proof that the use of liquor has been improper or excessive. Association with others who drink to excess will be considered as an indication of using more than a moderate amount of liquor."

Did you call that to the attention of your people?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir. They ran into that individual as they were entering -- two agents ran into this individual as they were entering the Fort Worth Club.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I hand you Commission's Exhibit No. 1020, and ask you if that is a document that you had prepared for the Commission.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1020 for identification.)

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And that includes, under capital letter A, the transmittal from Inspector McCann; B, the report of

the investigation by Inspector McCann; C, the Drew Pearson article?

Mr. Rowley, Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. D, the statements of the supervisors; and, E, the statements of the special agents; F, the statements of witnesses; and, G, the memorandum of May 19, 1964, by Agent Sorrells, is that right?

Mr. Rowley. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. And are those various documents a part of the official report by the Secret Service to the Commission of this matter?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1020.

The Chairman. It may be so admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1020 was received in evidence.)

Mr. Dulles. Off the record, may I ask a question?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Chief, I notice -- I have read this report. At any place in here, did any of your investigators, Inspector McCann, or your special agents, or anybody else, indicate that there

had been any violation of any kind on the part of your people, or particularly any violation of this Section 10, Chapter 1, page 7 of the Secret Service manual?

Mr. Rowley. I think what happened in this instance, we responded to the broadcast of Mr. Pearson and his charge that the men were inebriated. We were primarily concerned with that at that time. And to get the statements from the men. But I do know that in the course of his interviewing of these individuals at the time, and taking their statements, he impressed upon them the fact that there was a violation.

The Chairman. Has there been any report made to the Commission to the effect that there was any violation of --

Mr. Rowley. No, sir, unless it is contained in this document here, sir.

The Chairman. I have not seen anything in there. It seems to me they were all given a complete bill of health. And I just wonder if that is quite consistent with the facts that the Commission should have.

Mr. Rowley. No, sir. As I said earlier, we don't condone their action, nor do we try to belittle the violation. But in the circumstances, I took the decision that I thought right in view of the tragedy and so forth. In other circumstances it would have been entirely different. But as I said earlier, I don't think these people should be blamed for the tragedy that

happened at that time, and that any attempt to assess formal .
punishment would in the light of history stigmatize them
for the rest of their life, as well as their families.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I plan to leave that subject
now -- unless there is some further question.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Very well.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, will you tell us whether you
learned anything about the preparations in Dallas for the visit
of the President on November 22nd?

Mr. Rowley. Yes. I read the report of Special Agent Lawson,
who was designated as the advance agent for that visit.

Mr. Rankin. And do you know that that report has been
furnished to us?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. A copy of it.

And have you examined it to determine whether it is accurate,
as far as you can determine?

Mr. Rowley. It is accurate, yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any additions or corrections?

Mr. Rowley. No, I have no corrections to make, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Were you -- are you satisfied, now examining
that report, with the manner in which the advance preparations

for the trip of the President were handled?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

The report follows the standard procedure that we have exercised over the years and in many of the trips we had taken with the late President. He covered everything with the police and all that we have normally covered on such visits.

Mr. Rankin. Did you have enough agents at that time to perform the required duties in connection with this trip for both Dallas and the other cities in Texas to be visited?

Mr. Rowley. Well, we never have enough agents for the activities that the President today is engaged in. We draw from the field to supplement or augment the agents from the White House Detail. We move the agents from one point to another where we can -- particularly in the area of the advance men.

But in Dallas we had sufficient agents with prior experience in Presidential protection who assisted Mr. Lawson in the advance preparations.

Mr. Rankin. Did you furnish to the Commission a statement of the preparations that were made for the trip?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And that included the various protective activities, did it?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. I hand you Exhibit 1021, and ask you if that is the report you made in regard to the trip.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1021 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any corrections or additions that you care to make to it?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission's Exhibit No. 1021.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1021 was received in evidence.)

The Chairman. Chief, I wondered about this question. Some months before Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been handled very roughly in Dallas. Did you make -- did your people make any investigation as to that group that caused that disturbance for him, to see if there might be some possibility of the same thing happening to the President?

Mr. Rowley. Not immediately at the time of the incident that occurred to Mr. Stevenson, but when the advance man came down, that was one of the things that we assigned a local agent

to inquire into, to ascertain the hard core of that group, if you will, that were responsible for stimulating that activity. And he contacted an informant, and with the local police, who are members of a special squad that are involved in this kind of activity, they went and identified through pictures, which they saw in the newsreel, the principal members. They had photographs made, and they issued them to the agents on their visit there, to be on the lookout for those men as potential troublemakers.

