

The Inside Story of the  
Cuban Missile Crisis

**EYEBALL  
TO  
EYEBALL**

**DINO A. BRUGIONI**

Edited by Robert F. McCort

Random House



New York

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*This book is dedicated to  
Arthur C. Lundahl.  
His vision and leadership made  
photo interpretation the guardian  
of the national security.*

*For my grandchildren*

## A Note to the Reader

I was one of the original cadre of twelve people who, under the direction of Arthur C. Lundahl, organized the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the mid to late 1950s. During the Cuban missile crisis, because of the current information the interpretation of reconnaissance photography was providing, the center became a focal point of many related and diverse activities. I was the chief of a unit responsible for providing all-source collateral information to the photo interpreters as well as managing collation and processing of intelligence data derived from the exploitation of photography acquired by various national-level aerial reconnaissance programs. Each morning during the crisis, Mr. Lundahl would review pertinent details of the all-source notes and briefing boards before conveying that information to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council, and the president. Returning from these briefings, he would inform his staff chiefs of the recipients' reactions and their continuing intelligence needs. Lundahl was an astute observer, and I made detailed notes of what he had seen and heard so the center might better respond to the concerns and needs of policymakers. John Hughes, special assistant to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), appeared each morning at the center to pick up a duplicate set of the briefing materials and notes and kept us posted of the reactions and needs of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high-ranking Defense Department officials. Service chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force photo-interpretation detachments at the Center also got copies of all the briefing materials and posted us on the reactions of the various Unified and Specified commands. Aerial photography from a variety of reconnaissance units was delivered to the

Center at all hours of the day and night during the crisis, usually by high-ranking military officers who knew intimately what was happening during the actual collecting of the information.

My unit also prepared all the notes for the materials carried by ranking CIA and diplomatic officials to de Gaulle, Diefenbaker, Macmillan, and Adenauer. I questioned the Agency personnel upon their return about what had happened during these meetings. Ray S. Cline, CIA deputy director for intelligence, and Colonel David S. Parker, deputy director of NPTC, provided details of the briefing of foreign delegates in Stevenson's office and the preparation of Stevenson's speech prior to his confrontation with Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin. Later, Huntington "Ting" Sheldon, a senior CIA official and intelligence expert, assigned as John J. McCloy's intelligence support officer during the critical discussions with the Russians relative to the removal of the missiles and Il-28 bombers from Cuba, gave additional "firsthand" information on McCloy and Stevenson's personal negotiations with Kuznetsov. He also revealed more fully how he created the psalm control system. When the UN was considering sending observers to Cuba, senior CIA official William Tidwell told me what happened during his discussions with U Thant's military advisers. We were made aware of U.S. battle plans and targets, and we provided field units with information and photography for their assigned missions. I was a participant in several postmortems conducted on the crisis, and I conducted interviews with Agency principals involved in the crisis for an Agency historical project. I am indebted to Sherman Kent for providing details on the discussions in the United States Intelligence Board and to Sidney Graybeal for discussions in the Guided Missile Astronautic Intelligence Committee. I met with military participants in the crisis and reviewed a number of oral histories, and I want to thank General Maxwell Taylor for providing information relative to discussions in the EXCOM and to General Lyman Lemnitzer and Admiral Alfred Gustave "Corky" Ward for their time and patience reviewing details of the preparations for an invasion of Cuba as well as their reactions to the crisis. I am also indebted to the U.S. Naval, Marine Corps, and Air Force historical centers, which provided information or reports pertinent to the crisis. Over the intervening years, I frequently attended intelligence briefings given by Mr. Lundahl and was able to question officials who were involved in the crisis. I corresponded with a number of people who, although not directly involved in the crisis, met with the president during that crucial period and solicited from them opinions on the president's mood and reactions. As one of the Agency officials who made the presentation of a photographic exhibit

that I had prepared for CIA headquarters on the tenth anniversary of the crisis to the John F. Kennedy Library, I was allowed to review library documents pertinent to the crisis as well as a number of transcripts of "secret" recordings made during the period.

This edition has been updated with information from the 1992 Havana Conference with U.S., Soviet, and Cuban participation, along with recently declassified CIA documents relating to the crisis. In addition, new information on military preparations, which was published during the thirtieth anniversary of the crisis, has been included. In most cases this new information will appear at the end of selected chapters surrounded by parentheses.

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# MYEBALL TO MYEBALL

the intelligence community was impressed when, on July 26, 1959, in celebration of the beginning of Castro's revolution, the CRAF, assisted by civilian pilots, managed to get twenty-nine aircraft into the air in a flypast over Havana. The aircraft consisted of eight Sea Furys, nine B-26's, four T-33's, two F-47's, four C-47's, one C-54, and one C-46. It would be the T-33's that would bomb the supply ships and cause the failure of the Bay of Pigs landing. Cuban air defenses had no intercept-type fighters, no early-warning radars, no ground-control radars, no airborne-intercept-radar equipment, and only a few anti-aircraft weapons left over from World War II. Cuba did not have any weapons sufficient to challenge U.S. reconnaissance capabilities.

There was considerable controversy regarding the political orientation the Cuban leader would adopt in charting his country's future. On February 13, 1960, a "commercial aid pact," in which the Soviets agreed to buy up to a million tons of sugar annually over a period of four years, in addition to granting Cuba a \$100 million-dollar loan, was signed by Premier Castro and Anastas Mikoyan. Five months later, the U.S. Congress, in retaliation for Castro's anti-U.S. policies, voted to give the president discretion to cut quotas of Cuban sugar imports to the U.S. A series of incidents escalated tensions between the United States and Cuba. Then, on April 16, 1961, Castro for the first time referred to the Cuban revolution as "socialist," and during his 1961 May Day speech he announced that Cuba was entering into an "era of socialist construction." The speech that received the most publicity, however, came on December 2, 1961, when he proclaimed that he "believed absolutely in Marxism" *of the type that Bayd Ppp* and that "he had for some time."

