

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARK A. ALLEN,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE)
 AGENCY, et al.,)
)
 Defendants.)
 _____)

Civil Action No. 78-1743

MEMORANDUM OF MARK A. ALLEN CONCERNING
CIA DOCUMENT #509-803

I. Background

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963 in Dallas, Texas. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, appointed a commission to investigate the murder, chaired by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren. The "Warren Commission," as it came to be known, had no independent investigative staff and relied primarily on the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency for its information.

One of the Commission's most important areas of investigation was Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City some two months before Kennedy's assassination. Oswald's contacts with representatives of two hostile foreign governments so close to the events of Dallas had grave implications for the Commission, which was largely dependent on the CIA for information in this area.

The document in issue was the agency's first report to the Warren Commission on Oswald's activities in Mexico. Dated January 31, 1964, it was submitted to the Commission a few days later and was denominated Warren Commission Document #347.

The Agency initially adopted a policy of not revealing its sources of information to the Commission (Exhibit 2). That policy was still in effect when the document in issue was written. As confirmed by a staff report of the U. S. House Select Committee on Assassinations, the document in issue does not contain a single reference to a sensitive intelligence source or method (Exhibit 3). Furthermore, a CIA cable from agency headquarters demonstrates that this document was written in a special way, so as to protect the CIA's sources and methods (Exhibit 4).

Over the years there have been numerous document releases by the CIA, FBI and National Archives concerning Oswald's Mexican activities. In addition, there have been several related news stories which have appeared in such prestigious publications as the New York Times and the Washington Post. Their cumulative effect, as this memorandum will demonstrate, has been to place the identity of the CIA's Mexican sources and methods into the public domain.

Exhibit 5 is the September 21, 1975 headline article of the Washington Star, which also appeared on the front page of the New York Times of the same day. The article correctly reports that the CIA "secretly tape recorded two telephone conversations between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City..."

Exhibit 6 is a front page Washington Post story of November 26, 1976 by staff writer Ronald Kessler. It reports that in September, 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and attempted to "make a deal." The article continued:

"This conversation was intercepted and recorded by the Central Intelligence Agency at the time... The Post has... determined that the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told the Warren Commission that it learned of most of Oswald's activities in Mexico City only after the assassination. The fact is, however, that the CIA monitored and taped his conversation with both the Russian and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City in the fall of 1963, before Kennedy's death."

"It was the CIA's belief that the two embassies were heavily involved in the spy business and that, specifically, they were operational bases for intelligence activities directed at the United States."

"So with the full cooperation of the Mexican government, CIA wiretaps were installed on telephone lines going into both embassies."

Even more detail on the CIA's telephone intercept operations in Mexico City was provided in Phillip Agee's book Inside the Company (Excerpted in Exhibit 7). Information on the intercepts was also published in Anthony Summers' book Conspiracy, with relevant portions found in Exhibit 8.

It is readily apparent to the informed observer that a substantial number of deletions in the document in issue are made because they tend to suggest a telephone intercept. Plaintiff therefore strongly urges the Court to carefully consider the extent to which these intercepts are public knowledge.

II. Discussion of Deletions

With the foregoing discussion in mind, the withheld portions of this document will be discussed. Exhibit 1 is a copy of the redacted document with each deleted segment labeled.

A. Paragraph 1

1. Deletion 1A - By comparing the in camera document with a publicly available Warren Commission memorandum, it is apparent that the deleted words are: "in halting Russian" (Exhibit 9).

2. Deletion 1B, 1C, 1D - A further comparison between the in camera document and the above mentioned Warren Commission memorandum reveals the substance of these withheld portions. The memorandum reads in pertinent part:
"After trying to establish by physical descriptions who at the Embassy Oswald had spoken to two days earlier, the guard stated that if it was a dark man it was probably 'Kostikov.' The guard then left Oswald outside of the Embassy, went in himself and spoke with someone, returned and said that the telegram had been sent but that no reply had been received" (Exhibit 10).

B. Paragraphs 5 thru 12 - These completely withheld paragraphs concern Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. Publicly available documents indicate there are at least three separate classes of information within these deleted pages:

1. Information obtained through the interrogation of Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran by the Mexican Federal Police (Exhibit 11).

2. Information on Oswald's Cuban and Soviet contacts gathered from intercepted conversations (Exhibit 12).

3. Information concerning conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and the Cuban President (Exhibit 13).

4. Exhibits 14-23 contain virtually all of the information found in deleted paragraphs 5-12. A brief description of each exhibit follows.
 - a. Exhibit 14 - This CIA release is very similar in structure to the document in issue. Particular attention should be given to the portion beginning on the fourth line of paragraph 2: "It turned up pictures of a man..." This may well relate to the withheld material in paragraphs 5-7. The "pictures" mentioned in this exhibit were obtained from the Agency's photographic surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, a fact which is also publicly known (See Attachment 1 to Exhibit 14).
 - b. Exhibit 15 - This Warren Commission exhibit was published in 1964. It is a report of the interrogation of Sylvia Duran, a Cuban Embassy employee, prepared by a high ranking official of the Mexican Federal Police. As Exhibit 11 demonstrates, a substantial portion of the withheld material in this document was obtained through the Mexican government's interrogation of Duran. Exhibit 15 not only shows that cooperation between Mexican authorities and the U. S. government was no secret, but provides extensive information gathered during the interrogation.
 - c. Exhibit 16 - This is a page from a chronology prepared by the Warren Commission staff. Among the sources used for this chronology was the document in issue, which is cited here by its Warren Commission Document number 347 (National Archives, Record Group/272, Entry 45).

- d. Exhibit 17 - Another page from the same Warren Commission chronology, which attributes certain information to page eight of the in camera document.

- e. Exhibit 18 - These two pages are from Warren Commission Document #1084d, a FBI report. Here conversations between officials of the Soviet Embassy, Cuban Embassy and Lee Harvy Oswald are set out in great detail. Essentially these pages are paraphrases of the CIA's intercepted conversations. Plaintiff is confident that the material concerning these conversations in the in camera document is no more sensitive than the information found in this exhibit and the one immediately following.

- f. Exhibit 19 - This is a February 14, 1964 Warren Commission internal memorandum written only two weeks after the in camera document reached the Commission. Plaintiff has an excellent working knowledge of the Commission's papers at the National Archives, and can state with some confidence that the in camera document is the only report that the Commission had received on Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies as of the date of this memo. Therefore, the information in this memo, beginning on page 8 at "Friday, September 27" and continuing through Tuesday, October 1 on page 10, was obtained directly from the in camera document.

- g. Exhibit 20 - Another page from the Commission chronology, apparently citing information to pages 8 and 9 of the document at issue.
- h. Exhibit 21 - This is an April 1, 1964 Warren Commission draft memorandum. Of particular relevance is paragraph 3 of this document, which discusses Oswald's contact with the Soviet Military Attache and with a Soviet Embassy guard.
- i. Exhibit 22 - Excerpt from a staff report of the U. S. House Select Committee on Assassinations entitled "CIA Support to the Warren Commission" (Appendix to Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, Vol. XI). This report reveals that conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and the Cuban President, Sr. Dorticos, were summarized in the document at issue.
- j. Exhibit 23 - This Warren Commission Document contains information relating to Oswald in Mexico which may appear in the in camera document.

C. Paragraphs 16, 17, 19 and 20

The CIA's last affidavit stated that these portions were withheld because they would reveal agency knowledge of the foreign intelligence affiliations of certain individuals (Supplemental Affidavit of Robert E. Owen, p. 6-7). This explanation is inadequate on its face. In Exhibits 24, 25 and 26 the CIA publicly reveals its knowledge that three Russian citizens (two of whom worked at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico) are officers of the KGB.

Warren Commission critic Mark Lane has theorized that the CIA frightened the Commission into an inadequate investigation by emphasizing the KGB connections of the Soviets officials Oswald contacted. While paragraph 15 does not indicate this to be the case, the complete withholding of paragraphs 16 and 17 will no doubt lead to further needless speculation on this point.

D. Paragraphs 21 thru 25

1. Deletions 21A thru 25A

According to the Supplemental Owen affidavit, (page 8) the deletions listed above were made to protect an "intelligence source." Yet it is painfully obvious that the "intelligence source" the agency seeks to "protect" is the Mexican Federal Police. The CIA has frequently been inconsistent in this area. Exhibit 27 contains a June 4, 1964 memo as released in August, 1976. It concerns the very topic in these deleted paragraphs: the allegation of Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte. This memo contains several deletions. Yet the entire memo was released 12 years earlier in 1964 (Exhibit 28). In examining what the CIA withheld in 1976, but released in 1964, it is noted that all the deleted material dealt with the Mexican Police. Exhibit 28 almost certainly contains information that has been withheld in paragraphs 21 thru 25 of the in camera document.

Exhibit 29 is an excerpt of Warren Commission Document #1000. That document is a memo from Richard Helms, Deputy Director of the CIA, to J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission. Attached is a

December 13, 1963 memo from Helms to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover entitled "Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto Ugarte." Attached to the original memo was a report of the Mexican police. This material demonstrates that the CIA's receipt of information from the Mexican police was no secret. Exhibit 30 reports the results of the Ugarte interrogation.

2. Deletions 25B and 25C - These deletions attempt to mask the publicly known fact that a CIA employee polygraphed Alvarado Ugarte. Exhibit 31 is a Hoover to Rankin letter of October 22, 1964 where Hoover notes: "He (Alvarado) was given a polygraph examination in Mexico by CIA." (emphasis added).


Exhibit 32, a FBI report of December 11, 1963, not only confirms that a CIA employee polygraphed Alvarado, but gives the name of the CIA examiner: Calvin Davis.

III. Conclusion

The CIA is withholding information that has long been in the public domain. Release of this publicly available information from publicly known sources can in no way lead to any identifiable damage of national security.

DATED: February 23, 1981
Washington, DC

Respectfully submitted,



Mark A. Allen
607 North Carolina Ave. S.E.
Washington, DC 20003
202/547-1636

L7

XAAZ-22594
31 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Leo Rankin

SUBJECT: Information Developed by CIA on the
Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in
Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963
as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. I am enclosing a presentation of the information developed by CIA on or about Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. We have included in this paper only hard, substantive information. Any judgments that are made represent professional evaluations by individuals who have worked over the years as specialists in their fields. Speculation, rumor, and vague detail not directly related to OSWALD's activity have not been included.

2. Pursuant to our discussion on 14 January 1964, I have given the enclosure an appropriate classification. The compromise of this material in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of current sources and methods of this Agency in Mexico and elsewhere.

Document Number 509-803

(signed)

for FOIA Review of: JUN 1976

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Enclosure

- Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att ✓
- 1 - DDP w/att
- 1 - D
- 1 - D
- ✓ 1 - D

D 31 January 1964

ATT.

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31 January 1964

Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of
Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City
28 September - 3 October 1963

I. OSWALD's Activity in Mexico City

1. On 9 October the CIA Station in Mexico City received the following information from a reliable and proven source:

An American named Lee OSWALD had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October 1963. He had spoken (IA) B to the Soviet Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier, Saturday, 28 September. He asked whether there had been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had promised to send to Washington. (IB)

whom OSWALD had talked (IC) R had probably been KOSTEKOV. OBYEDKOV,

1 to: XANZ-22574

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(1D)

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ assured
OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but
no answer had been received.

The information was forwarded by cable to CIA Headquarters
the same day it was received.

2. A file check in Washington which is routine in these
matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the Lee
OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably
with KOSTIKOV, and the defector returnee, Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

3. On 10 October 1963 CIA Headquarters disseminated by
cable the report in substantially the form and in the detail
indicated above, in paragraph 1, to the Federal agencies whose
jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of
OSWALD's file: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Depart-


* The CIA file on Lee Harvey OSWALD was opened on 9 December
1960 to accommodate biographic information developed by CIA in
response to an inquiry from the Department of State on a list of
American defectors in Soviet Bloc countries. OSWALD's was
among the names in the list. The Department of State inquiry
was dated 25 October 1960. An interim reply was given by CIA
on 3 November 1960; a final reply, on 21 November 1960. Until
early October 1963 the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA
consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations
received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Navy Department.

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ment of State, the Navy Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that the subject, Lee OSWALD, was probably identical with the former Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (The report disseminated by CIA in Washington on 10 October also included a physical description of an individual who was believed to have been the OSWALD who had contacted the Soviets in Mexico City. It was subsequently established by investigation that the description did not pertain to OSWALD.)

4. On the same day, 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station of the background information held in the Headquarters' file on OSWALD. An instruction was included for the Mexico City Station to pass the substance of its 9 October report to the local representatives of the same Federal departments and agencies that had been given the information in Washington. This instruction was immediately carried out. In this manner the information on OSWALD's contact with the Soviets on 1 October was passed in Mexico City to the Embassy, the FBI representative, the Naval Attaché, and to the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. There were no requests from recipients of the report for further information or for follow-up investigation.

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5. After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey OSWALD, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City to determine the purpose of OSWALD's visit. (S)

6.

(6)

A S B

A S B

7.

(7)








PLATE 107-675 24



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9. (9)

A & B

10. (10)

A & B

11. (11)





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
12. (12)

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


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
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These additional materials were promptly disseminated in Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

c. 1 October. See paragraph 1 above for Lee OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Consulate.


II. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

13. It is believed that the Soviet official with whom OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attache Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933. A photograph of KOSTIKOV is attached. ^(sic) In his letter of 9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN (sic) of the Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico." There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

14. KOSTIKOV is the senior officer of five Soviet Consular representatives who deal with visas and related

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matters. There is firm evidence for the conclusion that KOSTIKOV is a Soviet State Security (KGB) officer, and the other four Consular officers are also known or strongly suspected to be Soviet State Security personnel serving under official cover. The State Security Service is the major of the Soviet intelligence services and it is charged with espionage, counterintelligence and related matters inside the Soviet Union and overseas.

15. It must be clearly stated that Soviet intelligence and security officers placed abroad under official cover normally are required to perform the routine and legitimate business demanded by the cover job in an embassy or consulate.

16.


(16)

17.

(17)



[Handwritten scribble]



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18. An intensive review of the files of our Mexico City Station was undertaken immediately after the assassination to comb out any previously unreported information about KOSTIKOV's activity. No useful new information bearing on the assassination resulted from this effort.

19. (19)

~~SECRET~~ C

20. (20)

~~SECRET~~ C

III. Monetary Payment to CSWALD - Investigation of Allegation

21. On 26 November 1963 a young Nicaraguan named Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte walked into the U.S. Embassy in

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~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Mexico City and claimed he had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee OSWALD had been given \$6,500 in cash to kill someone.

(21A)

A

He said that he was in Mexico

City

(21B)

A

trying to get himself accepted

by the Cubans as a communist so they would take him to Cuba for guerrilla training.

(21C)

A

He

had apparently visited the Cuban Embassy and its Consular offices on a number of occasions and he correctly identified some twenty Cuban Embassy and Consular employees.

22. While intensive investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive interrogation failed to shake ALVARADO's story.

(22A)

A

23.

(23)

A

24.

(24)

A

25.

(25A)

A

But because of the importance of

resolving the problem CIA personnel continued the interrogation

in close coordination with the FBI. ALVARADO voluntarily

agreed to a lie detector examination. A ^(25B) polygraph expert,

assisted by an FBI special agent, requestioned ALVARADO and

secured admissions that he must have been mistaken. The ^(25C)

polygraph expert concluded from the results of his tests that

ALVARADO had fabricated his story about OSWALD in toto.

26. It should be noted that when he first told his story

on 26 November, ALVARADO could have known from the

Mexican press that OSWALD had visited the Cuban Consulate

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in Mexico City. Also, he could have heard the rumors current there that OSWALD had \$5,000 with him when he returned from Mexico to the United States. ALVARADO has since been departed by the Mexican authorities to his native Nicaragua.

Attachment - photograph

EX-107

201-289248

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

APPENDIX TO
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
VOLUME XI
THE WARREN COMMISSION
CIA SUPPORT TO THE WARREN COMMISSION
THE MOTORCADE
MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION

MARCH 1979

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations



Exhibit 2
78-1743

Robert Gemberling, p. 85.

Committee report, p. 70.

on the Warren Commission.
Committee report, p. 71.

p. 151, 172.
p. 178-9.

on to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964.
Session testimony, p. 27.

Session testimony, p. 46.
Session testimony, p. 132.
p. 91.
ny, p. 23.

. 28.
ny, p. 20.
testimony, p. 171.
lon testimony, pp. 38-61.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE
WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Staff Report
of the

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

fied. He stated that: "a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (78)

(68) Scelso offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' nondisclosure to the Warren Commission:

STAFF COUNSEL. Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. SCELSO. No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (79)

C. AGENCY'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS—FACTORS AFFECTING THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMISSION REQUESTS

(69) The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's request for information was dependent on (1) the availability of information; (2) the complexity of the issues involved in the request; and (3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Helms testified that when the CIA was able to satisfy a Commission request, it would send a reply back. With respect to timing:

(70) . . . some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (80)

(71) Under law, the Director of Central Intelligence has always been required to protect sensitive sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ([50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)]). As a result of this responsibility, in some instances the Agency initially limited access by the Commission to CIA original source materials. (81) J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that on occasion, the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods affected the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (82)

(72) The committee was fully aware that traditional intelligence reporting procedures do not normally include revealing sources and methods. Moreover, Federal law obligates the CIA to protect its sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Had the Warren Commission investigation been conducted under normal conditions, revealing sources and methods would not have been expected, much less required. Nevertheless, it may be argued because the circumstances of this investigation were extraordinary, no possible source of relevant evidence should have been considered an unauthorized disclosure.

