

this individual would indeed constitute a risk to the President's safety, if he went to that area.

Mr. Stern. This is done, this is organized on a geographic basis?

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. Stern. By Secret Service field offices?

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Is there any other control device that you employed at the time of Dallas?

Mr. Bouck. We had at the time a very small device that we call an album which has a few, perhaps 12 or 15 people that we consider very dangerous or at least dangerous and no mobile that we can't be sure where they might be. This is a constant thing. Copies of these are kept before the protective personnel at the White House all the time. This resides in their office.

Sen. Cooper. On that point, if this last category represents a group that is so highly dangerous, have any individuals in that group reached the place where they have made such statements as would bring them under the Federal Act which would require prosecution?

Mr. Bouck. No, sir, if they were prosecutable we would seek that solution immediately, and many of them have been taken to the District Attorney and it has just been determined they do not quite meet the requirements for prosecution.

Some have been prosecuted, and have served sentences and

are out at the end of sentences but still thought to be dangerous.

Sen. Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Bouck. Some have been in mental institutions and discharged, and there isn't ground to put them back but we are still afraid of them.

Mr. Stern. Are the individuals who are listed in the trip index file which numbered at the time of Dallas about 100, also listed in the check-up control files?

Mr. Bouck. Yes. Yes, they would, primarily that 100 would to a large degree be in both places.

Mr. Stern. Then it is a fair summary, Mr. Bouck, that at the time of Dallas the number of individuals that you were concerned with were some thousand, the number you will supply, who were institutionalized either in prison or in mental hospitals, and with hospital institutions you had an arrangement that would promptly notify you of the discharge or escape of that individual, some 400 on a systematic review, approximately every six months by your field offices, of which 100 were separately identified as particularly dangerous in the trip index file, and some 12 to 15 whose photographs were in the album?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, I think --

Mr. Stern. As a matter of fact, I would suppose the people in the album would also be in the check-up control file so really we are talking about, are we not, the unknown number in

institutions, and about 400 other individuals whom you were actively reviewing and about whom you would be concerned on the occasion of the President's trip?

Mr. Bouck. That is right.

Mr. Stern. In addition, you had files on, active files on, approximately 50,000 cases involving at least that number and probably more, individuals which were your basic library, as it were, but of reference use only until more information was developed about them?

Mr. Bouck. Well, I think you are quite accurate except in the last category. In these 50,000 cases would be tremendous numbers of cases that had been given investigative attention, and had been determined that our first thought or our first indications of danger were not substantiated, the investigator, and we concurred, felt that the individual, at least at any particular time, that this particular individual was not really in fact a menace to the President's life.

Mr. Dulles. What was the location of these 50,000 cases? We are talking now about Dallas, is that countrywide?

Mr. Bouck. Countrywide.

Mr. McCloy. International.

Mr. Bouck. It is worldwide over a period of 20 years.

Mr. Dulles. Yes. Somebody in Thailand, if he was in Thailand wouldn't be of much danger in Dallas.

Mr. Stern. But he would be, as I understand it, if he

included in the basic files if he had come to their attention as a potential danger.

Mr. Dulles. Someone in New Orleans, for example, he could get up to Dallas very quickly or if he were in Houston, but this 50,000 covers the whole world.

Mr. Storn. Yes, and it is, I think the important point here, Mr. Dulles, is that these are 50,000 cases of background information, people already investigated and found not to represent danger. The number of cases under active scrutiny at the time of Dallas amounted to about 400, who were reviewed periodically, plus a much larger number in the thousands of persons committed or imprisoned, and as to those, I estimate there would be no problem until they were released.

Mr. Bouck. That is right.

Mr. Storn. And you had a system to be notified about the release or escape, is that correct?

Mr. Bouck. That is correct.

Mr. Dulles. So can we get from that about the number of cases you felt to look at in connection with the President's trip to Dallas?

Mr. Bouck. We actually --

Mr. Dulles. What range would that be?

Mr. Bouck. We actually looked at a volume of cases approximating 400 in connection with the trip to Dallas.

Mr. Storn. Well --

Mr. Bouck. That is the total file that we looked into.

Mr. Stern. On a national basis?

Mr. Bouck. The total two or three files we looked into would encompass about that many people.

Mr. Dulles. All right. That gives me just what I was asking for.

Mr. Stern. In point of fact, Mr. Bouck, when you looked at the check-up control file and the trip index file before the Dallas trip how many names were, in fact, reported for the areas in Dallas where the President was to visit?

Mr. Bouck. We found no uncontrolled people in the trip file for Dallas. All of the cases in Dallas were controlled to our satisfaction. We found also in the check-up file no uncontrolled individuals that we thought warranted an alert for Dallas.

Mr. Dulles:- Did you ask the FBI or any other local agency for any cases they might have?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. In connection with the trip?

Mr. Bouck. In fact, they referred several cases to us in connection with the trip, right prior to the trip on the local level.

Mr. Dulles. On the local level?

Mr. Bouck. On the local level.

Mr. McCloy. Being as objective as you can be under the circumstances, what would you have done if the FBI had told you

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there was a man named Oswald in Dallas who was a defector, had been a defector?

Mr. Bouck. I think if they had told us only that, we probably would not have taken action. If I might qualify it further, if we had known what all of the government agencies know together, and know that he had that vantage point on the route, then we certainly would have taken very drastic action.

Mr. McCloy. If they had told you that there was a man named Oswald in Dallas who had been a defector who was employed at the Texas School Book Depository?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir, we would have looked at that.

Mr. McCloy. You would have looked at that?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. Knowing that the Texas School Book Depository was on the President's route?

Mr. Bouck. On the President's route.