U-2 flights continued over the Soviet Union, and the information obtained continued to enhance national estimates that the United States had achieved a superior strategic position. Reports to Congress and statements by administration officials started to reflect that strategic strength. During this same period, Soviet military policy underwent far-reaching appraisals and innovations, culminating in a newly created Strategic Rocket Forces, an expanded Air Defense Force, and an expanded subsurface navy. On January 14, 1960, Khrushchev

addressed the Supreme Soviet, and while he painted a rosy picture of the Soviets versus the United States in economic matters, he made note of the widening strategic gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: "Realization that the international situation has changed, that a basic shift has taken place in the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist states, is increasingly spreading in the Western countries. Numerous statements by government and business leaders are devoted to this subject."<sup>10</sup>

The expanded Soviet air defense was noted in the deployment of surface-to-air-missile sites. The first Soviet surface-to-air missile, the SA-1 (Guild), was deployed only around Moscow and in fixed installations. Because of the threat posed by B-47 and B-52 bombers and reconnaissance missions by the U-2, the Soviets subsequently developed a more sophisticated mobile surface-to-air system, designated the SA-2 (Guideline). Guideline missiles employed in the SA-2 system were first observed in the November 7, 1957, Moscow parade; operational deployment of the system began in 1958. Obviously, the state-of-art of the SA-2 system was such that it had the capability of downing a U-2. This deployment was disturbing to those of us who were involved in U-2 flight planning.

By 1959, SA-2 missile sites were not only being deployed around the principal Soviet cities but also at strategic industrial installations deep in the Urals and Siberia coincident with our intelligence interests and objectives. Flight tracks were adjusted so that the U-2 would come no closer than twenty-five miles to such a site.

On May 1, 1960, just fifteen days before a scheduled four-power summit conference was to convene in Paris, Gary Powers's U-2 airplane was brought down by an indirect hit from a near-miss SA-2 missile near Sverdlovsk, in the USSR. Powers would later relate that there was an explosion behind him, followed by a brilliant orange light, while he was flying at an altitude of about 70,000 feet. Almost immediately, the nose of the aircraft pitched into a steep dive and Powers began procedures to escape the doomed U-2. Powers's flight had begun at Peshawar, Pakistan, passed over Stalinabad, the Tyura Tam Missile Test Center, the nuclear plants in the Urals, and was to proceed to the ICBM missile base under construction at Yurya, the missile test center at Plesetsk, the submarine shipyard at Severodvinsk, the naval bases at Murmansk, and then on to Bodo, Norway.



(Khrushchev was on the reviewing stand for the May Day parade when Marshall Biryuzov, head of the Soviet defense forces, came up to the stand and whispered to Khrushchev that a U-2 had been downed in the Urals.) Four days later, Khrushchev, in a long speech before the Supreme Soviet, announced that an American plane flew into Soviet territory and was shot down. (In 1990, *Red Star*, the Soviet army newspaper, revealed there was confusion among ground-control and air-defense forces at the time. They believed the missile that exploded behind Powers's U-2 had missed its target and fired a second missile. That missile struck a MiG-19 tracking the U-2, killing its pilot.)

On the day of Khrushchev's announcement, a State Department spokesman told the press that the department had been informed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that "An unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, had been missing since May 1. It is entirely possible that having a failure in oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace." We at the Center had not been informed beforehand of the cover story, and when the State Department announcement was made, Lundahl shook his head. It could be embarrassing, since Powers's U-2 was well into the mission and about half of the 5,000 feet of film had been exposed. Since the film was wound tight and safety-based, it therefore would be extremely difficult to ignite. Lundahl notified CIA headquarters that even in a crash, he was sure the Soviets would have recovered some of the exposed film.

I was put in charge of a damage-control unit established at the Center to receive and evaluate all the press reports and photographs that the Russians were issuing. One such photo depicted Khrushchev holding an aerial photo purportedly from the downed U-2. Lou Franceschini and I examined the photo. It had the unique 9 x 18-inch format of the B camera used in the U-2, and when it was examined under the high-power optics, we could authenticate the clock imprint in one corner. Although the Russians had printed the photo backward, there was no doubt they now had positive proof that Powers was on a reconnaissance mission and was not merely flying a weather-research mission and off-course, as the State De-

partment maintained. Lundahl again notified headquarters of our findings.

The Russians then did a foolish thing. They released a photograph purportedly of the crashed U-2. When I viewed the photograph, I knew immediately it wasn't the U-2 because the U-2 is flush-riveted and I could clearly see several rows of prominent rivets on the plane in question. Lundahl called that information to headquarters. The Soviet photo was forwarded to Kelly Johnson, who held a press conference describing in detail why the plane in the photo was not a U-2 but probably a Russian Il-28.

On May 6, a State Department spokesman again denied that any American plane had ever deliberately violated Soviet airspace and said it would be "monstrous" to claim that the U.S. was trying to fool the world about the real purpose of Powers's flight. But the U.S. had fallen into Khrushchev's carefully laid trap. On May 7, Khrushchev again spoke to the Supreme Soviet: "Comrades, I must tell you a secret. When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have got parts of the plane. We did so deliberately because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version." Khrushchev demanded an immediate apology from President Eisenhower, which was not forthcoming. Eisenhower instead said that although activities such as the U-2 flight over Russia were distasteful, they were "a vital necessity in the world as it is today." The downing of the U-2 cast some doubt as to whether the scheduled four-power meeting in Paris between the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France would be held.