(73) The committee identified two related areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods may have impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These were:

different procedural approach problem." (78)
 cal appraisal of Helms' nondisclo-

Mr. Helms was acting prop-
 Warren Commission about the

It was a morally highly repre-
 possibly justify under his oath
 standard of professional public

TO PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
 THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMISS-

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 its sensitive sources and methods may
 mission's investigation. These were:

(74) —Initially not providing the Commission with original source materials pertaining to Oswald's trip to Mexico;

(75) —The Agency's reluctance to reveal the origin of a photograph of an unidentified man who had mistakenly been linked to Oswald.

(76) The CIA's concern over revealing the existence of sensitive sources and methods was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Scelso commented that "we are not authorized at first to reveal all our [sensitive] operations." (83) He did, however, testify that:

(77) We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including [sensitive] sources, including the [sensitive sources] and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duram, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [sensitive sources]. (84)

(78) Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission, dated January 31, 1964, regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (85) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based on sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

(79) The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to a [foreign country] station. The cable stated:

(80) Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of [sensitive sources and methods] in order to protect [* * *] continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave [State Department]. (86)

(81) The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963, cable, as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI, is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (87) In that memorandum, [an Agency employee] of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Special Investigations Group, wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complemented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963, that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided [the Agency employee] with this report, which indicated that some U.S. agency was conducting a sensitive operation abroad and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of this operation. The [Agency employee] memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. The [Agency employee] then made the following notation regarding sensitive sources and methods:

(82) He [Scelso] was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner—via the FBI—sensitive information which could relate to sensitive sources and methods * * * [The] Agency desired to establish some other policy with regard to meeting the needs of the Commission.* (88)

(83) The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA headquarters to a CIA [unit]. (91) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission that would be in a form protective of the CIA sources and techniques. (92)

(84) On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission. It is likely that he discussed the CIA memorandum to the Warren Commission of January 31, 1964.** (93) On February 10, 1964, Rankin wrote Helms in regard to that CIA memorandum. (94) A review of Rankin's letter indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no information pertaining to CIA's [sensitive sources and methods] that had generated the information on Oswald.

(85) Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964, letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City (as stated in paragraph 1 of the January 31 memorandum) had been obtained by [sensitive source and methods] or by interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been informed of

* The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963, was set forth on January 14, 1964, in a formalized fashion when Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information [as determined from Agency sources] coinciding with dates when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (89)

Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

(1) Your Bureau not disseminate information received from this Agency without prior concurrence.

(2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or complements (or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through) other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate action preparatory to meeting its needs. (90)

**See paragraphs 78.

0
Robert Gemberling, p. 85.

Committee report, p. 70.

Report on the Warren Commission.
Committee report, p. 71.

pp. 151, 172.
pp. 178-9.

Testimony to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964.
Session testimony, p. 27.

Session testimony, p. 48.
Session testimony, p. 132.
p. 91.
Testimony, p. 23.

p. 28.
Testimony, p. 20.
Testimony, p. 171.
Session testimony, pp. 38-61.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE
WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

(471)

Exhibit 3
78-1743

different procedural approach prob-
ken." (78)
ical appraisal of Helms' nondisclo-

nk Mr. Helms was acting prop-
Warren Commission about the

at was a morally highly repre-
possibly justify under his oath
ndard of professional public

TO PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMISS-

ed by the CIA to respond to the War-
nformation was dependent on (1)
(2) the complexity of the issues in-
e extent to which the relevant infor-
IA sources and methods. On the first
when the CIA was able to satisfy a
send a reply back. With respect to

ries obviously took longer than

involve checking a file which was
ries might involve trying to see if
in some overseas country.
er to perform than the other. (80)

of Central Intelligence has always been
urces and methods from unauthorized
(3)]. As a result of this responsibility,
nitially limited access by the Commis-
erials. (81) J. Lee Rankin expressed the
Agency's effort to protect its sensitive
he quality of the information to which
staff were given access. (82)

y aware that traditional intelligence re-
ormally include revealing sources and
law obligates the CIA to protect its
authorized disclosure. Had the Warren
n conducted under normal conditions,
s would not have been expected, much
may be argued because the circumstances
ordinary, no possible source of relevant
sidered an unauthorized disclosure.
ed two related areas of concern in which
t its sensitive sources and methods may
ommission's investigation. These were:

- (74) —Initially not providing the Commission with original source materials pertaining to Oswald's trip to Mexico;
- (75) —The Agency's reluctance to reveal the origin of a photograph of an unidentified man who had mistakenly been linked to Oswald.
- (76) The CIA's concern over revealing the existence of sensitive sources and methods was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Scelso commented that "we are not authorized at first to reveal all our [sensitive] operations." (83) He did, however, testify that:
- (77) We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including [sensitive] sources, including the [sensitive sources] and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [sensitive sources]. (84)
- (78) Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission, dated January 31, 1964, regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (85) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based on sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.
- (79) The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to a [foreign country] station. The cable stated:
- (80) Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of [sensitive sources and methods] in order to protect [* * *] continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave [State Department]. (86)
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

29 JANUARY 1964

- INDEX
- NO INDEX
- FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING		
1		4
2		5
3		6

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

29 JAN 64 22 40

ROUTINE

file

TO PRIORITY

INFO

CITE DIR 97829

1. MR. HELMS APPEARED BEFORE WARREN COMMISSION ON 28 JANUARY AND RECEIVED GUIDELINES ON WHAT THEY EXPECT FROM CIA ON SATURDAY 1 FEB WE WILL GIVE COMMISSION A REPORT ON LEE OSWALD'S ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO, PRESENTED SO AS TO PROTECT YOUR SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES. PLS REVIEW YOUR REPORTING TO US THIS SUBJECT AND CABLE IN ANYTHING ADDITIONAL YOU MAY HAVE IN TIME FOR US TO INCLUDE IN REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

Document Number 498-204

for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Exhibit 4
78-1743

Weather
and partly
ugh tomor-
both days in
low tonight
ails: E-11.

The Washington Star

SEPTEMBER 21, 1975

★★★★

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Phone (202) 484-5000

CIRCULATION 484-3000

CLASSIFIED 484-6000

Report the CIA Taped Oswald On Soviet Call

• See Warren Commission Story Below

By Nicholas M. Horrock
New York Times News Service

The Central Intelligence Agency secretly tape recorded two telephone conversations between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City some eight weeks before President John F. Kennedy was shot to death Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas, according to government sources familiar with the events.

The call to the Soviet Embassy, the sources said yesterday, alerted the CIA to the presence of Oswald in Mexico City, and on Oct. 10 the agency warned the FBI. There is no indication that the FBI, which was investigating Oswald for his pro-Castro activities, ever followed up on the information.

The call to the Cuban Embassy, the sources said, was not associated

made arrangements to return to the United States with a Russian wife.

"This biographical data was based upon FBI reports provided to the CIA following Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.

"THIS INFORMATION was also provided to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Navy, the U.S. ambassador and his staff in Mexico and to the representative of the FBI in Mexico.

See TAPES, A-6

Ford Talks Of Colleges

Exhibit 5
78-1742

By Nicholas M. Horrock
New York Times News Service

The Central Intelligence Agency secretly tape recorded two telephone conversations between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City some eight weeks before President John F. Kennedy was shot to death Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas, according to government sources familiar with the events.

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The call to the Cuban Embassy, the sources said, was not associated with Oswald until after Kennedy's death. A federal commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren found that Oswald, acting alone, had shot the President.

THE CALLS reportedly were placed by Oswald on a trip to Mexico City in late September and early October 1963. The events of this trip have never been fully made public and have been the subject of speculation for more than a decade.

The reports of the calls are the latest developments in the increasing speculation concerning the Warren Commission's conclusions. Evidence that the CIA and FBI may have been less than candid with the commission have added to the questions surrounding the assassination and have led to more calls for a reopening of the inquiry.

The Mexico City trip was given only scant treatment in the Warren Commission report because publication of information about it might have exposed "sources and methods" of the CIA and impaired national security, intelligence officers and commission staff sources have said.

IN RESPONSE TO inquiries from the New York Times, the CIA issued an unusual public statement on the matter. It would not confirm that there were any tape recorded conversations, but said:

"On Oct. 9, 1963, CIA headquarters received information that a person named Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in late September or early October 1963. In transmitting the information on Oct. 10, 1963, CIA headquarters said Lee Oswald was probably identical to Lee Henry (sic) Oswald, a former radar operator in the U.S. Marine Corps, born Oct. 18, 1939, in New Orleans who defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and who subsequently

made arrangements to return to the United States with a Russian wife.

"This biographical data was based upon FBI reports provided to the CIA following Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.

"THIS INFORMATION was also provided to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Navy, the U.S. ambassador and his staff in Mexico and to the representative of the FBI in Mexico.

See TAPES, A-6

Ford Talks Of Colleges And Nixon

From News Services

MALIBU, Calif. — President Ford vowed yesterday to fight legislation that would discourage private gifts to independent colleges, saying such institutions already are "battered and buffeted in ways that may ultimately jeopardize their survival."

"I will do all that I can to encourage the use of private funds for the public good," Ford declared at ceremonies dedicating the new, privately endowed Firestone Field House at Pepperdine University. Ford received an honorary doctor of laws degree from Dr. William S. Banowsky, president of the school.

The President's campus visit followed an interview at a Los Angeles television station in which he was asked if he foresaw any new political role for former President Richard M. Nixon.

"I THINK that's a decision he has to make," Ford replied.

The President said he might visit Nixon at some time, adding, "I don't think what has happened in the recent past should destroy our personal friendship."

As he has before, Ford said in the interview that a battle between him and former California Gov. Ronald Reagan for the 1976 GOP presidential nomination would not hurt the party. And Ford again expressed confidence that he would win.

The President also said he does not know categorically whether Israel has nuclear weapons, but that in any event the United States is obligated to "study" Israel's request for Pershing missiles, which could be mounted with nuclear warheads.

See FORD, A-6

TAPES

Continued From A-1

"Following the assassination of President Kennedy, CIA records revealed that a person believed to be Oswald was in contact with the Cuban Embassy on Sept. 27, 1963, for the purpose of receiving a transit visa for use en route to the USSR.

"In addition a number of photographs of individuals believed to be in contact with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City were received from the CIA station in Mexico and were compared with pictures of Oswald by CIA officers in Mexico City and CIA headquarters and by United States authorities in Dallas, Tex.

"It was determined that none of these photographs was the photograph of Oswald. Their determinations, and the raw data upon which they were based, along with the reports of his visit to the Soviet Embassy, were made to the Warren and Rockefeller commissions as were all other materials relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death."

THREE STAFF MEMBERS of the Warren Commission were assigned to investigate the Mexico City trip and other matters involving the CIA. They were William T. Coleman, now secretary of transportation, Howard P. Willens, a former Justice Department official now in private law practice, and W. David Slawson, a law professor in California.

Coleman said in an interview that he was "disturbed" about the possibility that United States security might be harmed by the recent disclosures, but he acknowledged that he and other staffers received information from the CIA on Oswald's activities in Mexico, and they did not run counter to the commission's conclusion that Oswald killed Kennedy and a Dallas police officer.

Coleman said he was sure that Lee Rankin, the Warren Commission chief counsel, was informed of the CIA Mexico data and that "at least two or three commission members" knew. He could not remember if the commission ever discussed the matter in executive session. Willens and Slawson declined to make public comment.

SOURCES FAMILIAR with the contents of the tapes said that Oswald was seeking a transit visa from Cuban officials and that he was "rebuffed." One source said that the call to the Soviet Embassy was an effort to get help from the Soviets in furthering his application at the Cuban

plot and, two, that the CIA and the FBI may not have been fully candid with the Warren Commission. These doubts have deepened in the last nine months as the CIA's role in plots to kill foreign leaders came under scrutiny. Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have confirmed, for instance, that the CIA did not tell the Warren Commission of its efforts to kill Fidel Castro, premier of Cuba, during the early 1960s.

Sen. Richard Schweiker, R-Pa., has called for a reopening of the commission's inquiry on this and other issues.

A SURVEY OF Warren Commission, Rockefeller Commission, intelligence and congressional sources, however, revealed that there are still two areas of suspicion concerning Kennedy's assassination. One is that Oswald received some sort of indirect support or inspiration in his

plot and, two, that the CIA and the FBI may not have been fully candid with the Warren Commission.

Sen. Richard Schweiker, R-Pa., has called for a reopening of the commission's inquiry on this and other issues.

ANOTHER AREA of unrest has arisen over the role of the FBI. Earlier this month it was revealed that the bureau did not inform the Warren Commission of a letter Oswald wrote threatening to blow up the Dallas police department.

Exhibit 6
78-1743

WASHINGTON POST 11/26/76

CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Call

By Ronald Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

In late September, 1963—eight weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy—Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned the Soviet embassy in Mexico City and tried to make a deal.

In exchange for unspecified information, he wanted a free trip to Russia.

This conversation was intercepted and recorded by the Central Intelligence Agency at the time. But it was not then turned over to the FBI, which has responsibility for investigating possible spies, and it was not later turned over to the Warren Commission during its investigation of the assassination.

The unanswered question is why not?

The existence of the CIA telephone intercept of Oswald's conversation in Mexico City and the contents of the still-secret transcript have been verified by The Washington Post. The Post has also verified that the CIA failed to turn over the complete

transcript to either the FBI or the Warren Commission.

Instead, the CIA gave the FBI in October, 1963, only a brief report saying Oswald had made contact with the Russians. It gave the Warren Commission a transcript of the taped conversation but for unexplained reasons failed to include in the transcript Oswald's offer of information and his suggestion that the Russians would want to pay his way to the Soviet Union.

The Post has also determined that the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told the Warren Commission that it learned of most of Oswald's activities in Mexico City only after the assassination. The fact is, however, that the CIA monitored and tape-recorded his conversation with both the Russian and Cuban embassies in Mexico City in the fall of 1963, before Kennedy's death.

It was the CIA's belief that the two embassies were heavily involved in the spy business and that, specifically, they were operational bases for intelligence activities directed at the United States.

So, with the full cooperation of the Mexican government, CIA wiretaps were installed on telephone lines going into both embassies.

The CIA was especially interested in U.S. citizens who made contact with the embassies.

Thus, when Oswald showed up in Mexico City in late September and telephoned the Russian embassy, his conversation was picked up from the wiretap. A transcript was made and circulated in the CIA offices in the American embassy in Mexico City.

The station chief at that time was the late Winston M. Scott, who personally reviewed all transcripts emanating from wiretaps on Soviet bloc installations.

The Oswald transcript, according to a CIA translator who worked with Scott, aroused a lot of interest.

"They usually picked up the transcripts the next day," he said. "This they wanted right away."

What that transcript contained is a matter of some dispute, and the CIA says it routinely destroyed the tape before the assassination. But some



LEE HARVEY OSWALD
... telephoned Soviet embass

See OSWALD, A7, Col. 1

11/24/16

CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Call

OSWALD, From A1

people who saw the transcript or heard the tape before the assassination recall that Oswald was trying to make a deal.

One of them is David A. Phillips, a former CIA officer, who now heads the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers and is a leading defender of CIA activities. Phillips was stationed in Mexico City at the time.

The transcript revealed, Phillips recalled, that Oswald told the Soviet embassy: "I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay my way" to Russia.

The stenographer who typed up the transcript and the translator who prepared it had similar recollections.

"He said he had some information to tell them," the typist said in an interview in Mexico. "His main concern was getting to one of the two countries [Russia or Cuba] and he wanted them to pay for it. He said he had to meet them."

The Warren Commission later concluded the Russians and Cubans were not much impressed by Oswald. This view is supported by Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen who worked in the Cuban embassy at the time of Oswald's visit. She talked to Oswald on Sept. 27, 1963, and recalls the meeting in some detail.

In a joint interview in Mexico City with this reporter and Post special correspondent Marlise Simons, Duran said Oswald told her that he wanted to travel to Cuba and Russia and displayed documents to show he was a "friend" of the Cuban revolution. Among other things, he claimed to be a member of the American Communist Party.

Duran said she informed Oswald that in order to travel to Russia he would have to obtain permission from the Soviets. Oswald went off and returned later in the day to inform Duran that he had obtained the necessary permission. Duran said she called the Soviet embassy and was told Oswald's application for a visa

Oswald "got really angry and red. He was gesticulating," Duran said she had to call for help from the Cuban consul who got into a shouting match with Oswald and told him to get out. Duran said she never saw him again.

However, Duran's story covered only the first day of Oswald's five-day stay in Mexico City. Oswald later referred in a letter to "meetings" he had in the Soviet Embassy.

How interested the CIA was in Oswald's dealings with the two embassies is uncertain.

The translator and typist who handled the transcript of the intercepted conversation recalled that the level of interest was high. But the CIA's own actions lead to a different conclusion.

The agency waited until Oct. 10, 1963, to notify the FBI of Oswald's activities. And its teletyped report made no mention of Oswald's offer of information in exchange for a free trip to Russia or of his attempts to travel to Cuba and Russia. "On October 1, 1963," the teletype message said, "a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington."