Mr. Stern. Would it have made a difference to you if he was a legitimate employee of that institution?

Mr. Bouck. Well, not from our standpoint of having us look at it. I can't predict too well what the field office would have done after they looked. It would depend on what they found out, but the field office would have checked that. We would have asked them to check it and they would in fact have checked it not knowing what conclusions they would have arrived at, I don't quite -- I am not quite able to predict just what measures

they would have taken.

Sen. Cooper. May I ask a question on this point? Have you examined your records since the assassination of President Kennedy to determine if the name Lee Oswald appears in your files?

Mr. Bouck. We have never had it prior in any connection, ever in our records.

Sen. Cooper. I gathered from what you said in response to Mr. McCloy's question you do not keep any special file relating to defectors?

Mr. Bouck. No, sir.

Sen. Cooper. In this country?

Mr. Bouck. Not unless there is something much more to it than the fact they defected.

Sen. Cooper. Then in the case of Lee Oswald from your statement that you do not keep any file on defectors, if you had known about his presence there, what would have been the cause then for you to have taken special notice of him?

Mr. Bouck. The key there would have been a deflection plus a knowledge that he had a vantage point on the route. These two together would have required action.

Sen. Cooper. The point I make is, and this again is arguing after the fact, if the fact he was a defector, plus vantage point would make you take notice of him it would seem to me it would be very substantial evidence to have in your file that he

was a defector, wouldn't you think so?

Mr. Bouck. Well, again, this is part of his big study that we are in. We never before do we know, I think of a defector who did anything like this so we are not quite sure that defection in itself is a key to an assassin. However, that combined with certain things, knowing that he had a vantage point would have caused us to look.

Mr. Stern. Were there any other characteristics of Oswald that you believe to have been known to other Federal agencies before November 22 that would have been important to you in deciding whether or not he was a potential threat?

Mr. Bouck. Yes. I think I have supplied you with a list of about 18 things that were known to the Federal agencies, but these, I believe, were spread from Moscow to Mexico City in at least four agencies, so I am not aware of how much any one agency or any one person might have known.

But there was quite a little split of derogatory information known about Oswald in this broad expanse of agencies.

Mr. Stern. Without respect to any such list, what other characteristics, trying as much as possible to avoid hindsight, do you think were germane to determine his potential danger?

Mr. Bouck. I would think his continued association with the Russian Embassy after his return, his association with the Castro groups would have been concern to us, a knowledge that he had, I believe, been court-martialed for illegal possession

of a gun, of a hand gun in the Marines, that he had owned a weapon and did a good deal of hunting or use of it, perhaps in Russia, plus a number of items about his disposition and unreliability of character, I think all of those if we had had them altogether, would have added up to pointing out a pretty bad individual, and I think that, together, had we known that he had a vantage point would have seemed somewhat serious to us, even though I must admit that none of these in themselves would be, would meet our specific criteria, none of them alone.

But it is when you begin adding them up to some degree that you begin to get criteria that is meaningful.

Sen. Cooper. I am sure you have answered what I am going to ask but I will ask it anyway. Then it is correct prior to the assassination the Secret Service had no information from any agency or any source --

Mr. Bouck. That is correct.

Sen. Cooper. --relating to Lee Oswald?

Mr. Bouck. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. I believe you said earlier, Mr. Bouck, that before Dallas you thought the liaison arrangements were satisfactory and that other Federal agencies, in particular, had full awareness of the kind of information that the Secret Service was looking for under the general criteria that you articulated?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. Now then, do you think Oswald -- you were not

notified of Oswald. Was there perhaps something wrong with the system?

Mr. Bouck. This, of course, is opinion. In my opinion, there was no lack of knowledge of what we should have. Insofar as I know no individual knew enough about Oswald to judge him to meet our criteria of presenting a danger to the President. I know of no individual who knew all about Oswald, including the fact that he had a vantage point on the route.

If that is so, I don't know. I didn't know.

Mr. McCloy. Somebody in the FBI knew it, didn't they?

Mr. Bouck. I have no record to know that. They knew certain information. I have no record that would indicate they knew all of the derogatory information.

Mr. McCloy. I don't know I would say they knew all the derogatory information but they certainly knew the vantage point and they certainly knew the defection elements.

Mr. Bouck. I know they knew he was in Dallas. Whether they recognized that as being on the route, I don't know that.

Mr. McCloy. I think the record shows he was employed there, or the deposition shows.

Mr. Bouck. I don't know that.

Mr. Stern. Is it of key importance to what you say now that the information on Oswald before the assassination to identify his vantage point, if you would take that away from the other characteristics does he then not become a threat?

Mr. Bouck. He would not meet the criteria of a threat as we had it at that time, if you take that away.

Mr. Stern. And the criterion was --

Mr. Bouck. That there be some specific indication that a possible danger to the President existed.

Mr. Dulles. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. McCloy. Back on the record.

Mr. Stern. Well, Mr. Bouck, if the pivotal ingredient is his employment at that depository, is that because that showed some, to your mind, some intention, some desire to be on the route, because access to the route --

Mr. Bouck. No, it relates him to the President. This, I think if all the information that was known about him, indicates that he was a pretty untrustworthy individual, I think there was no indication that that untrustworthiness might be of a danger to the President until you associated that he had a vantage point where he might use it toward the President.

There was nothing previous that indicated that the President might be an object of this, and --

Mr. Stern. As far as any of us know, any citizen had pretty much the same sort of access to the parade route. Is there any difference --

Mr. Bouck. We would feel the same way if we knew this much derogatory type of information about any citizen if we

knew he had a particular vantage point on a route.