In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Macmillan was, according to John M. Clarke, a senior CIA official, "quite sensitive over how to treat the likely parliamentary question that might occur from the opposition as a consequence of the U-2 flight. The West was not entirely sure of what Powers may have told the Soviets, including perhaps divulging the British role in the 'American' program. When the inevitable question came, i.e., What is Her Majesty's position toward Powers and the shutdown of the U-2? the Prime Minister responded, 'But for the grace of God, it could have been one of our boys.' This response admitted nothing and as is tradition on official secrets, required no further elaboration."<sup>11</sup>

Throughout history, it has been the practice for governments never to admit intelligence activities, especially clandestine operations. The U-2, however, was no ordinary spy, and the big question was whether or not President Eisenhower should admit personal complicity in U-2 operations. Some advocated an attempt to salvage the summit conference by maintaining silence in Washington and leaving the matter to the usual exchange of angry diplomatic notes. A number of irate congressmen and national leaders recommended that Eisenhower punish, either by reprimand or dismissal, selected officials who had been intimately involved in the U-2 operations. Allen Dulles, in conversations with Eisenhower, had offered to resign. Eisenhower explained, "The thought that such action would provide at least an implication that the flight had taken place without my authorization or possibly even without my knowledge and that I had been the victim of overzealous subordinates."<sup>12</sup>

Other congressmen and senators called for the cancellation of the entire program. Adlai Stevenson, the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for president in 1952 and 1956, was extremely critical, charging that Eisenhower had given Khrushchev "the crowbar and sledgehammer to wreck the conference." Senator John F. Kennedy, a leading presidential hopeful, was asked by a student in Portland, Oregon, what he would have done in President Eisenhower's place in Paris. Kennedy said he had recalled that Khrushchev had set two conditions for continuing the summit conference—an end to the U-2 flights, which the president had in fact ordered, and an apology. Concerning the apology, Kennedy told his audience, "This might have been possible to do," and then continued that if Mr. Khrushchev had asked the president to express regret, "That would have been a more reasonable term."<sup>13</sup> A furious debate ensued in the Senate, with Senators Everett Dirksen and Hugh Scott charging Stevenson and Kennedy with "appeasement" and "irresponsibility." To quell the debate, Allen Dulles decided to brief the entire Senate on the benefits that were derived from the U-2 program.

Mr. Lundahl was told that he would be allowed precisely thirty minutes and that this should be the briefing of his lifetime. Lundahl gave us the task of organizing the effort, and I carefully reviewed all the contributions that the U-2 missions had made to the national

estimative process, along with the many crises wherein the intelligence derived had been employed to resolve policy issues worldwide. A number of spectacular briefing boards were created, and Lundahl rehearsed himself intently on the substantive content of the boards, to assure that he could effectively deliver the information within the prescribed thirty minutes.

Lundahl remembers the chamber he and Dulles entered as being "filled with senators, many in angry or combative moods." Mr. Dulles, wearing one of his usual English tweed suits, introduced Lundahl. He then lit his curved tobacco pipe and settled back to enjoy Lundahl's startling presentation, which upon completion provoked a standing ovation from the senators present. Mr. Dulles was so surprised by the reaction that when he rose to his feet, his lit pipe tumbled into his lap, setting his tweed coat afire. Lundahl, taken aback, did not know whether to simply stand there and accept the senators' acclaim or to seek a glass of water to throw on his inflamed director.

In Paris, General Charles de Gaulle, after being reassured that the head of each of the participating states would attend, announced that the four-power conference would be held as scheduled. Eisenhower meanwhile asked to be briefed by the Agency on the status of the A-11 (SR-71) aircraft and the satellite-reconnaissance development program. He was told that the A-11 would not be ready for at least another year while the satellite program was on schedule.

Eisenhower arrived in Paris on May 15, 1960, and called on General de Gaulle that afternoon. De Gaulle told Eisenhower that Khrushchev had been to see him, was highly agitated about the U-2 overflights, and was still demanding an apology from President Eisenhower. De Gaulle said, "You obviously cannot apologize and I will do anything I can to help you." Eisenhower replied that as president, he had to ascertain the Soviet threat to the United States—and to world peace—and that there was no other way than using the U-2. De Gaulle agreed. Eisenhower decided that de Gaulle should see some of the photographic materials acquired by the U-2 over the Soviet Union. Washington was notified, and that afternoon Lundahl and Cunningham were on their way to Paris.

Lundahl, Cunningham, and a translator were driven to the Elysée

Palace and escorted to de Gaulle's office. De Gaulle was alone. Lundaahl opened the package of briefing materials and moved toward de Gaulle in order to brief him at his desk. De Gaulle rose, walked toward Lundaahl, and asked him to place the graphics on a large conference table, where he stood looking down at them. Knowledgeable of his poor eyesight, Lundaahl handed him a large magnifying glass. De Gaulle asked a number of questions about the focal length of the cameras and the speed and altitude at which the photography was acquired. Frequently, as Lundaahl unfolded details depicted on the briefing boards, de Gaulle would take a magnifying glass in hand and lift the board to carefully analyze the details that could be seen on the photography. His initial response to what he saw was expressed, cryptically, in French, "*Formidable! Formidable!*" When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundaahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, "This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue." De Gaulle assured them that he would so inform President Eisenhower.

The four-power conference was held in the Elysée Palace. De Gaulle purposefully waited to walk in with President Eisenhower. He whispered his thanks for the briefing and said, "Now I see why Khrushchev is so mad." De Gaulle explained that since Eisenhower was the only chief of delegation who was chief of state as well, he should be allowed to speak first. Khrushchev, very agitated, demanded to speak first. Eisenhower nodded assent to de Gaulle. Khrushchev launched a flamboyant attack against Eisenhower and again demanded that the U.S. president apologize for the U-2 overflights. Khrushchev returned again and again to his static theme that the Americans were surreptitiously sending spy planes over the Soviet Union and, indeed, over the world.

De Gaulle had listened patiently, but his patience had worn thin. He looked directly at Khrushchev and said, "You're making too big a fuss about this matter." Khrushchev drew back in surprise. De Gaulle continued, "There is probably a ton of Russian iron [referring to Russian satellites] coming through French space every day without my permission. I have no idea what is inside those satellites and you have not told me. But I am not making a big fuss."

Khrushchev replied, "My hands are clean. We do not do things like that."

"Then tell me how you took some of the pictures of the Soviet Union taken from a satellite that you are so proud of."

"In that satellite, we had cameras."

"Aha, in that one you had cameras," de Gaulle continued. "But you are not sure if all of them have cameras."

