

Notes on selection of records in FBI's 9/19/85 incomplete Nosenko disclosures

Serial Nos in FBIHQ 65-68530

1) Brennan to Sullivan 2/5/64 begins with CIA's dawning of suspicions about Nosenko from its first contact with the FBI on 2/4 (Serial 2), delayed from CIA's interview of Nosenko, who sought it out 1/23/64 this time, in Geneva. Without any basis of even logical reason the CIA suspects he is a "plant" in "some ~~plant~~ type of operation designed to embarrass the U.S. Government at the Disarmament conference in Geneva that would be done by the Soviets announcing to the world that the CIA endeavored to recruit a Soviet member of the delegation." How silly and how could the FBI believe it? All the CIA then would have had to do is call a press conference and play its tapes of its interviews with Nosenko. *and him.*

4) Newspaper clippings, declassified 10/23/81, including AP photo of Nosenko (Repeated references to "See addendum." No addendum included. By "190-709-103x1, In the FBI's file classifications 190= Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts.

5) Biography of Nosenko, under 1955, says that when a new KGB department for counteintelligence against tourists was created, he was transferred to it and was on occasion temporarily assigned to the U.S. Embassy section of the First Department of the KGB "due to the fact that he had had some success in recruiting American tourists."

17NR7 by this date, 2/24/64, Nosenko "is now on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll for \$500 a month."

27 2/26/64, from WFO re Nosenko interview, repeats KGB suspicion Oswald might be an American "sleeper" agent. (page 2, top)

28 heavily excised p. 1, with even date blacked out, just sent to me, has part of a stamp not obliterated "ABC'D - READING ROOM."

309 3/6/64 Hoover to CIA forwards memos on FBI's 2/28 and 3/4 interviews with Nosenko, re Oswald. Nosenko read and initialed each page, offered to testify in secret before Warren Commission. NOTE: THIS DATE SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH THE TIME THE CIA CHANGED ITS TREATMENT OF NOSENKO FROM ALMOST PRINCELY TO SUBHUMAN.

41? 3/4/64 WFO to FBIHQ is incomplete, first page only provided. Reports Nosenko likes treatment and FBI's recounting of what he said. What is withheld is what else Nosenko said, what follows the colon.

47NR2 (anything further eliminated by offcenter xeroxing), 3/5/64 Branigan to Sullivan, spells out Nosenko's account of the basis for the KGB's evaluation of Oswald, "on the basis of information obtained from Oswald's Intourist guide and from employees of hotel (sic) where Oswald resided in Moscow..." The gets to the CIA ex poste facto reason for claiming to question Nosenko's bona fides, his statement that the KGB had no interest in Oswald and didn't interview him. I can only wonder how the press swallowed that concoction and failed to understand the high likelihood that the Intourist and hotels for foreigners personnel are not KGB connected. This is not a record copy in the Nosenko file. It is a record copy in a Commission or CIA file, Not Recorded in this Nosenko file. The offcenter xeroxing eliminates the area in which the FBI usually notes the file in which it is the record copy.

Serial blacked out, 3/4/64 Branigan to Sullivan, summarizes FBI's Nosenko interviews over the five-day period 2/24-28. I suppose that more than one interview is included in one of the three FD302s that it sent the Commission, but I'd thought each covered the interview of a single day. The record includes the CIA second reason for claiming Nosenko was a Soviet plant. Not to disrupt the disarmament conference in Geneva but now "to disrupt American intelligence work." (None of these records includes even a suggestion of the CIA's later reason, to disinform about the JFK assassination and

exculpate the USSR. The FBI's comment on the second CIA alleged reason is that "we do not ~~necessarily~~ accept this analysis as necessarily correct." Page 3 reports "Nosenko told of the recruitment of Sam Jaffe," ABC correspondent in Moscow, Jaffe denies this and he had been an unpaid FBI informant re the USSR.

70)? Serial partially obliterated in processing, 4/2/64 Sullivan to Belmont. The text is entirely blacked out, except for the introductory sentence and the one in conclusion. That Sullivan advances Nosenko theories that are withheld as Secret classification is indicated in the concluding sentence, "Any specifics desired to support the thesis not set forth above will be provided if desired."