Mr. Storn. But a citizen, possessing all the characteristic you believe to have been known about Oswald but not having access through employment or residence or some comparable relationship to the parade route, would not have been of concern to you under the criteria and practices in effect at the time of Dallas, is that what you are saying?

Mr. Bouck. I think a little broader than that. Access of any kind, working in a hotel or any point where he might have unusual access.

If you broaden the question to that, I would say that is what I am saying.

Mr. Storn. Unusual access?

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. If I might intervene here, if I understand it. I don't know whether it is good but it is speculation and conjecture in it, I don't know if you will get far with it, if you probably had known all the derogatory information that you now know was accumulated in all of the agencies of the government irrespective of where this fellow was in Dallas you might have kept your eye on him.

Mr. Bouck. Again, that would be speculation. I don't know. It wouldn't be normal. It wouldn't fit within our normal category unless we knew he was -- he had a vantage point. We know of tremendous numbers of people who are bad people that we

don't keep an eye on.

Mr. McCloy. Yes, but suppose you knew these men, or suppose you encountered some of these, I am told there are 18 others, wouldn't you have been somewhat negligent if you didn't check up to him when he got to the vantage point in Dallas?

Mr. Bouck. If we had checked up, I don't know whether we would have gone beyond that.

Mr. McCloy. I don't suggest that but you might have kept him under surveillance.

Mr. Bouck. We would have taken note of this.

Mr. Stern. Would that have been true if he had not been known to be living in Dallas, if his last known address was New Orleans?

Mr. Bouck. If he had not been living in Dallas we would not have checked on him in this trip even with the other information.

Mr. Stern. Suppose he had been living in Fort Worth?

Mr. Bouck. Well, if we had known he were living in Fort Worth that would be the same as Dallas, to us. When we speak of a city we speak of the driving distance or the commutable distance to a city.

Mr. Stern. We will move very quickly to questions concerning Oswald and I would like to go back now and cover the details of your file search and other PRS activity for the Texas trip, the total Texas trip, and if you would starting with the first date

you heard that the President was preparing to travel to Texas and tell us what your section did and what you found?

Mr. Bouck. Our first knowledge of the Texas trip was on November 8 when the advance agent, Agent Lawson, reported to the Protective Research Section that the President was going to Texas, and that Dallas was one of the stops. I checked at that time was made of our trip index, and no cards were found on Dallas to indicate that there was an uncontrolled dangerous person in Dallas.

Two such people were found at the Houston stop. This information was imparted to Mr. Lawson at that time.

Mr. Storn. Excuse me, could you identify the two Houston cases from Exhibit 762?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, they are in here. They are 26 is one. This individual is a local law enforcement officer that was not considered awfully dangerous but again because he might have an unusual vantage point we made arrangements each time to see that he was not used in any way that he might have a vantage point. 26 is the other one, which is a case that goes back many, many years of an individual who has been repeatedly threatening but we have been unable to do much about. She has been in and out of mental hospitals.

Mr. Storn. So these were then the two cases?

Mr. Bouck. The two cases.

Mr. Storn. That were in the trip index file involving

the jurisdiction of the Houston field office?

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

A notation was made at that time for the individual in charge of that section and on the 14th he again checked that file. He pulled out these two cards, and he checked the check-up file and concluded that those in the State of Texas were the only two uncontrolled people that we should alert the field about, and he pulled the case jackets on those two people and reviewed those, and then caused an alert to be prepared on those two people, the original being sent to the White House detail, and the copy being sent to the field office.

Mr. Stern. These are the same two Houston cases?

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Was there an additional case added on the 14th?

Mr. Bouck. No. Not by our section. There were just the two. There were cases picked up in the field on some of these, but we only sent out the two cases as being in our opinion of protective concern on that trip.

Mr. Stern. Would you look, Mr. Bouck, please, at the first page of Exhibit 760, the first text page, the third paragraph, the middle of the paragraph, it says, "On November 14, 1963, the above indicated clerical employee prepared an office memorandum advising the name of one PRS subject who had previously been referred to the interested officers and was still of concern and furnishing identifying data on a new PRS subject who had

not been previously included in the report."

Mr. Bouck. These were the two cases. The one we had alerted on a previous trip, the Deputy Sheriff one, had not been that had occurred since a previous trip and so this was the first time that we had told the detail in the field office that this individual should be looked at. Making a total of two.

Mr. Stern. Were there entries in the trip index file then for the other cities that the President was planning to visit or the other field office areas, Dallas, San Antonio and El Paso?

Mr. Bouck. No, there were no cards on any of the other three cities indicating uncontrolled people.

Mr. Stern. So in the four field offices covering the entire State of Texas there were in the trip index only two cards both of them residing in the Houston office area?

Mr. Bouck. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Now, do you know what was done in Dallas to supplement this investigation into potentially harmful people?

Mr. Bouck. Dallas made contact with the local authorities, they had contact with the FBI, they had contact with the local police in Dallas, and also some of the suburbs, particularly Denton, Texas, in which they received information on several situations and several individuals in addition to well, they received this information.

Mr. Stern. Are these cases summarized in Exhibit 762?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, they are. I think the first one of those

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is page number 2 of Exhibit 762, which involved people who had attempted to embarrass Ambassador Stevenson. Also page 3 is a further one. I believe they also received information on some scurrilous literature that was being circulated in Dallas at that time from the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Now, referring to the visit of Ambassador Stevenson in October, I believe --

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. Stern. -- was anything done at the time of that visit in October to identify the people who were participating in the obstreperous conduct that was carried on?

Mr. Bouck. I do not know. It was nothing.

Mr. Stern. So far as PRS?

Mr. Bouck. Nothing was done by PRS.

