



AFFIDAVIT

My name is Harold Weisberg. I reside at 7627 Old Receiver Road, Frederick, Maryland. I have been a Senate editor and investigator, an investigative reporter, an intelligence analyst and, since November 22, 1963, have conducted what I believe is the most extensive nonofficial examination of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and its official investigations that has been made. I have published six books on this (and one on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) beginning in 1965. My books are used as college texts as well as by persons who are interested in their subject matter. My records, largely the result of FOIA litigation, are in regular use by others, including private persons interested in the subject matter, the major media, and college and university students, including those engaged in studies ranging from honors papers to doctoral theses. I have been consulted by a number of Congressional committees, of both Houses. I am described in the standard bibliography in the field, by historians Dr. DeLloyd Guth and Dr. David Wrone, as the preeminent expert in this field. I am, to the best of my knowledge, the only person working in this field who is not what has come to be known as a "conspiracy theorist" and I adhere to no theory of who may have conspired to assassinate President Kennedy. Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. James H. Lesar, who has represented me in a number of FOIA lawsuits, including litigation in which the Central Intelligence Agency was the defendant and other cases in which CIA records and attestations were involved, has sent me copies of and asked me to read what is styled "Defendant's Motion for Clarification," with attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed in this litigation on August 9,

1984, and a letter to him, dated August 22, 1984, from Ms. Laura Einstein of the Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy, along with its enclosed redacted copy of CIA Document No. 1648-452-C, which I also have read. This CIA document is the subject of defendant's Memorandum identified above.

1. My prior experience with CIA attestations, including those of its Office of Operations, is that they not uncommonly are not factually correct, that they misrepresent, distort, and sometimes are overtly untrue. It is my experience that the CIA asserts claims to the need to protect "secret" sources and "secret" methods to withhold the public domain, particularly when the content of what is withheld can be embarrassing to officialdom. The Dube affidavit of the CIA's Office of Operations on which defendant's Memorandum is based is consistent with my prior experiences with CIA attestations in that, as quoted in defendant's Memorandum, it is not at any point truthful, as I detail below.

2. As quoted in defendant's Memorandum, it is limited to claims to Exemptions (b) (1)<sup>(3)</sup> and (5). As I attest below, these CIA claims were made for information all of which before then was extensively in the public domain in countless sources. Among these public sources of that very information are newspapers, magazines, the government's own public reading rooms, records provided to me by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and records disclosed by the CIA itself, samples of which I attach below. Much of the information Dube attests requires protection and secrecy was published 17 years ago (Exhibits 2 and 3). And the CIA knew this (Exhibit 7).

3. Defendant's Memorandum (page 3) refers to this CIA document as a "draft memorandum which contains 'predecisional opinions and conclusions' of an 'unidentified author', the release of which 'could lead to the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.'" Except that the author is unidentified, not

one word as quoted above from defendant's Memorandum is in accord with the facts that are obvious to anyone with any subject-matter knowledge. Even if political assassination by the United States Government is considered an "intelligence method," there still was not and would not have been any "disclosure" because long before Dube executed his affidavit it was public domain that the CIA plotted political assassinations, including that of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, which is the subject of this CIA speculation and conjecture, as it describes itself. (Its title is "What Could Castro Have Known?")

4. There is nothing in this incomplete, misleading, misrepresentative and inaccurate document that is in any sense predecisional. There in fact was no need for anyone to conjecture about what Castro could have known about CIA attempts to assassinate him because, prior to the date of this CIA document, he had repeatedly stated that he had such knowledge and had put those apprehended on trial. (Illustrations in Exhibit 8) As of the later date of the Dube affidavit, all he swore had to be withheld under claims to (b)(1) and (3) was in the public domain along with much more that is carefully omitted by the CIA. No self-respecting intelligence expert or organization would disgrace himself or itself by representing that this document is full, complete and accurate enough to be used as the basis for decision-making. It is obvious that nobody had to know whether Castro knew of the plots against him because his knowledge of them was well-known and public. There thus was no need for anyone to decide whether or not he had such knowledge. From my reading of this CIA document, it is obvious that not a single alleged source is identified in it so by its content there is neither an intelligence source nor an intelligence method to be protected.

5. However, if there really had been any need for anyone to make a decision that required the kind of information glossed over and otherwise included

unfaithfully in this CIA document, any such official would have been much more fully and accurately informed if he or she had consulted the Washington Post and the Washington Merry-Go-Round column, as I relate below. And even if none of this were true, there is the permeating fiction, hardly appropriate in a predecisional document, that while Castro knew of attempts to assassinate him, he could not connect them with the CIA. He knew by capture, trial and confession and from the United States press - as the CIA itself knew he did. He also had no reason to suspect anyone else. This document, then, was designed from other purposes that are not consistent with full and honest disclosure to anyone of what the CIA knew beyond question. Detail on this follows below.

6. Aside from possibly the name of an unidentified person who collaborated with the CIA and whose identification is not possible from this document in any event, there is not a single thing in it that was not in the public domain long before Dube executed his affidavit. This without reasonable question was known to both Dube's Office of Operations and to Ms. Einstein's Office of Information and Privacy of the Department of Justice as a result of disclosures to me resulting from decisions by that office and documented appeals I filed with it. It is entirely without question that, long before the Department presented the Dube affidavit to this court and even longer before it filed this "Motion for Clarification," the Department (especially its FBI) was well aware of this prior publication in the Merry-Go-Round column and in the Post and countless other papers.

7. The language of the Dube affidavit that I state above is untruthful as it is quoted in defendant's Memorandum is that FOIA Exemptions 1, 3 and 5 must be invoked because the withheld CIA document "consists of" the following:

Circumstantial information which, in combination with other information, could lead to the identification of an intelligence source ....  
Information disclosing an intelligence method used in intelligence

collection and other intelligence activities .... This document was withheld in its entirety as an interagency document exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption 5 ...

8. In this, as I attest at the outset, the CIA is entirely consistent with what I learned when it claimed Exemptions 1, 3 and others to withhold from me records the disclosure of which was later compelled. In all instances the information withheld under these claims had long been in the public domain and in almost all instances I was able, in advance and accurately, to inform the court precisely what was withheld, including even the names of KGB defectors the CIA claimed were secret when in fact they had given public testimony and had even authored books in which they identified themselves.

9. As is conspicuous to anyone with subject-matter knowledge, all that is not redacted was much more extensively, completely and accurately in the public domain and what is redacted also was within the public domain, as I attest and document below. As I stated above, there is no possibility of any doubt at all that the CIA in general and its embarrassed Office of Operations in particular were fully aware of what was so public and so embarrassing to it, resulting in great scandals.

10. Of the CIA's attempts to assassinate Castro, two of those most extensively publicized are the focus of this self-described work of "speculation" about which Castro never had any need to speculate. The well publicized names of the participants in them that are not mentioned in this paper that allegedly was to inform decision-makers are, in the "AMLASH" plot (and "AMLASH" is redacted), the Castro official, Major Rolando  Cuebela, and Desmond FitzGerald, who is misleadingly referred to as the "case officer" when in fact he was CIA executive officer. (The name of the city in which they met also redacted, again on the claimed need to protect "intelligence sources and methods," is Paris, France.)

In the mafia plot, those whose publicly known names the CIA also withheld from officials it alleges were to have made decisions, the gangsters John Rosselli (referred to as merely of the west coast) and Sam "Momo" Giancana (referred to as merely from Chicago) and, with the name apparently redacted, described as one who had had gambling interests in Cuba, Santo Trafficante. (The word "mafia" is not mentioned to the supposed decision makers.) Both Rosselli ("Rollins") and Giancana ("Gold") were assassinated; Trafficante testified to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

11. What this CIA document also did not tell the alleged decision-makers is how it arranged for these top gangsters to conspire to assassinate Castro for it. That was through Robert Maheu, then of the Howard Hughes operations, with responsibilities included within the euphemism "security."

12. This allegedly "predecisional" CIA document also found it expedient to withhold from the alleged decision-makers how what came to extensive attention in their project might also have gotten back to Castro, the ostensible purpose of this allegedly "predecisional" document being "What Could Castro Have Known?" In this omission the CIA also withheld from the supposed decision-makers any indication at all of the extraordinary services rendered Momo, a principal figure in its mafia project, to assassinate Castro, and the consequences thereof.

13. The services demanded by Momo and provided to him include taped electronic surveillance of a woman in bed with a man other than Momo - Momo's suspected rival for her body and favors.

14. Momo, himself married, was having an affair (among many reported) with Phyllis McGuire of the then famous performing act of the McGuire sisters. Momo also suspected that she was simultaneously having an affair with Dan Rowan, of the then also famous act of Rowan and Martin.

