

File No.

# D STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 4, 1964

Classified by 2040 Rol. LEE HARVEY OSWALExempt from GDS, Sategory

INTERNAL SECURITY - R Date of Declassification Indefinite USSK On March 3, 1964, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko advised

that at the time of Oswald's arrival in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the Fall of 1959, he (Nosenko) held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), KGB (Committee for State Security). This particular Section, of which he was then Deputy Chief, handled the KGB investigations of tourists from the United States and British Commonwealth countries.

The First Section, at that time, and at present, contains fifteen or sixteen officers, holding ranks of Junior Case Officers, Case Officers and Senior Case Officers. the time of President John F. Kennedy's assassination, Nosenko stated he then held the position of Deputy Chief. Seventh Department, (Tourist Department), Second Chief Directorate, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Seventh Department, consisting of approximately ninety Case Officers, is responsible for KGB investigations of tourists from all non-communist countries.

Prior to Oswald's arrival in the USSR he was completely unknown to the KGB, according to Nosenko. this connection he pointed out that immediately upon issuance of a visa to a person to visit the USSR, the Seventh Department (Tourist), Second Chief Directorate, KGB, is notified. At that time a preliminary evaluation is made of the individual and a determination made as to what action. if any, should be taken by the Tourist Department. Oswald's background was not of sufficient importance for the Tourist Department to have any advance interest in him and Nosenko stated that his first knowledge of the existence of Oswald arose in about October, 1959, when Kim Georgievich Krupnov, a Case Officer in his section, reported to him information which Krupnov had received from an Intourist interpreter. was to the effect that Oswald, an American citizen who had

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entered the USSR on a temporary visa, desired to remain permanently in the USSR and to become a Soviet citizen. Krupnov at this time displayed to Nosenko a memorandum prepared by Krupnov containing information which had been received by Krupnov from KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin (which administratively is part of the Hotel Metropole) concerning Oswald's behavior patterns, an Intourist itinerary for Oswald, and a two-page report prepared by the Intourist interpreter (a KGB informant) concerning his conversations with Oswald and his impressions and evaluations of Oswald. At that time a file was opened in Nosenko's section incorporating all of the information which Krupnov had collected.

Nosenko and Krupnov, on basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal. Nosenko could not specifically state what factors caused him to evaluate Oswald as being abnormal, but on basis of all information available to him at the time there was no doubt in his mind that Oswald was not "fully normal." At that time the KGB did not know of Oswald's prior military service and Nosenko stated that had such information been available to him, it would have been of no particular interest or significance to the KGB.

On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald, through the Intourist interpreter, that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the USSR permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa and thereafter seek re-entry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States. Nosenko's instructions were carried out and on the same date or the following day he learned that Oswald failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Intourist guide. This prompted Intourist to initiate efforts to locate him and after a couple of hours, inquiry at the Berlin Hotel established that Oswald's room key was missing, indicating that he was apparently in his room. employees then determined that Oswald's room was secured from the inside and when he failed to respond to their request for him to open the door, they forced it open. Oswald was found-

bleeding severely from self-inflicted wounds and was immediately taken by an ambulance to a hospital, believed by Nosenko to be the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow. did not know specifically whether Oswald was bleeding from wounds in his left or right wrist or whether from both wrists and he did not know what instrument was used to cause the wound or wounds. The information regarding Oswald's wounds was received by Nosenko from Krupnov who in turn received it from Intourist sources. Nosenko did not know how long Oswald remained in the hospital but stated it was for several days. Oswald's attempted suicide was reported by Nosenko to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Colonel Konstantin Nikitovich Dubas, and Nosenko believed that Dubas then reported it to the Office of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. Nosenko's original decision that the KGB would not become involved with Oswald was approved by the Chief of the Second Directorate, and it was further agreed that he should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

A report from the hospital was received which gave the circumstances of Oswald's admittance to the hospital, treatment received including blood transfusion, and the report stated Oswald had attempted suicide because he was not granted permission to remain in the USSR. The hospital record also included an evaluation that Oswald's attempted suicide indicated mental instability. Nosenko did not know whether this evaluation was based on a psychiatric examination or was merely an observation of the hospital medical staff. Nosenko also learned that upon Oswald's discharge from the hospital he was again informed by Intourist that he could not reside in the USSR and Oswald stated he would commit suicide.