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Did they do the same thing concerning the incident that Vice President Johnson had a year or so before that?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir, not at that time. That was more or less in the heat of a political campaign. I don't think that was a similar type of activity.

The Chairman. I see

But you did do it with the Stevenson matter?

Mr. Rowley. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you make a report to the Commission with regard to the publicity concerning the trip of the President?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And is Exhibit 1022 that report?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1022 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin. Do you wish to make any additions or corrections of that letter?

Mr. Rowley. Of that letter?

No.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1022.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1022 was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, could you inform the Commission about the advance publicity concerning trips of the President to various parts of the country? There has been the question raised as to whether that is a threat to the President, and might make the work of the Secret Service and others who are doing protective work more difficult.

Mr. Rowley. Well, we have found that it is. And we always consider it as a potential threat in that it might give someone the opportunity who had any plans, whether it be an individual as in this case or a group, to select an area, if they knew what the route was, or to conduct a reconnaissance,

if you will. I have always been opposed to it, and I have always tried to prevail upon the staff of the various Presidents who might be responsible for the release not to release it too far in advance.

Mr. Rankin. Could you tell the Commission what the problem is in that regard?

Mr. Rowley. Well, in this regard, it is a political thing. The President cannot be contained in a vacuum. If he wants to go out and meet the people under our form of government, he will in his own way. Each and every President has his own thoughts and methods as it pertains to these visits, and the need for publicity. This trip in Dallas was an opportunity for the people to see the President, as are the trips of any President. I remember well when President Truman started his trip across the country in June 48, the purpose being to get the feel of the people and let the people see him at the time.

And it was then, as a result of that trip, that he determined he would run for re-election. That I know of my own personal knowledge.

But these are the things that are hard in security, as far as developing a close screen on the President.

Mr. Rankin. Is the protective research section of the Secret Service under your direction, too?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir. That is part of the White House

area, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Are you familiar with the testimony of Robert Bouck concerning that section?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know whether that accurately describes the conduct of that section?

Mr. Rowley. Well, at that time. The section was established by us some 20 years ago, and primarily to process threats, obscene letters and suicide notes. Over the years, and particularly during the last nine years, the work has evolved to a point where we find that it requires further expansion.

It had a broad and general concept in the criteria of what it needed for Presidential protection, in knowing what risks were about the country.

Mr. Rankin. Did the Secret Service have a written communication to other intelligence agencies as to the criteria for information that they sought?

Mr. Rowley. At that time?

Mr. Rankin. Yes, at that time.

Mr. Rowley. No, it was more or less of an informal arrangement that we had with the agencies, as we developed the Section.

Mr. Rankin. Will you tell the Commission what the standard was that you told the agencies you would like to have information concerning?

Mr. Rowley. Well, any threats to the President, we were interested in being informed about it. We were in touch with the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and others.

In the basic schools of the Treasury, and through coordination, our agents in charge of the areas, in coordination meetings, would inform representatives of other agencies of the type of people that we were interested in, the nature of the threats that we asked that they be referred to us.

Mr. Rankin. Did you know that this standard only developed about 4-- names from all over the country?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And that it produced none in the immediate Dallas vicinity?

Mr. Rowley. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. Now, have you done anything about that standard since the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Well, we have had a complete re-examination of the PRS Section.

Mr. Rankin. Can you describe --

Mr. Rowley. We infused new blood. We have asked the Rand Corporation, the Research Analysis Corporation, the President's Scientific Advisor and the medical people for a study of this, and we are in constant consultation. We have brought in experienced agents who now are processing, evaluating and

analyzing all reports we receive and indexing the information as we receive it from the various agencies. We have more recently issued and forwarded to the intelligence community in Washington our criteria at the present time regarding what we would ask them in a more formal document. This is the beginning of what we hope to be a more thorough and practical approach to this problem.

Mr. Rankin. Chief, I will hand you Commission's exhibit No. 1023, dated June 17, 1964, and ask you if that is a communication from you to the Commission describing the new criteria.

Mr. Rowly. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit 1023 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin. Does it accurately state that criteria?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir, it does.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1023.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1023 was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rowley. If I may read --

Mr. Rankin. Would you tell us the gist of the new criteria, and what the difference is as you conceive it between the old standard?

