

September 30, 1984

~~XXX~~ Dear Harold,

I don't have time for a proper letter at the moment, since my parents are still visiting. Thanks for your letters of 9/5 and 9/17, and in particular for your work on CIA 1648-452C. Jim has sent me your affidavits and the attached documents, which I have found useful. It is particularly helpful to have all these documents in ~~n~~ one place. I have decided not to ~~file~~ file any affidavits until Jim and I have agreed on the outline (if not the details) of whatever motion(s) we file next. ~~Then~~ Then I will consider whether anything beyond the motion itself is needed. I am ~~not~~ reluctant to get into the details of what was known about the Castro plots until we have clarified the legal context of such an argument.

By the way, I see from the exhibits ~~xxx~~ to your affidavit that the Jack Anderson column quoting the IG report came before the HSCA ~~public~~ published excerpts, but after they had distributed those pages to spectators at the public hearings.

With hasty regards,

Best,

*Paul*

PLH

Encl:

CNSS Item #60 (4 pp., 4/22 and 4/25/75)  
CIA 1646-452A (4/15/75), a.k.a. RC-5  
CIA 1644-451 (5/30/75, 2+27 pp.) (Rocca memo)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

60

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: R. G. Rocca		EXTENSION 1054	NO. DATE 25 April 1975
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. DC/Ops Staff			<p>Eloise: This is further to my interim report I have to you earlier this week and specifically to para 3 of Mr. Belin's letter. Attached herewith are photostat copies of the cover of Castro's statement to the Associated Press correspondent on 7 September 1963 as the statements appeared in the Times-Picayune of New Orleans and the Evening Star, Washington. Also attached are photostat copies of the coverage as it appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times. The Times Picayune and the Evening Star items will be of particular interest within the framework of para 3 of Mr. Belin's letter and I suggest that they be forwarded to him through Knoche forthwith.</p> <p>Orig - DC/Ops, w/atts 1 - C/LA, wo/atts</p>
2. REF: David W. Belin's letter to E. Henry Knoche			
3. 15 April 1975			
4. <i>OIG / Mr. Laker 25/4/75</i>			
5. <i>Mr. Brubridge</i>			
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FORM 3-62

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

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22 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Operations Staff

SUBJECT : Interim Reply to Questions by  
David W. Belin

REFERENCE : Memorandum by David W. Belin to  
Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975.  
(This memorandum sets out five questions  
dealing with various aspects of informa-  
tion possibly heard by the Agency relating  
to its alleged involvement in planning the  
assassination of Fidel CASTRO.)

1. This is an interim reply based on a comprehensive, but as yet incomplete, review of materials held by CIOPS in the OSWALD 201 (58 volumes). On the basis of this material we cannot respond for the Agency to Mr. Belin's questions because the OSWALD file does not contain any significant proportion of WAVE or other Agency material dealing with emigre activity. Our holdings on that aspect of the question reflect solely what was relevant to the Kennedy assassination as an act performed by OSWALD. It will be necessary, therefore, for LA Division to make a considerable input to the finalized responses.

2. At this point our tentative, brief answers to the five questions stipulated by Mr. Belin are as follows (the responses are keyed to the numbering of Mr. Belin's questions).

a. Question 1. As far as we can tell from all of the materials at our disposition, no one discussed any alleged plan [to assassinate Fidel CASTRO] with the Warren Commission. As far as our materials show, there were no such plans underway or known to us in CI Staff, as the working-level point of contact with the Warren Commission. There is no evidence that anyone known to our records made a decision not to tell the Warren Commission anything about this topic or anything else.

Our records show at every point a marked intent to make as much available to the Commission as was consistent with the security of ongoing operations.

b. Question 2. We have no evidence in our materials indicating CASTRO's knowledge or the possession of documentation of alleged assassination plans directed against him.

c. Question 3. We are able to be affirmatively responsive to this question. Daniel HARKER filed a report from Havana of an informal interview given to him at a Brazilian Embassy reception on Saturday, 7 September 1963. This was not a public speech. The HARKER item was variously played by newspapers in the United States as is clear from the attached transcriptions of the gist of items we have located in two newspapers, The Washington Star (which played up the GOLDWATER, political aspects) and the Times Picayune of New Orleans (which emphasized the physical threat to U.S. leadership). We have not checked the Dallas newspapers. The New York Times published a UPI item entirely different in emphasis from the AP item, omitting any reference to CASTRO's warning to U.S. leadership. And the Washington Post did a summary which also omitted any reference to the threatening aspects of CASTRO's interview. We have been unable to secure photographic copies of the Star and Times Picayune coverage, but the partial transcriptions attached are accurate. As far as we know, CASTRO made no other public statement of that kind prior to 22 November 1963.

d. Question 4. Our records contain no direct information that any foreign government or foreign group was considering possible assassination of an American leader. However, it should be noted that on 9 January 1964 Guatemala Station forwarded a duplicate copy of a raw report dated 5 January 1962, dealing with a year-end CPG cell meeting.