Nosenko did not know who made the decision to grant Oswald permission to reside temporarily in the USSR, but he is sure it was not a KGB decision and he added that upon learning of this decision the KGB instructed that Oswald not be permitted to reside in the Moscow area. Nosenko suggested that either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the decision to permit Oswald to reside in the USSR and also made the decision to assign him to Minsk. Nosenko attached no particular significance to the fact that Oswald was settled in Minsk but offered the opinion that since

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Minsk is a capital city of one of the Republics and is an above-average Soviet city in cleanliness and modern facilities, it was selected in order to create a better impression on Oswald, a foreigner.

After the KGB was advised of the decision to authorize Oswald to reside in Minsk it was necessary for Krupnov to bring Oswald's file up to date for purpose of transferring it to the KGB Office in Minsk. This was done and the file was forwarded to Minsk by a cover letter prepared by Krupnov. That cover letter briefly summarized Oswald's case and specifically instructed that KGB, Minsk take no action concerning Oswald except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure that he was not a United States intelligence agent temporarily dormant. Krupnov's letter was read by Nosenko and signed by Dubas.

Nosenko stated that in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB, Moscow. According to Nosenko no such approval was ever requested or granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay at Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors, associates and review of his mail.

The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet re-entry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application.

His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by M. I. Turalin, Service Number 2, (counter-intelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate.

Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Yladimir Kuzmich Alekseey, Chief, Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's Department had no interest in Oswald and recommended that Oswald's request for a re-entry visa be denied. Nosenko could not recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with his visa application.

Nosenko's next knowledge of Oswald's activities arose as a result of President John F. Kennedy's assassination. Nosenko recalled that about two hours after President Kennedy had been shot he was telephonically advised at his home by the KGB Center of this fact. A short time later he was telephonically advised of the President's death. About two hours later Nosenko was advised that Oswald had been arrested. and Nosenko and his staff were called to work for purpose of determining whether the KGB had any information/concerning Oswald. After establishing Oswald's identity from KGB files and ascertaining that Oswald's file was still in Minsk, Nosenko, on instructions of General Oleg M. Gribanov, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, telephonically contacted the KGB Office in Minsk and had them dictate a summary of the Oswald file. Nosenko did not personally accept this summary, but it was taken down by an employee of his department. As reported by Nosenko at the time of his interview on February 26, 1964, this summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk had endeavored "to influence Oswald in the right direction." As reported by Nosenko, this latter statement greatly disturbed Gribanov since the KGB Headquarters had instructed that no action be taken concerning Oswald except to passively observe his activities. Accordingly, Gribanov ordered all records at Minsk pertaining to Oswald be forwarded immediately to Moscow by military aircraft with an explanation concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement. Nosenko read the file summary telephonically furnished by Minsk, the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement, and thoroughly reviewed Oswald's file prior to making same available to Sergei Mikhailovich redoseev, Chief of the First Department, Second Chief Directorat , KGP who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for Gribanov. That memorandum was furnished by Gribanov to Vladimir Semichastny Chairman of KGB who in turn reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USSR, and to Nikita S. Khrushchev, According to Nosenko, Oswald's file, as received from Minsk, contained no information to indicate that the KGB at Minsk had taken any action with respect to Oswald contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. It did contain information concerning Oswald's marriage to Marina Oswald, background data on Marina, including fact she had been a member of the Komsomol (Communist Party Youth Organization) but was dropped for nonpayment of dues and the fact that

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the Oswalds had departed the USSR for the United States.
His file also included a statement that Oswald had been a poor worker. Nosenko read Fedoseev's summary memorandum and he recalled that it contained the definite statement that from the date of Oswald's arrival in the USSR until his departure from the USSR, the KGB had no personal contact with Oswald and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

Nosenko was questioned as to whether Oswald could have been trained and furnished assignments by any other Soviet intelligence organization including the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) or the Thirteenth Department of the First Directorate of the KGB (which deals with sabotage, explosions, killings, terror). Nosenko stated that he is absolutely certain that Oswald received no such training or assignments. In this connection he explained that if any other department of KGB wanted to utilize Oswald, they would have to contact the department which originally opened up the file on Oswald (Nosenko's department) and ask permission to utilize him. Nosenko stated that this would also apply to Nosenko further explained that in view of their evaluation that Oswald appeared to be mentally unstable no Soviet Intelligence Agency, particularly the Thirteenth Department, would consider using him. Nosenko also advised that further evidence that Oswald was not of intelligence interest to the KGB is shown by the fact that the KGB Headquarters did not retain a control file concerning Oswald following his settlement in Minsk. He elaborated by stating that had Oswald been of any intelligence interest to KGB a control file would also have been maintained at KGB Headquarters. This file would have been assigned to a Case Officer at Headquarters with responsibility to direct supervision of the case, including the making of periodic visits to Minsk by the Case Officer. In Oswald's case the only record maintained at KGB Headquarters in Moscow was an index card bearing Oswald's name and the identity of the department which originated the file concerning him.