15. What I here attest to is not from a raunchy novel. It is from disclosed FBIHQ records my copies of which, with extensive withholdings, still make a stack of about an inch and a half of xeroxes. So far from secret are these records they are in the FBI's public reading room.

16. This file is No. 139-1201. (139 means Interception of Communications in the FBI's file classifications.) It is titled "Arthur James Balletti," the name of the bugger caught in the act. He was provided to the project by the Miami agency it engaged, run by a former FBI special agent, Edward Du Boise (also represented as Du Bois).

17. So opposite the complete and total security represented in the Dube affidavit was this that a large number of people came to know, in varying degree, what was afoot - and abed. Balletti was so incompetent or so careless that when the maid made the bed she discovered his bug. She reported this and knowledge of it went upward in the hotel chain of command, whence it went first to the sheriff and then to other public authority, including the prosecutor. Faced with prosecution, Balletti let it be known that, if he went down, he would not go down alone. The FBI, the CIA and others became involved, and in the end neither Balletti nor any of his principals went down. But before the end there was no longer any secrecy at all. The FBI's tracings of phone calls included the CIA and an eminent lawyer/member of the President's Intelligence Board.

18. All this and ever so much more, all in greater detail, others and I have from the FBI and is for and for sometime has been freely available to anyone who wants to go to the FBI's public reading room to see it. Yet the CIA withheld all of it and so much more that is public and relevant from the so-called decision-makers for whom it allegedly prepared its allegedly "predecisional" paper.

19. So far from secret was this matter that it was disclosed by the CIA



itself long before Dube executed his affidavit. (Exhibit 1, Department of Justice file 82-46-5) As of May 1962, Exhibit 1 reflects (marked in the margin on page 2) the CIA had reason to believe that, in addition to the mafioso and all the others who had knowledge of this project, the victims of this service to Momo, Phyllis McGuire and Dan Rowan, also may have had knowledge and passed it on. Moreover, Momo had talked to the Chicago newspapers in 1963, as is indicated in another CIA document, Exhibit 7 below. (The well-known CIA name withheld by the CIA in Exhibit 1, that of its Col. Sheffield Edwards, also appears in Exhibit 7, as it has in countless publications.)

20. The Chicago newspaper account may not have received widespread distribution and attention but the 1967 reporting of this fiasco by the Merry-Go-Round column did. To economize on space and xeroxing, I attach instead of several columns what the FBI disclosed in 1977 about this, that with their special anti-government twist the CIA's mafia types themselves had their lawyer leak their version to the late Drew Pearson. He went to Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had headed the Presidential commission, who informed the Secret Service Director, who wrote the FBI Director. (Exhibit 2)

21. The FBI also disclosed its letter to the Secret Service, attached as Exhibit 3. The FBI made no additional investigation because it already had learned all the details, as indicated above, because it had no use for its former Inspector turned mafia counsel, and because it knew that the Castro-kickback theory of the Kennedy assassination was fictional, as Director Hoover told the Secret Service Director. (This, of course, reflects that the claimed "predecisional" purpose of the CIA document that is the subject of defendant's Memorandum is spurious, the complete lack of basis for it having been established in the FBI's 1963 and 1964 investigation.)

22. Counsel Edward Morgan, serving his clients' purposes further, accepted the FBI invitation and was interviewed and reported on at some length. This is included in FBI records provided to me and available in the FBI reading room and thus generally available to the public long before Dube executed his affidavit.

23. Despite the no-conspiracy conclusion of the FBI's investigation and illustrative of the Byzantine nature of the inside of the world of "intelligence," the FBI was not above convincing President Lyndon Johnson, based on this bizarre fiasco of the CIA's plotting with the mafia to assassinate Castro, that the exact opposite was true, "that there was a plot in connection with the assassination," and "that the CIA had something to do with this plot." (Exhibit 3, last paragraph on page 3, marked in margin.)

24. The date of the CIA document that is the subject of defendant's Memorandum coincides in time with the life of the original Senate Intelligence Committee, known as the Church committee. It also coincides with arranged-for and expected testimony by Momo, who then was assassinated before he could sing again. The date of this document also is of the time frame of a broadcast by Daniel Schorr then with CBS-TV News. That report was followed by a CIA denial of it and it, in turn was followed by an outraged refutation of the CIA's denial by a retired Air Force Colonel who was himself involved in details of the CIA's assassination plotting against Castro. (Exhibit 4)

25. That there was official acknowledgment of the CIA plots against Castro many years before Dube executed his affidavit is established further by the Church committee. In the interest of space economy I attach a newspaper account that fits on one page. (Exhibit 5. Extensive additional details in a CIA record follow in Exhibit 7. Actually, my files of published accounts of all the matters included in this affidavit are quite extensive and I provide illustrative samples only as

exhibits.)

26. That the CIA knew very well that what Dube swears to this court is secret and must be kept secret in the interest of "national security" and protecting "secret" sources and "secret" intelligence methods was all public years earlier is reflected in the Merry-Go-Round column of May 2, 1979. (Exhibit 6) It reports that in 1967, after publication of the original columns, the CIA conducted an Inspector General's internal investigation that confirmed those stories and that, of course, Castro had that knowledge, if not by any other way, as a result of that extensive publication.

27. Not later than the date of this column, the CIA knew very well that the content and at least the essence of its internal investigation was not secret, as Dube swears it was. I attach pages of it as Exhibit 7. The most casual reading of Exhibit 7 establishes that everything Dube swears was secret to the CIA's knowledge was public domain, in much greater detail, and that what Dube swears had to be redacted was also disclosed. Moreover, the existence of this earlier lengthy and detailed record in CIA files establishes that there was no need for the CIA to create the document that is the subject of defendant's Memorandum to inform decision-makers. In turn, this indicates that the actual purposes of the CIA document in question was to underinform, mislead and deceive, and that it was not "predecisional." The CIA's internal investigation of 1967 also confirms that there were many people with knowledge of the CIA's plotting against Castro, hence as of then, 1967 at the latest, there was no secrecy and no legitimate basis for claiming the exemptions claimed.

28. The other CIA assassination plot to which time and space are devoted in the CIA's document in question (beginning on page 8) had been well publicized long before Dube executed his affidavit. Although it and the names of those

involved have been public since 1967 at the latest, defendant's Memorandum uses the Dube affidavit to claim the alleged 1984 need to withhold to keep all secret. In what Ms. Einstein belatedly mailed August 22, 1984, the CIA withholds even the disclosed code name for the operation/intended assassin, AMLASH. (See also Exhibit 7, page 94) This entire thing was gone into and made public in great detail by the Senate Intelligence Committee, following earlier Washington Post publication of an exceptionally long article by George Crile exposing the AMLASH plot. Book V of this committee's report was disclosed at 6:00 p.m. Wednesday, June 23, 1976, which is many years before Dube's affidavit. Thirteen printed pages of the report alone are devoted to the AMLASH plot, beginning with "Knowledge of Plots to Assassinate Castro," on page 67.

29. In this regard Dube attests to the need to withhold to preserve "national security" secrecy and "intelligence sources and methods" what was earlier public in CIA records, too. Beginning on page 8 of the CIA document in question, what is withheld is the code name AMLASH, the name of the man, Rolando Cubela, and even where the poison pen that Cubela was to use to kill Castro was delivered to him, which was Paris, France. Further obfuscating for the alleged decision-makers, this CIA document refers to its executive officer, who had flown to Paris to give Cubela the poison pen the CIA had made, as his case officer, which he was not (page 9). This unnamed "person" was Desmond FitzGerald. (In 1976 the Senate Intelligence Committee report identified FitzGerald by name and title.)

30. Deceptive and misleading and at best semantical, if not an outright untruth, is the statement on page 10 about Cubela, that "there was no basis for him to believe that he had U.S. Government support for the assassination of Castro prior to the time of death." (Emphasis added) It was on the day of the assassination that FitzGerald gave Cubela the CIA pen loaded with CIA poison with which to

assassinate Castro. FitzGerald told Cubela that he represented Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General. (See also pages 6 and 7 of Exhibit 7)

31. While it is apparent from the foregoing paragraphs that there was no need for the CIA to conjecture for an allegedly predecisional paper, "What Could Castro Have Known?" about the CIA's plots to assassinate him, and contrary to the pretenses of this CIA document in question, Castro had long been fully informed of many plots, as he outlined them to former Senator George McGovern and many others, all published long before the Dube affidavit and defendant's Memorandum. That Castro had knowledge of these and other CIA assassination attempts prior to both the Dube affidavit and the Memorandum is also established by a published interview with Castro on April 3, 1978, by the chairmen and other members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and members of its staff. (Exhibit 8) That Cubela's name was known, that he was tried and that the facts were well known to Castro is clear on page 27. That Castro had had knowledge of such plots for many years is clear on page 35. That he knew about the CIA's mafia plot is clear on page 49.