"I am only concerned with that which is over the Soviet Union with a man in it. That it doesn't have men in it doesn't bother me."

De Gaulle drew himself up to his full height and said, "I understand."

Eisenhower assumed his arched-brow grimace and, knowing that the U.S. photo satellite program was about to begin, doodled "Most interesting."

The conference collapsed because of Khrushchev's intransigence on the U-2 issue. Khrushchev undoubtedly knew of the SR-71 and the Soviet inability to stop it if it were used in reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev's ostentatious rage with temperate words, patience, and dignity. He calmly explained that reconnaissance was, and is, a necessity—that it was vital for the United States to know what went on behind the Iron Curtain. Eisenhower's public admission that he had authorized the U-2 flights, the first time any nation had publicly admitted that it was engaged in espionage, was characteristic of a man who always had the courage to act on his convictions. The incident also emphasized the vital importance that leaders of the twentieth century attached to aerial reconnaissance. Eisenhower explained, "Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands it. As the secretary of state pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my administration, I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information that is required to protect the United States and the free nations against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."

Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided

to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government. Here was an unprecedented opportunity to show the American people and the world, with spectacular aerial photography, what the Soviets were concealing. A stick-it-in-their-teeth atmosphere prevailed at the White House. Robert Montgomery, the famous movie actor and producer—now the assistant to the president for TV presentations—was especially aware of a magnificent opportunity. Montgomery had envisioned a series of spectacular briefing boards that would be attached to the walls of the Oval Office, and as the president spoke, the television cameras would focus on them. Lundahl placed me in charge of preparing the required materials. On my own, I had the idea that maybe the president might like to show the comparison of U.S. and Soviet installations. So in addition to about forty other briefing boards, ten briefing boards were made comparing our long-range bomber airfields, shipyards, nuclear installations, and missile and aircraft plants with theirs. I had a briefing board made of the San Diego complex, to be compared with facilities in Leningrad.

James C. Hagerly, the president's press secretary, selected a number of the boards and left to show them to the president. He returned after a few minutes, saying that Eisenhower had rejected the idea of showing all the briefing boards. "The boss has decided against using these because it would probably make our relations with the Russians much worse than they are." Rather than releasing photography of Soviet installations for public display, the president had selected the single briefing board I had prepared of the San Diego Naval Air Station, showing the airfield, aircraft, hangars, and runway markers in great detail. The president said that the American people could understand and relate to such a picture. (When I went to the White House to pick up the remaining boards, I was surprised to find Hagerly was showing the entire package to Walter Winchell, the noted newspaper columnist and a staunch supporter of the Eisenhower administration.)

In his televised address, Eisenhower predictably emphasized the need for good intelligence: "Our safety, and that of the free world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of other powerful nations, especially those

that make a fetish of secrecy."<sup>14</sup> He then added, "Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in the Paris peace conference, he confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September."<sup>15</sup>

The Soviets had been quite successful in maintaining secrecy about their industrial and military establishment. The U-2 had effectively compromised much of that secrecy. As for critics of the program, Eisenhower later utilized another time-honored Midwestern practice of responding to a question with a question: "Would you be ready to give back all the information we secured from our U-2 flights over Russia if there had been no disaster to one of our planes in Russia? I have never received an affirmative response."<sup>16</sup>

Eisenhower informed officials that U-2 flights over the Soviet Union would be discontinued and gave two reasons: 1) the utility of the U-2 was limited because of the new Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles; and 2) considerable progress was now being made in the developmental program of photographing the earth from space. Eisenhower would later sum up his opinion of the U-2: "During the four years of its operations, the U-2 program produced intelligence of critical importance to the United States. Perhaps as important as the positive information—what the Soviets did have—was the negative information it produced—what the Soviets did not have. Intelligence gained from this source provided proof that the horrors of the alleged 'bomber gap' and later the 'missile gap' were nothing more than imaginative creations of irresponsibility. U-2 information deprived Khrushchev of the most powerful weapon of Communist conspiracy—international blackmail—usable only as long as the Soviets could exploit the ignorance and resulting fears of the free world."<sup>17</sup>

In addition to providing the president and the Congress with information essential to their decision making, the U-2 provided the Department of Defense and the respective services with reams of

details on Soviet targets.\* This knowledge alone saved billions of dollars in development of appropriate counterweapons. The U-2 photography also provided precise geodetic data for targeting our missiles and to produce accurate, up-to-date charts for the Strategic Air Command's B-47 and B-52 bombers.

There are a number of references in books on Powers's U-2 flight<sup>18</sup> and the Kennedy assassination to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald provided the Russians with data on the U-2 that was subsequently used by the Soviets in downing Gary Powers's U-2. Most of these accounts focus on the fact that in 1957, Oswald, then a seventeen-year-old U.S. Marine Corps private, was assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station, about twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U-2's used the naval air station as a staging base for missions over the Soviet Union. Oswald returned to the U.S., and on October 31, 1959, renounced his U.S. citizenship. At the U.S. embassy in Moscow, he indicated that he would tell the Russians everything he knew about U.S. radar operators and something else he termed "of special interest."<sup>19</sup> The knowledge derived from radar intercepts—i.e., course, altitude, and speed—is the same whether learned from U.S. or Russian radar operators. The Soviets certainly had begun to compile data on U-2 performance beginning with the first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956. On subsequent missions, the data was refined so that in a relatively short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U-2 characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact that they had been tracking and were knowledgeable about U-2 operations. (In addition to using MiG-17's, MiG-19's, and later MiG-21's in zoom-climb intercept techniques, the Russians recently admitted that they also tried to use an Su-9 Fishpot fighter stripped of its armor to climb and ram the U-2.) All of these

\* Allen Dulles succinctly summed up the contribution of U-2 overflights during congressional testimony in August 1960: "It is extremely difficult for me to sum up in words the significance of this effort to our national security. I do not wish to exaggerate, nor do I wish to belittle other vital intelligence programs. The photographic coverage and the data derived from it are an inseparable part of the whole national intelligence effort. But in terms of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and of the other senior officials responsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply, invaluable."

intercept attempts were vectored by ground-control stations, so the Russians were well aware of the U-2's altitude, course, and speed.