Nosenko advised that he ascertained from reading Oswald's file that the Soviet Red Cross had made payments to Oswald. He stated, however, that it is a normal practice

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for the Soviet Red Cross to make payments to emigres and defectors in order to assist them in enjoying a better standard of living than Soviet citizens engaged in similar occupations. He learned that Oswald received the minimum payments from the Soviet Red Cross which he estimated to be approximately 90 rubles per month. He did not know when these payments began and did not know for how long they continued.

Nosenko stated that there are no Soviet regulations which would have prevented Oswald from traveling from Minsk to Moscow without police authority. He stated that Soviet citizens likewise are permitted to travel from place to place without having to receive special permission.

Following President Kennedy's assassination
Nosenko ascertained from Oswald's file that he had had access
to a gun which he used to hunt game with fellow employees in the
USSR. He could not describe the gun used by Oswald but did
remember that it was used to shoot rabbits. Nosenko stated
that Western newspaper reports describe Oswald as an expert
shot; however, Oswald's file contained statements from fellow
hunters that Oswald was an extremely poor shot and that it
was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to
provide him with game.

Nosenko stated that there is no KGB and no GRU training school in the vicinity of Minsk.

According to Nosenko, no separate file was maintained by the KGB concerning Marina Oswald and all of KGB's information concerning her was kept in Oswald's file. He said that no information in that file indicated that the KGB had any interest in Marina Oswald either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she departed the Soviet Union. Nosenko also advised the KGB had no plans to contact either Oswald or Marina in the United States.

Nosenko opined that after Oswald departed the USSR he would not have been permitted to re-enter that country under any circumstances. He expressed the opinion that Marina and her children would have been granted permission to return alone had President Kennedy not been assassinated.

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Since the assassination of President Kennedy he does not know what decision would be made with respect to Marina Oswald and her children.

Nosenko had no information that the Soviet Government ever received any contact from the Cubans concerning Oswald, and he knew of no Cuban involvement in the assassination.

Nosenko stated that he had no knowledge that Oswald had made application to re-enter the Soviet Union other than through his contact with the Soviet Embassy at Mexico City. He pointed out in this connection, that had Oswald applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., or elsewhere, the KGB would not have ever been apprised of the visa request if the visa issuing officer at the Embassy decided on his own authority to reject the visa application.

Nosenko noted that all mail addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow, emanating abroad or from the USSR itself is first reviewed by the KGB in Moscow. Nosenko added that on occasions mail from "significant" persons is not even permitted by KGB to reach the American Embassy. In the case of Oswald, Nosenko stated that since he was of no significance or particular interest to the KGB, correspondence from Oswald would be permitted to reach the Embassy, even though critical. However, Nosenko had no knowledge that Oswald ever directed a communication of any type to the American Embassy at Moscow.

Nosenko stated that no publicity appeared in the Soviet Press or over the radio regarding Oswald's arrival or departure from the USSR and no publicity resulted from his attempted suicide. Soviet newspapers and radio have carried numerous statements concerning President Kennedy's assassination which quoted from Western newspaper stories concerning Oswald's alleged involvement including the fact that Oswald had previously visited the USSR.

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Nosenko advised he saw nothing unusual in the fact that Oswald was permitted to marry a Soviet citizen and later permitted to depart the USSR with her. He noted that Soviet law specifically provides that a Soviet citizen may marry a foreign national in the USSR and depart from the USSR with spouse provided, of course, the Soviet citizen had not had access to sensitive information.

It was his opinion that President Kennedy was held in high esteem by the Soviet Government and that President Kennedy had been evaluated by the Soviet Government as a person interested in maintaining peace. He stated that following the assassination, the Soviet guards were removed from around the American Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet people were permitted without interference to visit the American Embassy to express their condolences. According to Nosenko, this is the only occasion he can recall where such action had been taken. He said that the orders to remove the guards came from "above." He added that his department provided approximately 20 men who spoke the English language for assignment in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy in Moscow to insure that no disrespect was shown during this period.

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