That was strictly a routine handling of the matter, and similar to the standard reports made to the FBI at that time on other contacts with the communists by American citizens in Mexico.

Even after Kennedy's assassination, the CIA failed to turn over to the Warren Commission the full transcript of the telephone intercept it had made in Mexico City. Oswald's offer of information to the Russians in exchange for passage was omitted from the transcript, and the CIA claimed it did not know of most of Oswald's activities in Mexico City until after the assassination.

The significance of the CIA actions

termittent interest in Oswald and might or might not have intensified that interest if it had been told of Oswald's conversations.

Whether the new information would have affected the Warren Commission's deliberations is also an open question. The commission investigated the possibility of a foreign conspiracy and concluded there was no evidence to show Oswald acted on behalf of a foreign power.

Nevertheless, there is yet no explanation for the CIA's handling of Oswald's conversations. The CIA today refuses to comment, saying it would not be appropriate in the light of an impending investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

When asked if they could explain the agency's actions, some CIA officers stationed at the time in Mexico City said the CIA may have had a relationship with Oswald that it sought to conceal. The CIA has denied this.

David W. Belin, who was an assistant counsel to the Warren Commission and later executive director of the Rockefeller commission's probe of the CIA, said that if the Warren Commission had known of Oswald's conversations and other new information, it would have been less sure that the assassination was not part of a foreign conspiracy.

Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), who led the Senate intelligence committee's probe of the assassination, said that investigation would have taken on an "entirely different direction and perspective" if the committee had been aware of Oswald's conversations.

In interviews with The Post, Belin, who documented the CIA plots against Castro in his capacity as executive director of the Rockefeller commission, revealed the CIA also did not tell the Warren Commission of a report from an alleged witness to a meeting in Mexico City between Oswald and Cuban intelligence agents.

with agents of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service.

Belin called on the CIA to make full disclosure of its knowledge of Oswald and his contacts with the Cubans and Russians.

Belin, a staunch defender of the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald was the lone assassin who killed Kennedy, said he recognizes the CIA's concern about disclosing secret sources and intelligence techniques. But he said a greater national interest would be served by disclosing the truth.

A CIA spokesman specifically denied that the agency has a report of a meeting between Oswald and Cuban agents. "The agency is aware of only one such specific allegation, and that was debunked," the spokesman said.

Hawaiian Volcano Activity Subsides

HILO, Hawaii, Nov. 25 (UPI)—Seismic activity deep inside the Hawaiian volcano Mauna Loa subsided today after nearly a week of increased tremors.

Volcanologist John Lockwood said such increases sometimes precede eruptions.

Only one light quake was recorded this morning along the northeast rift of the 13,653-foot-high volcano, the most dangerous in Hawaii. Scores of tiny tremors were recorded Wednesday night, Lockwood said.

The Hawaiian Volcanoes Observatory recorded more than 300 tremors during a 24-hour period Tuesday.

Lockwood said scientists are sticking by their forecast that Mauna Loa will erupt "sometime within the next 18 months." The volcano is on the island of Hawaii some 200 miles south of Honolulu and was described by Lockwood as "definitely an active volcano."

The last eruption of Mauna Loa oc-

**INSIDE THE COMPANY:
CIA DIARY**

Philip Agee



Exhibit 7
78-1743

Mexico City designed to penetrate the exile communities in the U.S., particularly Miami.

Other Cuban intelligence operations are for propaganda and support to the revolutionary organizations of their liking in Mexico and Central America. Traditionally, moreover, the Cuban mission in Mexico City supports the travel of revolutionaries from all over Latin America and the U.S. through the frequent Cubana Airlines flights between Mexico City and Havana.

The New China News Agency (NCNA)

The Chinese communists have had an NCNA office in Mexico City for several years. However, last month the three Chinese officials were expelled through station liaison operations on the grounds that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had, in fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support to pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Central America.

Central American Exiles

Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from Central American countries including communists and other extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in order to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid repression from the Mexican government.

Washington, D.C. — 20 December 1966

Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the U.S., its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether the station has some fifteen operations officers under State Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the

Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around fifty.

Liaison Operations

Dominating the station operational program is the LITEMPO project which is administered by Winston Scott, † the Chief of Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie Goodpasture, † a case officer who has also been at the station for some years. This project embraces a complicated series of operational support programs to the various Mexican civilian security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint operations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelligence collection and public security functions.

At the top of the LITEMPO operation is the Mexican President, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, † who has worked extremely closely with the station since he became Minister of Government in the previous administration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos, † (1958-64) with whom Scott had developed a very close working relationship. Scott has problems, however, with Luis Echeverria, the current Minister of Government, who is generally unenthusiastic and reluctant in the relationship with the station. Scott fears that Echeverria is following Diaz Ordaz's orders to maintain joint operations with the station only under protest and that the current happy situation may end when Echeverria becomes President in 1970.

Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico City Freeman's expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President's preference for dealing with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts with the Presi-

dent while his diplomatic talents focused on the President. The problem of who would deal with the President was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not long after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station operational program, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who worked in the legal attaché's office in the Mexico City Embassy—the legal attaché is usually the FBI officer in an American embassy. The FBI officer had left the FBI to come with the station, but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment in order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the CIA's "stealing" of an FBI officer. The two non-official cover officers are the equivalent of an AID Public Safety mission but in Mexico this function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mexican nationalist sensitivities—as is the case in Argentina. Through the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equipment for a new secret communications network to function between Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security services include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action.

The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary organizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section on international developments based on information from headquarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are

sent to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. These reports, like the daily round-up, include information from station unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authorities in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action.

Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The U.S. military attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexican military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received regularly by the station.

Stan Watson,† the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recently sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean soundings for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America.

Communist Party Operations

The station CP section consists of two case officers, Wade Thomas† and Ben Ramirez,‡ both under Embassy cover, plus two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob Driscoll,‡ a retired operations officer now working under contract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil to Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organizations of importance. The quality of this intelligence is high, although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos Manuel Pellecer,‡ the station's most important communist party penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico City where for years he was the station's best source (cryp-

tonym LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America. Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propaganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who formally break with communism without revealing their years of work as spies—Eudocio Ravines,‡ the well-known Peruvian defector from communism, is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer, also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a continuation of CIA exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and Joaquín Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the Cuban revolution.

The station also collects information about communists from the U.S. living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the McCarthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI, which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGMC). Information collected about them includes that obtained through the LIENVOY telephone-tapping operation described below.

The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where the FBI continued operations against the local left when the CIA took over in 1947. The FBI intelligence is of high quality.

Soviet/Satellite Operations

The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/satellite operations. It has four case officers, three intelligence assistants and a secretary, all under Embassy cover, and four case officers under non-official cover. It is headed by Paul Dillon‡ and the other official cover case officers are Donald Vogel,‡ Cynthia Hausman‡ and Robert Steele.‡ A number of sensitive operations are underway.

The station has two observation posts in front of the

Soviet Embassy, which cover the entrances, plus a third observation post in the back of the Embassy to provide coverage of the gardens. The LICALLA observation post in the back is the closest of five houses bordering the Embassy property—all five are owned by the station. Several years ago films were made of Soviets conversing in the garden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to discover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the front OP's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team for signaling when a particular Soviet surveillance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data. Photos are regularly taken from all the OP's of Soviets and their families and all visitors to the Embassy. When visitors use vehicles, photographs are taken of their license plates for tracing. Occasionally the LICALLA OP is used for electronic monitoring, since it is close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccessful.

In addition to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, several other support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the LIENVOY operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored, and through the LIFIRE travel-control operation photographs of travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and departures. Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including the diplomatic couriers. In addition, NSA is also monitoring several communications systems involving "burst" transmissions from the USSR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in Mexico—possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as "illegals," with false identity and non-official cover.

The station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents against the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and reliability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been recruited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the station. Two of the most important of the current access-agents are Katherine Manjarrez,‡ Secretary of the Foreign Press

Association, and her husband—both of whom are targeted against the Soviet press attaché and the *Tass* correspondent. Others are LICOWL-1‡ and LIOVAL-1.‡

LICOWL-1 is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends including their soft drinks—TSD is studying ways of bugging a wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More important, LICOWL-1 is involved at the moment in an operation against the Embassy *zavhoz* (administrative officer), who spends considerable time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the *zavhoz*, has been on the prowl for a lover—or so he said to LICOWL-1—the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait. An appropriate girl was obtained through NESABER,‡ an agent who is normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at LICOWL-1's store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby—obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is astonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl. Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relationships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disruption by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail is refused.

LIOVAL-1‡ is not as interesting a case but is more important. The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquainted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior KGB officer—possibly the Mexico City *rezident* (KGB chief). Yatskov and the agent spend one or two weekends per month off in the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship. When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow—he has already been in Mexico for some years—we shall decide whether to try to defect him through LIOVAL-1. There is some talk of offering him \$500,000

to defect. The Company is also willing to set him up with an elaborate cover as the owner of an income-producing fishing lodge in Canada. Recently Peter Deriabin,‡ the well-known KGB defector from the 1950s who is now a U.S. citizen and full-time CIA employee, went to Mexico City to study the voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He concluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL-1 has been recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the station officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation continues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied further.

The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, LICOZY-1,‡ LICOZY-3‡ and LICOZY-5,‡ are all being wound up for lack of productivity or problems of control. One of these agents, LICOZY-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was recruited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who reported the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City station. He worked for the FBI after returning to the U.S.—the Soviet case officer was a U.N. official at one time—but recently Soviet interest in him has fallen off and the FBI turned the case back over to the Agency for termination.

Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of operation are targeted. Access agents, observation posts, telephone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets. In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the CIA as has one of the Embassy's secretaries.

Until the *New China News Agency* (NCNA) office was closed last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite section of the station was responsible for following the movements of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the LIRICE team were directed against them, but the most important intelligence collected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in headquarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to Mexico City. Now that the

NCNA offices are closed, the audio equipment will be removed and the station will continue to follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.

Cuban Operations

The Cuban operations section consists of two case officers, Francis Sherry† and Joe Piccolo,‡ and a secretary under Embassy cover and one case officer under non-official. An observation post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY telephone monitoring and LIFIRE airport travel control. Through the LIFIRE team the station obtains regular clandestine access to the *Prensa Latina* pouch from Havana, and copies of correspondence between PL headquarters in Havana and its correspondents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations concerned.

Through the LITEMPO liaison operation the Mexican immigration service provides special coverage of all travelers to and from Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveler is photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or departure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper instead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that name checks can be made. In the case of U.S. citizens, the Mexican service obliges by preventing departure when requested by the station.

The most important current operation targeted against the Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the telephone system. Telephone company engineers working in the LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters with switches will have been cast by TSD. At the moment, however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of interference on the lines, the

engineers report back that everything in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the wall-boxes "defective" and will replace them with the bugged boxes cast by TSD. Right now, however, this operation (cryptonym: LISAMPAN) is still in the "interference-complaint-testing" stage.

Another important operation directed against the Cubans is a sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Medal for Stan Archenhold,‡ the case officer who conceived it. The operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban intelligence service in their Mexico City Embassy from a person who purported to be a CIA officer trying to help them. The letters purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-guard leader of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking military leader, as a CIA agent. I haven't learned all the details of this operation, but my impression is that Ordoqui may have been an informant during the 1950s when exiled in Mexico, but that he refused to continue and was subsequently "burned" by the Agency to the Cubans. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence although Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired controversy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership followed.

As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations section, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to meet several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his main agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulias,‡ Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps.

Support Operations

The support operations must also be detailed. The joint operation for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected in cooperation with the Mexican authorities and has a capacity for about forty lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistance, couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the connections in

the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In addition to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic missions and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also covers special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cárdenas and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping has started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual who is planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the *Miami News* and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are sent immediately to the White House.

The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping operation which is limited to special cases where the involvement of the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this operation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as far as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the Mexicans in the event of discovery.

Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveillance are the duties of a six-man team called LIFIRE. They obtain flight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the station and take photographs of passengers to and from communist countries and of their passports as they pass through immigration.

Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE, has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Soviet/satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson,† who also controls another eight-man team (LIRICE), similarly equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other miscellaneous targets.

Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail from communist countries, but can occasionally be used to get correspondence from selected Mexican addresses.

As in every station, a variety of people assist in support tasks which they perform in the course of their

ordinary jobs. For processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover personnel, for example, Judd Austin,† one of the U.S. lawyers in Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, Al Wichtrich,† channels political information to the station that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications in audio, flaps and seals, and photography.

Covert-Action Operations

The station covert-action operations section consists of Stanley Watson,† the Deputy Chief of Station, and two case officers under Embassy cover plus one case officer under non-official cover. Operations underway provide for placing propaganda in the major Mexico City dailies, several magazines and television. Student operations are centered mostly in the National University of Mexico (UNAM), while labor operations are concentrated on support for and guidance of the Mexico City headquarters of ORIT.† Station labor operations also include agents at the new ORIT school in Cuernavaca (built with CIA funds) for spotting and assessment of trainees for use in labor operations after they return to their country of origin. The Mexico programs of the American Institute for Free Labor Development† (AIFLD) are also under station direction.

Although the LITEMPO operation and others provide constant political intelligence on the Mexican situation, the station has one official cover case officer, Bob Feldman,† working full-time on LICOBRA, which is the operation for penetrating the PRI and the Mexican government. This officer works closely with the legitimate political section of the Embassy and is currently cultivating several PRI legislators for recruitment. Another LICOBRA target is an office in the Ministry of Government called the Department of Political and Social Investigations. This office, although part of a

CONSPIRACY

by
ANTHONY SUMMERS


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San Francisco Toronto

Exhibit 8
78-1743



26. The heart of the matter? This artist's impression (*top left*) was issued in 1978 by Congress' Assassinations Committee in an effort to identify a U.S. intelligence officer who operated under the name of "Maurice Bishop." The source of the description, anti-Castro leader Antonio Veciana (*photographed with the author, below*), says "Bishop" met Oswald before the assassination and tried to fabricate evidence linking Oswald to Cuban diplomats in Mexico City. The Assassinations Committee, considering whether former Mexico CIA officer David Phillips (*top right*) was "Bishop," was not satisfied by his denials, nor by Veciana's. The search for "Bishop" continues.






27. Spying on the spies: Cuban intelligence identify the building (*left*) as the vantage point from which CIA cameras and sound devices monitored the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. Cuban photographers in turn watched Albert Rodriguez Gallego (*right*), said to have been the CIA agent manning the observation post. The CIA admits the surveillance, but claims it has no pictures of Oswald visitihg the consulate. It says sound tapes of Oswald were destroyed. Why?



28. The reconnaissance. As early as the night of the assassination, Jack Ruby was at Dallas police station with his gun. This picture, taken from moving footage, shows him (*arrowed*) at a crowded press conference.



CHAPTER 19

Exits and Entrances in Mexico City

The key to the President's assassination lies in Oswald's movements during the unaccounted-for five-day period after he allegedly tried to get a Cuban visa in Mexico City.

— Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker, 1966

Several fellow passengers would remember the young man who joined Continental Trailways bus No. 5133 in the early hours of the morning of September 26, somewhere in southern Texas. The boy was, after all, somewhat unusual. During the journey to the Mexican border, and afterward on a Mexican bus, he positively advertised his business. He left his seat to seek out two Australian girls traveling at the back of the bus and regaled them at length with stories of his time in the Marines and in the Soviet Union. He even pulled out his old 1959 passport to prove he really had been in Russia. He also struck up a conversation with a British couple from Liverpool, Bryan and Meryl McFarland, and they had good cause to remember him. The stranger made a point of saying he had been secretary for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and was traveling through Mexico in order to reach Cuba. He hoped, he confided, to see Fidel Castro. At a time of great tension over Cuba, when Americans traveling there were liable to prosecution on their return, this man emphasized that his destination was Havana.

A few weeks later, after the assassination, some of the things the passengers recalled would seem odd. The Australian girls, for instance, had noticed that their garrulous companion sat talking to a much older man who spoke with an English accent. An extensive search in later months led investigators to a man who had traveled under the name of John Bowen but who was calling himself Albert Osborne when the FBI tracked him down. He denied sitting next to Oswald, but — in a rare flash of skepticism — the Warren Commission concluded that "his denial cannot be credited."

Questioned about his use of two identities, Bowen-Osborne said he had been doing so for fifty years. He claimed that he was a "missionary" who traveled extensively and that his most recent trip, begun just before the Kennedy assassination, had included France and Spain. Intensive frontier checks revealed no record of entrance to either country, and Bowen-Osborne did not reveal how his frequent travels were financed. Not surprisingly, there has been speculation that he was in some way connected with intelligence. If so, we may hazard a guess as to which side of the political fence he was on. During World War II Bowen-Osborne was a fanatical supporter of Nazi Germany. It may well be just another coincidence, but the evidence is that Oswald twice called himself "Osborne" when ordering Fair Play for Cuba printed material in New Orleans.

On the final leg of the grueling journey to Mexico City, the young stranger told the two Australian girls he had been there before. According to the record, Oswald had never been to Mexico, apart from a long-ago foray into a border town during leave from a Marine base in California. Guy Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, however, told me in 1978 that — on the basis of what Banister told her — she knew Oswald had made more than one trip to Mexico in the summer of 1963. Certainly, on the bus, he talked as though he had been there before; Oswald recommended the Hotel Cuba to the Australian girls as a good place to stay. Strangely, he did not stay there himself. Hotel registration forms show that within an hour of the bus arriving in Mexico City, "Lee Harvey Oswald" checked into Room 18 of the Hotel Comercio.