Mr. Rowley. Well, if I may do this. We have sent this criteria to the intelligence agencies that we think would be of help to us, with a covering letter in which we say that studies are now under way, "by which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view toward amendment if required. We will appreciate your cooperation and suggestions concerning these guidelines, so that the person of the President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and resources."

Another thing today now that we have to concern ourselves with, is that we now get an expanding file of information.

Mr. Rankin. Has that happened since the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Well, yes. We have gotten some 9,000 reports on the members of the Communist Party from the F.E.I. At this time we have read and evaluated and catalogued them and indexed them. There has been a small percentage that have been to date of interest to us. But this is the beginning. And except for the indexes, we are more or less current as a result of that. This is through the long hours and hard work by the new group that I brought in to develop this department.

Mr. Rankin. Now, how is the standard described in Exhibit 1023 different from the prior standard?

Mr. Rowley. Well, we have always had the basic standard.

The other standard was the threat to harm or embarrass the President. However, this time we added three factors.

Mr. Rankin. And those are in addition to the threat or harm to the President?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. All right. Proceed.

Mr. Rowley. The interest of the individual or the organization, capabilities of the individual or organization. The interests of the individual or organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria, but must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.

"The interest must be towards the President or others named or other high government official in the nature of a complaint, coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. After the interest phase of the criteria is met, then the activity which encompasses previous history, that is, mental instability, history of violence and the capability of the individual or organization for furthering this interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service. In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating to each of the

three factor criteria."

Mr. Rankin. Now, is the Secret Service operating under the standard or criteria described in Exhibit 102? at the present time?

Mr. Rowley. At the present time, it is, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And when did that become effective?

Mr. Rowley. That became effective in the last three weeks as we developed and explored and examined the many reports that we were receiving.

Mr. Rankin. Now, the language that you read into the record, where you invited comment and suggestions from the various other agencies to whom you sent communication, what did you mean by that? Is that asking them for their ideas so that you may further change the criteria?

Mr. Rowley. Where we may get in a position later on to break it down into categories. In other words, if every agency forwards and inundates us with many reports -- say we expand to 3 million, obviously, the whole intelligence family could not cope with that. You have to get it down to a workable number -- on the other hand, if you try to restrict the categories too much, then you find yourself in a position that you may miss another Oswald, and then the utilities of your file are of no consequence. So you have to try to reach the level in between where it is going to be practical for us to

react or develop the type of risks that we think should be covered by our organization in the protection of the President of the United States.

Mr. Rankin. Are you doing anything about the use of equipment that might help you to secure information about any particular locality the President was going to travel to more readily?

Mr. Rowley. In connection with the PRS?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Rowley. Well, we have conferred with IBM.

Can I go off the record on this?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, you have described off the record certain matters that involve the security of the country and cannot be made public. But can you tell us whether you have done anything in the past to try to improve your methods in testimony that can be made public?

Mr. Rowley. Well, I have tried to secure in the appropriation funds to enable us to procure the equipment and personnel that we thought would be necessary.

With the approval of the Congress, we were able two years ago to secure funds to enable us to our check forgeries, to try

to adapt the characteristics of handwriting to an ADP processing program. We are hopeful that this will work out. And we have used the Bureau of Standards to assist us in this program. We have prints out and have programmed part of the operation.

Now, it was my thought that if we succeeded in that area, we could also apply it to PRS. So we are working quite hard on this other area. And I knew the need would be eventually for us to get into the PRS stage on the electronic machine situation.

Mr. Rankin. Now, did you know that we had asked Mr. Bouck when he testified if he could inform us at a later date about people who were in institutions or otherwise might be dangerous, and with regard to whom you asked that the Secret Service be notified, so that they could make adequate protection for the President?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know how many such cases you now have?

Mr. Rowley. Approximately a thousand.

Mr. Rankin. Would you tell the Commission what your practice was for the Secret Service concerning the route of the motorcade at the time of the assassination -- that is, whether you made inspection of adjacent buildings?

Mr. Rowley. At that time, and prior to that time, except for the inaugurations in Washington, and other parades, involving the visit of foreign dignitaries in Washington, in which the President would ride in the motorcade with the head of state and where we had ample time to make these surveys, we had never conducted on trips out of Washington surveys of this nature. I have here the statement of the conditions that prevailed in Dallas as well as other areas -- if I may read this.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Rowley. "Except for inauguration and other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by the Secret Service Agents or

by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.

"In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could not have been seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for a motorcade of 10 miles including many blocks of tall commercial buildings is not practical, nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.