Mr. Stern. These individuals did come to light in the liaison activities just prior to President Kennedy's trip to Dallas?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And they were then, as I understand it, placed in your permanent records and are now in your trip index files?

Mr. Bouck. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Bouck, since the Stevenson trip received a great deal of publicity and I take it you knew about it at the time or PRS knew about it, can you tell us why there was no effort in October to determine who these people were for possible

use if President Kennedy or a later President should consider a trip to Dallas?

Mr. Bouck. Well, there are a great many disturbances and activities around, and we have never felt that we should document those per se inasmuch as they did not constitute a jurisdiction -- they were not within our jurisdiction except when the President went to an area, so it has always been something that we attempted to resolve when we had jurisdiction in the area because the President was going there, rather than engage in investigative activity that was not within our jurisdiction just per se, whenever there was a disturbance.

Mr. Stern. I am not sure I follow that. I take it your jurisdiction is to determine, perhaps not to act upon, but to determine people who might be threats to the President or Vice-President.

Mr. Bouck. These people were not judged at that time to be threats to the President, necessarily.

Mr. Stern. I see. Their activities in connection with Ambassador Stevenson's visit did not seem to you at that time --

Mr. Bouck. They did not fit our criteria as being a direct indication that the President might be harmed, but when the President went to that area, then that was a more serious connection was put on those people and they were investigated and were identified and pictures were made of them and given to the agents.

Mr. Stern. That is because the President was then going to that area?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Stern. Suppose the President was going to another area to which those individuals had moved in between the Stevenson visit and the hypothetical Presidential trip. You would have had no record of them, no way of knowing about them, is that correct?

Mr. Bouck. No, that would have to -- unless it had been reported to me they had moved, then the only way we would pick that up would be in the local liaison which begins some days before a trip.

Mr. Stern. But there would have been no basis to report to you that they had moved as I understand it because they would not have been persons of concern to you merely because of their involvement in the Stevenson affair?

Mr. Bouck. That is probably right.

Mr. McCloy. To summarize your testimony a bit I gather that the fundamental criterion that you were looking for is the potential threat to the health and life of the President of the United States, that you are not a general security agency of the United States, but it is directed particularly to that particular objective, and one of the things that alerts you to that threat is the threat, and then you examine that threat to determine whether or not it is a serious threat. A lot of elements enter

into that and at that point when it does become a serious threat, then you put it on your alert files, is that about right?

Mr. Bouck. That is a very good --

Mr. McCloy. Furthermore --

Mr. Bouck. Analysis.

Mr. McCloy. -Flowing from that the mere fact that a man or woman was a defector, or a man is a member of a political organization doesn't in itself embody the threat to the United States, to the President, the person of the President, of the United States.

Mr. Bouck. Right.

Mr. McCloy. It is only as there is some additional element that is influenced into that that causes you to fear that there is a potential menace that you put in that you have been talking about?

Mr. Bouck. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. I think we might illustrate that, Mr. McCloy, by a series of abstracts of cases that Mr. Bouck has prepared. I show you Commission Exhibit No. 766 for identification.

Mr. Bouck. Yes.

Mr. Stern. And would you describe that and summarize very briefly the cases involved there which I think are intended to typify, are they not --

Mr. Bouck. Yes. I prepared this and the thought was that the Commission might be interested in a couple of examples of

how the PRS function has been helpful in protection, and so three cases have been presented in this paper.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Bouck, have you anything you would like to add, any clarifications, any amplifications of the matters we have discussed this morning?

Mr. Bouck. I don't believe so. I think Mr. McCloy's summary probably exceeds anything I could give, and I think it is quite good and reflects, I believe, what we were trying to get at here.

Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed the memorandum and other exhibits that you have identified this morning and do you have any corrections or additions to make to those?

Mr. Bouck. No, sir, I think they are accurate.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move the admission of all the exhibits that Mr. Bouck has identified for us this morning and I have no further questions.

Mr. McCloy. They may be admitted.

(The documents referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibits 763 through 766, were received in evidence.)

Mr. McCloy. I have one more question I would like to ask you. In the light of what you know now about the whole episode, have you come to any conclusions as to how you ought to operate in the future other than you did in the Dallas situation?

Mr. Bouck. As Mr. Carroll has mentioned, of course, a great deal of study is being conducted. I think there are a number

of other things that can be done. Great problems arise as to human rights and Constitutional rights and costs and resources and just sheer, dealing with just sheer volume of millions of people, and I do not feel I would want to give final judgment as to whether we should do these things until we have completed all of these studies, but perhaps there will be some that will --

Mr. McCloy. You at this stage have any definite ideas about any steps that ought to be taken for the added protection of the President?

Mr. Bouck. Well, I have quite a lot of the which are incorporated in this study. I have been, and as I understand it, the Commission perhaps will have the benefit of that but I have been very heavily involved in many, many ways in this study, and as to the final conclusions, of course, I think maybe it goes all the way to the Congress to decide the practicality of some of this.

Mr. McCloy. I am sure it does.

Mr. Bouck. I just don't quite feel in a position to say that I would want to recommend most of these things without reservation at this time. If I might, without presuming to evade your question, if we could delay that a little bit until we have completed this rather massive look that we are now talking.

Mr. McCloy. Very well. Thank you very much for your cooperation, and very much obliged to you and the Treasury Department for helping us.

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Mr. Bouck. Thank you, sir.

Mr. McCloy. To achieve our, perform our duties.

Thank you.

We will adjourn until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1:00 o'clock p.m., the Commission adjourned
to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p.m., of the same day.

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Report of Proceedings
Held at
Washington, D. C.