There can be no serious doubt that the young man on the bus and the man in Room 18 was indeed Lee Oswald. Bus and frontier records, later identification by fellow passengers, and the handwriting in the hotel register together make compelling evidence that Oswald did go to Mexico City.⁸⁷ It is also clear that he returned to the United States, again by bus, six days later. His activities during those days, however, remain the subject of continuing controversy and speculation.

The Warren Commission decided that Oswald spent his leisure hours in Mexico alone, going to the movies, perhaps a bullfight, and dining cheaply at a restaurant near his hotel. The Report

did not mention the statement by another resident of the Hotel Comercio, who said he observed Oswald in the company of four Cubans, one of whom came from Florida. The hotel, it has since been reported, was a local haunt of anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

The truth behind the Oswald visit to Mexico hinges on Cuba. Somebody, in that crucial period, used the name Oswald a great deal, in a way which would later seem highly compromising. Was it really Lee Oswald, or was he the victim of a sophisticated set-up?

It was Friday, September 27, 1963, in Mexico City. For Sylvia Duran, a young Mexican woman working in the Cuban consul's office, it had been a normal morning of processing visa applications. Then, shortly before lunchtime, in came the young American. Today she remembers him as ungainly, hesitant, and unsure of himself. He asked, "Do you speak English?" and was relieved to find she did. The visitor then explained he was Lee Harvey Oswald, an American citizen, and he wanted a Cuban transit visa. His final destination was the Soviet Union, but he wanted to travel via Cuba. The request was urgent; he wanted to leave in three days' time and stay in Cuba for a couple of weeks. Credentials were no problem — out came the documentary harvest of Oswald's time in the Soviet Union and New Orleans. Sylvia Duran was shown passports, old Soviet documents, and correspondence with the American Communist Party. Then there were the prize exhibits, membership cards for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, identification as its president in New Orleans, and a newspaper clipping about the demonstration which ended in Oswald's arrest. There was even — says Duran — a photograph of Oswald in custody, a policeman on each arm. Later she was to reflect that it had looked phoney, and indeed there is no such known photograph of Oswald. The visitor showed all these things with pride and waited expectantly. The consul's assistant was puzzled and a little suspicious. She found the display of allegiance to the Cuban cause strangely overdone. If the young man was, as he claimed, a member of the Communist Party, why had he not arranged his visa the customary way — by applying in advance to the Communist Party in Cuba? In any case, Sylvia Duran emphasized, her office could not issue a transit visa for Cuba without first knowing the traveler had Soviet clearance for travel to Russia.

Looking crestfallen, the visitor departed, promising to come back with the photographs needed for a visa application.

Two or three hours later the young American was back with the photographs. Now Sylvia Duran accepted his visa application and asked him to call in about a week. "Impossible," said the young man. "I can only stay in Mexico three days." The consul's assistant explained all over again how the system worked, and the American left looking perplexed. That evening, says Sylvia Duran, he turned up once more, this time after the consulate had already closed to the public. He talked his way in and rushed into the office visibly agitated. His attitude was peremptory — he said he had been to the Soviet Embassy and knew the Soviet visa would be granted. Now, he insisted, the Cubans should issue him a visa at once. Patiently, says Sylvia Duran, she checked by telephone with the Soviet Embassy and heard a very different story. They knew about Oswald but said Moscow could take as long as four months to decide on his application to go to Russia. At this news the young stranger caused a scene Sylvia Duran would never forget. She told me in 1978, "He didn't want to listen. His face reddened, his eyes flashed, and he shouted, 'Impossible! I can't wait that long!'" The American visitor was now literally raging, and at this point the consul himself, Eusebio Azcue, intervened. He laboriously repeated the formalities, but still the stranger fumed. Now the consul lost patience too, finally telling the American that "a person of his type was harming the Cuban revolution more than helping it." That was still not the end of the saga. There was yet another visit and another row with the consul. Azcue and a colleague were suspicious of a card Oswald produced showing membership in the American Communist Party. It looked strangely new and unused. The officials were justifiably doubtful; Oswald had never joined the Party. According to Azcue, the final straw was when the youngster mocked him and Sylvia Duran as mere "bureaucrats." At this the consul ordered him out of the building. The man who called himself Lee Harvey Oswald had made an unforgettable impression. Eight weeks later, when the name hit the headlines as the presumed assassin of President Kennedy, both the consul and his secretary instantly remembered their troublesome visitor.

Months later, the Warren Commission investigators pieced

together this curious story. They had not only the firsthand account of Sylvia Duran but also secret information provided by the CIA. We know now that in 1963 — as it may well do to this day — the Central Intelligence Agency spied on Communist embassies as a matter of routine. In Mexico City, from hiding places across the street from the Cuban and Soviet embassies, CIA agents photographed visitors, bugged diplomats' offices with concealed microphones, and listened in on phone calls. In the case of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, Havana's officials say they discovered the extent of the United States' surveillance some time after the assassination. On a research visit to Havana in 1978, I was shown some of the bugging equipment the Cubans claim they found in their Embassy in 1964. According to an electronics technician for Cuban intelligence, every single telephone wall socket in the Mexico Embassy contained a miniature microphone capable of transmitting Cuban conversations to CIA receiver points outside the building. I was even shown a device embedded in the arm of a chair, discovered — say the Cubans — in the ambassador's office. Cuban intelligence says it identified the building across the street where the conversations were monitored, along with the CIA agents who manned it (*see illustration 27*). The CIA is coy about its electronic spying, but recently released documents making it clear that this was the basis for much of the information later used to reconstruct Oswald's visit to Mexico. CIA eavesdropping, and perhaps a human informant as well, indicate that a man calling himself Lee Oswald made repeated visits to the Soviet Embassy pressing for a visa to the Soviet Union. Two of the officials he apparently encountered were identified as KGB officers using diplomatic cover. Piecing together the human testimony and the CIA data, Warren Commission investigators formed a cohesive picture of an Oswald frantic to get to Cuba but rejected by the very Communists he had expected to welcome him with open arms. That was fine as far as it went, but the lawyers who wrote the Warren Report were at a loss to see how it fitted into the over-all picture of the Kennedy assassination. Had there ever been serious investigation into the possibility that the assassination was not the work of a lone assassin called Oswald, the lawyers might have read different signs in the evidence of New Orleans and Mexico. Today this tale of two cities

offers an ominous message. To start with, there is doubt as to whether the man who made the fuss at the Cuban Embassy was really Oswald.

The Cuban consul, Azcue, had been working out the last days of his Mexican tour of duty when the troublesome American made his visits. By the day of the Kennedy assassination he was back in Havana. He at first assumed like everyone else that the Lee Oswald he had met was one and the same as the man arrested in Dallas. Then, two or three weeks after the assassination, Consul Azcue went to the movies. The newsreel included scenes of Oswald under arrest in Dallas and the sensational sequence in which Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby. In this footage Oswald can be seen clearly, in close-up and walking. According to Azcue, the Oswald on the film "in no way resembled" the man who made the scene at the Cuban Embassy less than two months previously. In 1978 he testified as much to the Assassinations Committee in Washington.

The Lee Oswald arrested in Dallas was 5 feet 9½ inches tall and very slim. He was not yet twenty-four years old at the time of the visit to Mexico. Azcue remembers the man in his office as being "maybe thirty-five years old," of "medium height," with "dark blond" hair and features quite different from those of the authentic Oswald. The film, as Azcue said, shows a young man with a youthful, unlined face. It was, according to the consul, "in radical contrast to the deeply lined face" of the man who came asking for a visa. Shown still photographs of the authentic Oswald, Azcue continued to assert, "My belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate." Azcue also has a worrying comment on the photograph used on the visa form. He told the Assassinations Committee he could "almost assure" them that the clothing worn in the visa picture was quite different from the clothes worn by the man he met.

Consul Azcue's colleague and successor, Alfredo Mirabal, does not share Azcue's conviction but admits that he saw "Oswald" only briefly when he peered out of his office to see what all the fuss was about. Azcue, on the other hand, had a chance to observe Oswald face to face for a quarter of an hour; because of their row, the consul also had good cause to remember his visitor.

Until recently, however, Azcue's assistant Duran has seemed sure enough that she met the real Oswald. Her former boss, a mild-mannered and impressive witness, observes mildly that long experience gave him "better eyes" and he believes he is right about meeting a false Oswald. Is it Azcue who is mistaken?

One important item of evidence does appear to place the real Oswald in the Cuban Embassy — the signature on the visa application form produced by the Cubans. In 1978 experts for Congress' Assassinations Committee declared themselves satisfied that this was the signature of the real Oswald. This opinion must be taken into account, along with the photograph on the application form. That certainly appears to show the real Oswald. As we have seen, the consul's assistant remembered that the Oswald who came to her office arrived without photographs. She recommended a nearby photographic service and off he went, ostensibly to have pictures taken. Yet, after the assassination, intensive research showed that the photographs on Oswald's visa forms came from none of the local establishments. If the man who visited the consulate was deliberately pretending to be Oswald, he would presumably have made it his business to have access to pictures of the real Oswald. Sylvia Duran, the consul's assistant, is no longer clear about when precisely the application forms were handed to the stranger. She told the Assassinations Committee she thought she typed out the forms for Oswald when he returned with the photographs and that he signed them in front of her. Nevertheless, she agreed that she sometimes allowed the forms to leave the building; she concedes that she simply cannot remember the precise sequence of events in the Oswald case. Those who have gone through similar visa applications know that, especially in a Latin atmosphere, consulate routine can be free and easy. As former Consul Azcue admits, "It is conceivable that, while writing down all the information on the application, she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check. . . . It is a mistake that results very often in the course of one's work. . . ." If the application forms did leave the Embassy for a matter of hours, and if there was a planned effort to impersonate Oswald, then the planting of a photograph and the forgery of a

signature would have been at least feasible. At all events, it should be remembered that the real Oswald almost certainly was in Mexico City at the relevant time, even if it was somebody else who visited the embassies. Without knowing how Oswald fitted into whatever plan was afoot, we cannot tell whether or not he was party to the Cuban visa application process. The apparently authentic Oswald signature would seem persuasive evidence that Consul Azcue is mistaken, that the applicant was indeed the real Oswald. So, too, does the fact that Sylvia Duran's name and phone number appear in Oswald's address book, seized later in Dallas. Other inconsistencies, however, serve only to corroborate Azcue's version and to hint at deception.

Today the consul's assistant, Sylvia Duran, points out sensibly that the passing of the years has blurred her recollection of Oswald. She emphasizes that, back in 1963, it never occurred to her that the Dallas Oswald and the Embassy Oswald might be different people. Her former husband, who was with her when the news of the assassination came through from Dallas, says that the Mexican newspapers carried only a poor wirephoto of the Oswald under arrest. It was the name, "Lee Oswald," not the photograph which made his wife think at once of the tiresome person who had come to her office. Sylvia Duran did see the fleeting television film of Ruby shooting Oswald and noticed nothing to make her feel the victim was different from the man she had encountered. Astonishingly, no official investigators have ever asked her to study either that footage or a longer film of Oswald which has been readily available ever since the assassination. In 1979 I made arrangements for Duran to see the filmed interview of Oswald made in New Orleans a few weeks before the Mexico episode. She was thus able to see and listen to Oswald addressing the camera for some minutes. Duran's reaction was disturbing. She said, "I was not sure if it was Oswald or not . . . the man on the film is not like the man I saw here in Mexico City." Asked what struck her as different, Duran replied, "The man on this film speaks strongly and carries himself with confidence. The man who came to my office in Mexico City was small and weak and spoke in a trembling voice." Sylvia Duran found herself thoroughly confused.

The investigator can build no certainties on Duran's new doubt.

Yet she supplies one further detail, and it increases the suspicion that her visitor was bogus. In her notes on the incident, Duran writes that the man at the consulate was a diminutive fellow — at the most about 5 feet 6 inches tall. That is short for a man, the sort of detail a woman might indeed remember. Duran told Assassinations Committee staff that Oswald was “short . . . about my size.” Duran is a little woman herself, only 5 feet 3½ inches. This is noticeably shorter than the real Oswald’s height of 5 feet 9½ inches.

Duran and her former boss both remember the Oswald at the consulate as being blond-haired. She also thinks he had “blue or green eyes.” If she is right, neither detail fits with the authentic Oswald. Even so, one might put that down to faulty memory — one might even dismiss the matter of height — were it not for the spontaneous recollection of yet another Mexico City witness.

In 1963 Oscar Contreras was studying to be a lawyer at Mexico City’s National University. He belonged to a left-wing student group which supported the Castro revolution and had contacts in the Cuban Embassy. One evening in late September 1963 — the time of the Oswald incidents in Mexico — Contreras and three like-minded friends were sitting in a university cafeteria when a man at a table nearby struck up a conversation. He introduced himself curiously, spelling out his entire name — “Lee Harvey Oswald.” That made Contreras and his friends laugh, because “Harvey” and “Oswald” were more familiar as names of characters in a popular cartoon about rabbits. Indeed, says Contreras, that was the main reason the name stuck in his mind. With minor variations, “Oswald” gave the students a familiar story. He said he was a painter, had had to leave Texas because the FBI was bothering him, and declared that life in the United States was not for him. He wanted to go to Cuba, but for some reason the Cuban consulate was refusing him a visa. Could the students help — through their friends in the Embassy? Contreras and his friends said they would try. That night they talked to their Cuban contacts, including Consul Azcue himself and a Cuban intelligence officer, and were sharply warned to break off contact with “Oswald” at once. The Cuban officials said they were suspicious of Oswald and believed he was trying to infiltrate left-wing groups. When Oswald next came to see them, Contreras and his

friends told him bluntly that the Cubans did not trust him and would not give him a visa. "Oswald" continued trying to ingratiate himself and ended up spending the night at their apartment. He left next morning, still begging for help in getting to Cuba, and the next time Contreras heard the name "Oswald" was after the assassination. He made no secret of the recent encounter but did not bother to report it to the American Embassy. Like many ordinary Mexicans, Contreras has little love for the American authorities. His story became known only in 1967, after he mentioned it in conversation with the local U.S. consul.⁸⁸ Congress' Assassinations Committee, concluding that neither the CIA nor the FBI had adequately investigated the matter, tried to reach Contreras in 1978. They failed to locate him, but I traced him easily enough in the bustling Mexico town of Tampico. He is today a successful journalist, the editor of the local newspaper, *El Mundo*, and I judged him a good witness. The details he supplied add further to the suspicion that the Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate was an impostor.

Like Azcue, Contreras says the "Oswald" he met looked more than thirty years old. Like Sylvia Duran, he recalls very positively that Oswald was short — he too thinks at most 5 feet 6 inches. Sensibly, he says he would normally be reluctant to be so specific, but his recall on this point is persuasive. Contreras himself is only 5 feet 9 inches tall, and he clearly recalls looking *down* at the man he calls "Oswald the Rabbit."

Contreras adds two further thoughts. Perhaps he is being oversuspicious, he says, but he cannot understand how, of all the thousands of students in Mexico City, the man called Oswald picked on three who really did have contacts in the Cuban Embassy. Contreras remembers that he and his friends were drinking coffee, after a discussion and film show in the Philosophy Department, when the strange American accosted them. Nothing about the evening, or the moment, had anything to do with Cuba. How did the American know that these particular students might indeed be able to help him? Contreras does not believe this was divine inspiration, and he remembers something else the Cuban officials said when they warned him to drop "Oswald." Azcue and the Cuban intelligence officer told Contreras that "Oswald" was "highly suspect as being some sort of provocateur, sent by the

United States to go to Cuba with evil intent." The consul's colleague, Alfredo Mirabal, confirms the impression "Oswald" left behind at the consulate. He told Congress' Assassinations Committee in 1978 that his "impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation." Was this suspicion, first voiced weeks before the assassination, mere paranoia on the part of the Cubans? It may well not have been. A stream of additional clues suggests that American intelligence was to find itself seriously compromised by public revelations of the Oswald incident in Mexico City. Consider this chain of events.

On October 10, 1963, just a week after the Oswald visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies, CIA headquarters issued this teletype for the attention of the FBI, the State Department, and the Navy.

Subject: Lee Henry [sic] Oswald.

- 1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.
- 2) It is believed that OSWALD may be identical to Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana. A former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangement through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic], and their child. . . .

This document was the genesis of a sixteen-year tussle between the CIA and assassination investigators, Congressional committees as much as private researchers. All have been justifiably concerned about the American at the Soviet Embassy who "identified himself as Lee Oswald" but looked totally unlike him — ten years older, much taller and heavier built. No mention was made of the Cuban Embassy. Could this be confirmation of

suspicion that somebody was masquerading as Oswald in approaches to at least one of the Communist embassies? Of course not, says the CIA, and offers its explanation.