Khrushchev continued his bluster on July 9, 1960, when he addressed the All-Russian Teacher's Conference. After making note of his displeasure at American missiles' being emplaced in Italy and aimed at Russia, and that Eisenhower had announced that the U.S. would no longer be buying sugar from Cuba, Khrushchev said, "We, for our part, will do everything to support Cuba and its courageous people in their struggle for freedom and national independence." Then Khrushchev warned: "It should not be forgotten that the United States is not so inaccessibly distant from the Soviet Union as it used to be. Figuratively speaking, in case of need Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressor forces in the Pentagon launch an intervention against Cuba. And let them not forget in the Pentagon that as the latest tests have shown, we have rockets capable of landing in a particular square at a distance of 13,000 kilometers. This is a warning to those who would like to settle international issues by force and not by reason."<sup>20</sup>

On August 18, at 12:57 p.m., the U.S. Discoverer XIV space satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California into an orbit, having an apogee of 500 miles and a perigee of 120 miles. The reentry vehicle was ejected over Alaska on its seventeenth pass. In the recovery area, which encompassed a 200-by-60-mile rectangle, six C-119's and one C-130 flew within the area called the ball park. Three other C-119's patrolled an "outfield" area, embracing an additional 400 miles. All aircraft flew an assigned search pattern. At 3:46 p.m. on August 19, one of the C-119 Flying Boxcars, piloted by Captain Harold E. Mitchell and his nine-man crew, searched in the "outfield" area, hooked the parachute and the 84-pound capsule in midair at an altitude of 8,500 feet and hauled them aboard.<sup>21</sup> A new era of reconnaissance had begun. On this first successful photographic satellite mission, carrying a twenty-pound roll of film, we gained more than 1 million square miles of coverage of the Soviet Union—more coverage in one capsule than the combined four years of U-2 coverage. (The capsule is now on display at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum.)

The Soviets, especially Khrushchev, deliberately took every opportunity to create the impression internationally that the Soviets were far ahead of the United States in all aspects of military might. Khrushchev boasted endlessly about Soviet scientific discoveries and industrial accomplishments. Americans were told by Khrushchev that "we will bury you." It was a carefully planned and fostered fear of the unknown, and this would explain, at least in part, Khrushchev's rage about the U-2. Lundahl and I frequently discussed how frustrating it must have been for Soviet military leaders to know that for four years an aircraft was overhead photographing their territory and yet they could do nothing about it.

The front page of *The New York Times* on August 20, 1960, headlined the first successful midair recovery of the reentry capsule and on the opposite side of the front page announced the end of the U-2 trial and conviction and sentencing of Gary Powers. One photographic-collection period of the Soviet Union was ending while another was just beginning.

The missile-gap controversy had become an election issue during the 1960 campaign, with the Democratic candidate, John F. Kennedy, charging that the U.S. was lagging behind the Soviets. By this time, of course, with successive satellite missions, we had searched the Soviet Union and come to the conclusion there was no missile gap. Both Eisenhower and Vice-President Richard Nixon knew this fact. Nixon, running for president on the Republican ticket, knew that the charges Kennedy was making were not true. Eisenhower was adamant that no references to this new information was to be made, for security reasons. I've often wondered if Nixon would have challenged Kennedy on this important issue if the close 1960 presidential election had not gone in his favor. Eisenhower arranged for President Kennedy to be briefed on the fact that the missile gap did not exist shortly after his election. Though McGeorge Bundy said later in a *Foreign Affairs* article in April 1963 that "it was with honest surprise and relief that, in 1961, he [the President] found the situation much less dangerous than the best evidence to the Senate had indicated the year before," Kennedy would never recant his election-year speeches condemning the missile gap. He gave McNamara the task of informing the public that the missile gap did not exist.

In the meantime, relations with Cuba continued to deteriorate.

and President Eisenhower authorized the first U-2 flight over Cuba on October 27, 1960. The mission did not reveal anything of significance. Its value lay in the importance of establishing a baseline of data on Cuba from which we could monitor succeeding events.

Eisenhower did not allude to Cuba in his State of the Union message to Congress on January 13, 1961. By the end of his administration, from information obtained from aerial reconnaissance, Eisenhower knew that the actual balance of strategic power was strongly in favor of the United States and was moving forward to an even greater U.S. advantage. Eisenhower implored, "We must not return to the crash-programs psychology of the past, when each new feint by the Communists was responded to in panic. The bomber gap of several years ago was always a fiction, and the missile gap shows every sign of being the same."

Just a few days before he was to leave office in January 1961, President Eisenhower signed National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number Eight, which established the National Photographic Interpretation Center under CIA administration, with multi-departmental staffing and Lundahl as director.

It is remarkable that in a period of only eight years, President Eisenhower had introduced four revolutionary reconnaissance systems into the U.S. inventory: the Genetrix aerial photographic balloons; the U-2; the SR-71; and the photographic satellite.



## President Kennedy and "The Cuba Problem"

"The enemy has no aerial photographic systems like ours."

—PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

ANY INDIVIDUALS play a role in the education of a president, and this was certainly true in the case of President John F. Kennedy. He chose his mentors well. He had the gift of judging his peers objectively, without the slightest taint of envy. Impressed by knowledge, he listened attentively and intently to new and unfamiliar ideas. He had great powers of concentration and an intellect capable of rapid assimilation. During his election campaign, he was briefed on intelligence but not on any of the reconnaissance systems.

A warm bond of genuine friendship developed between President Eisenhower and President Kennedy. Soon after Kennedy's election in November 1960, President Eisenhower had the president-elect briefed in depth by Bissell and Lundahl on all photographic-intelligence systems. President Eisenhower sat in on several of these meetings, informing Kennedy on the various arrangements made with foreign countries in the sharing of intelligence derived from the collection systems. Kennedy became intrigued with the whole process of photo collection and interpretation. President Eisenhower would often interrupt, emphasizing how valuable intelligence had been in his decision making. Eisenhower and Kennedy shared an insatiable craving for knowledge of their Soviet adversary, and photo

interpretation became a prime source of satisfying that craving. When Eisenhower talked about reconnaissance, there was an enthusiasm in his voice quite different from that when he talked about political matters. Eisenhower told Kennedy triumphantly after one of the briefings, "The enemy has no aerial photographic systems like ours."