136NR15 This April (rest of date illegible) CIA memo to the FBI is captioned with the title of the FBI's own file on him but the record copy is in a 105 file the number of which is illegible, a very large file from what can be discerned of the serial. It begins 350 and is likely 3508. Thus there is indication of either another Nosenko file or another file in which there is Nosenko information.

If taken literally, this CIA memo begins with what seems to be unusual, "Source (meaning Nosenko) was queried on the OSWALD affair on 23 January 1964." That is the date Nosenko then first went to the ~~Russia~~ CIA. (He had gone to it earlier, I think in 1962.) He had at best only a relatively short part of a day if he was to remain unsuspected by the USSR people with whom he was, and of all the things about which the CIA could have interrogated him at the outset, despite the interest in the assassination, it appears odd that they would on that occasion go into the assassination when they had expectation of having a great deal of time with him. What then follows seems to invalidate the CIA's later excuse for its bestial treatment of Nosenko, the claim that he had said that the KGB had not looked into his potential usefulness and that it had not interrogated him. (See note above re Oswald's Intourist and hotel employees.) When Oswald asked to become a Soviet citizen "The KGB decided to look into OSWALD's case to see if there was any operational interest (punctuation illegible) which part of the KGB might have use for him and what was behind the request. It was decided that OSWALD was of no interest . . ." Despite the CIA's contrary pretense, there is nothing unusual in this. Oswald did have knowledge of codes and of height-seeking radar, but the KGB knew that the codes would be changed with his defection (radar codes) and by then the height-seeking radar was no longer secret. I know of no reason the KGB should have had to have any interest in Oswald, and I know of no valid reason the CIA has ever advanced.

That Oswald was anti-Soviet in the USSR, which is consistent with his later writing, is inconsistent with the official characterization of him and thus the federal agencies may want to discount it, but it seems perfectly reasonable to me for Marina's uncle to talk to him and Marina "and persuade ~~him~~ OSWALD not to spread anti-Soviet propaganda after his departure" from the USSR.

This memo, without indicating whether there were intervening interviews with Nosenko, says he was interviewed on 1/30/64 about "the possible involvement of the Soviet government in the assassination of President Kennedy." Nosenko is quoted as saying, "No matter how I may hate anyone, but I cannot speak against my convictions and since I know this case I could unhesitatingly sign off of the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this (assassination) in any way." The matter of KGB recruitment of Oswald was brought up again. Nosenko then "continued that the KGB was frightened of OSWALD and would not have discussed such a matter (the assassination) with him." On recruitment, "the decision was 'Absolutely not.'" Nosenko's knowledge that the KGB continued to have no interest in Oswald comes from the fact that after the assassination the KGB did not trust the official papers and he, Nosenko, "had to make a complete investigation and even sent several KGB staff personnel to Minsk to investigate on the spot." Anything else, despite the CIA's claimed suspicion, would be extremely foolhardy and atypical for any intelligence agency.

When Oswald tried to get ~~himself~~ to the USSR from Mexico the KGB prohibited it.

This memo concludes by stating that noise on the tape of the 1/23 interrogation made "the early portion" useless and that subsequent tapes were transcribed. My question above about how unusual it seems that on the very first interrogation Nosenko was queried about the assassination is buttressed by the fact that the CIA itself says that happened in the "early portion" of "the first half of the first meeting" with Nosenko.

I do not mean to suggest that the CIA should not have questioned Nosenko about the JFK assassination but because there was no factual or reasonable reason to suspect USSR involvement and because other things of which Nosenko did have personal knowledge and because of the CIA's need at the outset to be able to satisfy itself that he was a genuine defector, its beginning with him about the JFK assassination does appear to me to be both unusual and for some hidden purpose

136NR41) Again the record copy is elsewhere, this time the number completely obliterated as "secret" with the date of review of classification also marked "Secret." This radiogram, copies of WFO and NY, is so completely obliterated that even the filed office to which it was sent is obliterated as secret. The WFO file number also is classified secret. There certainly was a large number of records inserted into the main Nosenko file at Serial 136. He therefore has to be a substantial part of another file or files. More follows on this.