32. This committee had a working agreement with the CIA not to disclose classified information unless it was first declassified. On this simple basis alone, although there are many others, it is apparent that long before the CIA, its Dube affidavit and its counsel in the Memorandum alleged the need to withhold under those claims to "national security," to protecting "intelligence sources and methods" and to the claimed immunity of "predecisional" papers the CIA knew that all such representations to this court were in fact not true and that all the information withheld had long been in the public domain, some the subject of enormous public attention in what were and were treated as scandalous official wrongdoing. It also is without doubt that the CIA knew long before the Dube

affidavit was executed and this Memorandum was filed that what was represented to this court as requiring withholding in the interest of "national security" and protecting "intelligence sources and methods" had in fact been the subject of public and published Congressional testimony and reports in both Houses and considerable public attention.

33. The lengthy Crile article to which I refer in Paragraph 26 above takes up about a full newspaper page and a half and is not suitable for attaching by xeroxing. I therefore attach as Exhibit 9 the beginning only of that story to reflect the fact of publication of Cubela's name and of the code-name AMLASH and to indicate that the names of others who worked for the CIA, contrary to its pretenses, were not all secret.


34. A lengthy bilingual official Cuban government statement on these and related matters, the copy from which this copy was made brought back to the United States by former Senator George McGovern, is too thick for attachment. I therefore attach a copy of its first page only, because it does contain adequate reflection of Castro's knowledge of CIA plots against him and others. (Exhibit 10)

35. To date this and to reflect that it was widely publicized in the United States and in Washington, where the CIA is headquartered, of the multitudinous published accounts of this nature in my files I attach as Exhibit 11 the front-page Washington Star story of July 30, 1975, "Castro Lists 24 Plots to Kill Him."

36. To reflect that Castro was making similar reports regularly, I attach as Exhibit 12 the New York Times report from Santiago, Cuba, of July 12, 1975, "Castro Recalls Dozens of Plots."

37. These exhibits, like all the earlier exhibits, are dated prior to the execution of the CIA's Dube affidavit and defendant's Memorandum. It is without doubt that when Dube executed and the CIA and the Department of Justice presented

his affidavit to this court and prepared defendant's Memorandum based upon it, they knew very well that Dube swore to what was not true yet swore to it nonetheless and presented it to this court as truth.


  
HAROLD WEISBERG

FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND

Before me this 29th day of August 1984 Deponent Harold Weisberg has appeared and signed this affidavit, first having sworn that the statements made therein are true.

My commission expires July 1, 1986.



  
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR  
FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy  
The Attorney General  
Washington 25, D. C.

In accordance with your request of 11 May 1962, I am forwarding herewith, in the attached sealed envelope, a Top Secret memorandum by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, setting forth the facts on which we briefed you on 7 May 1962.

*Encl. T*

*A. R. Houston*

*82-46-5*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	RECORD	WRENCE R. HOUSTON General Counsel
JUN 27 1962		CIA
RECORDS BRANCH		(DATE)
		15 MAY 1962



[REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FILE  
N. B.

14 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication  
or Use of Communications

1. This memorandum for the record is prepared at the request of the Attorney General of the United States following a complete oral briefing of him relative to a sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to May 1961. In August 1960 the undersigned was approached by Mr. Richard Bissell then Deputy Director for Plans of CIA to explore the possibility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro. It was thought that certain gambling interests which had formerly been active in Cuba might be willing and able to assist and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba and communications between Miami, Florida and Cuba. Accordingly, Mr. Robert Maheu, a private investigator of the firm of Maheu and King was approached by the undersigned and asked to establish contact with a member or members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabilities. Mr. Maheu was known to have accounts with several prominent business men and organizations in the United States. Maheu was to make his approach to the syndicate as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in Cuba. Mr. Maheu accordingly met and established contact with one John Rosselli of Los Angeles. Mr. Rosselli showed interest in the possibility and indicated he had some contacts in Miami that he might use. Maheu reported that John Rosselli said he was not interested in any remuneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the desired project. Towards the end of September Mr. Maheu and Mr. Rosselli proceeded to Miami where, as reported, Maheu was introduced to Sam Giancana of Chicago. Sam Giancana arranged for Maheu and Rosselli to meet with a "courier" who was going back

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Copy No. 1 of 1

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Page 1 of 3 pages

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22 JUN 27 1962  
RECORDS BRANCH  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

[REDACTED]

and forth to Havana. From information received back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a payment to be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in Cuba. Maheu reported that Rosselli and Giancana emphatically stated that they wished no part of any payment. The undersigned then briefed the proper senior officials of this Agency on the proposal. Knowledge of this project during its life was kept to a total of six persons and never became a part of the project current at the time for the invasion of Cuba and there were no memoranda on the project nor were there other written documents or agreements. The project was duly orally approved by the said senior officials of the Agency.

2. Rosselli and Maheu spent considerable time in Miami talking with the courier. Sam Giancana was present during parts of these meetings. Several months after this period Maheu told me that Sam Giancana had asked him to put a listening device in the room of one Phyllis McGuire, reported to be the mistress of Giancana. At that time it was reported to me that Maheu passed the matter over to one Edward Du Boise, another private investigator. It appears that Arthur James Balletti was discovered in the act of installing the listening device and was arrested by the Sheriff in Las Vegas, Nevada. Maheu reported to me that he had referred the matter to Edward Du Boise on behalf of Sam Giancana. At the time of the incident neither this Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation. Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that Phyllis McGuire might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, another friend of McGuire's. At the time that Maheu reported this to the undersigned he reported he was under surveillance by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, he thought, were exploring his association with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana incident to the project. I told Maheu that if he was formally approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba.

3. During the period from September on through April efforts were continued by Rosselli and Maheu to proceed with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another principal

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Page 2 of 3 pages

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Copy No. <u>1</u> of <u>2</u>

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: February 15, 1967

FROM : A. Rosen

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Malley
- 1 - Mr. Shroder
- 1 - Mr. Raupach
- 1 - Mr. Wick
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY NOVEMBER 22, 1963, DALLAS, TEXAS

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:

To advise of the action taken in response to a letter dated 2-13-67, from James J. Rowley, Director, U.S. Secret Service.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated 2-13-67, James J. Rowley, Director, U.S. Secret Service, informed the Bureau he had a discussion with Chief Justice Earl Warren on 1-31-67. At that time the Chief Justice informed Mr. Rowley that during the week of 1-23-67, Drew Pearson was in to see the Chief Justice. At that time Pearson advised the Chief Justice that a lawyer, Ed Morgan, had a client who informed him "that Bobby Kennedy had organized a group who went to Cuba to kill Castro; that all were killed or imprisoned, except one person who escaped; that subsequently Castro decided to utilize the same procedure to kill President Kennedy and that he hired Oswald to do the job." Pearson wanted the Chief Justice to see Ed Morgan; however, he declined. The Chief Justice informed Pearson it would be necessary for him to pass this information on and Pearson inferred that Ed Morgan was not in good standing with the FBI and as a result the Secret Service was notified.

Arrangements were made by Mr. Rowley with Drew Pearson to have Ed Morgan come to see him and a tentative date was made for 2-8-67. Subsequently, on 2-10-67, Mr. Rowley spoke with Chief Justice Warren, informing him that neither Mr. Pearson nor Mr. Morgan had called and that the information received from the Chief Justice would be reported to the Bureau. The Chief Justice advised Mr. Rowley to do whatever he had to do.

Ed Morgan may be identical with Edward Pierpont Morgan, a former Bureau Inspector, who resigned 3-15-47. He is on the "not to contact list." Morgan is a known source of information for Drew Pearson in his vindictive attacks on the Director and the FBI.

Enclosures *sent 2-15-67*  
KMR:hw

FEB 24 1967 CONTINUED - OVER

DPRS REC UNIT

*See Report  
Brown  
W...*

*L...*

REC-9


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MAR 2 1967

Section 112

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach  
RE: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT  
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY



No investigation will be conducted regarding the allegation made by Pearson to Chief Justice Warren. However, if information is volunteered to the Bureau regarding this matter, it will be accepted.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a letter to Mr. Rowley. Also attached is a letter to the Acting Attorney General, with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General, enclosing a copy of Mr. Rowley's letter and the Bureau's reply. Consideration was given to furnishing this information to the White House, but since this matter does not concern, nor is it pertinent to the present Administration, no letter is being sent.