"In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other checks were made by the Secret Service or by any other law enforcement agency at its request of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot."

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I will ask you not to describe any procedure, because of security considerations, but I would like to have you tell on the record, as I think it is proper, whether there has been a change in this regard in the procedures of the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. There has been a change in this regard.

Mr. Rankin. I will not make an inquiry about that, unless the Commission wishes to go into it off the record.

Rep. Ford. It is my understanding that the Commission has such documents that we could analyze ourselves as to these changes?

Mr. Rankin. I don't think we have any report of this.

Rep. Boggs. Why can't we get it off the record?

The Chairman. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you give us --

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question with regard to Exhibit 1023?

This, as I understand it, is the new specifications with regard to persons with respect to whom you wish to have alert information.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. It is called U. S. Secret Service Protective Information Guidelines." The top of page 2 of this exhibit is a paragraph that reads, "The interest" -- and that is the interest of the suspect, I assume --

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. "The interest must be towards the President or other named or other high government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance real or imagined."

I wonder if you could explain that a little more? I ask this question because I have been studying the previous assassinations a great deal. And in many of these cases, it seems to me this definition would not have covered the assassin. That is, there has been in some cases opposition to government, opposition to people in authority, but there has been no expressed hatred towards or animus against a particular President. And I was wondering whether this went too far on

a definition to meet your purposes.

Mr. Rowley. This is a beginning, as I indicated to you here. We hope to improve it. But this is one of the things where we want to include the Oswald type individual.

Now, Oswald wrote to the Governor intimating that he would use whatever means was necessary to obtain the change of his undesirable, or as he called it, dishonorable discharge. All legal means had been used in his case, where the Navy Review Board had examined it and came to a decision.

And this is an example of what we were trying to include in the area of this type of individual.

Now, the other people --

Mr. Dulles. But that was not a threat directed against the President. That was directed against the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. But then, on the other hand, they transfer the threats. I am quite sure that the Congressmen here get many threats, and that sometimes they may not come off. But these people are obsessed.

You take the individual that attempted the assassination of the late President Roosevelt in Miami that time. His original purpose was to shoot President Hoover. But then when he heard Roosevelt was there, he transferred.

Now, I remember a situation involving a member of Truman's staff, where a fellow stalked this man at his home. And finally we got into the case on his request. We satisfied ourselves that he wasn't a real threat to him -- but we picked up the paper a year later and found out he shot at an assemblyman in Staten Island. So if they make a threat or something like this, even though it is against the Government as a group, or have some grievance, they transfer it -- particularly to the President. They use that father complex, as indicated in the research work that these different agencies have submitted to us.

Rep. Ford. Under this criteria, which you are now following Oswald would have been designated? Is that your judgment?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. I had some question about that in reading it. That did not occur to me, because Oswald had never expressed any antagonism towards the President as far as I know up to this time -- the President personally, or even afterwards.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. But under this criteria he would. Namely, we had the interest because of the letter he wrote to Governor Connally. The activity, because he was a defector, and he demonstrated for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. The capability, because he traveled, and he had knowledge of firearms.

Mr. Dulles. Yes. But those do not come, it seems to me, within this definition. Maybe I interpret it differently than you. The last interest Oswald showed was directed towards General Walker. It wasn't against -- of course, that wasn't known.

Mr. Rowley. No. It wasn't known, but the first interest of this type was the letter to Governor Connally, in which he said he would use whatever means he could to correct that discharge; inferring, of course, that he would apply illegal means if he could.

Rep. Ford. If we only had the letter that he wrote to Governor Connally, and no other information, how would that threat or that course of action become known to the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. It would not unless it was furnished by the Navy Department or Secretary of the Navy's office.

Just like you gentlemen get letters that never come to our attention. But you might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.

Rep. Ford. Would this criteria be circulated among the 50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are received against a governor, then the governor's staff in that particular state would so notify the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. It could.

In this case it would be a help. But they refer all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.

Rep. Ford. The state?

Mr. Rowley. The governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this system would bring it to our attention.

Mr. Dulles. I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.

Mr. Rowley. Well, this is something -- actually, we have to develop something, but we have to, if you will, have a crash program. We are working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I indicated earlier.

(At his point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?

Mr. Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. I hand you Commission's Exhibit 1024, and ask you if that is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements that you have just described from the various agents about the events at Dallas.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024, for identification.)

(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission's Exhibit No. 1024.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1024 was received in evidence.)

(Mr. Rankin. I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.

The Chairman. Very well.

