

showing that students who usually drop out of school after adoption of the rule, students dropped out and a number of those who did continue their education at home. Since it is desirable to keep children in school until they have graduated from high school, a policy designed to discourage marriage among students is not to be a proper exercise of the authority of the school board.

Student, on the other hand, that he has a constitutional right to get married, and the rule deprives him of an important part of his school's program because marriage is an action taken in violation of state law which interferes with his civil liberties.

The basis of this court's exercise over almost 20 years, the student acted wrongly and the rules promulgated by the school board are based on a very reasonable desire to deal with a social problem of great complexity and difficulty. This court has previously expressed its strong approval of their objective of discouraging child marriages. The Ohio Supreme Court in *State v. Gans*, 151 Ohio App. 2d 109 (1958), while recognizing that children over the age of 18 have the right to marry, noted that the public policy of this state is against 'child marriages' * * * although the minor participants in such marriages are 'more to be pitied than scorned,' the same attitudes do not hold true of adults who participate in effecting such marriages—and it is the opinion of this court that it would behoove all parents, including parents, to discourage child marriages."

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the student did legally get married, in violation of any law of the state, and thus attained the status where marital privacy might not be invaded by the state, even for the laudable purpose of discouraging other students from doing what he did.

The court conceded that in the best of thinking, extracurricular activities are an integral and complementary part of the total school program. Part of the function of education of children is to provide them with the basic knowledge and training necessary to become productive

citizens, either or not in some of its manifestations it may come within the scope of the antitrust laws. Hence, it is difficult to refute the argument that a secondary school system that deprives a student of the opportunity to develop his full potential for entering the field of professional baseball is not functioning as it should."

It seems clear that the effect of the enforcement of the rule which the school board has promulgated under the color of authority of the state laws is to put what may be an unendurable strain upon the students' marital privacy. This court cannot escape the obligation to protect from invasion by the power of the state that right to marital privacy that *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), holds to be protected by the constitution. What greater invasion of marital privacy can there be than one which could totally destroy the marriage itself?

[Text] The defendants should not be faulted for trying, by the adoption of their rule, to discourage child marriages. Unfortunately, the laudable purpose of their rule fails to take into account the extremely limited deterrent value of punishment in areas where action is mainly governed by emotion. What the rule does, as distinguished from what it is intended to do, is to punish the one who has not been deterred at all even by the immediate prospect of the punishment, much less by the example it is supposed to offer. The combined effect of the *Griswold* and *Tinker* [393 U.S. 503, 37 LW 4121 (1969)] cases is to preclude the defendants from even trying to do what they have done. With real sorrow, this court must so hold. [End Text]—Young, J.

—USDC NOhio, *Davis v. Meek*, 5/5/72.

Securities and Exchanges

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION—

Termination of Government agency's investigation and enforcement proceeding does not extinguish "investigatory files" exemption under Freedom of Information Act.

During a non-public investigation

of the statements and press releases made by a publicly-held corporation, the SEC amassed an investigatory file of over 7,000 pages of testimony and documents. On the basis of information obtained during the investigation, the commission instituted suit in Southern New York against the corporation for violations of Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, seeking to enjoin further violations of the statute and rule. One day after the complaint was filed, the parties agreed to a consent decree, ending both the suit and the investigation.

A shareholder commenced a class action for damages against the corporation, alleging violations of the securities laws, derived from the SEC's complaint. His attorney sought in vain the commission's permission to inspect and copy the documents that supported, explained, and discussed the violations claimed in the settled action against the corporation. Then the shareholder sued the SEC for an injunction against continued withholding of the documents in violation of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. The commission contended that the documents were not subject to the Act's mandatory public disclosure requirements due to the statutory exemptions for "investigatory files" and "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums."

The district court denied the SEC's motion for summary judgment and granted in part the shareholder's motion for the injunction. Since the Commission had not taken any steps, subsequent to the consent decree, to maintain the file for current law enforcement purposes, the court below ruled that the "investigatory files" exemption no longer applied to the requested document. Although the district judge ordered the SEC to permit shareholder to inspect and copy non-exempt records, he referred the question of the "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums" exemption to a special master for an in camera review of the documents and for a report on the extent any of the material in the files falls within that exemption.

The issue presented on appeal is "whether the exemption from disclosure to 'any person' of 'matter' contained in an 'investigatory file' compiled and utilized by an agency in an enforcement proceeding applies after the investigation and the enforcement proceeding have terminated." To resolve this issue, this court turns to the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act. The congressional committee reports show that "the broad legislative intent behind enactment * * * was to give the electorate greater access to information concerning the operations of the Federal Government. The

ultimate purpose was to enable the public to have sufficient information in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental activities." The legislative history and the various disclosure provisions "clearly indicate that the general purpose of the Act was that the public be informed about the processes of government so that the electorate would be in a better position to pass upon the structure and operation of government."

The Senate and House Reports on the "investigatory files" exemptions, also show a two-fold legislative purpose for the exemption: "to prevent the premature disclosure of the results of an investigation so that the Government can present its strongest case in court, and to keep confidential the procedures by which the agency conducted its investigation and by which it has obtained information." Therefore, termination of an investigation and an enforcement proceeding does not extinguish the exemption. "If an agency's investigatory files were obtainable without limitation after the investigation was concluded, future law enforcement efforts by the agency could be seriously hindered" because its investigatory procedures and informants would be revealed.

This court wishes to emphasize that nothing in its holding would bar the shareholder from obtaining information contained in the documents through the remedy of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dissent. The ten year, legislative history of the Act is "so extensive and so full of internal inconsistencies" that the committee reports do not address themselves to the enacted version of the bill. The question presented is a narrow one because "a careful district judge specifically framed his order and accompanying memorandum to preserve to the SEC, through in camera production, its exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), 'commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,' and (b)(5) 'inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency'."

The intent of Congress was to delegate to the federal judiciary the power to subject agency operations to public perusal. There is a long line of cases where Government agencies, on a showing of good cause, have been required to produce documents obtained in the course of an investigation.

[Text] I am of the view that the federal courts can amply safeguard investigatory agency procedures and informants by in camera examination of the files in doubtful cases. Thus the fear of exposure underlying the majority's view is largely groundless. The argument to which the SEC is ultimately reduced is that it should not be required to disclose its files to just "any person." The fact is that plaintiffs here are or were in litigation with Occidental Petroleum. Thus, if the words "any person" mean any person with standing, plaintiffs here surely have it. [End Text]—Oakes, J.

—CA 2; Frankel v. SEC, 5/4/72.