136NR42) 4/29/64 Branigan to Sullivan is a copy of 105-unclear-3527 (see above, 3508). Branigan seems to be impressed with Nosenko's statement that despite his hatred of the USSR and/or KGB he would not involve it/them and he has absolutely no reason to, same quote as above on this. He also notes that "the CIA memorandum does not indicate ~~matter~~ that the data is being furnished to the President's Commission. Since the CIA in the past specifically stated that they desire to furnish the Commission any information originating with their Agency, no further action is necessary." I have read all in the Commission's files that is not still withheld and this possibly important Nosenko is not included in what the CIA told the WC.

I also note that although he was the USSR/Communist expert in the Sullivan office, T.N. Goble's initials are not on the record and I do not recall seeing them on any of these Nosenko records.

136NR48) Record copy file number obliterated in xeroxing, sends Washington Field the translation it has requested. When the record was generated it was consigned to the main Nosenko file by number but the record copy is ~~elsewhere~~ elsewhere.

136NR48 appears to be identical but isn't. Dates withheld as secret on both.

137NR5 same as above

42(rest of # obliterated in xeroxing) 3/25/68 Branigan to Sullivan reports coming SEPost article by David Wise dealing mostly with WC/^{unavailable} Archives material but including Nosenko info "apparently developed by David Wise through independent inquiries". A CIA memo said to be attached (and as I recall isn't) also relates to that coming article and says Nosenko inquiries should be expected. "CIA then goes on record that Nosenko is still in the custody of their agency in the United States. According to CIA the question of his bona fides is still not resolved." This graf is marked with its classification extended as of 12/28/78, long after Hart's testimony for the CIA, with the next declassification review 3/25/88. This classification is attributed to the CIA.

1729) 5/17/77 CIA to FBI, for Thomas W. Leavitt from DDO William W. Wells, "The Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," says their conclusion after a comprehensive review by senior intelligence specialists over a six-month period is "that Nosenko was, from the beginning of his contact with this Agency in 1962, and has continued to be up until the present time, a bona fide defector" and the CIA is now ready to address any matters of special FBI interest. Nothing in the file

as disclosed reflects any FBI expression of any special interests.

1730) However, on 8/8/77, or three months later, the FBI did say it was interested in a copy of the "study" because it could be an invaluable guide in assessing the bona fides of other such defectors. This was continued in classification until the scheduled review of 8/8/97 on 3/27/79, or long after Hart's testimony for the CIA, by the FBI's 2333.

1733) 2/22/78, FBIHQ to WFO, enclosing a copy of the drafts of two coming Epstein Readers Digest articles, and admits, without denying it, that, Epstein attributes some of his information to the FBI and CIA.

Why to WFO only and why it only would be kept au courant by FBIHQ seems odd.

No other reference to Epstein, his book or the ~~XXXXXX~~ Digest's serialization appears in these records.

1742NR2, 5/17/78 and 6/26/78, captioned in typing Missing File and by hand Yuri I. Nosenko, are record copies in a 66 file that is almost entirely obliterated by off-center xerixing. 66 is an admat in which the FBI hides electronic surveillances and tapes of them, among other things, as "administrative matters."

Section 8, Serials 120-135 of the main Nosenko file are missing and the first memo requests permission for each FBIHQ Division to have a search of all their space to locate it. "The enclosure behind file for serial 228, which pertains to a very sensitive ~~matter~~ subject, cannot be located" in the Records Management Div. Such a search by RMD would require checking more than 7,000 file cabinets, drawer by drawer, and will require 150 people to work on Saturday 5/20/78. It was approved that RMD and each Division make this search. The second memo reports the search was not successful but the missing file has been reconstructed from other sources, including field offices. Only two are mentioned (not counting obliterations) in the records disclosed, and that is quite exceptional. Three with WFO and WF as one.

The FBI's covering letter is deceptive, untruthful and is intended to cover unjustified and unaccounted withholdings only some indicated above. I'll write it separately and that letter will hold more detail.