A participant is noted as stating: "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostication, that he will die within the present year [1962]."

It should be noted that this item of raw reporting was received after the Kennedy assassination. We have no indication thus far in the file as to whether any action

was taken on the item with the Warren Commission. This will have to be gone into with the Division.

e. Question 5. We have no indication in our records that there was any communication to President Johnson regarding the matter dealt with by this question.

3. The gist of these replies was taken up directly with Mr. Belin in a conversation which took place this morning from 10:30 - 12:15.

  
Raymond G. Rocca  
Counter Intelligence Operations

Attachments:  
Gist of newspaper items

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lans Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

April 15, 1975

Document Number **1646-452-A**  
for FOIA Review on FEB 1978

Mr. E. Henry Knoche  
Assistant to the Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Knoche:

As you know, there have been allegations that the CIA was involved in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. For the purposes of this letter, we will assume that these allegations are correct, and based upon this assumption I would like to know the answers to the following questions:


1. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the Warren Commission or any lawyer serving on the Warren Commission staff that such plans had been underway? If the answer is yes, we would like to know what person or persons with the Agency delivered said information, to whom it was delivered, when it was delivered, what specifically was told or said, what documents there are to support the answers to the foregoing questions, and what response, if any, was received from the Warren Commission. If the Commission was not told about this, why was it not told and who made the decision not to deliver such information to the Warren Commission?
2. There is evidence that Castro, prior to November 22, 1963, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government. Did the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren Commission investigation have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans? If the answer is yes, would you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and details of any such information.
3. Several months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy there is evidence of a public speech by Castro that was recorded by the Associated Press whereby Castro alluded

to possible assassination attempts on his life and possible retaliation. Would you please advise us if there is any evidence that this Associated Press report may have appeared in any newspapers in the United States, including specifically any newspapers in Dallas or New Orleans. Would you also advise us if you have any other information of public statements of any Cuban leader prior to November 22, 1963 indicating any awareness of possible assassination plots on the lives of Cuban leaders.

4. Would you please advise us if there is any information in CIA records to indicate that at any time prior to November 22, 1963 any foreign government or any foreign group was considering a possible assassination of any American leader. If so, would you please advise us of all details and also advise us who in the United States Government outside the CIA was advised of these plans or possibilities.

5. Prior to his death Lyndon Johnson supposedly stated that he believed that although there was no doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy and Tippitt, nevertheless Oswald might have been a part of a conspiracy in retaliation to possible United States assassination attempts in Cuba. Would you please advise us of any information in Agency files showing whether or not there was any communication to President Johnson of any possible plans involving the attempted assassinations of any Cuban leader and if the answer is yes, also give us all details involving this matter.

Sincerely yours,



David W. Belin  
Executive Director

*Copy in  
Comm. Carney*

[REDACTED]  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Execut [REDACTED]  
75-6585

30 May 1975

Mr. David W. Belin  
Executive Director  
Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States

Dear Mr. Belin:

You will recall your letter of 15 April, paragraph 3, in which you refer to a public speech by Castro in 1963. I understand you had a number of conversations with [REDACTED] on this and related matters. I attach a memorandum prepared by [REDACTED] responsive to your discussions.

The attached review represents the research and analysis of an individual officer. It has not been fully researched and verified and does not necessarily represent the position of this Agency.

Faithfully yours,

E. H. Knoche  
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

Document Number 1644-451

for FOIA Review on FEB 1978

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



EKnoch: [REDACTED] (5/30/75)

Distribution:

- Orig - Mr. Belin w/att (Cuban Operations Papers)
- 1 - ER wo/att
- 1 - OGC wo/att
- 1 - IG wo/att
- 1 - Knoche Chrono wo/att
- 1 - Belin Letter Request File 5/23<sup>15</sup> w/att
- 1 - Comm Correspondence wo/att

Document Number

1644-451

for FOIA Review on FEB 1978

**SUBJECT** : Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination

**REFERENCE** : Letter by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, etc.), attached

**BACKGROUND**

1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER.