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
1961  
R  
S  
D.D.  
C.D.  
C.D.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Malley
- 1 - Mr. Shroder
- 1 - Mr. Raupach
- 1 - Mr. Wick
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

February 15, 1967

BY LIAISON

62-109090-

Honorable James J. Rowley  
 Director  
 United States Secret Service  
 Washington, D. C.

*2-16-67 delivered copy Warren Commission*

Dear Mr. Rowley:

Thank you for your letter dated February 13, 1967,  
 bringing me of your discussion with Chief Justice Earl Warren  
 on February 31, 1967, and the information he furnished to you.

In connection with the allegation that a Castro conspiracy  
 was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, our  
 investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro or  
 officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey  
 Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy.

This Bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding  
 this matter. However, should Mr. Pearson, Mr. Morgan, or  
 Mr. Morgan's source of information care to volunteer any  
 information to this Bureau, it would be accepted. Thereafter,  
 consideration would be given as to whether any additional investi-  
 gation is warranted.

I am taking the liberty of furnishing a copy of your letter  
 and my reply to you to the Acting Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

KMR:hw  
(11)

NOTE: See Rosen to DeLoach memo captioned "Assassination of President  
 John Fitzgerald Kennedy, November 22, 1963, Dallas, Texas," KMR:hw,  
 2-15-67.

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EXHIBIT B

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

REC-43

Tolson	
DeLoach	
Mohr	
Bishop	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Felt	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 4/4/67

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

cc Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Wick

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF  
PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Jack Anderson came in to see me at 11:55 a.m. today. He has just returned from New Orleans where, at the invitation of District Attorney Jim Garrison, he interviewed Garrison for approximately six hours at his home. Anderson and Garrison later had dinner at the Latin Quarter restaurant in New Orleans.

Anderson stated that he went to New Orleans fully prepared to present a hostile viewpoint to Garrison. After listening to Garrison for approximately 90 minutes he began to believe Garrison's story. Anderson describes Garrison as a very convincing talker who has considerable facts at his disposal. Anderson now believes there is some authenticity to Garrison's claims and future plans. Garrison told Anderson that he will undoubtedly hold a full-scale trial within six months.

Basically, Garrison told Anderson that the entire assassination plot stemmed from David W. Ferrie, who was the genius and mastermind of the entire thing, and with Clay Shaw, who was in the beginning subsidized by the Central Intelligence Agency. Garrison has facts, as well as witnesses, according to Anderson, to prove that Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention of Ferrie and Shaw when Oswald first arrived in New Orleans. At that point both Ferrie and Shaw recognized the fact that Oswald was a former marine, had had lengthy experience in the Soviet Union, was married to a Soviet citizen, and therefore had ties and background which would lend themselves to gaining easy access to Cuba. Shaw at this point already had been approved by the CIA, through an appropriate cut-out, to engineer a plot that would result in the assassination of Fidel Castro.

Upon learning of Oswald's background, Ferrie conceived the idea of setting up Oswald in an attempt to establish a Fair Play for Cuba organization in New Orleans. Ferrie and Shaw arranged for Oswald to obtain an office which formerly had

APR 10

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 67-104-44-101

CDD:CSH (5) Sullivan 4/2/67 which analyzed numerous items  
see memo Branigan 4/10/67

CONTINUED-----OVER

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5/10/67

Mr. Tolson

been rented by an anti-Castro organization. Ferrie and Shaw also conceived the idea of sending Oswald to Mexico in a fake attempt to obtain permission to re-enter the Soviet Union. Garrison, according to Anderson, can prove that Oswald did this merely to establish a good atmosphere so that he could gain ready access to Cuba.

Garrison claims that it was at this point that Oswald became disillusioned and refused to go through with the plot to assassinate Castro. Upon returning to New Orleans from Mexico, Oswald advised both Ferrie and Shaw that he would not go through with their plans. Shaw and Ferrie, being guided by several Cubans in their midst, then conceived the idea (mostly because of the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs) of assassinating President Kennedy. Ferrie and Shaw believed that Oswald could be the "patsy" and instructed him to go to Dallas for the purpose of the assassination.

They also engineered the idea of him buying the gun under the name of A. J. Hidoll, and the use of the mails in procuring this gun so that it would be an open, public record which could be traced to Oswald. They additionally told Oswald that he should keep certain papers in his possession which would trace back to the gun.

On the day of the assassination, Ferrie traveled to Houston, allegedly for the purpose of ice skating. Witnesses at the ice skating rink remember Ferrie as being at the rink and have indicated to Garrison that Ferrie, while he did not ice skate, did stand near a pay telephone at all times on the day of 11/22/63.

Garrison also has witnesses who will testify that Jack Ruby was the eyes and ears for Ferrie at all times. Ruby sent two of his people to Houston so that, upon the success of the assassination attempt, these two people could use a local pay phone to advise Ferrie of the success of the plot. Garrison claims that a long distance phone call from Dallas to Houston could, of course, have been traced; hence the desirability of using the local phone. Anderson stated that Ruby was definitely in on the plot and was later instructed by Ferrie and Shaw to take care of Oswald.

Mr. Tolson

Anderson next sprang the "Sixty-four dollar question." He stated that at the close of Garrison's six-hour recitation of facts, he (Anderson) was of the opinion that Garrison was not only sincere, but very convincing. Anderson stated that Garrison firmly believed his facts. Anderson then told me that he bluntly asked Garrison why Garrison had not given all these convincing facts to the FBI, whereupon Garrison replied, "I got started off on the wrong foot with the FBI." Garrison added, "I would be more than willing to give the FBI everything I have and let them finish the investigation if they so desire."

Anderson told me that he, of course, is now in a position to contact Garrison and indicate that the FBI will or will not take over this case. I told Anderson that the FBI would not under any circumstances take over the case. I stated that Garrison had made it quite plain that he did not want the cooperation of the FBI and, as a matter of fact, Garrison had threatened to put handcuffs on any of our agents who approached him for information.

I also told Anderson that, while we of course would accept any information that was voluntarily given to us, we at the same time would not take over Garrison's "dirty laundry."

Anderson told me that if the Bureau had any change of policy in the above regard he would appreciate knowing about it. I told him we would keep his offer in mind; however, there definitely would be no change of policy.

Anderson also told me that he had discussed this entire matter with George Christian, the President's Press Secretary, at the White House. He stated that Christian was also convinced that there must be some truth to Garrison's allegations. Christian told Anderson to get in touch with the FBI. Anderson stated he had already been planning to do this, but that he now especially wanted to advise us of the full facts because of Christian's request.

In this connection, Marvin Watson called me late last night and stated that the President had told him, in an off moment, that he was now convinced that there was a plot in connection with the assassination. Watson stated the President felt that CIA had had something to do with this plot. Watson requested that any further information we could furnish

Central Intelligence Agency

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Mr. Tolson

In this connection would be most appreciated by him and the President. I reminded Watson that the Director had sent over to the White House some weeks back all the information in our possession in connection with CIA's attempts to use former agent Robert Maheu and his private detective outfit in contacts with Sam Giancana and other hoodlums, relative to fostering a plot to assassinate Castro. Watson stated this was true and he remembered our memorandum in this regard, but that if we had anything else we should by all means forward it to the White House. I told him we had no further information in this regard.

**ACTION:** For record purposes. There is no need to make further contact with Anderson.

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# Retired Colonel Tells of Action Against Castro

Associated Press

A retired Air Force colonel said the CIA once requested a plane under his command and flew two men into Cuba to kill Fidel Castro.

L. Fletcher Prouty said he came forward now with an account of his involvement in the abortive plot in "late 1959 or early 1960" because of a verbal attack Monday by former CIA Director Richard Helms against CBS newsman Daniel Schorr for reporting possible CIA involvement in assassination schemes.

"It got me a little upset," Prouty said of Helms' denunciation, which was widely reported and televised.

Prouty, who handled Air Force liaison with the CIA, said in a telephone interview Tuesday that he was positive Helms knew about the plot to kill Castro. Helms has claimed to have no knowledge of CIA responsibility for any assassinations, but hasn't mentioned the possibility of unsuccessful attempts.

At the time of the Castro assassination attempt, Helms was in almost total control of the CIA's clandestine operations against Cuba, Prouty said. Helms was assistant to Richard Bissel, then-CIA deputy director of plans, the agency's so-called "dirty tricks" department.

Prouty said he dispatched a specially equipped Air Force plane at the CIA's request to land two Cuban exiles on a road near Havana. The would-be assassins were "equipped with a high-powered rifle and telescopic sights" and "knew how to get to a building in Havana which overlooked a building where Castro passed daily," Prouty said.