Agency spokesmen have been at pains to explain that there really is no mystery at all, and certainly no Oswald impostor. Taken together, their stories add up to this. On October 1, when Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy to press for his visa, a "reliable and sensitive source" provided the CIA with details of the visit and "described" the strange American. The available CIA files suggest it had three different sources of intelligence in connection with the Mexico episode — a human informant inside the Soviet Embassy, hidden microphones (the bugging system described earlier), and surveillance photographs. According to the CIA, the raw data on Oswald's visit was at first associated with a picture of another American — "a person known to frequent the Soviet Embassy" at the relevant time and who had been there three days after the Oswald visit. The second American — the heavily built man of thirty-five — had been photographed by the hidden CIA cameras, and someone in the CIA's Mexico station mistakenly "guessed" that he and Oswald were one and the same. Thus the misleading October report went off to Washington, and headquarters began a laborious process of sorting out the discrepancy between the picture of the thirty-five-year-old and the contradictory file details of the real Oswald, as collected during his visit to Russia. The task was all the harder, the CIA would later claim, because at that time the Agency had no photograph of the real Oswald.

The photograph of the man who visited the Soviet Embassy reached the FBI office in Dallas on the evening of the assassination. It subsequently caused a great deal of confusion, and twelve years later a Director of the CIA, William Colby, was still saying of the American who was not Oswald, "To this day we don't know who he is." Whether or not that is true, the basic CIA story is shaky. It is certainly not good enough to dispel suspicions that U.S. intelligence was linked to the shenanigans in Mexico.

Take the CIA's claim that it had no photograph of the real Oswald to compare with its October 1963 surveillance picture. In 1967, a year of renewed doubt about the assassination, an anonymous CIA official wrote a long analgesic memorandum to

CIA lawyer Lawrence Houston. It said cheerily of the general CIA position, "I think our position is very strong, indeed, on this matter" and said specifically of the Mexico episode, "CIA did not have a known photograph of Oswald in its files before the assassination of President Kennedy, either in Washington or abroad." This is almost certainly inaccurate. The CIA apparently did have pictures of the real Oswald at the time of the Mexico affair. The evidence is in its own files.

Less than four months after the assassination the CIA sent the Warren Commission what it called "an exact reproduction of the Agency's official dossier [on Oswald]. . . . We were able to make available exact copies of all material in this file up to early October 1963." October 1963, of course, was the precise date of the Mexico Embassy visits, and the CIA memo enclosed as part of the official dossier "four newspaper clippings." The clippings are attached for all to see and turn out to be items in the *Washington Post* and *Washington Evening Star*, reporting Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959. Two of them feature, prominently, news-agency photographs of the real Oswald. Well before the assassination, therefore, a department of the CIA did have pictures of Oswald. Then there are the two pictures of Oswald we discussed earlier, taken in 1961 in the Soviet Union by American tourists visiting Minsk.* The CIA, of course, maintains that the photographs were taken fortuitously, selected for reasons having nothing to do with Oswald, and that Oswald's presence in the pictures was not noticed until after the assassination. The truth about that episode has yet to be established. In view of Oswald's defection to Russia, it would surely have been natural — in any case — for the CIA to obtain photographs from Marine Corps and Passport Office files. The CIA claims nobody did so until after the Mexico episode, when a picture was requested from the Office of Naval Intelligence. The fact is that the CIA did have news pictures of Oswald before the autumn of 1963, and others were perhaps held by some Agency department with a special interest. By indicating otherwise, and by many of its utterances about Mexico, the CIA has floundered ever deeper into a mire of inconsistency.

After the assassination the Agency at first indulged in

* See Chapter 11 for full discussion.

shadow-boxing with the Warren Commission. Asked to provide all its Oswald files, and those on Mexico City in particular, the CIA delayed its replies. Internal memoranda reveal a desire by CIA officials to "wait out" the Commission — in other words, to stall as long as possible. Why? Deputy Director Helms told the Committee that the Agency was afraid full disclosure would compromise its espionage sources and methods. By July 1964, as the Agency fenced with the Warren Commission over how the Mexico affair should be presented to the public, the CIA was saying its surveillance picture — of the man who was not Oswald — was taken on October 4, the day *after* the real Oswald apparently left Mexico City to return to Texas. This must have made him seem irrelevant, diminishing any incentive by the Commission to discover more about the mystery man. It seems the CIA did not reveal he had also been at the Soviet Embassy on October 1, the date of an "Oswald" contact with the Soviets.

Who was the mystery man, anyway? The CIA had referred to him dismissively as the "unidentified man" but appears to hint in the same document that it knows very well who he is. This states that it would be wrong to publish the photograph because "it could be embarrassing to the individual involved, who as far as this Agency is aware has no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy." The CIA's concern about embarrassment may mean the mystery man was somehow linked to an intelligence operation. This begs the key outstanding questions about this whole episode — how and why did the CIA come to associate the unknown stranger with Lee Oswald in the first place? Was it really just a matter of human error, of a CIA operative jumping wrongly to the conclusion that the man identified as Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy was identical with the heavily-built stranger in the surveillance photograph? On this point, said former Warren Commission counsel Wesley Liebeler, "the CIA was so secretive that it was virtually useless to the Commission."

CIA error or not, it seems it was not the stranger in the surveillance picture who entered the Cuban consulate as Oswald. Both Consul Azcue and his assistant are sure of that. However, this does not lessen suspicion that *somebody* was impersonating Oswald, nor does it let the CIA off the hook. Take another look at

that first CIA message about the mystery man. The implication there is that the Oswald visit was originally "reported" by a human source, and it was he or she who "described" the visitor to the Embassy as "approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build." If this description of the Oswald visitor was provided by a human informant, one can see why the Mexico office thought it tallied with the large man in the surveillance picture. This seems to add a CIA informant to the tally of those who observed the Oswald visiting the embassies as quite different from the real Oswald. The entire puzzle prompts yet another question for the CIA. Even if the unidentified, heavily-built stranger had nothing to do with the case, he was at least clear evidence that the CIA was taking photographs of people visiting Communist embassies. Therefore, should not the Agency have pictures of whoever *did* go to the Soviet and Cuban embassies — on several occasions — calling himself Oswald? If that really was Oswald, then surely the pictures should clear up the matter once and for all. Where are they?

The CIA says it has no pictures of the real Oswald visiting either the Soviet or Cuban embassies, and has come up with contradictory explanations. In 1975 Agency officials claimed that the camera at the Soviet Embassy was not used at weekends and that this explained why there were no pictures of Oswald on the Saturday he supposedly visited the Russians. They also maintained that the camera at the Cuban Embassy happened to break down during Oswald's stay in Mexico. The first Chief Counsel of Congress' Assassinations Committee, Richard Sprague, found these CIA stories wholly inadequate. As he told me in 1978, "When I heard all that, I wanted to talk to the CIA camera people. I wanted to find out if it was true. And that's where we got stopped." The greatest weakness in the CIA claim not to have photographed Oswald derives from its own surveillance of the man who was not Oswald. In 1976, it finally emerged that there were at least twelve photographs of him, still frames taken from what was originally moving footage. The dozen pictures, pried out of the CIA by recent Freedom of Information suits, show the mystery man in various poses and wearing different clothes. One of the pictures was taken at the Soviet Embassy on October 1, and that is one of the days Oswald supposedly went there. In 1978

when I visited Havana, the Cuban authorities gave me a whole file of pictures taken — by their own intelligence people — of American surveillance operations across the street from their Embassy (see illustration 27). The watchers were being watched, and it is apparent that the U.S. operation was extensive. There is every reason to believe there was a similar effort at the Soviet Embassy. Why, then, do we have no American intelligence pictures of Oswald — especially if he was at one of the embassies on a day the cameras were working?

An attempt at a CIA explanation has been provided by a former chief of the Agency's Western Hemisphere Division. This is David Phillips, who was serving in Mexico at the time of the Oswald visit. In 1977 he claimed he knew just what had happened. He wrote that "A capability for such photographic coverage existed, but it was not a twenty-four-hours-a-day, Saturday and Sunday, capability. [We] spent several days studying literally hundreds of photographs available to the CIA before and during Oswald's trip to Mexico City. He did not appear in any of them." The Phillips account is in conflict with both the evidence and the earlier CIA version. Congress' Assassinations Committee did not accept his explanation. It too noted that, according to the best evidence, photographs were taken "routinely" and that the man called Oswald made at least five visits to the Communist embassies. It was hard to believe that CIA cameras failed to pick him up even once. The Committee dourly stated its belief that "photographs of Oswald might have been taken and subsequently lost or destroyed. . . ." It did not follow up and ask how the CIA could have lost pictures of Oswald — of all people. And why would the Agency *destroy* pictures of Oswald?

If the CIA did have pictures of the real Oswald entering the embassies, and entering them alone, we can be sure it would have been delighted to produce them long ago. The fact that they have not done so encourages the notion that the man who called himself Oswald was filmed entering the embassies but that — just as some witnesses suggest — he was indeed an impostor. The impostor theory is strengthened by the feeble tales the CIA has told about another intelligence-gathering system in Mexico City — the bugging of Communist embassies with hidden microphones. If the embassies were bugged, and if that is how some

of the intelligence on the "Oswald" visits was gathered, where are the sound tapes? That question really stumps the Agency.

In 1975 William Colby, then CIA Director, was remarkably vague when asked about the recordings on a television program. He merely said he "thought" there were voice recordings of Oswald from the Embassy contacts. There were indeed; the documents show that the Agency bugged a phone call from the Cuban consulate to the Soviet Embassy by a man calling himself Oswald, a conversation with a guard at the entrance to the Soviet Embassy in which he clearly identified himself as "Lee Oswald," and apparently a conversation in which he named Odessa as the town he wished to visit in the Soviet Union.

We know little about the content of the tapes. There is one important clue in a report about the call from the Cuban consulate to the Soviet Embassy. According to information supplied to the Warren Commission, "The American spoke in *very poor Russian* to the Soviet representative. . . ." This does not sound like the real Oswald, who spoke Russian so well when he met his future wife that, she says, she assumed he was a Soviet citizen from another part of Russia. Even back in the United States, Oswald had impressed the Russian community with his fluency in colloquial Russian. Sylvia Duran, furthermore, insists that "Oswald" took no part in the consultation call she made to the Soviet Embassy about his visa. He spoke no Russian in her presence and did not use the telephone at all. This may be a further indication that Oswald was being impersonated in Mexico City, and obviously the tape deserves careful analysis. If the CIA is to be believed, that is now impossible. The tapes no longer exist.

In 1976, it was once again CIA Mexico veteran David Phillips who offered an explanation. He said that the tapes were no longer available because they had been "routinely destroyed" a week or so after the Oswald visit to Mexico City. He mentioned, though, that a transcript had been made of the tape and that he, as an officer of the CIA Mexico station, had seen it. An investigative journalist from Washington traced the typist and a translator who worked on the transcript. They too recalled the detail Phillips mentioned and added something intriguing. The translator recalled that the Oswald tapes caused his CIA bosses to depart from routine. "Usually," said the translator, "they picked up the tran-

scripts the next day. This they wanted right away." That makes no sense in terms of the CIA's official stance on the Mexico episode. Its officers have maintained that until Oswald's name surfaced after the assassination his visits to embassies in Mexico were merely registered by routine intelligence and passed on to Washington in leisurely fashion. Why, then, did CIA officers react — many weeks before the assassination — as though the Oswald case was a top priority? The alleged destruction of the tape recordings a week or so later becomes even more improbable. Congress' Assassinations Committee had its work further complicated by a top-level report which at first seemed to confirm — unambiguously — that the tapes *were* still in existence at the time of the President's murder.

Within twenty-four hours of the assassination, FBI Director Hoover had compiled a preliminary analysis. It is five pages long and unremarkable except for one paragraph. It reads:

The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identifying himself as Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and *have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.*

The message seems crystal-clear. The CIA had sent to Dallas both a picture and a sound recording of the man who had been spotted by its surveillance calling himself Lee Oswald. Neither picture nor tape matched the Oswald under arrest. Not surprisingly, this caused alarmed inquiry at FBI headquarters — and an apparent resolution. The FBI Special Agent-in-Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, informed headquarters that the CIA had delivered only a photograph and *typewritten reports*. Available CIA documents do mention the dispatch to Dallas of a special plane carrying photographs but make no reference to tapes. The FBI agents who interrogated Oswald in Dallas said that, if there was a recording, they never heard it. It may be that no tapes were sent, although it

is hard to fathom how such a huge inaccuracy crept into a report on the assassination at FBI Director level. Unfortunately for historical certainty, however, the Committee was also to find — in a separate area — that Shanklin and one of the agents in the Dallas area were involved in the destruction of vital evidence about Oswald. The Committee's report regarded this as an "impeachment of [their] credibility," an indictment which permits us to doubt whether the whole truth has been told about whether the tape reached Dallas. Warily, the Committee concluded in 1979 that the recording of Oswald never even reached CIA headquarters from Mexico. It failed to resolve, however, what had happened to the tape which clearly did exist, before the assassination, at the CIA in Mexico City.

In the end, the Assassinations Committee found itself faced with an unenviable choice. One pile of evidence suggested imposture, while other material — such as the visa forms bearing the real Oswald's photograph and apparent signature — indicated he really had visited the Cuban consulate. The Committee made its public aware of the conflict and then — citing unspecified "other information provided by the CIA" — concluded that the Oswald who visited the Cuban Embassy was genuine. It made an interesting distinction, though, and said nothing so concrete about the individual who visited the Soviet Embassy. In that case, said the Committee gingerly, "Evidence of a sensitive nature provided . . . by the CIA *tended to indicate* that the person who contacted the Soviet Embassy" was one and the same as the man at the Cuban consulate. Finally, the Committee confessed itself "unable to determine" whether the CIA did in fact obtain a picture of Oswald during his Embassy visits. This is not a satisfactory conclusion. Even for its key decision as to whether the real Oswald had been at the Cuban consulate, the Committee was forced to fall back on mysterious "CIA" evidence. This could not, apparently, be described because to do so would reveal classified sources and methods. It sounds very much as though national security is being invoked to protect some human source, perhaps an erstwhile spy inside the Cuban Embassy. That might be justifiable, except that — in an apparent reference to the source on another key matter — the Committee judged it to be "in error." On another area of the Mexico inquiry, the Committee spoke tetchily of the CIA's

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“refusal” to make sources available — even to security-cleared Committee staff. Sixteen years on, it is plain silly for the CIA to make such a mystery out of Mexico — if there is nothing to hide.

What we have of the jigsaw may mean that, perhaps because of an operation against Fair Play for Cuba, one branch of the CIA was isolated from information on Oswald held by another department. This would explain why, in October 1963, one office at CIA headquarters still did not know — according to the record — whether the man in its Mexico surveillance coverage was Oswald. It asked the Navy to supply pictures of the real Oswald, even though CIA files already had photographs of him. Meanwhile, this same office seems to have been curiously out of date on the Oswald case. On October 10, as it initiated inquiries into the Mexico episode, the office stated that its latest information on Oswald was from a 1962 report. Yet the record shows that the FBI sent the CIA three September 1963 reports on Oswald’s most recent doings, including one on his latest FPCC activities in New Orleans. Why, then, in a largely automated agency which could process intelligence data at lightning speed, was headquarters so ill-informed? It may have been because of the clandestine operations being conducted against FPCC by a separate intelligence department. In the interests of security, intelligence agencies do often run compartmentalized operations. It might have been undesirable, after the assassination, to reveal what some CIA “dirty tricks” department was up to — against Fair Play for Cuba or simply against Castro’s Cuba. Yet there the rationalization ends. If Oswald was part of a covert operation against Havana’s interests, he could surely have been sent into the Communist embassies himself. Today the questions remain. Was somebody impersonating Oswald in Mexico City and, if so, why?⁸⁹ There are no easy answers, but there are some highly disturbing leads.

In 1976, when former Mexico CIA officer David Phillips offered his account about the surveillance tapes having been destroyed before the assassination, he took the opportunity to spread a fresh allegation about Oswald. He claimed that, according to the transcript of an “Oswald” telephone call to the Soviet Embassy, Oswald had tried to make a deal with the Soviets. According to Phillips, Oswald had said words to the effect, “I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay

my way [to Russia]." Phillips' allegations found apparent corroboration from two other CIA employees, the translator and typist who said they worked on the Oswald transcript. They said "Oswald" had indeed offered to give "information" to the Russians. What information? Phillips, the translator, and the typist have not elaborated. However, the public has been offered two more versions of what was supposedly said by "Oswald" in Mexico City. Both bear the mark of American intelligence.

One version came in 1975 from Ernesto Rodriguez, who said he was a former CIA contract agent in Mexico City. According to him, "Oswald" told both the Soviets and Cubans that he had information on a new CIA attempt to kill Fidel Castro. Oswald offered more information, said Rodriguez, in exchange for a Cuban entry visa. Rodriguez said "Oswald" not only talked about this on the telephone but openly blabbed about the planned Castro assassination attempt in conversations with Fair Play for Cuba members in Mexico City. Rodriguez also alleged, improbably, that Oswald discussed his calls to the Cubans with local reporters. Rodriguez' story attracted little attention, but a second story has enjoyed a longer life and intense official interest.

In 1967 a British reporter, Comer Clark, returned from Havana claiming to have secured a sensational impromptu interview with Fidel Castro. He subsequently published a story saying that the Cuban leader had known in advance of an Oswald threat to kill President Kennedy but had done nothing about it. According to Clark, Castro said, "Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. He wouldn't go into details. The second time he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' Then Oswald said — and this was exactly how it was reported to me — 'Maybe I'll try to do it.' This was less than two months before the U.S. President was assassinated. . . . Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible I could have saved him. I might have been able to — but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect." According to Clark, Castro simply did not take the Oswald threat seriously and so failed to warn United States authorities.