The task of educating President Kennedy on photo interpretation devolved upon Arthur Lundahl. Lundahl was a key official who established a close working relationship with both President Kennedy and the assistant to the president for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Lundahl's articulate, erudite, and succinct explanations of what was seen on aerial photography were always welcome at the White House. The president wanted technical information presented in a straightforward manner, free of military jargon, so it would be comprehensible not only to him but also the average person. In one of his early briefings of the president, Lundahl explained that the U-2 camera could photograph a swath about 125 nautical miles wide and about 3,000 nautical miles long on over 10,000 feet of film. Lundahl drew the analogy that each foot of film was scanned under magnification in much the same manner that Sherlock Holmes would scan evidence or look for clues with a large magnifying glass. "Imagine," Lundahl would suggest, "a group of photo interpreters on their hands and knees scanning a roll of film that extended from the White House to the Capitol and back." Kennedy never forgot the analogy. When other high officials were briefed on the U-2 at the White House, the president would call on Lundahl to repeat the story.

Lundahl and President Kennedy hit it off famously. Periodically, Lundahl would update the president in private briefings on the latest finds from both U-2 and satellite photography. The president's discomfort from a chronic back ailment, the usual cluttered condition of the presidential desk, with its many mementos and reams of reading material, and the very nature of the large photographic briefing materials to be presented required that a certain special physical arrangement be made. Lundahl would enter the Oval Office and the president would leave his cluttered desk and be seated in the famous rocking chair that had been custom-designed to alleviate his back problem. The rocking chair was positioned in front of a round coffee table. Lundahl would be seated on the sofa to the right of the pres-

ident, and the director of the CIA frequently would be seated on the president's left. Removing the silver cigar humidor and ashtray that were usually on the table, Lundahl would arrange his briefing materials and provide the president with a large magnifying glass. The president then drew up his rocking chair close to the table and, using the magnifying glass, began to study the latest photography as Lundahl briefed.

According to Lundahl, the president was a good listener. He liked good lead-in statements. Lundahl knew this and carefully selected and arranged his words so he could gauge the president's reaction as he spoke. Once he asked Lundahl to remain after a briefing. He was eager to know more about the photo-interpretation process. "Where do you get photo interpreters? How much do you pay them? How do you train them? Are they satisfied with their work?" He indicated that he would like to visit the center and observe the high technology of interpretation at work. Lundahl was afforded a unique opportunity because of his position. He admired the president's intellect and courage, and in turn, the president came to admire Lundahl for his intelligence and grace in making a difficult task look exceptionally easy. He came to know the president as a friend and was privy to share the laughter, heartaches, secrets, moods, defeats, and triumphs that occurred during the Kennedy years.

Intelligence, like knowledge, is power. Photographic intelligence, because of its currency, reliability, and relevancy, is an especially effective tool when it is applied to matters concerning strategic balances of power and knowledge of a crisis. Colonel—later General—Andrew Goodpaster became powerful during the Eisenhower administration performing this important national-security-affairs function. McGeorge Bundy—who had been appointed assistant to the president for national security affairs after the Bay of Pigs invasion and also had an instinct for power—assumed the intelligence-watchdog role in President Kennedy's administration. Intense, articulate, and intelligent, Bundy kept close track of the satellite, U-2, and other aircraft missions being flown—and their results. Any photography shown to the president had to be passed through Bundy's office in the White House basement. Extremely flexible, he would drop his regular duties to see the latest takes of photography and be briefed on them. Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara would

frequently meet with the CIA director and Lundahl at the White House to see the photography and hear the briefings before meeting with the president. More often than not, Bundy would state the significance of the information and its U.S. foreign policy implications. While Bundy exhibited great intellect and insight, he was never pompous or overbearing. Because of Bundy's knowledge and presence, however, many intelligence officers were uncomfortable if they were required to remain in his office for an extended period.

The Bay of Pigs affair had been treated the world over as a fiasco and a serious political setback for the president of the United States.<sup>1</sup> The Bay of Pigs also ended the intelligence careers of two distinguished men, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell. Allen Dulles had set the course of the Agency so that his loss as a manager would not be irreparable, but the greater loss would be Richard Bissell, the progenitor of technical intelligence collection. Most intelligence professionals agreed that Dulles had stayed too long. Some even said that he would have stayed with the Agency until he was carried out. But the image "the old man" had created would not easily fade. Dulles was known affectionately to his people as the great white case officer. He, perhaps more than any other individual, had shaped the organization and operation of the CIA. He had the vision, endurance, and stamina to create the organization that would supply the intelligence answers for the 1950s and 1960s. His greatest accomplishment, however, was the recruiting and training of a group of intelligence professionals who could match any organization in the world. His concern in his later years was to build a new headquarters building at Langley, Virginia. Dulles had hoped that Lieutenant General Charles Pearre Cabell, the deputy director of the Agency, would remain and provide the continuity for the reconnaissance and other programs underway, but he too would soon be leaving, because of a most unfortunate incident.