He said the five-seat, single-engine plane landed and re-

turned safely to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, but the two exiles "as far as I know were picked up between where they were left off and town."

Prouty said one of the exiles was named Oscar Spijo and that the plane had been flown by "mercenaries" on the CIA payroll.

Now an Amtrak official, Prouty was with the Defense Department's Office of Special Operations at the time of the plot. He retired from the Air Force in 1963 and wrote a book called "The Secret Team," detailing his experiences as Air Force liaison with the CIA.

The incident that triggered Prouty's disclosure followed a 3½-hour appearance by Helms before a closed-door meeting of the Rockefeller Commission, which is investigating CIA domestic activities.

As he emerged from the session, Helms spotted Schorr in the hallway and denounced him with profanities and referred to him as "Killer Schorr" for reporting that the "CIA goes around killing people."

Schorr has reported that President Ford is concerned that an unlimited investigation of CIA activities could uncover agency involvement in foreign assassinations.

Bissel, who left the agency after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, said in a recent interview that there had been high-level discussions about killing Castro but that the plans were vetoed by then-CIA Director Allen Dulles.

Prouty said he knew of "one or two" other assassination attempts against Castro after the Bay of Pigs, but said he did not know details of the missions because he was not directly involved in them.

# Church Says CIA Tried to Kill Castro

10/6/65  
By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S.-sponsored plans and actual attempts to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro spanned the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the chairman of the Senate intelligence committee said yesterday.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the forthcoming report of his committee will make public the facts of the Castro assassination plots, based at least in part on secret testimony to the committee from former Central Intelligence Agency director Richard M. Helms. According to Church, Helms has confirmed in secret session that the CIA attempted to assassinate Castro.

Interviewed on "Issues and Answers" (ABC, WMAL), Church said his committee has been unable to establish whether the Presidents involved had knowledge of the assassination attempt.

"Our most determined and most thorough effort to get all these facts leaves this question still unclear," he said. He added that the committee intends to lay out in detail all the evidence it has gathered on this point in the report to be issued soon.

Appearing on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTQP), CIA Director William E. Colby

See CIA, A2, Col. 7

# Church Says CIA Tried to Kill Castro

CIA, From A1

refused to discuss alleged assassination attempts in detail, saying the subject is "not appropriate for open public discussion." Colby said the facts of assassination attempts, including the question of high-level approval, are "very murky."

Two years ago Colby issued a directive forbidding assassination plans, but Church said yesterday that such administrative directives are not enough.

Church said his committee will propose a law to prevent any government agency from becoming involved in assassinations. He also said his committee will recommend a joint congressional committee to oversee U.S. intelligence activity.

According to Church, the assassination attempts against Castro were finally stopped "in the early part of the Johnson administration." He gave no date.

The late Allen W. Dulles was CIA director during the Eisenhower administration and through the early days of the Kennedy administration. He was succeeded in November, 1961, by John A. McCone, who served through the rest of the Kennedy administration and until April, 1965.

McCone has said publicly that the CIA planned and undertook some steps to assassinate Castro in the early 1960s, but that all of these schemes were "aborted" and the principal effort stopped

soon after the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961.

Underworld figures connected with the Mafia have been linked to a plot to kill Castro in the early 1960s, but Church said assassination attempts both predated and postdated this previously reported effort.

A former aide to President Johnson, Leo Janis, quoted him as saying soon after he took office in November, 1963, that he discovered "we had been operating a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."

Castro himself submitted a report to Senate investigators, delivered through Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), listing 24 episodes, some attributed to groups listed only as having "CIA connections and contacts."

The Cuban government charged that the CIA attempted to kill Castro as late as 1971, which was during the Nixon administration. But Church gave no indication of such an effort in his statements yesterday.

The Senate committee headed by Church has conducted three months of secret meetings on the assassination issue and is expected to issue its report on the matter within a few weeks.

The committee has asked former President Nixon to testify on intelligence matters during his administration, and Church said yesterday he would favor a subpoena for Nixon if he fails to appear. He said he believes the committee will back him up.

k Anderson

P. 01 5/2/79

## Plot Disclosure Made CIA Squirm

It has taken 12 years to get the reaction of the Central Intelligence Agency to our stories on its recruitment of Mafia mobsters to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Working under the late Drew Pearson, I produced two columns, dated March 3 and March 7, 1967, on the plot to kill Castro. CIA officials grimly refused to comment.

But President Lyndon Johnson demanded a full report from the CIA after he read our stories. We have obtained a still-secret report by the CIA's inspector general that confirmed the essentials of the columns, conceded that the disclosures had caused "much distress" at the spy agency, and discussed the ways in which the government could minimize the embarrassment.

"Drew Pearson's column of March 7, 1967 refers to a reported CIA plot in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," the inspector general wrote. "Pearson also has information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro was discussed, and that a team (of three men) actually landed in Cuba with (poison) pills to be used in an assassination attempt."

The report then says: "There is a basis in fact for each of those three reports."

In light of this uncomfortable accuracy, the inspector general asks: "Can we plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro?"

And the answer: "No. We cannot. We are reasonably confident that there is nothing in writing outside the government that would confirm Pearson's story of the operation, but there are plenty of non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation."

Well then, the inspector general asks, "Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" In other words, could the spooks pass the buck to the martyred President Kennedy?

"Not in this case," the report decides. "While it was true that (the later phase of the plots) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. (It) was initiated in August 1960 under the Eisenhower administration."

The inspector general also concluded that the Castro assassination project could not be fobbed off as just a practice maneuver—part of the "Executive Action Capability" being developed by the CIA's clandestine operations arm.

It is still not known whether this "capability" program, code-named with ominous prescience "ZR-RIFLE," was requested by the Kennedy administration or developed by the CIA on its own.

Our stories raised the question whether then-attorney general Robert Kennedy had approved the assassination plot. The secret report confirmed only that Kennedy "was fully briefed" on May 7, 1962. "A memorandum con-

firms the oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962 . . . The memorandum does not use the word 'assassinate,' but there is little room for misinterpretation of what was meant."

But the inspector general stressed that Kennedy was told only about the first phase of the mobster-recruitment program. He was not told about the second phase, "which was well under way at the time (he) was briefed."

A further reason the Kennedys couldn't be saddled with blame for the plots was that a key ingredient mentioned in our column was not known to the president and his brother. "The Pearson story, which is causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team." If the CIA tried to foist responsibility onto the Kennedys, the sources who told us about the three-man team could easily point out that the agency was lying.

"What measures might be taken to lessen the damage?" the rhetorically curious inspector general asks. A classic cover-up was discarded as impractical.

"We cannot now suppress the story because it is already out," he concluded. "If we were to approach any of the participants and urge discretion upon him, and if this became known, it would merely lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat improbable."

So the agency maintained a stone wall of silence.

25 April 1967

## MEMORANDUM

This reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or were put on paper from memory years afterward. William Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the years in question, and they are our best source of dates.

\_\_\_\_\_ of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of when he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed. \_\_\_\_\_ of TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are pertinent. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ were involved in only the technical aspects of operational planning, and their participations were short-lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing critical time frames. Operational files are useful in some instances, because they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be inferred from collateral information.

For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. Their recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and some of them

are no longer able to keep the details of one plan separate from those of another. We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles and General Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab 1. We did not go on fishing expeditions among the mere possibles. To have done so would have risked making witting a number of employees who were previously unwitting and, in our estimate, would have added little to the details available from those directly involved. There are inconsistencies among the various accounts, but most of them can be resolved by collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable participants in a particular plan and by then checking it against specific dates that can be fixed with fair certainty. We believe that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking associated with it is reasonably sound. If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events. People still remember much of what happened, but they can no longer recall precisely when.

It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one

Tab A not  
attached

to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behaviour or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched in late 1960 and early 1961 were aggressively pursued and were viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of Pigs.

c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major scheme that was begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense administration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his Cuba.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the

aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in April 1962 was finally terminated in early 1963. Two other plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable and nothing ever came of them.

We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt themselves subject to the <sup>Kennedy</sup> administration's severe pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that light.

Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body, will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the downfall of a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from



positions of power, and there is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination. Such removals from power as the house arrest of a Mossadeg or the flight of a Batista should not cause one to overlook the killings of a Diem or of a Trujillo by forces encouraged but not controlled by the U.S. Government.

There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews and from review of files. The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche--the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

The suggestion was made to us that operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere of stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's

demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through 1966,

The NIE's on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba" have brief paragraphs on likely successor governments if Castro were to depart the scene.

In each case the treatment is no more nor less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence publications.

Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro was discussed and that a team actually landed in Cuba with pills to be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis in fact for each of those three reports.

a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963. The weapon was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe.

The CIA officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe with Black Leaf 40. The evidence indicates that the meeting was under way at the very moment President Kennedy was shot.

b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August 1962 at which Secretary McNamara broached the subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project HONGOOSE action memorandum prepared by Edward Lansdale. At another Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services information report on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused the exile's request for funds and had no involvement in the plot.

c. CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working in behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961 plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in April 1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in turn had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would make an attempt on Castro's life--perhaps using the pills.

This report describes these and other episodes in detail; puts them into perspective; and reveals, that while the events described by Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched together as though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unfounded.

Gambling Syndicate

The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of members of the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation had two phases: the first ran from August 1960 until late April or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about May 1961.

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1

August 1960

Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Edwards claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now recalls having had only limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date--about mid-1962.

same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by Sheffield Edwards on 14 May 1962 states: "No monies were ever paid to Roselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Miami." (Giancana is "Gold.")

... was introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee of Maheu, the explanation being that ... would handle the case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full time himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of the operation at this time. Edwards himself did not meet Roselli until the summer of 1962.

At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had a contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate elements in Cuba could be reached. These syndicate elements in Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter part of September 1960, Edwards, ... and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S. gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time.

With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles) and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards

deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words." The descriptive term used was "an intelligence operation." Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being "from A to B to C." As he then envisioned it, "A" was Maheu, "B" was Roselli, and "C" was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly, there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval to use his own judgment. Bissell committed \$150,000 for the support of the operation.

(Comment: In the light of this description of the briefing, it is appropriate to conjecture as to just what the Director did approve. It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never stated in unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of "bad words" emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.)

During the week of 25 September 1960, \_\_\_\_\_ and Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting

tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee, or bouillon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets. . . . remembers meeting with Edwards and . . . in Edwards' office to discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison be stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting, and with a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either liquid or solid form. . . . states that the pill form was chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment: The gangsters may have had some influence on the choice of a means of assassination. . . . says that in his very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely, Maheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the



use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as \_\_\_\_\_ who was then \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
The gangsters said that \_\_\_\_\_ had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed the money.)

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even disintegrate, let alone dissolve. \_\_\_\_\_ took them back and made up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He called on \_\_\_\_\_ to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. \_\_\_\_\_ has a record of a conversation with \_\_\_\_\_ on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that \_\_\_\_\_ tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2

William Harvey, Chief of [redacted] was briefed in February 1961 (by authority of Richard Bissell) on phase one of the gambling syndicate operation. That briefing was in connection with a sensitive operation that Bissell had assigned to Harvey. Harvey describes it thus: Early in the Kennedy administration, Bissell called him in to discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; i.e., a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Harvey's notes quote Bissell as saying, "The White House has twice urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He mentioned the Edwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro in that context, but he now thinks that the operation was over by then and that reference to it was in terms of a past operation as a case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be briefed by Edwards. Harvey's fixing of the date as February was only after review of events both preceding the briefing and following it. He says now that it might have been <sup>as</sup> early as late January or as late as March 1961.

After some discussion of the problems involved in developing an Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects

of the problem with \_\_\_\_\_ and with \_\_\_\_\_. Since \_\_\_\_\_ was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability, although never with respect to Castro. We did not question \_\_\_\_\_ on his knowledge of the program for creating an Executive Action Capability, but Harvey's mention of him in this connection may explain a notation by \_\_\_\_\_ that Harvey instructed \_\_\_\_\_ to discuss techniques with \_\_\_\_\_ without associating the discussion with the Castro operation.

Harvey states that after the decision was made to go ahead with the creating of an Executive Action Capability, and while he was still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms fully on the general concept but without mention of the then ongoing plan to assassinate Castro.

The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by \_\_\_\_\_ for use in a special operation in the Congo (~~the assassination of Patrice Lumumba~~) to be run by \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which Bissell granted.) The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962. The new DD/P (Helms) on that date authorized Harvey, by \_\_\_\_\_

"creating what had been started earlier"

memorandum, to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for expenditures was to be by general category and on Harvey's certification. The initial approval was for \$14,700, consisting of \$7,200 for QUINN's annual salary and \$7,500 for operational expenses.

Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an ..... operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers). It continued on a course separate from the Edwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro until 15 November 1961. Harvey has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. Harvey says that Bissell instructed him to take over Edwards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter to run the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, as a completely unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he was told by Holms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba task force.

Late 1961 - Early 1962

Harvey recalls that he was very busy with a number of things in the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his taking over Edwards' Castro operation. He was turning over his responsibilities in ..... He was working with NSA on the Martin/Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and

briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said he understood the situation and in due time might brief the Director, Mr. McCone. It is not known whether General Carter did or did not brief Mr. McCone. There is no indication that General Carter was further briefed on the full details of the assassination plot against Castro.

May 1962

The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational involvement with gangster elements, because he requested a briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and, as Edwards puts it, "briefed him all the way." Houston says that after the briefing Kennedy "thought about the problem quite seriously." The Attorney General said that he could see the problem and that he could not proceed against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite firmly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again--with gangsters--you will let the Attorney General know before you do it." Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that among the points covered was that of Roselli's motivation. The Attorney General had thought that Roselli was doing the job (the attempt at assassination of Castro) for money. Edwards corrected that impression; he was not.

Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney General the latter asked for a memorandum record of the meeting. Edwards believes that the request was made later and by telephone. A memorandum was prepared and was signed by Edwards. Both Edwards and Houston recall having had a hand in writing it. A transmittal back-slip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was made on 11 May, which suggests that Edwards is correct in his belief that the request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney General. The memorandum is dated 14 May 1962. It was typed in two copies only, with the original being sent to Attorney General Kennedy and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was typed by Edwards' secretary, . . . . . It does not state the purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was briefed, but it does make it clear that the operation was against Castro and its true purpose may be inferred from the memorandum.

Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and the forwarding of a memorandum of record was carried out without briefing the Director (John McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the DD/P (Richard Helms). He felt that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was under way, they should be protected from involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the

out of the meeting, and AM/SM were informed that President Kennedy had been assassinated. [redacted] was visibly moved over the news. He asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?" The contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the [redacted] - AM/SM meeting, but it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro. [redacted] states that he received an OPM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off. We do not find such a cable in the AM/ASH file. There is a record in the file that [redacted] was due to arrive back in Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November.

The AM/ASH project was probably about as widely known within the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature. However, we can identify only four people who know of the just-described episode involving a hypodermic syringe and Black Leaf 40. [redacted] knew all of the story, [redacted] knew most of it, and [redacted] knew much of it. Fitzgerald did not mention this aspect of the AM/ASH operation when he first briefed us on it. When we went back to him later with specific questions, he said he remembered something about Black Leaf 40, but nothing whatever about a device for administering it. [redacted] said he had the impression that Fitzgerald

THE DEAN FEARSON STORY

The Facts As We Know Them

True.

Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase One after it was over. He was not briefed on Phase Two.

True.

Roselli informed Harvey on 21 June 1962, presumably on the basis of information from [redacted] that a team of three men was inside Cuba. We do not know their identities nor what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually dispatched. None of the announced captures and executions during this period fits this team.

This reportedly has come out in the Garrison investigations. It also was stated by [redacted] in the Philippines under direct interrogation. We have no independent confirmation of any sort. (Note that Garrison met with Roselli in Las Vegas in March 1967.)

True. At least we were told by Roselli that the pills were sent in during Phase One and again in Phase Two.

True. The subject was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did result in a WONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders. The offending phrase was later excised from copies forwarded to CIA, State, Defense, and USIA, but the damage may already have been done.

Unpublished Details

The CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro.

Robert Kennedy may have approved an assassination plot.

Underworld figures were actually recruited to carry out the plot.

Three hired assassins were caught in Havana where a lone survivor is still supposed to be languishing in prison.

Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

Unpublished Details

Pills were sent to Cuba for use in the assassination.

There was a meeting at the Department of State at which the assassination of Castro was discussed.



him on the Pearson story.

d. Pearson, Anderson, and Greenspun (in Las Vegas) are newspapermen with a newsworthy story. Pearson has already published much of it.

e. Maheu does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach /and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion.

What do other components of Government know about this operation?

Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edwards on 7 May 1962. A memorandum confirming the oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962. The memorandum does not use the word "assassinate," but there is little room for misinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original of that memorandum is still in the files of the Justice Department. It should be noted that the briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase One of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier. Phase Two was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was not told of it.