(Mr. Rankin. Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back of the car?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. I will hand you Exhibit 1025 and ask you if that is your transmittal letter with the statement attached.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 1025.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1025 was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in making these statements was understood by you or properly could have been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility about the protection of the President.

Mr. Rowley. No, I would not so construe that, Mr. Rankin. The agents would respond regardless of what the President said if the situation indicated a potential danger. The facilities were available to them. They had the rear steps and immediately in the event of any emergency they would have used them.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know why there was no one riding on the rear step at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. From normal practice, based on my own experience over the years, I know that the agent in charge in the front or any experienced agent who is either on the right front or the left front of the follow-up car, without being told will react immediately. If he determines there is a situation here, there is a big crowd and so forth, he will immediately leave that follow-up car. Now, the running board on the follow-up

car has an important place in the setup. It is a much better place to be than on the rear step if you see a situation and you want to move fast. Suppose someone is coming towards the President's car, you would be surprised how fast you are propelled by jumping off that car, and you are in motion fast, where you can either tackle somebody, or block him or anything like that. So this is an important part. You cannot do that from the rear step of the President's car.

Now, when the agents are in a heavy crowd, as we have been abroad, in places where we had to run, say, for 10 miles, alongside the car, agents could stand on the rear steps and screen the President. In addition, there would be agents on the side, protecting him on his right side.....the crowd is surging close to him, you are bouncing off the car and the people trying to ward them off from touching the President.

After a period of time you are weary. But with the aid of this step, you can be replaced by the agent there, and he takes your place until you revive yourself -- and you are acting as a screen.

Now if the thing gets too sticky, you put the agent right in the back seat which I have done many times with past Presidents.

When you come out of a big crowd like that, and the crowd is sparse, and it doesn't look like there is a potential danger,

you return to the follow-up car to be ready for any emergency in the event somebody darts across.

In this instance, when the Presidential car was coming towards the Freeway and the people were sparse, the men at some point came back to this car. This is one of the automatic operations, if you will, that the agents respond to. So it wasn't until the first shot was fired that -- as I said earlier -- Hill had the opportunity to span from his left to his right, that he saw the President -- the action of the President. Then he responded immediately. That is why he got up to the President's car.

Mr. Rankin. Has it ever been the practice of the Secret Service to have an agent ride all of the time on the back step?

Mr. Rowley. No, it hasn't. Because there are times when you pick up your speed, for instance on a Freeway, when you pick up your speed, it is the most difficult thing on a step maybe 10 to 12 inches wide, and a grip, to stand up. And you would not be a very good screen going that fast because you would have to bend down.

This has happened to me because I have been caught on it.

Now, I was in Costa Rica and worked the follow-up car. Whenever I was on a trip abroad, I would work the follow-up car to see how the agents work, and work myself, because it wasn't what you might refer to as a routine trip.

But the follow-up car conked out. The crowds were surging around the President's car. We had two men next to the President's car. I left the follow-up car immediately and jumped on the step to the right rear of the President and held onto the hand grip. And then when the man came back, I relieved him and took my position on the side -- for a distance of a mile or two, until such time as the follow-up car got underway, and the other people came up to him. But you had to stay with the President under these circumstances.

So these are the different things that occur in a given situation.

The Chairman. Chief, as I understand this, President Kennedy did not give any general instructions to the agents never to ride on his car. It was only in specific circumstances where for one reason or another he did not want them on there at that particular time.

Mr. Rowley. No President will tell the Secret Service what they can or cannot do.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. Rowley. Sometimes it might be as a political man or individual he might think this might not look good in a given situation. But that does not mean, per se, that he doesn't want you on there. And I don't think anyone with common sense

interprets it as such.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Rowley. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean, this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in Protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. Rowley, Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And that is Exhibit 1026?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1026.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026 was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. I will hand you Commission's Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. Rowley, Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Exhibit 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be -- that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. Rowley. No, as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit No. 1027.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027 was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Exhibit 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you answered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. Rowley. No, not at this time.

Mr. Dulles. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mrs. Dulles. You think they would?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. You think they understand that?

Mr. Rowley. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out, we haven't gotten any reaction. We asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. Dulles. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. Rowley. Well, they are given to us now -- We are being furnished the name of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be

furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, ----

Rep. Boggs. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. Rowley. Yes. Under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no indication that they had made by threat towards the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Rep. Boggs. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times -- he was interviewed in New Orleans when you allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, he was interviewed shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository.

I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life.

But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was