The president, on April 22, 1961, appointed General Maxwell Taylor to head an investigation of the CIA's role in the Bay of Pigs disaster and the next day asked Attorney General Bobby Kennedy to assist Taylor in that investigation. Other members of the Taylor probe panel included CIA director Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the chief of naval operations.<sup>2</sup> Information from their report was leaked to Charles J. V. Murphy, Washington bureau chief



for *Fortune* magazine. Murphy wrote an account of the Bay of Pigs invasion highly critical of President Kennedy and thereby incurred the president's wrath.<sup>3</sup> The president was furious. Suspecting that General Cabell had leaked information, he asked for his resignation. Cabell tried to explain to the president that he was not the source of the leak, but to no avail. On January 31, 1962, he resigned as deputy director and retired from the Air Force. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Marshall "Pat" Carter. A number of years after President Kennedy's death, Murphy was doing another story related to intelligence and Lundahl and I were directed to cooperate with him. He revealed to us that Admiral Arleigh Burke had been the source of his Bay of Pigs information. The admiral felt that the president had "chickened out" in not calling for Navy fighter aircraft to cover the Bay of Pigs invasion. Murphy said that Burke had nothing but disdain for President Kennedy and his "bagman" at the Department of Defense, McNamara.<sup>4</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs, Cuba became a continuous thorn in the sides of the Kennedys. The president had made it clear, however, that he did not intend to abandon the Cubans to Castro and the Communists. To many Cubans, that indicated the threat of another invasion. Cuba had become a partner in the Communist adventure, and Russian "experts" began to move into offices of the various Cuban ministries. While this was welcomed by old-time Communists, the idealists in the Cuban revolution began to resent the way the Russians began to institutionalize the Cuban revolution, making Cuba become a surrogate in the export of Soviet Communism. Provided with the necessary financial and logistical support, Cuba began to push a more radical solution—the Guevara-style revolution. Bold, brazen, poorly planned, and often not very discreet, one Cuban covert operation after another in Latin America was unmasked or failed. Although the Russians had admonished the Cubans to go slowly, Castro and Che Guevara were not left much room to maneuver in international relations. Che and Castro's credentials as revolutionaries were being tarnished by the presence of the Russians and by their own operational failures.

After the Bay of Pigs, all the U.S. and Cuba had in common were a morbid mutual suspicion and the expectation of more years of hostility. Castro, after a series of severe diplomatic setbacks, believed

more than ever that the very survival of Cuba was seriously threatened. He felt a sense of bitterness and isolation toward the U.S. and Latin America. The Bay of Pigs and subsequent Soviet arms shipments to Cuba served to fortify Castro's already arrogant attitude toward President Kennedy and the United States. Castro praised the Cuban revolutionary spirit and said that its influence beyond Cuba's borders "intimidated Americans." Castro had publicly proclaimed in many flamboyant speeches before the assembled multitudes in Havana Square the need for revolution throughout Latin America. He chided Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs disaster and boasted that at Playa Giron, "the imperialists had suffered their greatest defeat in Latin America." He referred to President Kennedy as "the chief of the pirates" and later boasted that he had exacted a \$62 million ransom that would further finance the Cuban revolution. He said contemptuously, "Let them continue to send expeditions." He regarded Kennedy's assumption of responsibility for the Bay of Pigs, and his efforts to ransom the captives, as an unparalleled mark of weakness. He felt that with the increased influx of Soviet arms, the United States would be extremely reluctant to attack Cuba again.

The sharp increase in Soviet support for the Castro regime provided further evidence of Khrushchev's conception of the political weakness of President Kennedy. The Soviets clearly regarded Cuba as a much more valuable asset over the long run in trying to formulate revolution in Latin America, and Khrushchev proceeded on the assumption that this policy entailed few risks of confrontation with the United States. The Soviets seemed confident they would be able to capitalize on the opportunities created by Castro's urgent need for assistance. President Kennedy became concerned about Castro's and Khrushchev's statements.

In an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1961, Kennedy warned: "Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our Nation. Should the time ever come, we do not intend to be

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since the August 29 and September 5 missions. I was immediately cut off by Kent, who stated, "That's another ball game that we are not to get involved in." Several Agency analysts pointed out that the flow of arms to Cuba was following an establishment of Soviet aid to other countries. They pointed out that the Soviets had sent I1-28 Beagle bombers and FROG missiles to other nations as part of their weapons package and these would also probably be sent to Cuba.

All participating Agency analysts and military representatives concurred in the draft estimate without exception.<sup>13</sup> Still, Kent was well aware of McCone's attitude and the controversy at the White House and that he would be asking General Carter, as acting director of the Agency, to sign the estimate. He carefully reviewed the Special National Intelligence Estimate draft several times. Still not satisfied with the draft in what it purveyed, he asked to see all the raw intelligence that reported offensive missiles in Cuba. There were about a thousand such reports, five of which contained some substance of truth and, in hindsight, indicated that the Soviets might place offensive missiles in Cuba. The rest had been proven invalid through the analysis of U-2 photography. Sidney Graybeal, the offensive-missile expert for the Agency, reviewed the five reports containing some valid data and, upon careful examination and verification analysis, concluded there were obvious errors—the same type of errors prevalent in refugee reporting on missiles. Kent read all the reports. When Graybeal affirmed that all of the reported information and sites had been checked against aerial photography, Kent was satisfied and reviewed the estimate for a final time.

Kent said it appeared impossible for anyone to sift "signals from noise" or to perceive a precise pattern. The estimate, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) No. 85-3-62, titled "The Military Buildup in Cuba," was approved by the United States Intelligence Board without objections and issued on September 19. The estimate indicated that: "We believe that the military buildup which began in July does not reflect a radically new Soviet policy towards Cuba, either in terms of military commitments or of the role of Cuba in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing the essentially defensive character of the military buildup in Cuba and without making an open pledge to protect Cuba under all circumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban military capabilities, repeated in stronger

jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, when it installs in Cuba missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads and of obliterating the Panama Canal, Mexico City, and Washington, when it prepares sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles and a capacity to strike at targets from Peru to Hudson Bay—when it does these things under the cloak of secrecy and to the accomplishment of premeditated deception, when its actions are in flagrant violation of the policies of the Organization of American States and of the Charter of the United Nations, this clearly is a threat to this hemisphere. And when it thus upsets the precarious balance in the world, it is a threat to the whole world."<sup>2</sup> The Russians did not answer Stevenson's charges.