Thursday, June 18, 1964

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Official Reporters

*Recd 9/27/64
from J. J. Rowley, Chief
USSS.
osth*

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

James J. Rowley

PAGE

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Robert Carswell

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EXHIBITS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FOR IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>IN EVIDENCE</u>
Commission 1018	7540	7540
Commission 1019	7561	7561
Commission 1020	7562	7563
Commission 1021	7566	7566
Commission 1022	7568	7568
Commission 1023	7572	7572
Commission 1024	7584	7585
Commission 1025	7585	7585
Commission 1026	7590	7590
Commission 1027	7590	7591
Commission 1028	7606	7606
Commission 1029	7626	7626
Commission 1030	7627	7627

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

- - -

Washington, D. C.

Thursday, June 18 1964

The President's Commission met, pursuant to recess, at
9:00 a.m., at 200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D. C.,
Chief Justice Earl Warren, presiding.

PRESENT:

Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman
Senator John Sherman Cooper, Member
Representative Hale Boggs, Member
Representative Gerald R. Ford, Member
Allen W. Dulles, Member

- - -

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel
Samuel Stern, Staff Member

- - -

(Members present at this point: Chief Justice Earl Warren.)

The Chairman. The Commission will come to order.

Chief, it is our procedure to read a little statement as to the purpose of the meeting, for the benefit of the witness.

Chief Rowley will be asked to testify with respect to the protective measures taken by the Secret Service of Dallas, changes in such measures made as a result of the Dallas experience, and with regard to the investigation of the assassination and any information he may have respecting the assassin of the President.

Would you raise your right hand and be sworn?

You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Rowley, I do.

The Chairman. Will you be seated, please. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, before starting the examination, I would like to make a brief statement for your benefit and for the benefit of the Commission, of the problems that are probably going to develop in this area with regard to the security of the country, and a suggestion about how we might handle them as we proceed with the witness.

I have suggested to Chief Rowley that as he moves along in his testimony he might have various matters that he would

think should not be on the record because of the security of the country, and if he would just suggest that, when he came to that point, and say specifically that it did involve the security of the country, then we would proceed to go off the record, if it was satisfactory to the Commission and consider those questions off the record. And then return to the record as soon as we had completed those security matters.

Would that be satisfactory?

The Chairman. I think that is an appropriate way to proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, will you state your name and address for the record, please?

Mr. Rowley, James J. Rowley, 3501 Rittenhouse Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have an official position with the Government?

Mr. Rowley, I have, as Chief of the United States Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. Rowley. Since September 1, 1961.

Mr. Rankin. What are the nature of the duties of that position?

Mr. Rowley. The nature of the duties is the general over-all supervision of the activities of the Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. And, in a general way, what is the official responsibility under the statutes of the United States of the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. Well, we are responsible under Title 18, Section 3056, to investigate all violations affecting the currency, and securities and coinage of the United States. That involves Government bonds, Government checks, and such other functions and duties as are authorized by law, subject to direction by the Secretary of the Treasury.

In addition, we have the responsibility for the protection of the President, members of his immediate family, the Vice President, President-elect, Vice President-elect, and the former President for a reasonable period of time as he leaves office.

Mr. Rankin. Will you please tell us what experience you had with the Secret Service prior to the time that you became Chief.

Mr. Rowley. I was in charge of the White House Detail from 1946 to 1961.

Mr. Rankin. Now, will you tell us briefly the training that you had in regard to Government Service?

Mr. Rowley. I first entered the Government as a member of the F.B.I. in 1937, and spent a year with the F.B.I., after

which I went back to New York for a period of nine months. I entered the Secret Service September 12, 1938. I spent time in criminal investigation in the New York City office, the Utica office of Secret Service and in April of 1939 I was assigned to Washington, eventually to the White House Detail.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Rowley. I served as a member of the White House Detail, as an agent on a shift, as an assistant agent in charge, agent in charge of the shift, and advance man, in preparing for Presidential visits, both domestically and abroad.

Mr. Rankin. What educational training did you have?

Mr. Rowley. I had two years of college towards a B.S., then I was graduated from law school, and secured a Masters Degree in law.

Mr. Rankin. Was one of the duties of your position as Chief of the Service to have general supervision over the trip of President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson to Dallas around November 22, 1963?

Mr. Rowley. Well, that would be part of my job -- the general supervision of the trip.

The actual direct supervision would have been under the jurisdiction of Mr. Behn, who was in charge of the White House Detail.

Mr. Rankin. Could you describe briefly the nature of Mr. Behn's responsibilities in that work?

Mr. Rowley. Well, it would have been, as I was in the period I was there, that he was responsible for developing all arrangements with the members of the White House staff, designating the members of the detail to develop advance work, assigning agents to the various shifts, directing their training as it applied to the White House Detail, and participating in any event that he thought would be necessary in connection with his work at the White House.

Mr. Rankin. Did you become familiar with what did happen on that trip, in your position as Chief?

Mr. Rowley. Yes. I was first informed while addressing a graduating class of our Secret Service School on that day. I was summoned by Mr. Behn to the White House, at which time he told me that the President had been shot. He was then at the hospital, and subsequently we were notified that the President had died; that the Vice President would take the oath of office in the airplane at Love Field.

In the meantime, I asked my deputy, who was in his office while I was at the White House, to arrange with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to close the border, Texas being in close proximity to the border. There might have been a conspiracy or something, we didn't want to take any chances.

And then I immediately dispatched an inspector from my staff to the Capitol to take over protection of the Speaker, and directed the other activities as we got the information from Dallas.

Mr. Rankin. Did you learn in connection with the trip when the assassination occurred that certain of the Secret Service agents had been in the press club and what is called the Cellar, at Fort worth the night before?