The Comer Clark story is a real puzzle. In 1978, Castro told

members of Congress' Assassinations Committee that he had given no such interview and advised them to check the reporter's background. The Committee found that Clark, now dead, had been an inveterate purveyor of sensational and sometimes dubious stories. On the other hand, the Committee's chief counsel told a public hearing in 1978, "Even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark's interview with President Castro, the committee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government." That sounded impressive until the Committee's report came out. This stated, "However reliable the confidential source may be, the committee found it to be in error in this instance. . . . On balance, the committee did not believe that Oswald voiced a threat to Cuban officials." In other words this mysterious, unnameable source — who sounds very like the source the Committee believed in deciding Oswald had been at the consulate — provided misleading information on what Oswald actually said in the consulate.⁹⁰

"Highly confidential but reliable sources" is a stock euphemism for intelligence information. The main intelligence source for the Assassinations Committee was the CIA. American intelligence sources, indeed, appear to be behind the various versions of what transpired between "Oswald" and the Cubans — the versions, that is, which incriminate both a leftist Oswald and Castro's Cuba. It is this, the pointing of the finger, that is the common denominator.

Rodriguez, the CIA contract agent, said Oswald warned the Cubans about an impending CIA assassination attempt. The inference here is that Castro may have responded to the information by launching a pre-emptive strike against President Kennedy. That has become a familiar allegation by Castro's enemies.

David Phillips, the former CIA officer who served in Mexico at the time of the Oswald visit, alleged that Oswald tried to make a deal with the Soviets. Phillips was to come to the Assassinations Committee's attention in a different context during its investigation. The Committee gave serious consideration to the possibility that David Phillips was the man behind the mask of "Maurice Bishop,"⁹¹ the case officer alleged to have schemed to provoke trouble over Cuba between the United States and the Soviet

Union, and to have met with Oswald shortly before the assassination. Phillips denied he was "Bishop," and so did the source of the "Bishop" allegations, Antonio Veciana. Nevertheless, the Committee said in its Report that it "suspected Veciana was lying" and that Phillips — referred to on this occasion as "the retired officer" — "aroused the Committee's suspicion" with the nature of his denial. The "Bishop" issue will see further coverage, both in this book and in the American national arena.

The story by the British reporter, about Castro learning of an Oswald threat in advance but failing to act, contains one detail that does sound like the Cuban leader. According to Clark, Castro said of the "Oswald" episode in Mexico City, "I thought the visits might be something to do with the CIA — whether anything eventually happened or not. . . . Then, too, after such a plot had been found out, we would be blamed — for something we had nothing to do with. It could have been an excuse for another invasion try. In any case, people would have tried to put it at my door. I was not responsible for Kennedy's death, I will tell you that. I think he was killed by U.S. fascists — right-wing elements who disagreed with him."

Was Castro's suspicion unfounded, or was he right in his feeling — reportedly in advance of the assassination — that the Mexico City incidents "might have something to do with the CIA"? Senator Schweiker, the Republican who led the Intelligence Committee inquiry into CIA activity surrounding the assassination, has a similar opinion. He charges that the CIA deliberately concealed the existence of Mexico pictures from his staff, and has expressed the belief that "a CIA cover-up is still going on." If the "Oswald" visits did involve a renegade element of U.S. intelligence, it is not hard to see why pictures and tapes would promptly vanish after the assassination.

One last fragment of information suggests the most sinister solution of all — that somebody within the CIA was not only involved in the events of Mexico City but involved in a way directly related to the assassination.

In 1978, exile leader Antonio Veciana added a disturbing postscript to his account of meeting CIA case officer "Maurice Bishop" in Oswald's company shortly before the Mexico episode. After the assassination, Veciana told me, "Bishop" made

a strange request. "He asked me to get in touch with a cousin of mine who worked in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, Guillermo Ruiz. 'Bishop' asked me to see if Ruiz would, for money, make statements stating that Lee Harvey Oswald had been at the Embassy a few weeks before the assassination. I asked him whether it was true that Oswald had been there, and Bishop replied that it did not matter whether he had or not — what was important was that my cousin, a member of the Cuban diplomatic service, should confirm that he had been."

Veciana did have a cousin by marriage called Ruiz.⁹² Veciana says, though, that he could not immediately contact Ruiz following "Bishop's" request. He says that, before he could do so, "Bishop" told him to "forget the whole thing and not to comment or ask any questions about Lee Harvey Oswald."

It must be stressed that, for all the imponderables about the "Bishop" allegation, Committee staff were able to make this report on Veciana's character: "Generally Veciana's reputation for honesty and integrity was excellent. A former associate who worked with him when Veciana was chief of sabotage for the M.R.P.* in Havana said, 'Veciana was the straightest, absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met. I would trust him implicitly.'"

That is one estimate of the man who insists " 'Bishop' did work for an intelligence agency of this country, and I am convinced that it was the CIA. . . . The impression I have is that the Mexico City episode was a device. By using it, 'Maurice Bishop' wanted to lay the blame for President Kennedy's death fairly and squarely on Castro and the Cuban government."

If that was indeed the ploy, it would come close to succeeding.

* Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo.

WDS:mfd:14 Feb 64

Oswald, Lee H. Post-Russian Period

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr.
Mr. W. David Clawson

SUBJECT: Mexican Trip

1. Issuance of a Passport.

FACT - A citizen of the United States need not have a passport in order to travel in Mexico for short periods. Nevertheless, Oswald applied for a passport at the Passport Office in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 24, 1963. His application states that he intended to stay abroad for from three months to one year and to visit England, France, Germany, Holland, USSR, Finland, Italy, and Poland. Passport number D092326 was issued on June 25, 1963. It was marked for travel to all countries except Albania and Cuba and these portions of China, Korea, and Vietnam which are under Communist control. These limitations are standard and their occurrence on Oswald's passport therefore carries no special significance.

(Report of the Department of State, Lee Harvey Oswald Appendix on "Passports," pages 7-8; FBI Summary of the Assassination of President Kennedy, pages 63-69.)

COMMENT - As will appear later in this memorandum, Oswald probably got this passport in order that he could have it with him in Mexico, to use when he tried to travel from there to Cuba.

2. Issuance of a Mexican "Tourist Card."

FACT - On September 17 Oswald applied for and received a "tourist card" for visiting Mexico at the offices of the Mexican Consulate General in New Orleans. He was issued a type IT-3 tourist card, No. 24035, which was good for one journey into Mexico lasting no longer than 15 days. The card was issued to Lee Harvey Oswald, profession, photographer, employed at 640 Rampart Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.

(Commission No. 73, page 1; Commission No. 75, pages 570-571.)

R73-1.1.5

Exhibit 9
78-1743

Sunday, September 29:

No information.

Monday, September 30:

No information.

Tuesday, October 1:

A man who fits the description of Oswald in "mid-morning" contacted the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City, saying he had been to the Soviet Embassy the previous Saturday and been told by the Soviet Consul that they were sending a telegram to Washington, and he asked the Military Attache whether there had been a reply to that telegram. The Military Attache replied to Oswald that he should inquire at the Consulate. Oswald went to the Russian Embassy and spoke to the guard in what is described as "halting" Russian, saying he had been there two days earlier, that there had been a telegram, etc., and asking whether there had been a reply to the telegram. After trying to establish by physical descriptions who at the Embassy Oswald had spoken to two days earlier, the guard stated that if it was a dark man it was probably "Kostikov." The guard then left Oswald outside of the Embassy, went in himself and spoke with someone, returned and said that the telegram had been sent but that no reply had been received.

Wednesday, October 2:

No information.

10. Departure from Mexico City.

FACT - Oswald left Mexico City for Nueva Laredo at about 1:00 P.M. on October 2 on a bus of the "Transportes Frontera" bus line.

COMMENT - A ticket for Seat No. 4 on a "Transportes Frontera" bus leaving Mexico City for Nueva Laredo at 1:00 P.M. on October 2, scheduled arrival time in Nueva Laredo 6:00 A.M. on October 3, was sold to Lee H. Oswald by this Mexican bus line. There were two drivers on this bus and neither one of them was able to identify Oswald as having been on the bus with them, but both drivers testified that this did not at all mean that he was not on the bus, because they commonly pay no attention whatever to the passengers. (Commission No. 78, page 3.)

WDS:mfd:14 Feb 64

Oswald, Lee H. Post-Russian Period

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr.
Mr. M. David Slawson

SUBJECT: Mexican Trip

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FACT - A citizen of the United States need not have a passport in order to travel in Mexico for short periods. Nevertheless, Oswald applied for a passport at the Passport Office in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 24, 1963. His application states that he intended to stay abroad for from three months to one year and to visit England, France, Germany, Holland, USSR, Finland, Italy, and Poland. Passport Number D092526 was issued on June 25, 1963. It was marked for travel to all countries except Albania and Cuba and those portions of China, Korea, and Vietnam which are under Communist control. These limitations are standard and their occurrence on Oswald's passport therefore carries no special significance.

(Report of the Department of State, Lee Harvey Oswald Appendix on "Passports," pages 7-8; FBI Summary of the Assassination of President Kennedy, pages 68-69.)

COMMENT - As will appear later in this memorandum, Oswald probably got this passport in order that he could have it with him in Mexico, to use when he tried to travel from there to Cuba.

2. Issuance of a Mexican "Tourist Card."

FACT - On September 17 Oswald applied for and received a "tourist card" for visiting Mexico at the offices of the Mexican Consulate General in New Orleans. He was issued a type M-3 tourist card, No. 24525, which was good for one journey into Mexico lasting no longer than 15 days. The card was issued to Lee Harvey Oswald, profession, photographer, employed at 640 Rampart Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.

(Commission No. 73, page 1; Commission No. 75, pages 570-571.)

R73-I.M. 5

Exhibit 10
78-1743

Sunday, September 29:

No information.

Monday, September 30:

No information.

Tuesday, October 1:

A man who fits the description of Oswald in "mid-morning" contacted the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City, saying he had been to the Soviet Embassy the previous Saturday and been told by the Soviet Consul that they were sending a telegram to Washington, and he asked the Military Attache whether there had been a reply to that telegram. The Military Attache replied to Oswald that he should inquire at the Consulate. Oswald went to the Russian Embassy and spoke to the guard in what is described as "halting" Russian, saying he had been there two days earlier, that there had been a telegram, etc., and asking whether there had been a reply to the telegram. After trying to establish by physical descriptions who at the Embassy Oswald had spoken to two days earlier, the guard stated that if it was a dark man it was probably "Kostikov." The guard then left Oswald outside of the Embassy, went in himself and spoke with someone, returned and said that the telegram had been sent but that no reply had been received.

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WDS:mrd:14Feb64

Oswald, Lee H. Post-Russian Period

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TO: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr.
Mr. M. David Slawson

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COMMENT - As will appear later in this memorandum, Oswald probably got this passport in order that he could have it with him in Mexico, to use when he tried to travel from there to Cuba.

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(Commission No. 73, page 1; Commission No. 75, pages 570-571.)

Exhibit 11
78-1743

after the assassination. To the extent that the draft differs from the final copy and shows crossed-out words and phrases, it tends to bear out the hypothesis that Oswald's purpose in Mexico was simply to get to Cuba and tends to counteract the inference which can be drawn from the final copy of the letter that Oswald, with the knowledge or even the cooperation of the Russian Embassy in Washington, had planned to carry out something highly secret and subversive. Finally, Marina Oswald has testified to the Commission (Transcript, pages 286-90) that when Oswald returned to Texas after his trip to Mexico he told her that aside from going to the two embassies, in an effort to do all he could do to get to Cuba, he had done nothing but see a bull fight, visit museums and go sight-seeing.

The foregoing general information has been supplemented by the CIA in a memorandum dated 31 January 1964. The CIA has stated that its sources of information for this report are very reliable. The information in the report nevertheless has two important weaknesses. First, a large part of it is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. Second, in many respects the information contained in the report is ambiguous as to what actually was going on. We have sent a letter to the CIA asking for clarification of these ambiguities but some of them, of course, may be inherent in the source material itself. Subject to these qualifications, Oswald's actions in Mexico City included the following:

Friday, September 27:

As previously stated, the bus upon which Oswald arrived at Mexico City was scheduled to arrive there at 10:00 A.M.

In "mid-afternoon" Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, informed the Soviet Embassy that Oswald had asked for a Cuban in-transit visa for use on his way to Russia. She told the Soviet Embassy that the Cuban Embassy would issue such a visa if they "were assured" that a Russian visa was forthcoming. It is not clear, but it appears that Oswald at this time told Mrs. Duran that he had been to the Soviet Embassy earlier that day. The Soviet Embassy replied to Mrs. Duran to the effect that Oswald had, in fact,

been to see them, had shown them a letter from the Soviet Embassy in Washington confirming that he had applied for and was awaiting a Soviet visa and had also shown them a letter

WARREN COMMISSION DOCUMENT 1984

~~SECRET~~
ON 9/27 An unidentified man was in

touch with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and made inquiries concerning visas for Odessa. On the same date SILVIA DURAN, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, was in contact with a representative of the Soviet Embassy there concerning an unnamed American citizen who had gone to the Cuban Consulate to apply for a Cuban transit visa in order to travel to the USSR. DURAN indicated that she had told this individual that he first would have to obtain a Soviet visa and had sent him to the Soviet Embassy for the purpose of inquiring about the Soviet visa.

On the same date and shortly after the above, a representative of the Soviet Embassy was in contact with DURAN and asked her if the American was in the Cuban Consulate at that time. DURAN stated that he was. The Soviet representative told DURAN that the American had exhibited letters from the Consulate (presumably Soviet) in Washington in which he indicated that he wanted to travel to the USSR with his wife, who is a Russian. The Soviet stated no reply had been received from Washington concerning the American's problem, and the Soviet indicated there might be a delay of four or five months in this case. He indicated that without the reply from Washington no action could be taken. The Soviet indicated the American had shown him a letter which stated that he is a member of an organization which is in favor of Cuba and that the American had told him that the Cubans could not give him a visa unless he had a Russian visa. The Soviet indicated that he did not know what to do with the American. DURAN indicated the American had a problem because he knew no one in Cuba and for this reason it would be very difficult to give him a visa for Cuba.

DURAN was again in touch with a representative of the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, at which time she advised that an American who had been in the Soviet Embassy was then in the Cuban Consulate and wished to speak to someone in the Soviet Embassy. The American spoke in very poor Russian to the Soviet representative, indicating that he had just been at the Soviet Embassy and had returned to the Cuban Embassy to get his address, which had been requested by the Soviet Embassy. This American indicated to the Soviet that he would immediately return to the Soviet Embassy and leave the address.

On October 1, 1963, the same person speaking broken

DECLASSIFIED

By Dept. of Justice

Letter, Nov. 3, 1979

ND by WJ Date 9 DEC 1979

-5-

S. B. C. R. E. T.

Exhibit 12

78-1743

MEMORANDUM

Russian was in contact with a representative of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and identified himself as LEE OSWALD. OSWALD indicated to the Soviet that he had been at the Soviet Embassy the previous Saturday, had spoken to a Consul there, and had been told that the Soviets would send a telegram to Washington. He asked the Soviet if there was anything new and was told by the latter that a request had been sent out, but that nothing had been received as yet.

According to the confidential source abroad mentioned at the outset, SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, was detained for questioning by Mexican authorities on November 23, 1963. The source reported that on interview by the Mexican authorities DURAN stated she has sympathized with the Cuban movement since its inception, that she had worked as Coordinator of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations, and that as a result she became acquainted with various functions of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. She stated that she and her husband had visited Cuba in December, 1961. About four months ago she started working as secretary of the Cuban Consulate General in Mexico City. She first worked with Consul EUSEBIO AZCUE and more recently with ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ.

DURAN stated that, on learning of the assassination of President KENNEDY and later that it appeared that his assassin was LEE HARVEY OSWALD, she recalled the latter immediately as a person who some two months before had appeared at the Cuban Consulate at Mexico City to apply for a Cuban transit visa for use in connection with travel to Russia. She said she recalled him immediately because of the fact that publicity mentioned that OSWALD was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and was married to a Russian. She stated that she checked the files of the Cuban Consulate and verified that she was thinking of the right person.

DURAN went on to state that the Cuban transit visa was denied to OSWALD, it being explained to him by the Cuban Consulate that in order to obtain such a visa it was necessary for him to first obtain a Soviet visa from the USSR Consulate. She said it was pointed out to OSWALD that there might be a delay of some four months in his obtaining the Soviet visa. OSWALD appeared to need to leave Mexico urgently and became

DECLASSIFIED

By Dept. of Justice

Letter, Nov. 5, 1970

HRB by Date:

-6-

SECRET

bert Gamberling, p. 85.

mittee report, p. 70.

n the Warren Commission.
tee report, p. 71.

151, 172.
173-9.

to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964.
on testimony, p. 27.

n testimony, p. 46.
n testimony, p. 132.
1.
p. 23.

p. 20.
imony, p. 171.
testimony, pp. 38-61.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE
WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

(471)

Exhibit 13
78-1243

not the Agency's desire to
at least in this manner—via
which could relate to sensi-
[The] Agency desired to
ward to meeting the needs

reference to Agency sensitive
by examination of an Agency
in CIA headquarters to a CIA
knowledge of Agency sources
from the Warren Commission,
1964, the CIA was to present
ies to the Warren Commission
of the CIA sources and tech-

appeared before the Commission.
Memorandum to the Warren
On February 10, 1964. Rankin
Memorandum.(94) A review of
writing, the Warren Commis-
CIA's [sensitive sources and
ation on Oswald.