As far as we know, the FBI has not been told the sensitive

operational details, but it would be naive to assume that they have not by now put two and two together and come out with the right answer. They know of CIA's involvement with Roselli and Giancana as a result of the Las Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago newspaper stories of August 1963, and from Giancana's own statement, it appears that they know this related to Cuba. When Roselli's story reached them (Roselli to Pearson to Warren to Rowley to the FBI), all of the pieces should have fallen into place. They should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of Castro and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation.

There is some support for this thesis in the conversation I had with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting between Roselli and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Giancana have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation." He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Roselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people."

Can we plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro?

No, we cannot. We are reasonably confident that there is nothing in writing outside of the Government that would confirm Pearson's

?

Morgan

story of the gambling syndicate operation, but there are plenty of non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation.

a. Maheu can confirm that Shef Edwards told Roselli that Edwards had told the Attorney General of Roselli's activities on behalf of the Government.

b. \_\_\_\_\_ can confirm the pill and three-man team elements of the story.

c. \_\_\_\_\_ can confirm the pill element of Phase One.

d. If an independent investigation were to be ordered, the investigators could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants.

Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?

Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. Phase One was initiated in August 1960 under the Eisenhower administration. Phase Two is associated in Harvey's mind with the Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings. Again, Phase One had been started and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared

on the scene.

When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1952, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check with the Attorney General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done with respect to Phase Two, which was already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed. The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team.

What measures might be taken to lessen the damage?

We see little to be gained from personal approaches now to Mahou, or Roselli. Mahou has much to lose and might be able to prevail upon [and Roselli not to spread the story further. It is questionable whether any such urging would be effective with Roselli, because Roselli stands only to gain from having the story of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress the story, because it is already out and may boil up afresh from the Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and urge discretion upon him, and if this became known, it would merely lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat improbable.

Phase 1  
5/18/60 - A  
6/1  
- Smith  
7/2/60

Houston  
May 62  
The 2 - Republic  
S. Edwards

III. Transcript of an interview of Fidel Castro Ruz on April 3, 1978 by Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, and Christopher Dodd, Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell, and Researcher Edwin Juan Lopez Soto

that interview in which he was going to be given the weapon to kill me and that was published by the Senate Committee. He never made reference to that. That person is alive because I had to request some leniency. I mean, because his crime was very serious. It was a tremendous betrayal. It was treason, and at that time to participate in such an action was very severely sanctioned. And, following a tradition with individuals that had participated in the revolution, whenever it has been possible to prevent drastic measures, we have done so. This gentleman had been a revolutionary leader. He had been a good revolutionary fighter, and the public opinion was very irritated about it. His crime was really very serious. I wrote a letter to the Cuban Tribunal morally condemning him (but asking for leniency). I did it for the public opinion, ... That is Cubela's case. We learned that later when the Senate Committee Report appeared. But, all these elements made us think about the advisability of organizing some investigation on our account. We had hoped that being in contact with your Committee could give us some elements of judgment for our own information. But, as far as I know, you don't contribute many elements of judgment because -- as I have been told -- you cannot make use of most of the information you possess.

I have been told that one of our hopes was to receive some information. We are giving as much information as we have and we are receiving nothing.

Stokes: One thing I would like to say and I think you ought to know is that many Americans are ashamed of the CIA and the degrading attempts that they've made on your life. And, that's something that disturbs many, many decent Americans and I think you ought to know that. Mr. President, with your permission I'd like to defer to my other colleagues, if they have any questions, if that is agreeable to you.

Castro: Yes, please.

Stokes: Mr. Preyer?

Preyer: Mr. President, you mentioned that you believe that you could transfer power of chains of government without killing the head of the government. That is the tradition of our country also. I speak personally and not for our government, but I join Chairman Stokes in saying that when I read about AMLASH, Cubela and the Church Committee reports I was shocked and outraged. I am confident that is the overwhelming reaction of the American people. I am convinced that the President did not know about that; the head of the CIA, John McCone, did not know of that; or our other high officials; and that this was an aberration of a small group and that it would have

normal life. We have taken many measures in all these years preventing attempts with different kinds of explosives and weapons, attempts with poison, and actually we are not saying all. I will tell you something. I would even say that I underestimated the CIA somewhat because I thought them capable of many things, but when I read the Senate Committee Report, I confess that I had not thought so much. Because, all that from bacterias, viruses, poisons, a shell with explosives, I don't know how many tremendous things. But it was not only that. I want you to know that if we would have been careless, they would have brought a microphone and put it over there in one of the ashtrays and one mike over there in that seat and everything. There were not only subversive activities, but also espionage. There were many activities related to espionage. I remember that around the day in which the sabotage against our plane took place, the CIA asked in a question, to one of their agents here, whether I was going to travel to Africa, whether he could find out what place I was going to visit, what means of transportation I was going to use, I mean, a whole set of investigation which was not political, but rather that could be used for anything else. Now, going back to this topic, one of the things I've gone into recently with some people, is why Cuba - it was really something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President?



cause he testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee. As I indicated to some of the members of your staff, Mr. Giancana was responsible for the death of hundreds of people in Chicago, and the remarkable thing is not that he died then, but that he had not been killed much earlier.

Stokes: The last gentleman here, Mr. President, is Gary Cornwell. Gary is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Kennedy Subcommittee and he would have direct responsibility in terms of the final work product related to the Kennedy investigation. I separate out the Kennedy assassination because as you know we are investigating also the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Two murder investigations are going at the same time.

Castro: The five million dollars is for both?

Blakey: You ought to also know, Mr. President, that this is the budget attributable to the Committee itself. In fact, the United States Senate, particularly the people who were responsible for the Church Committee investigation, have been helping this Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a relatively large staff devoted to getting their files made available to us. We have actually received cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency. Some members of the staff would say not as fast and as full as we might like, but the final report is not in. The police departments in Dallas

The Washington Post **OUTLOOK** Colu

SUNDAY, MAY 2, 197

By George Crile III

Was the CIA's Man in Havana a  
**The Riddle of AM**

**A**M LASH is the cryptonym the CIA assigned to the senior Cuban official it recruited in 1961 to kill Fidel Castro. The agency's dealings with AM LASH, which continued up to a disastrous end in 1965, encompassed the longest-standing and, on the surface, the most likely to succeed of its numerous plots on Castro's life. It therefore seems a remarkable suspension of curiosity that the Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the CIA's assassination activities, assessed so lightly over this critical chapter.

To begin with, any examination of AM LASH's history would suggest that he had for many years been far too close to insanity to be relied on in any sensitive operation. And from this a larger question presents itself. Was AM LASH actually a conscious double agent for Castro, or was he perhaps so transparent and emotionally exploitable that he unwittingly provided an equivalent service? And if so, and if Castro had become convinced that the United States would stop at nothing to kill him, could Castro have felt compelled to strike first?


AM LASH has never been publicly named, but his history is well known among Cuban exiles in Miami. He was a Cuban doctor, a former *comandante* of the rebel army, a hero of the revolution: Rolando Cubela, an intimate of Castro. The CIA persuaded the Senate Intelligence Committee not to identify Cubela, who is now in jail in Cuba. It maintains that alerting the Cubans to his role in early CIA plots would expose him to reprisals.

But this argument is specious. The Cuban government is filled with men who know Cubela and his history and who must have read the Church Committee's report. It is difficult to believe that Cubela now has any secrets from his captors. The only people who stand to gain from continued secrecy are those all too eager conspirators at the CIA. For the rest of us this story is essential if we are to begin to make sense of the events surrounding the secret but deadly struggle that was being fought in the autumn of 1963.

**The Tortured Assassin**

**T**O UNDERSTAND Cubela fully, it is necessary at once to introduce a Cuban exile in Miami, Jose Aleman, whose assertions are sufficiently important to make it worth reviewing his record for reliability.

*Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine and is writing a book on the CIA's Cuban operations.*



Aleman was educated in the United States at Worcester Academy and then at the University of Miami. During the 1940s, his father was perhaps the most powerful man in Cuba. Nominally minister of education, he was a heavily guarded poodler and boss, whose most rewarding coup was to back a truck up to the Cuban treasury and make off with the Republic's foreign reserves. In Miami, he

bought up most of Key Biscayne, retained Sen. George Smathers as his lawyer and vested as heavily in American politicians in American real estate.

His son chose a different path. A young handsome idealist, he became, like Castro, a revolutionary against the Batista regime. While Castro was in the mountains, Ale

La Agencia Central de Inteligencia(CIA) de Estados Unidos, ha jugado el papel principal en la historia de las agresiones contra Cuba, promoviendo, organizando, financiando y en muchos casos dirigiendo acciones vandálicas, no sólo contra el territorio cubano sino también contra nuestras representaciones e intereses en países extranjeros o en aguas internacionales.