Mr. Rowley. Well, that came to my attention through a broadcast that Mr. Pearson made, that the agents were inebriated the night before at the Fort Worth Press Club. I immediately dispatched Inspector McCann to Fort Worth to investigate the report and to interview the agents.

Mr. Rankin. What did you learn?

Mr. Rowley. I learned that there were nine agents involved at the Press Club. And I might say this -- the agents on duty throughout that day had no opportunity to eat. When they arrived at Fort Worth, they were informed that there was a buffet to be served at the Fort Worth Club. This is what I ascertained in personal interviews. Upon going over there, they learned there was no buffet, and some of them stayed for a drink. Three, I think, had one scotch, and others had two or three beers. They were in and out -- from the time they arrived, I would say

roughly around 12:30, until the place closed at 1 o'clock.

Now, after that some of them went to the Cellular. This is a place that does not serve alcoholic beverages. They went there primarily, I think, out of curiosity, because this was some kind of a beatnik place where someone gets up and recites, or plays the guitar.

Mr. Rankin. Did you learn whether or not there were any violations of the regulations of the Secret Service by these men?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, there was a violation. At that time there was a section in our manual in effect that said that during --

Mr. Rankin. Will you give us first the number?

Mr. Rowley. Section 10.

Mr. Rankin. Is that Chapter 1, page 7?

Mr. Rowley, Chapter 1, page 7, yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Now, will you tell the Commission about what the regulation was?

Mr. Rowley. The use of liquor. "Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours they are officially employed at their posts of duty or when they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an official duty."

The one that applies here -- "However, all members of the

White House Detail and Special Agents cooperating with them on Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them or by special agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel status is prohibited."

Mr. Rankin. Can you tell the Commission how many men were involved in these trips to the Press Club and the Cellar, where these things were done?

Mr. Rowley. There were nine men involved at the Press Club, and there were 10 men involved at the Cellar.

Mr. Rankin. Now, how many men, of those 10 men, were in the Presidential motorcade on the day of the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Four -- four men were in the follow-up car.

The Chairman. Who were they?

Mr. Rankin. Do you know their names?

Mr. Rowley. Yes. -- Landis, Hill, Reedy, and Bennett.

Mr. Rankin. Did you make any investigation to determine whether or not their violation of the Secret Service regulations had anything to do with the assassination of the President?

Mr. Rowley. Yes. They performed their duties from the time they departed in the follow-up car from Love Field until

the point of the tragedy in a most satisfactory manner. There was nothing deficient in their actions or their alertness. They went through the heaviest part of downtown Dallas, through the crowds, and performed in an exemplary manner.

Mr. Rankin. How do you know that?

Mr. Rowley. From the reports that I got from their superiors.

Mr. Rankin. In the work that you did with the White House Detail before you became Chief of the Secret Service, did you know the various responsibilities of the members of the White House Detail?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you ever participate in such motorcades yourself?

Mr. Rowley. I have, yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. How much?

Mr. Rowley. Well, I have participated, in rough numbers, over a period of 22 years -- roughly, maybe a thousand or more.

Mr. Rankin. Will you briefly describe the functions of the Secret Service agents in connection with the President's car?

The Chairman. Have you finished this other matter?

Mr. Rankin. No. I just wanted to --

The Chairman. All right. Go right ahead.

Mr. Rowley. When the President's car leaves the airport, or a railroad station or any other location, the agents accompany him to the car and stand to the right and left in the same order as their designated position on the follow-up car and screen him. And then when the car moves out, slowly, because the rest of the cars have to have an opportunity to follow in the motorcade, so that none linger behind, or is left behind. And then the agent in the lead car determines that the motorcade is intact and is moving, then he steps up his speed, which is a cue to the Presidential driver to step up his speed, and then they go at a speed consistent with the crowd that is there, and so forth.

Now, upon leaving the airport, if there is a huge crowd there, the men are still on the ground running on the right and left side of the President, both rear and front of the vehicle. After they get out of the crowd, then the men in the front beside the Presidential vehicle drop back and take their positions on the follow-up car.

This is so that they are not in the way of the men running on the right and left rear. They move back last and have a clear opportunity to jump on board the follow-up car in the event the speed of the motorcade is stepped up.

When the motorcade comes to intersections or turns which are always vulnerable points, in that if you make a right turn, that is the closest point for someone to come out, the agents on the right side before reaching that point, will jump off, to be available alongside the President's car in the event someone darts out with some malicious plan.

There have been also times when innocently ladies and young people will come out to throw a bouquet of flowers. And then if there is a crowd that is sparse, they return to their positions in the follow-up car.

Now, when they come into a big crowd, they take it on foot, and at a little jog, if necessary.

In some instances, if the crowd continues for a prolonged distance, the agents work together. In other words, there are rear steps on the right and left rear of the Presidential car with handrail. These have two purposes. One for an agent to ride and to screen the President from anything from above; the second, in a situation like this, to keep an additional man available in case of trouble, and also to alternate with the man to the right rear of the President, who are jogging along warding off the crowd.

Mr. Rankin. Now, what positions did the four men that you referred to that were involved in the press club and the Cellar matter occupy on the day of the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Well, Mr. Reedy occupied the right front,

Mr. Landis to his rear --

Mr. Rankin. What do you mean by right front?

Mr. Rowley. Right front, running board of the follow-up car. It was his responsibility or duty to jump off in crowds and to take the position at the right rear of the President's car.

Mr. Landis, if necessary, to jump off if the occasion demanded and take the right front of the President's car.

Mr. Hill was on the left front running board of the follow-up car and his responsibility was at the rear of the President's car. His position was assigned there because he was in charge of the First Lady's Detail, and she was seated on the left side.