10, 1964, letter whether Os-
oyees of the Soviet Embassy
1 of the January 31 memo-
e source and methods] or by
Commission been informed of

ember 20, 1963, was set forth on
en Helms expressed his concern
ources to the Warren Commission.
that the FBI had already:

through its attorney, that we
ency sources] coinciding with
d which may have some bear-

t be called upon to provide addi-
A records and agency sources. He
enable CIA to work cooperatively
protect CIA information, sources
were two which Helms claimed
of Agency originated information.
lity of revealing its sources and
were:

ormation received from this

has provided information to
ormation is pertinent to the
ts (or otherwise is pertinent
your Bureau through) other
ne Commission, you refer the
it will be appreciated if you
that we may anticipate the
and initiate action prepara-

the sensitive source and method, this inquiry by Rankin would not have
been made.

(86) Nevertheless, it was Rocca's recollection that during the time
period of January 1964–April 1964, Warren Commission repre-
sentatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., and had
been shown the original source materials derived from sensitive CIA
sources and methods.(95) Rocca, however, did not personally make
this material available to Commission representatives and was not able
to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren
Commission first learned of these operations.(96)

(87) On February 19, 1964, the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry
of February 10.(97) The Agency response indicated that Oswald had
contacted the Soviet consulate and was also interviewed at the con-
sulate. Nevertheless, the Agency still did not explicitly reveal the
source of this information.(98)

D. WARREN COMMISSION KNOWLEDGE OF CIA SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS

(88) During the period of March–April 1964, David Slawson drafted
a series of memorandums that, among other issues, concerned Warren
Commission knowledge of and access to the material derived from
relevant CIA sensitive operations. CIA headquarters had obtained
the raw data generated by these sensitive operations almost immedi-
ately after the assassination.(99) A review of these memorandums
tends to support the belief that the Warren Commission, through
Messrs. Slawson, Coleman and Willens, did not obtain access to CIA
[original source] materials until April 9, 1964.(100) On that date,
Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with a CIA [representative] who
provided them with [raw data] derived from [sensitive operations].*

(89) It appears doubtful that the Commission had been given direct
access to this material prior to April 9. Nevertheless, by March 12,
1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least
become aware of the CIA [sensitive operations] that had generated
information concerning Oswald.(102) Slawson's memorandum of
March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that the
CIA possessed information concerning conversations between the
Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and Cuban Presi-
dent Dorticos.** The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the
Warren Commission representatives at a March 12 meeting with CIA
officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest
and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police.(104) Helms re-
sponded to the Commission's request for access that he would attempt
to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review
this material.(105)

(90) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964, con-
cerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson wrote that the tentative con-
clusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip were derived

* Slawson, when interviewed by this committee, stated that he became aware
of the existence of CIA [sensitive operations] probably prior to his April 9, 1964,
trip to Mexico City and no later than during his visit to Mexico City.(101)

**These conversations had been summarized in the CIA's January 31, mem-
orandum concerning Oswald's activities while in Mexico City.(103)

SUMMARY of Relevant Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD at 0700 on
24 November 1963.

1. Our first information on OSWALD came from [redacted]
[redacted] Mexico City [redacted] on 9 October 1963. It
revealed that on 1 October 1963 Lee OSWALD had been in touch there
with Soviet Consul Valery KOSTUKOV about a telegram which the
Soviet Embassy was supposed to send on him to the Soviet Embassy in
Washington. The data showed that OSWALD had also been at the Soviet
Embassy on 28 September. Traces showed OSWALD was a former U. S.
defector to the USSR and on 10 October CIA Headquarters notified the
FBI, State and the Navy (OSWALD had been a Marine). Our Mexico Station
was told to pass its information on OSWALD to the Mexico City offices
of the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Embassy.
Since our Agency is not supposed to investigate U. S. citizens abroad
without special request, we did nothing further on the case.

2. After the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November,
Mexico Station, which immediately recalled its earlier report on OSWALD
[redacted] began researching all its files and records for
reports which might relate to him. It turned up pictures of a man
believed to be OSWALD entering the Soviet and Cuban Embassies
[redacted] in October, [redacted] but when some of these
pictures were sent to the FBI in Dallas they proved to be someone other

149

than OSWALD. Mexico Station has, to date, found no pictures of OSWALD entering the Soviet or Cuban Embassy.

3. The search did reveal more data [redacted] however. This information [redacted] had not been previously associated with OSWALD because his name is not actually mentioned in it, but the subject matter shows it is about him, [redacted]

4. This further [redacted] information covers [redacted] visits which OSWALD made to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 27 September and 3 October 1963. This has been supplemented by reports on his travel in and out of Mexico obtained by the U. S. Consulate in the border town of Nuevo Laredo from Mexican Immigration Service records.

5. In brief, all this information shows that Lee Harvey OSWALD entered Mexico (apparently by car) at Nuevo Laredo on 26 September 1963, claiming he was a photographer, living in Bay Galena and bound for Mexico City. On 27 September he was in Mexico City [redacted] to ask for a visa so he could go to Odesa, USSR. On 28 September, he was at the Cuban Embassy [redacted]

It seems that OSWALD [redacted] granted a Cuban transit visa so he could go to Cuba and wait there for a Soviet

visa which would permit him and his wife to go on to the Soviet
Union.

6. On 28 September 1963, OSWALD again visits the Cuban Embassy

about the same matter,

7.

8. That same day, 3 October 1963, OSWALD drove back into the
United States at the Nuevo Laredo-Laredo, Texas crossing point. He

had travelled on a Mexican Tourist Card in lieu of passport.

9.

10. Observation of the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico and of their principal intelligence officers, including KOSTIKOV, since the assassination of President Kennedy, shows nothing unusual.

11.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, DALLAS (89-43)

~~Secret~~

DATE: 11/22/63

FROM : KYLE G. CLARK, ASAC

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

M.C.
CLARK ANDERSON, Legat, ~~Madrid~~, telephonically advised the following:
This must be PROTECTED.

CIA photographed OSWALD coming out of the RUSSIAN EMBASSY, Mexico City, 10/2/63.

Photographs being sent AM, today. U

(S)
(4)

*by CIA letter dated
11/14/63
SRS 1056/dkc*

KGC:ej
(2)

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JJPT/L 5/5/78

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3908
EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FORM NO. 1-80
DATE OF REVIEW
DECLASSIFICATION DATE 11-22-83~~

Based on previous release

89-43-15
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
NOV 22 1963
FBI - DALLAS

~~Secret~~

WARRIOR COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2122

UIC XVII

686

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(TRANSLATION)

no. 16235
I-52, R-XX
Spanish

Annex 1

Annex 7

[Stamp of Executive Branch of Mexico]

UNITED MEXICAN STATES
Department of the Interior
Original No. 21035
Valid for 15 days

Good for one trip only for --- days

Full name: Leo Harvey Oswald
Photograph
Sex: M Age: 23 Marital status: Un-married
Document certifying nationality: Birth certificate American
[Note: the word "American" is handwritten]
Destinations: Mexico City
New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A.
September 17, 1963
Place and Date

(s) Leo H. Oswald
Signature of Bearer

To be filled out by the Immigration authorities:
Department of the Interior, Population Division

Entered: September 26, 1963
date stamp
Hollo Tuexl Paydon
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas

Dpt. of the Interior,
Population Division
Departed:
October 3, 1963
Alberto Aramendi Chapa
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas

[Remainder of page contains duplicate of tourist card and notes concerning the tax applicable to the tourist card]

[Certification follows]

At 6 p.m. on November 23, 1963, in Mexico City, Federal District, I, the undersigned, Captain Fernando Gutierrez Barrios, Deputy Federal Director of Security, acting legally, in the presence of witnesses, certify that Mrs. Silvia Tirado Duran, having appeared for questioning concerning the events stated below, drew up this instrument:

Mrs. Silvia Tirado Duran, being present and having sworn to tell the truth after being informed of the penalties for perjury, stated that her name was as written, that she was 26, married, no religion, clerk, illiterate, a native and resident of this city, her address being Apt. 3, No. 141 Constituyentes, who declared, with respect to the events being investigated:

That she had been legally married to Mr. Horacio Duran Navarro since November 5, 1953, and had one child, a girl named Patricia, 3-1/2 years old; that in July or August 1961, she was invited to take the position of Coordinator with the Instituto Mexicano Cubano de Relaciones Culturales, [Mexican-Cuban Cultural Relations Institute] at that time headed by Mr. Agustin Cue Canovas, and although she did not remember exactly who recommended her, she could state that for some time she had been in contact with, and frequently visited, officials of the Cuban Embassy, being a personal friend of Ambassador Portuondo and of the Cultural Attaché, Teresa Frenza and Luis Alvaru, as well as of the clerks, chiefly the Consul's secretary, Miss Maricarmen Olavarri, of Spanish nationality but a relative of the Consul, Eusebio Ascué;

That the Institute engaged in purely cultural activities, which were sometimes attended by the above-mentioned Cultural Attaché and various Cubans, although most of those attending were Mexicans, always artists and intellectuals. Politics were never discussed. She remembered only that during the Cuban crisis in October in connection with the attempted invasion of Cuba and later the blockade of the Island by the United States Government, they listened by short-wave radio to the reports being announced by Frenza Latina and made up a bulletin of those reports, which was read. The reports they heard came directly from Habana. She admitted that some Cubans and Mexicans also attended these meetings.

XIV-45

discussed the Cuban political problem among themselves but not officially; That the declarant had received a salary of 500 pesos a month as Coordinator of the Institute; that her working hours were 8 to 3 p.m. daily; that the money to support the Institute was received from a monthly account from the Cuban Embassy, the amount of which she did not know. In addition, each of the members paid dues, and contributions were received from individuals whose names she did not remember, because most of them contributed anonymously. She could not give the monthly amount, despite the fact that she was the one who personally received all the money that came into the Institute;

That the only other person who received a monthly salary of 500 pesos was Mr. Felipe Rojas, who worked at the Institute in the mornings as Secretary; the rest of the money received was used for rent for the premises and other operating expenses;

That in December 1961, the declarant and her husband flew to Habana, Cuba, paying for their own tickets. However, all their expenses while in Habana and several other cities of Cuba were paid by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (Cuban Friendship Institute) and the Cultural Club known as "The Americas." The trip lasted 15 days. The declarant and her husband had no contact with officials of the Cuban Government on this trip;

That, as she had already stated, the declarant had been a follower of Socialism and the Marxist doctrine for several years, having studied philosophy and existentialism; and in particular, she had supported the Cuban Revolution since its beginning, and continued to support it;

That about three months ago, she began to work as Secretary to Mr. Eusebio Acub, the Cuban Consul in this city, who terminated his duties in that capacity five days ago, that is to say, Monday, November 10, when he was replaced by Mr. Alfredo Miraval y Diaz. She stated that from the beginning she had taken the position on a temporary basis because of the death in an automobile accident of her friend, Maricarmen Olavarri, the Consul's Secretary, until someone else could come from Cuba to fill the position. She was responsible for the administrative work,

filling out the visas issued, and processing applications for such visas, which are invariably sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba for approval. She obtained this position directly through former Consul Acub, with whom she was very friendly, even having given him a farewell party in her home, which was attended by almost all the officials and employees of the Embassy and Consulate, except the Ambassador;

That she did not belong to any political party and had never attended any demonstrations or meetings, nor had she ever given any lectures or speeches, although her husband had, since he had written several articles in the newspaper El Dia;

That she had never been arrested for any reason, including the time of Mr. John F. Kennedy's visit to Mexico, which visit had made her very happy because of the benefits it would bring to her country;

That yesterday, while she was working at the Cuban Consulate, where she is employed from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. and from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. daily, for which she receives a monthly salary of 1,500 pesos, at about the time for her to leave for lunch, a colleague remarked that she had just heard on the radio that President Kennedy had been attacked, and that three shots had been fired at him. She called her husband by telephone and commented on the news. He replied that he already knew it and called the attack "monstrous". He agreed that when they reached home they would talk about it, and they did that, when they went home for lunch, but only briefly, since they did not know the details of the attack or the name and description of the alleged assailant. It was not until that night that they read in an "extra" a report on the matter, and later, on their radio at home, the declarant heard the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, which made her remember that that was the name of an American who, at the end of September or beginning of October, had come to the Cuban Consulate and applied for transit visa for Cuba, en route to Russia. In support of his request, he had presented his passport, which showed that he had lived in Russia for three years, his work card from that country, in Russian, and letters in that language. He also presented evidence showing

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that he was married to a Russian woman, and that he appeared to be the leader in New Orleans of the organization known as "Fair Treatment for Cuba," claiming that he was accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution. In view of all that, the declarant, performing her duties, took all his data and filled out the necessary application. He then left the office but returned in the afternoon with his photographs, and the declarant, admitting that she exceeded her duties, unofficially called the Russian Consulate in a desire to facilitate the processing of the Russian visa for Lee Harvey Oswald. However, she was told by that Consulate that it would take approximately four months to process his application, which annoyed the applicant, because, he said, he was in a hurry to obtain the visas to go to Russia. He insisted on his right to them because of his background and his support and personal activities in behalf of the Cuban Movement. The declarant could not state--because she did not remember--whether he said he was a member of the Communist Party. He did say that his Russian wife was at that time in New York, from where she would follow him, having come from the above-mentioned city of New Orleans.

That when Oswald heard that a Cuban visa, being a transit visa, could not be issued to him until after he had obtained a Russian visa, he became excited and very angry, and so the declarant called Consul Acuña, who was in his private office with Mr. Miraval, who later replaced him. The Consul came out of his office and began to argue with Oswald in English. Acuña finally said, "If it were up to me, I would ^{not} give you a visa," and "people like you, instead of helping the Cuban Revolution, only do it harm," it being understood that in their argument, they were referring to the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban Revolution. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for wanting a visa so urgently, and they were: his permit to stay in Mexico was about to expire; and he needed to reach Russia right away. Despite the dispute, the declarant gave Oswald a piece of paper identical to the one on which she was writing in the proceedings, on which she wrote her name "Silvia Durán" and the

telephone number of the Cuban Consulate "11-28-17," and his visa application was processed in any case. It was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, which sent a reply in the routine manner, 15 to 30 days later, granting the visa on condition that the applicant first obtained a Russian visa. The declarant did not remember whether or not Oswald later called the declarant on the Consulate telephone. She said that her entire conversation with Oswald, as well as the conversation the Consul had with him, was in English, since Oswald did not speak Spanish at all.

That when she saw the photograph that appeared in today's newspaper, precisely in El Día, she immediately recognized him and identified him as the one whom she had been calling Lee Harvey Oswald.

That, only once, the declarant went to a reception at the Russian Embassy when astronauts Gagarin and Tereshkova were there, having received a personal invitation from Russian Consul Jackson when he went to the Cuban Consulate, to see Acuña and Miraval and gave them their invitations.

That, with respect to her brother--and sister-in-law, Lidia and Rubén Durán Navarro, Lidia Durán went several times with the declarant to meetings at the Institute, but Rubén Durán went only once or twice, and then it was to see exhibitions of paintings; that Eloy Serrato Aboar, Rubén's wife, had always stayed out of these activities, although all of them are Leftists, but do not actively participate in any activities; that Barbara Ann Blitt Freeman and Enquiel and Agata Rosendo Garcia are friends of Baty; that the declarant had only very infrequent, casual contacts with them, and she did not know about their activities or ideology. As for the gentleman whose name she knew to be Bently, she had never seen him before and assumed that he was a friend of Barbara, since she noticed that she was the one to whom he was talking; and that she, her husband, Agata, and Lidia were dining at her home, while the others were at the home of her brother-in-law, Rubén.

That she had nothing further to declare, and after her statement had been read to her, she approved the contents and signed in the margin in witness thereof.

Population Division
Office of Inspection

The proceedings were closed and attested. Certified.

Report

[Initials]

Capt. Fernando Oultreras Barrera

Deputy Federal Director of Security

Chief of the Office of Inspection
City

[Signature]

Fernando Ortiz de la Peña

Witness

[Signature]

Carlos Durán Lora

Witness

[Certified May 7, 1964, by Not Palomares, Chief Administrative Officer,
Department of the Interior, Mexico.]

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2123--Continued

Pursuant to the order I received to go to Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, to conduct an investigation of the American, Leo Harvey Oswald, I take the liberty of submitting to you the following report:

Entry. The above-mentioned alien entered the country via Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, with FMS No. 24085 (tourist card) on September 26, 1963. The Immigration Officer, Helle Tuexi Maydon, who attended him, failed to record three essential facts: the time of his entry, the means of transportation he used, and his nationality. When asked about this, he admitted his mistakes and added that he could not furnish any information that would help in this investigation because of the time that had elapsed. He could not remember anything at all relating to Oswald.

It was possible to establish, beyond any doubt, that Oswald passed through the Immigration Office between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. on that day, since the time sheet shows that Officer Tuexi Maydon was on duty during that shift.