2. HARKER's interview reached New York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States.

3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he excoriated in extraordinarily provocative fashion ("... KENNEDY is a cretin;" "... the BATISTA of his times ... the most opportunistic American President of all time ...").

4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.

5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September, page 7, under a three-column headline: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by-line:

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba.'

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"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.'

"... World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks.

"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

"But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's ..."

6. The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated rewrite (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks.

S E C R E T

The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the political aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece.

7. There is no evidence in the files on the KENNEDY assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although [REDACTED] specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.

8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's request, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD's activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader - which we know from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others - he read the CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results

[REDACTED]

of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20 - 20 quality of hindsight, may be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the assassination to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them in alone and of his own determination stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this judgement did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and

(C) (C)

[REDACTED]

grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open.<sup>1</sup>

c. In the absence of additional or new elements of "credible" evidence, there are "nuances" in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 - if OSWALD did indeed read

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<sup>1</sup> Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 - 129. See especially p. 124 - "Mr. Helms: 'Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.'"

it in New Orleans - must be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup after his attempt to kill General WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's warning and threat, given to AP correspondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no circumstances was excusable as retorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963.

CUBAN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA,  
EARLY 1959 (?)

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group



[REDACTED]

member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"<sup>2</sup>

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report, and its implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus, the record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testified:

" ... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to

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<sup>2</sup> Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Report, p. 687.

[REDACTED]

get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversion or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

" ... I seen this envelope in his foot-locker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

" ... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to

relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down

[REDACTED]

there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours, talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. LIEBELER: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. DELGADO : About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. DELGADO : No. No ...

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO : I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with

[REDACTED]

these Cuban people. he started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers.....

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. DELGADO : Not that I can recall, no.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you have any reason to believe that these things came to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO : Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope, you know ... something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white; almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United, something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

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"Mr. DELGADO : No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. DELGADO : No, he didn't.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. DELGADO : No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to -- once he got out of the service -- he was going to Switzerland ... "3

12. OSWALD's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD

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<sup>3</sup>  
Hearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 - 243.

[REDACTED]

accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1969 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

13. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presumption is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on OSWALD?<sup>4</sup>

[REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>4</sup> U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

(C) [REDACTED] (C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAUGE,  
7 NOVEMBER 1963

16. A [REDACTED] source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: " ... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have

[REDACTED]

a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

[REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED]

19. [REDACTED]

20. [REDACTED]

21. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

22.

[REDACTED]

a.

[REDACTED]

b.

[REDACTED]

c.

[REDACTED]

23.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( ( [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24.

[REDACTED]

25.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND  
CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO  
ALLEGATIONS OF (A) [REDACTED] AND  
(B) [REDACTED]

26. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ..."<sup>6</sup> Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - was the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D."<sup>7</sup> ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in

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<sup>6</sup> See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the others were the cases of Ylario ROJAS Villeneuve in Cozumel and Guadalupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo GONGORA in New York City, the claims of [REDACTED] Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of [REDACTED]

<sup>7</sup> See Report, pp. 307 - 308.

Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

28. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the release of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

29. [REDACTED]

30. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C) (C)

[REDACTED]

31. The first reference to the [REDACTED] story was noted in a Mexico [REDACTED] Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

[REDACTED] [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the [REDACTED] family [REDACTED]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place that she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both [REDACTED] and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos 'without a doubt' at the party."

32. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

33.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

34. It developed that [REDACTED] and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attache on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to [REDACTED] but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to [REDACTED] CIA [REDACTED] on 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

35. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

36. There the matter rests. [REDACTED] chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed data of OSWALD's presence there. Her story, however, had two points congruent with allegations by others regarding OSWALD:

a. ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's published account of the "D" case] and

b. [REDACTED] later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

37. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, [REDACTED] in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, [REDACTED] who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

38. In June 1969 [REDACTED] was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD

( [REDACTED] )

case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to [REDACTED] and his friend. OSWALD met [REDACTED] and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy had denied him a visa. He requested aid from [REDACTED] group. [REDACTED] and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

39. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] determined that [REDACTED] was indeed at the University of Mexico but only

[REDACTED]

for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publicly associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962, and

[REDACTED] was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the [REDACTED] allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by [REDACTED] about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near the hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.