And Mr. McIntyre was to his rear on the left running board. So his assignment would have been up to the left front of the President's car. Mr. Bennett was in the rear seat of the follow-up car.

Mr. Rankin. Now, how can you tell that the fact that they were out as they were the night before and violated the regulations, had nothing to do with the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Well, based on the reports of my investigating agents and the fact as to how they performed at the time of the tragedy. Mr. Hill, who was on the left side, responded immediately -- as he looked toward the Presidential car, being

on the left side, he scanned from left to right, and when he saw something happened to the President following a noise, he immediately jumped from his position to get aboard from his side.

Mr. Reedy scanned to the right so he was looking away from the President, because he was looking around from the right side. As a consequence, he wasn't aware of what was happening in the front. The car was also going on a turn at that time.

Mr. Rankin. What about the other two?

Mr. Rowley. The other two were watching -- they reacted normally -- the man on the left side looked to his left rear, and the man, Landis, looked to his right rear.

Mr. Rankin. Have you done anything to discipline these men for violation of the regulations of the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. Well, I did consider what type of punishment would be provided.

Then I also considered the fact that these men in no way had -- their conduct had no bearing on the assassination. And, therefore, I thought that in the light of history, to place a stigma on them by punishing them at that time from which inevitably the public would conclude that they were responsible

for the assassination of the President -- I didn't think this would be fair, and that they did not deserve that with their family and children.

(At this point, Representative Ford entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Dulles. May I ask one question there?

You described the assignment of the four men with respect to the follow-up car and the President's car. Do they have different assignments with regard to watching what is happening around them, or does that depend on the circumstances in which they are?

Mr. Rowley. Both. When they start off they have a certain area that they have to watch. Like the man in the right front would naturally watch slightly to the right and in front of him.

The fellow on the side, behind him, will watch to the right and rear.

In other words, as they are going by a building, he should scan the building.

In the meantime, he picks up where the man in the front has finished. In other words, the scan of the man in the front will cover the building to his front and side; the fellow behind will scan along side from rear to forward. Their scanning joins.

This is the way they are accustomed to doing it.

Mr. Dulles. Who would cover straight ahead?

Mr. Rowley. The man in the front seat has that responsibility.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, how do you construe subparagraph (c) of your regulation 10 regarding the use of alcoholic liquors?

The Chairman. Will you read it for the record?

Mr. Rankin. Will you kindly read it?

Mr. Rowley. "Violation or slight disregard of the above paragraphs or the excessive or improper use of intoxicating liquor at any time will be cause for removal from the Service. In interpreting the words "excessive" and "improper", slight evidence tending to indicate unusual or questionable conduct will be considered proof that the use of a liquor has been improper or excessive. Association with others who drink to excess will be considered as an indication of using more than a moderate amount of liquor. The excuse that liquor was used for medicinal purposes will not be accepted."

Mr. Rankin. How do you construe and apply that?

Mr. Rowley. Well, the actions of the men were wrong.

Mr. Rankin. Now, were these men under this regulation considered to be on travel status, so that they should not be using intoxicating liquor?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And there is no question about that in your mind?

Mr. Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Has anything been done to reprimand and cause them to realize that this is a violation of your regulations?

Mr. Rowley. They were interviewed by the inspector at the time. The seriousness of their acts were impressed upon them. And I think they recognize the seriousness of their acts.

The men we recruit are men that are college graduates and mature, and we screen them very carefully, particularly before we assign them to the White House Detail. They know and we know that they are in a fishbowl 24 hours a day, and that, therefore, their conduct is always subject to scrutiny, and so forth, and that they are responsible individuals. Their records have indicated that they have been performing in a high degree. They have worked endless hours of overtime. They are dedicated.

And if they were not, they would not be on the detail.

They realize the seriousness of the violation, and I went over it with my special agent in charge. He understands it. And I am quite sure that they all understand it at this time.

Mr. Rankin. I would like to have you examine Commission's

Exhibit No. 1018, Chief Rowley, and see if that is the regulation of the Secret Service that you have been referring to.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, that is what I have been reading here, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to offer as a part of the record the regulation, Commission Exhibit 1018.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document was marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1018, and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, have you had any other complaints similar to this in regard to the conduct of the Secret Service agents on the Presidential or White House Detail?

Mr. Rowley. We had one in the last month. We had charges leveled at us by an agent of the Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. Rowley. The charges were made by an agent who is currently under indictment, and who will be brought to trial on criminal charges on the 29th of June. I have no reluctance to discuss it. But, on the other hand, you may want to go off the record, because I don't want to in any way prejudice the case.

The Chairman. There is no reason to discuss that case here, Chief.

Is there anything in particular that would affect this situation you wanted to know about, Mr. Rankin?

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, the only thing would be the investigation as to whether or not there was comparable conduct. I didn't know whether the Commission would like to know what that investigation was and what the results of it were.

The Chairman. Well, I suppose there is no objection to the Chief telling us what this complaint was, but not insofar as it bears on the crime that he is charged with.

Mr. Rowley. Well, it ties in with the crime, because he said he was framed.

Now, he said he was framed because he was prepared to go before your Commission, sir, to testify about this thing that happened three years ago, and in the charges he said he advised me, as well as others, and nothing was done.

He said he was framed for this reason.

The Chairman. Had he ever made any complaint to you before?

Mr. Rowley. He had never made any complaint to me. It came as a complete surprise.

Rep. Ford. The complaint to you came subsequent to the filing of criminal charges against him?

Mr. Rowley. He said he had made the charges at the time the alleged incidents occurred, Mr. Congressman, that he notified me, before he left an assignment three years ago.