En esta amplia gama de actividades desplegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos subversivos de Estados Unidos contra nuestro País, se destacan por su peligrosidad, los reiterados planes dirigidos a la eliminación física de los principales dirigentes de la Revolución y, en especial, contra la figura de nuestro Primer Ministro.

Las pruebas que aportamos evidencian que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus objetivos principales, mediante el empleo de los más variados métodos técnicos de precisión. En los casos de agentes radicados en el exterior, les han facilitado medios de traslación y comunicación.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has played the leading role in the history of the aggressions against Cuba, promoting, organizing, financing, and, in many cases, directing vandalic actions, not only against the Cuban territory, but also against our representations and interest in foreign countries, or in international waters.

In this wide variety of activities carried out by the CIA and by other United States subversive bodies against our country, the reiterated plans toward the physical elimination, of the principal leaders of the Revolution, and specially, against our Prime Minister, stand out because of their dangerousness.

The proofs we provide, evidence that, since 1959, this has been one of its major aims, by using the most varied technical precision methods. In the case of agents living abroad, they have been given means of transportation and communication.

7-30-75 WS

# Castro Lists 24 Plots to Kill Him

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Sen. George S. McGovern today made public a Cuban summary of 24 alleged plots to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro and other top Communist officials. The Cuban document linked most of the attempts to the CIA.

McGovern told a press conference he had "no way to verify these allegations." He said he obtained the summary personally from Castro during a visit to Havana this year.

McGovern said the material would be turned over to the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, to be investigated.

THE DOCUMENT describes three attempts on Castro's life in 1960 and 1961 prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and 21 attempts following the Bay of Pigs, the latest in March 1971.


The 1971 attempt, which the Cubans said was made during Castro's visit to Marxist President Salvador Allende in Chile, appears to

have no direct link to the CIA except for an unsubstantiated assertion that the assassin acted "with the CIA, Chilean fascists and Cuban counter-revolutionaries."

The Cubans said the assassin was Jesus Dominguez Benitez, who posed as a Venezuelan newsman and concealed his gun in a television camera.

According to the Cubans, Benitez had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for terrorist activity in the United States and in 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate Cuba and had sought refuge at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

See CASTRO, A-6



—United Press International

Premier Castro taking Sen. McGovern on a jeep tour.

IN MOST of the 24 cases included in the summary, which McGovern said was not intended to be all-inclusive, individuals charged with attempted assassination were arrested by Cuban authorities.

The summary includes the names of a number of individuals identified by the Cubans as CIA agents. However, the document makes it appear that if they had connections with the CIA they were "contractors" rather than regular employees.

The Cubans said Adm. Arleigh Burke, then chief of naval operations, participated in passing instructions to assassins for an attempt on Castro's life in July 1961.

In that case, the Cubans said, instructions were passed by Burke and "CIA agents on Guantanamo." It said the weapons included "explosives, mortars, high-powered rifles and .30-caliber machine guns." Apparently the attempt never took place.

The Cuban summary includes allegations of plots stretching over four U.S. administrations, the first during the Eisenhower administration and the last during the Nixon administration.

McGOVERN, the unsuccessful Democratic presidential candidate against Nixon in 1972, said that al-

though he cannot vouch for the truth of the Cuban report, if the charges are true "the CIA has engaged in the most shocking, murderous, and un-American behavior against the leaders of a neighboring state."

"The Cubans link the CIA to a wide range of anti-Castro groups both inside Cuba and elsewhere," McGovern said. "They attribute to the CIA consistent efforts to consolidate counterrevolutionary organizations into such umbrella groups as the United Resistance, Union for United Revolutionaries, and anti-Communist civic resistance, and to create the impression of widespread opposition to Castro inside Cuba."

McGovern said the Cubans listed as targets, in addition to Castro, Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Defense Minister Raul Castro and Foreign Minister Raul Roa.

Most of the plots listed in the Cuban summary were broken up — often by the arrest of individuals charged with the conspiracies — before the actual assassination attempts could be carried out.

The summary did not include efforts by a Mafia group including mobsters Sam Giancana and Sam Rosselli to assassinate Castro. McGovern said the list was intended to include only allegations which had not previously been made public.

The Cuban summary said that in 1962 a group of Cuban anti-Communists, aided by the CIA, hatched a plan to kill foreign minister Roa and then wipe out other leaders attending his funeral.

The Cubans said that on Sept. 28, 1963, a group acting through a person they identified as CIA agent Pierre Owen Diaz de Ure planned to dynamite sewer pipes under the presidential

palace. The Cubans said de Ure was arrested and confessed working for the CIA for two years.

"THE MATERIAL supplied by the Cuban authorities obviously warrants further investigation by the appropriate committees in the Senate and House and by the executive branch," McGovern said. "Conclusions on CIA involvement are apparently based on confessions and circumstantial evidence."

McGovern noted that since the missile crisis of 1962 the official U.S. policy has been to discourage violence against the Castro government. If the Cuban allegations are true, McGovern said, it points to one of two conclusions: That official U.S. policy was untruthful or that the CIA acted on its own, perhaps in defiance of higher authority.

IES, SATURDAY, JULY 12, 1975

## CASTRO RECALLS DOZENS OF PLOTS

But Says Bullet to Kill Him  
'Has Not Yet Been Made'

SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 10 (Reuters)—Premier Fidel Castro said today that he knew of plans for dozens—maybe 40 to 60—attempts against his life by counterrevolutionary groups controlled by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

But he said he had no grounds to affirm that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy were directly involved in the attempts.

Talking to newsmen during the visit here of Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica, 600 miles east of Havana, Mr. Castro told about an attempt to poison him in 1961 with a chocolate milkshake. He said this had failed as the bottle containing the poison had broken or the liquid had frozen in the refrigerator.

This was a time-poison designed to kill without traces two or three days after being ingested, he said.

He also said he had information about a group of newsmen with Venezuelan television credentials who intended to kill him with guns hidden in TV-cameras during his 1971 trip to Chile.

There were some Cubans among them, he said. But he added that nobody had ever shot at him in an assassination attempt.

"It seems the bullet which will kill me has not yet been made," he said.

The men involved in the attempt in Chile did not shoot, perhaps because they were afraid, he said.

But Mr. Castro told of an attempt against the life of Carlos Rafail Rodriguez, currently Deputy Premier in charge of foreign affairs. He said nine men had opened cross-fire on Mr. Rodriguez as he drove back from an official ceremony in Matanzas, 60 miles east of Havana, in 1961.

Dr. Rodriguez escaped unhurt, one of the attackers was killed, apparently when a hand grenade he was holding exploded, Mr. Castro said. Other members of the group were captured and one confessed that the attempt had been organized by the C.I.A., he said.

Asked when the last assassination attempt took place, Mr. Castro said he had not heard of any for some time.

He said it was good for the United States people to know about C.I.A. activities because there was no example in contemporary history of a government agency trying to murder foreign leaders.

### C.I.A. Change Seen

Mr. Castro also said that hijackings had been "invented" by C.I.A. agents who offered up to \$100,000 to the United States shortly after the 1959 revolution.

the agents bribed Cubans to hijack airliners to the United States, he said, adding that there had been fights in flight between Cuban security men and counter-revolutionary elements.

According to Mr. Castro, there are still C.I.A. agents in Cuba with sophisticated electronic equipment. But he said they were now more involved in intelligence gathering by such methods as recruiting foreign diplomats.

Counterrevolutionary groups in Cuba, as well as in Miami are infiltrated, he said. He added that Cuba would not afford an intelligence service but had sympathizers abroad.

Asked what would have happened if former President Richard M. Nixon had been elected in 1960—one year before the Bay of Pigs invasion—Mr. Castro said that Mr. Nixon probably would have sent in the United States Army and Navy.

He said that Cuba had to fight a sort of regular war for nearly two years after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion against numerous attacks from sea. These were led by counter-revolutionary groups and organized by the Kennedy Administration, he said.



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Legal Policy  
*Office of Information and Privacy*

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Washington, D.C. 20530

James H. Lesar, Esq.  
Fensterwald & Associates  
1000 Wilson Boulevard - Suite 900  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

AUG 22 1984

Dear Jim:

As we discussed on the telephone this afternoon, I am enclosing a redacted copy of Document No. 1648-452-C. I will notify Judge Robinson's Chambers that the CIA has only now discovered that this document was previously disclosed to another requester and that it has been sent to you in redacted form.

I also enclose a copy of the Stipulation for enlargement, filed today.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Laura".

Laura F. Einstein