The United States would come under a barrage of criticism from the British press after the president's speech, and British leaders were surprised and disturbed by its ferocity. The president lashed out at British ambassador Ormsby-Gore with anger and some venom. He accused the British press of deliberately distorting the U.S. position and castigated the British government for maintaining a sideline attitude. The British were still rankled about the U.S. treatment of them during the Suez crisis of 1956, and the British press was also displaying considerable skepticism about the validity of the photographic evidence of the missiles being in Cuba, speaking of the "so-called missiles." There were implications that the missiles were only of the short-range variety. Macmillan later ordered that the photographs of the missile sites be interpreted by the best British photo interpreters at the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Center, at Brampton. Their evaluations not only substantiated the American interpretation but also established that the U.S. interpretation effort was far more comprehensive than the British could have accomplished within the same time frame.

British government officials openly expressed grave anxieties about the consequences of the president's actions regarding Cuba. One highly placed official stated that "a sugar and rum kingdom" was not worth a nuclear war. Macmillan and his ministers were also making it clear that Britain was not committed to aid the U.S. in the Caribbean with any naval or military support. When the news reached the White House, Bobby said sarcastically, "Those son of a bitches have a short memory." Angered by the continuing British

criticism, the president was dead like Chamberlain.

The British prime minister were being freighters and tank nonmilitary cargo transport minister, to protect for all British ships administration proposed Macmillan government assumed the offense: argument into focus: the issue of the free world defend Great Britain.

British ambassador afternoon and anxious around Cuba to allude to Kennedy's speech. The arc five hundred intercepting ships Admiral Anderson unless ordered to land.

It was obvious to the diplomatic community from Moscow and missiles being in Cuba advocating a hard Soviet news agency would not stop on were attacked, it was member of the Soviet their ships to cope at a reception at the Soviet ships steamed stopped or searched.

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offensive weapons in Cuba. When President Kennedy was told of Roa's remark, he repeated one of his favorite phrases, "There's another son of a bitch that didn't get the word."

Castro continued to maintain a hard-line position. Although the intensity of his anti-U.S. oratory had been reduced, he refused to submit to Soviet overtures to negotiate the issues. Distrusting the Soviets, Castro attempted to buttress his case for a more prominent role by raising other U.S.-Cuban issues. He was disturbed over the possibility of unilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations and openly critical of the Soviets for failing to support his demands. But Castro had few alternatives. Although he was alienating both the U.S. and the Soviets, he forged ahead, at least temporarily and tentatively.

That evening, an irate president called Ray Cline, who was attending a dinner party at the apartment of Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of the late general. The president said that he had heard rumors that certain CIA officers were alleging that information on the missile bases had been available for several days before it was called to his attention. The president wanted to know who was responsible for the intelligence and how it had been brought to the attention of higher authorities. Cline told the president that he was responsible. Cline then reviewed with the president the reconnaissance mission flown on October 14, how it was processed and analyzed on October 15 and the information brought to the president's attention on the morning of October 16, in accordance with instructions from Mr. Bundy. The president seemed satisfied.

As the tension mounted and the days became longer and more difficult, the president sought surcease in an evening swim. He would call Dave Powers and, together, they headed for the White House pool. Powers liked to repeat that the president had once said while they were swimming, "You know, if it wasn't for the children, you could easily say the hell with it and push the button." Powers said he looked at the president in a quizzical manner, and the president added, "But I can't do that. Not for just Caroline and John, but for all the children all over the world—not only for those that are alive who will suffer and die, but all those who will have never lived." Then the president emerged from the pool, put on his terry-cloth robe, and returned to the family quarters. Powers did not follow, thinking there were moments that a man had to be left alone with

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ities and supposed that the representatives of the two governments in New York could work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. My impression is, however, that the time is very urgent." (Scali still retains the note and displayed it to reporters on August 4, 1964.) Fomin was further encouraged by Scali to place the Russian initiative into diplomatic channels.

Fomin, however, suddenly reversed his condescending attitude. He proposed that if Cuba was to be inspected by the UN, then why shouldn't the United States forces in Florida also be inspected? This clearly was an intelligence officer's desperate attempt to make the best of an uncertain situation. Scali dismissed these conditions to the proposal, stating that he was not authorized to speak for the State Department and went on to belittle it in view of the urgency of the situation. Scali reemphasized to Fomin the importance of a quick response. Fomin and Scali parted shortly after 8 P.M.

The Agency knew that Fomin's KGB position gave him a separate secure channel of communications with Moscow KGB headquarters, independent of Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

The president had demanded all week long that the Soviets had to withdraw the missiles, stating that this issue was nonnegotiable. He was still beleaguered, however, feeling that he had lost prestige and credibility both at home and abroad in his previous dealing with the Russians. This time he would have to be totally affirmative. Consternation among powerful members of Congress continued to grow that Khrushchev might interpret Kennedy's action as symptomatic of America's lack of nerve to wage nuclear war. There were calls, however, from others complimenting the president's stand.<sup>11</sup>

Even in a crisis, politics prevailed. Douglas Dillon remarked during an early-morning meeting of the EXCOM that there was the very real possibility that if the United States did not get the missiles removed promptly from Cuba, the next House of Representatives was likely to have a Republican majority and that this would completely paralyze the U.S. ability to react sensibly and coherently to further Soviet advances.

There was no doubt among the Democratic leadership in Congress that if the missiles were still in Cuba by the time of the November elections, it would be disastrous for both Kennedy and the Demo-

cratic party. There might be or impeachment. The administration modate a Soviet fait accompli. Kennedy and Bobby had said, "I just don't think you hadn't acted, you Bobby," "The president I think—I would have

At about 6 P.M. that to receive transmission one was a long, rambling than belligerent. It had early on Friday morning it had been written by length and complexity any Soviet-U.S. naval sibly even Wednesday decisions personally ar eral Taylor would lat message—the most to said that the question be overlooked. When the letter, he said the command, but he did

Khrushchev put on defensive purposes—the of the Bay of Pigs inv: antine and dwelt at le experiences in World Russia had suffered. F was full of polemics: the ends of the rope in the harder you and I Therefore, if there is dooming the world to not only relax the forc measures for untying was ambiguous enou