In other words, let me give you the background so there is no misunderstanding. We have what we call an orientation program. The men we recruit from the colleges, and the type of men that we want, we cannot always get off the Civil Service roster. Therefore, we have an understanding with Civil Service that we can take men under Schedule A. Within a period of two years, they will have to be assigned to the White House or dropped from the Service.

Now, in order to determine their ability and fitness for such an assignment, since some people are better criminal investigators than they are in protection work, we have an orientation program which includes duty on the White House Detail. Mr. Bolden was one of the men selected to come in the summer of 1961. He was also a replacement for some regular agent on the detail who was on leave. It was a 30 day assignment. This afforded us an opportunity to observe him, determine whether he was equipped and so forth.

And he was on the White House Detail for this short period of time. The time that he complains about was a five day weekend up in Hyannis Port.

Mr. Rankin. I don't think that quite answers --

Mr. Rowley. I am giving the background.

Mr. Rankin. I think the question is as to when you got the complaint.

Mr. Rowley. Well -- excuse me.

Continuing -- Before he left his detail assignment, you see, he alleges that he told me about the condition that was going on up in Hyannis.

Rep. Ford. Before he left on this 30 day assignment?

Mr. Rowley. When he left to return to his office in Chicago.

Mr. Rankin. And what is the fact in that regard?

Mr. Rowley. The fact is he never informed me. He never informed any of his supervisors or anyone on the detail.

Mr. Rankin. I think the record should show, Mr. Chairman, that we were never advised that he wanted to testify to any inquiry or anything about the matter, until after we learned about it in the newspapers. And, even then, he didn't ask to testify. And we asked the F.B.I. to check into it, and he had counsel, and they refused to tell anything about the matter at that time.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question?

Did I understand you to say that the Civil Service prescribes that certain men must be assigned to the White House for a certain detail?

Mr. Rowley. No. Mr. Dulles, we have an arrangement with the Civil Service that they will permit us to recruit these men, not from the register, but under what they call Schedule A. They give us an opportunity, two years, to train these men - with the

understanding that within two years time they will have to be assigned to the White House Detail or we will not be able to retain them in the Service.

However, during that two years, we urge them to take the Civil Service examination, so that they get on the register. And then when they do -- quite frequently this occurs -- they are selected from the register, and once they become permanent, if they are not interested in the White House Detail, then they continue their work as a criminal investigator in the field.

Mr. Dulles. But if they do not take that special examination, then -- and become a part of the Civil Service, then they have to be assigned to the White House, to stay on?

Mr. Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. I was a little worried when you said certain people had to be assigned to the White House, that you were under compulsion to assign certain people to the White House in order to retain them.

Mr. Rowley. No. Anyone who works in the White House, whether he is an electrician, a painter, or anything, for a period of two years, he automatically becomes eligible for permanent Civil Service status.

Rep. Ford. Is that by law or by regulation?

Mr. Rowley. That I cannot say. I would always interpret it as under law. I may be wrong on that, Mr. Ford. But this

is what happens. When our men spend two years on the detail at the White House, they come within that classification.

Mr. Rankin. Chief, can you clarify Commissioner Dulles' inquiry? The Civil Service does not direct that you put certain people in the White House?

Mr. Rowley. Oh, no. We do that in order to -- I see your point, sir.

We do that in order to give them the permanency that they should have to continue the employment with the Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. But that is the choice of the Secret Service rather than anybody else?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. I gather the Civil Service prescribed if they did not do this, they could not be retained. Is that correct?

Mr. Rowley. That is right. In other words --

Mr. Dulles. There is some pressure, I should think.

Mr. Rowley. There is no pressure, because we voluntarily entered into an agreement with them, sir, for this arrangement, explaining that we frequently don't get from the register the type of men that we want, and that, therefore, we want the opportunity to recruit the men from the universities or colleges.

Once they have served on the White House Detail for a period of two years, then they would get this permanent status. However, during the two years, they have an opportunity and they are encouraged to take the Civil Service examination, so they get career status. But there is no pressure from the Civil Service. It is a convenience or agreement that they have arranged with us.

Mr. Rankin. Maybe I can help, Chief. Schedule A is an exemption from the regular Civil Service roster, is it not?

Mr. Rowley, That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. And the register is a list of employees from which you have to otherwise select Government employees if they are not exempt by reason of their positions, is that correct?

Mr. Rowley. That is right.

Rep. Ford. In other words, Civil Service Commission has set up for the White House Detail all inclusive --

Mr. Rowley. Not necessarily for the White House Detail, Mr. Ford. For the Secret Service -- to allow us to get the type of individuals that we want for both criminal investigation and protective work. Because if you say exclusively for the White House Detail, the fellow might not be equipped for the White House Detail.

Rep. Ford. In other words, every person recruited by Secret Service for any capacity is recruited in the first instance under Schedule A.

Mr. Rowley. Yes. If he hasn't -- if he is not on the register for Civil Service. We first go to the Civil Service, when we want to select somebody, to see if there is anyone on there that meets our qualifications. And then, if not, then we hire them under Schedule A, which is sort of a blanket exemption.

Rep. Ford. But I gather from what you have said, or I think you are intimating that most of your recruiting actually is from colleges, and they are under Schedule A.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. Yes, sir. Many of them from your state, sir -- Michigan State University.

Rep. Ford. It is a fine school.

Mr. Rowley. That is where it started, actually. They were the first ones. Now we also recruit particularly on the West Coast, in California, they have terrific schools out there.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, I don't think you covered the Bolden matter as to whether you had an investigation made.

Did you?

Mr. Rowley, Yes, I did, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you find out anything about the conduct of your agents?