Departure. The alien in question left the country on October 3, 1963, having been checked by Immigration Officer Alberto Arzamendi Chapa at kilometer 26 on the highway.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2123--Continued

CITBS OF
CD 347

SEPTEMBER 27, 1963
(FRIDAY)

HARVEY OSWALD

MEXICO CITY

KNOWN ACTIVITIES:

Oswald had breakfast on morning of 27th with a couple in their 30's.
(306 p-5)

Oswald visited Cuban Embassy, Mexico City and requested visa to transit Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. Silvia Duran, Clerk at the Cuban Embassy states Cuban Consulate would only give him a visa if a Soviet visa were issued. Oswald advised he was a member of the FPCC and the Soviet Embassy confirmed that he had visited there and shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington, D.C., indicating he was awaiting visa for him and his wife.
(347 pp-6 and 7)

Oswald registered at Hotel del Comercio. (FBI Summary)

RESIDENCE:

Hotel del Comercio, Calle Sahagun 19, Mexico. (FBI Summary)

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Exhibit 16
78-1743

SEPTEMBER 28, 1963
(SATURDAY)

LEE HARVEY OSWALD

MEXICO CITY

KNOWN ACTIVITIES:

Oswald carried on Hotel Register Book. (FBI Summary)

{ Silvia Duran states Oswald again visited Cuban Embassy. While there he talked on the phone with Soviets in Russian. (3-7 p-8)

RESIDENCE:

Hotel del Comercio
Calle Sahagun 19, Mexico

ON 9/27 An unidentified man was in

touch with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and made inquiries concerning visas for Odessa. On the same date SILVIA DURAN, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, was in contact with a representative of the Soviet Embassy there concerning an unnamed American citizen who had gone to the Cuban Consulate to apply for a Cuban transit visa in order to travel to the USSR. DURAN indicated that she had told this individual that he first would have to obtain a Soviet visa and had sent him to the Soviet Embassy for the purpose of inquiring about the Soviet visa.

On the same date and shortly after the above, a representative of the Soviet Embassy was in contact with DURAN and asked her if the American was in the Cuban Consulate at that time. DURAN stated that he was. The Soviet representative told DURAN that the American had exhibited letters from the Consulate (presumably Soviet) in Washington in which he indicated that he wanted to travel to the USSR with his wife, who is a Russian. The Soviet stated no reply had been received from Washington concerning the American's problem, and the Soviet indicated there might be a delay of four or five months in this case. He indicated that without the reply from Washington no action could be taken. The Soviet indicated the American had shown him a letter which stated that he is a member of an organization which is in favor of Cuba and that the American had told him that the Cubans could not give him a visa unless he had a Russian visa. The Soviet indicated that he did not know what to do with the American. DURAN indicated the American had a problem because he knew no one in Cuba and for this reason it would be very difficult to give him a visa for Cuba.

DURAN was again in touch with a representative of the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, at which time she advised that an American who had been in the Soviet Embassy was then in the Cuban Consulate and wished to speak to someone in the Soviet Embassy. The American spoke in very poor Russian to the Soviet representative, indicating that he had just been at the Soviet Embassy and had returned to the Cuban Embassy to get his address, which had been requested by the Soviet Embassy. This American indicated to the Soviet that he would immediately return to the Soviet Embassy and leave the address.

On October 1, 1963, the same person speaking broken

DECLASSIFIED

By Dept. of Justice

Letter, Nov. 3, 1979

HRD by Date: 9 DEC 1978

-5-

SECRET

Exhibit 18
78-1743

~~SECRET~~

Russian was in contact with a representative of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and identified himself as LEE OSWALD. OSWALD indicated to the Soviet that he had been at the Soviet Embassy the previous Saturday, had spoken to a Consul there, and had been told that the Soviets would send a telegram to Washington. He asked the Soviet if there was anything new and was told by the latter that a request had been sent out, but that nothing had been received as yet.

According to the confidential source abroad mentioned at the outset, SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, was detained for questioning by Mexican authorities on November 23, 1963. The source reported that on interview by the Mexican authorities DURAN stated she has sympathized with the Cuban movement since its inception, that she had worked as Coordinator of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations, and that as a result she became acquainted with various functions of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. She stated that she and her husband had visited Cuba in December, 1961. About four months ago she started working as secretary of the Cuban Consulate General in Mexico City. She first worked with Consul EUSEBIO AZCUE and more recently with ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ.

DURAN stated that, on learning of the assassination of President KENNEDY and later that it appeared that his assassin was LEE HARVEY OSWALD, she recalled the latter immediately as a person who some two months before had appeared at the Cuban Consulate at Mexico City to apply for a Cuban transit visa for use in connection with travel to Russia. She said she recalled him immediately because of the fact that publicity mentioned that OSWALD was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and was married to a Russian. She stated that she checked the files of the Cuban Consulate and verified that she was thinking of the right person.

DURAN went on to state that the Cuban transit visa was denied to OSWALD, it being explained to him by the Cuban Consulate that in order to obtain such a visa it was necessary for him to first obtain a Soviet visa from the USSR Consulate. She said it was pointed out to OSWALD that there might be a delay of some four months in his obtaining the Soviet visa. OSWALD appeared to need to leave Mexico urgently and became

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By Dept. of Justice

letter, Nov. 5, 1970

MIB by Date:

-6-

~~SECRET~~

WDS:mtd:14Feb64

Oswald, Lee H. Post-Russian Period

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr.
Mr. M. David Slawson

SUBJECT: Mexican Trip

1. Issuance of a Passport.

FACT - A citizen of the United States need not have a passport in order to travel in Mexico for short periods. Nevertheless, Oswald applied for a passport at the Passport Office in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 24, 1963. His application states that he intended to stay abroad for from three months to one year and to visit England, France, Germany, Holland, USSR, Finland, Italy, and Poland. Passport Number EO92526 was issued on June 25, 1963. It was marked for travel to all countries except Albania and Cuba and those portions of China, Korea, and Vietnam which are under Communist control. These limitations are standard and their occurrence on Oswald's passport therefore carries no special significance.

(Report of the Department of State, Lee Harvey Oswald Appendix on "Passports," pages 7-8; FBI Summary of the Assassination of President Kennedy, pages 68-69.)

COMMENT - As will appear later in this memorandum, Oswald probably got this passport in order that he could have it with him in Mexico, to use when he tried to travel from there to Cuba.

2. Issuance of a Mexican "Tourist Card."

FACT - On September 17 Oswald applied for and received a "tourist card" for visiting Mexico at the offices of the Mexican Consulate General in New Orleans. He was issued a type EM-3 tourist card, No. 24035, which was good for one journey into Mexico lasting no longer than 15 days. The card was issued to "Lee Harvey Oswald," profession, "photographer," employed at 640 Rampart Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.

(Commission No. 73, page 1; Commission No. 75, pages 570-571.)

after the assassination. To the extent that the draft differs from the final copy and shows crossed-out words and phrases, it tends to bear out the hypothesis that Oswald's purpose in Mexico was simply to get to Cuba and tends to counteract the inference which can be drawn from the final copy of the letter that Oswald, with the knowledge or even the cooperation of the Russian Embassy in Washington, had planned to carry out something highly secret and subversive. Finally, Marina Oswald has testified to the Commission (Transcript, pages 286-90) that when Oswald returned to Texas after his trip to Mexico he told her that aside from going to the two embassies, in an effort to do all he could do to get to Cuba, he had done nothing but see a bull fight, visit museums and go sight-seeing.

The foregoing general information has been supplemented by the CIA in a memorandum dated 31 January 1964. The CIA has stated that its sources of information for this report are very reliable. The information in the report nevertheless has two important weaknesses. First, a large part of it is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. Second, in many respects the information contained in the report is ambiguous as to what actually was going on. We have sent a letter to the CIA asking for clarification of these ambiguities but some of them, of course, may be inherent in the source material itself. Subject to these qualifications, Oswald's actions in Mexico City included the following:

Friday, September 27:

As previously stated, the bus upon which Oswald arrived at Mexico City was scheduled to arrive there at 10:00 A.M.

In "mid-afternoon" Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, informed the Soviet Embassy that Oswald had asked for a Cuban in-transit visa for use on his way to Russia. She told the Soviet Embassy that the Cuban Embassy would issue such a visa if they "were assured" that a Russian visa was forthcoming. It is not clear, but it appears that Oswald at this time told Mrs. Duran that he had been to the Soviet Embassy earlier that day. The Soviet Embassy replied to Mrs. Duran to the effect that Oswald had, in fact, been to see them, had shown them a letter from the Soviet Embassy in Washington confirming that he had applied for and was awaiting a Soviet visa and had also shown them a letter

attesting that he was "a member of a pro-Cuban organization"; in addition, the Russian Embassy said that Oswald had told them that he could not get a Cuban visa unless he had already received a Russian visa. The conversation between the embassies also included some references to Oswald not knowing anyone in Cuba or not being known in Cuba, or in Russia, etc., but all this is very unclear at this point.

The Soviet Embassy told Mrs. Duran that it would take a long time to get a Soviet visa for Oswald, such things sometimes taking 4 or 5 months. Mrs. Duran then told Oswald that she could not give him an in-transit visa unless she first got a Soviet visa and that therefore there was nothing more to be done at this time at the Cuban Embassy.

Saturday, September 28:

Oswald again visited the Cuban Embassy and apparently stayed there for a rather long period. Silvia Duran again contacted the Russian Embassy, spoke to two persons there and put Oswald "in direct contact" with one of them. It is not clear whether she put Oswald on the telephone to one of these two men or whether she arranged a meeting between them at the Russian Embassy. Some discussion went on between Oswald and this Russian official as to an "address," presumably Oswald's.

Oswald came back later the same day to the Cuban Embassy and spoke again to Silvia Duran. She repeated what he had already been told several times: that he must first get a Soviet visa, and this would take considerable time. She gave Oswald a slip of paper with her name and telephone number on it, telling him to call her when he got his Soviet visa. She said he never called back.

Friday or Saturday, September 27-28:

It is not clear when, but at some point during Oswald's visits to the Cuban Embassy, Mrs. Duran requested that the Cuban Consul himself, a Mr. Eusebio Azque, speak to Oswald, which he did. Mr. Azque also personally spoke with the Soviet Embassy and confirmed that there would probably be a four-month waiting period for a Soviet visa. He then explained again to Oswald that he could not get a Cuban in-transit visa unless he first got a Russian visa and advised him to leave Mexico and come back later when he had received a Russian visa, which might be as much as 4 months later. Oswald at this point got angry and there was an argument.

Sunday, September 29:

No information.

Monday, September 30:

No information.

Tuesday, October 1:

A man who fits the description of Oswald in "mid-morning" contacted the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City, saying he had been to the Soviet Embassy the previous Saturday and been told by the Soviet Consul that they were sending a telegram to Washington, and he asked the Military Attache whether there had been a reply to that telegram. The Military Attache replied to Oswald that he should inquire at the Consulate. Oswald went to the Russian Embassy and spoke to the guard in what is described as "halting" Russian, saying he had been there two days earlier, that there had been a telegram, etc., and asking whether there had been a reply to the telegram. After trying to establish by physical descriptions who at the Embassy Oswald had spoken to two days earlier, the guard stated that if it was a dark man it was probably "Kostikov." The guard then left Oswald outside of the Embassy, went in himself and spoke with someone, returned and said that the telegram had been sent but that no reply had been received.

Wednesday, October 2:

No information.

10. Departure from Mexico City.

FACT - Oswald left Mexico City for Nueva Laredo at about 1:00 P.M. on October 2 on a bus of the "Transportes Frontera" bus line.

COMMENT - A ticket for Seat No. 4 on a "Transportes Frontera" bus leaving Mexico City for Nueva Laredo at 1:00 P.M. on October 2, scheduled arrival time in Nueva Laredo 6:00 A.M. on October 3, was sold to Lee H. Oswald by this Mexican bus line. There were two drivers on this bus and neither one of them was able to identify Oswald as having been on the bus with them, but both drivers testified that this did not at all mean that he was not on the bus, because they commonly pay no attention whatever to the passengers. (Commission No. 78, page 3.)

OCTOBER 1, 1963
(TUESDAY)

LEE HARVEY OSWALD

MEXICO CITY

KNOWN ACTIVITIES: Checked out of hotel, but paid for night of October 1. Probably spent night at hotel. (FBI Summary)

In midmorning, contacted Soviet Embassy to determine if telegram to Soviet Embassy, Washington, had been answered. Believed to have dealt with VALERIY VLADOMIROVICH KOSTIKOV, senior officer of five Soviet consular representatives. (347 p-829)

On October 1, 1963, Greyhound International Exchange Order No. 43599 issued to Mr. H. O. LEE (OSWALD) by the "Agencia de Viajes, Transportes Chihuahuenses, S.A. de C.V." for travel by bus from Laredo to Dallas. H. O. LEE paid \$20.30 in cash to the "Agencia de Viajes, Transportes, Chihuahuenses, S.A. de C.V." for travel from Mexico, D.F. to Dallas, Texas. (905B p-3)

RESIDENCE: Hotel Del Comercio
Calle Sahagun 19
Mexico City

* * *

MARINA OSWALD

IRVING, TEXAS

KNOWN ACTIVITIES: Parkland Hospital file shows visit by MARINA for tests in connection with her pregnancy. (884 p-16)

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Coleman-Slawson

SUBJECT: Statement of Pedro Gutierrez Valencia

In a letter to President Johnson dated December 2, 1963 and in three statements summarized by the FBI in Commission Nos 564, 566, and 663, Gutierrez has stated that on September 30, 1963 or on October 1, 1963, probably the latter, he saw a Cuban give money to an American, just outside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and he claims now to identify the American now as Oswald. He fixes the time of the event as approximately 10:50 a.m.

The Mexican police check of Gutierrez shows him to be a responsible and respected person, and a car answering the description of the one he claims to have seen the American and Cuban enter has been found to have been registered during the years 1963-64 under what is probably a fictitious name. His statements must therefore be given serious consideration.

The following inquiries might be worthwhile:

1. Gutierrez says that the woman whose credit he checked showed him a card which identified her as a "second counselor" of the Cuban Embassy. (Commission No. 564, page 4.) Perhaps CIA or FBI or some other source has a way of finding


R73-1.M. 15

out what person or persons carried the title of "second counselor" at this time. Gutierrez has also suggested that the name of the person may have been Maria Luisa Calderon. (Commission No. 566, page 10.) He should be asked how he got this name and, in addition, it should be a rather easy matter to check to see whether any person with this name was listed in the Mexico City telephone directory or in the official Mexican records of employees of the Cuban Embassy, etc.

2. One of the essential aspects of Gutierrez' story is that he noticed considerable detail because he was immediately alarmed by what he saw, since it appeared sinister and illegal, and because he is a staunch anti-communist and was therefore especially alert to something which appeared to be a communist plot. For these reasons, he says he tried his best to overhear the conversation and observe as much as he could and even to follow the Cuban and American car in his own car. The obvious question is why, if he felt so alarmed about the whole thing, he did not report it immediately to the responsible Mexican authorities. His answer to this question may shed considerable ^{light} on whether he is making ^{up} the whole affair.

3. The CIA has reported to the Commission that Oswald was observed in "mid-morning" at the office of the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City. CIA has also reported

that Oswald was told by the Military Attache that he should inquiry at the Soviet Embassy, since the Military Attache knew nothing about his problem, and that Oswald did in fact then go to the Russian Embassy and spoke with the guard there.



Since Gutierrez now fixes the time of Oswald's appearance at the Cuban Embassy as 10:50 a.m. on October 1, the same day as the CIA's very reliable source states he was at the Soviet Military Attache and the Soviet Embassy, the possibility of conflict as to the times should be explored.

4. The automobile in which the payoff was supposedly to have occurred has been traced, possibly, to a certain "Arturo Gaona Elias," who may or may not be the same person as the man of the same name who is in the bug-spray business and who lives in Sonora, Mexico. It should not be too difficult to establish by checking of the man in Sonora's employers, etc. whether he could have been in Mexico City at the time in question. I assume, however, that this kind of follow-up is already under way.

5. If Oswald received any large amounts of money he certainly did not have them in his possession when he was arrested in Dallas. It certainly would seem worthwhile that a routine check of the bank accounts and safety deposit boxes throughout the Mexico City area should be made for Oswald and

his known aliases. This kind of check probably ought to be made on general principles, quite apart from the Gutierrez assertions.

s not the Agency's desire to at least in this manner—via which could relate to sensi- [The] Agency desired to regard to meeting the needs

reference to Agency sensitive d by examination of an Agency m CIA headquarters to a CIA e knowledge of Agency sources l from the Warren Commission, 1, 1964, the CIA was to present ities to the Warren Commission of the CIA. sources and tech-

appeared before the Commission. A memorandum to the Warren) On February 10, 1964, Rankin memorandum.(94) A review of s writing, the Warren Commis- CIA's [sensitive sources and rmination on Oswald.

ry 10, 1964, letter whether Os- ployees of the Soviet Embassy ph 1 of the January 31 memo- ive source and methods] or by Commission been informed of

December 20, 1963, was set forth on when Helms expressed his concern sources to the Warren Commission. e that the FBI had already:

n, through its attorney, that we Agency sources] coinciding with and which may have some bear-

ght be called upon to provide addi- CIA records and agency sources. He to enable CIA to work cooperatively d protect CIA information, sources ed were two which Helms claimed r of Agency originated information. bility of revealing its sources and ed were:

Information received from this

y has provided information to nformation is pertinent to the ents (or otherwise is pertinent y your Bureau through) other s the Commission, you refer the es it will be appreciated if you er that we may anticipate the ion and initiate action prepara-

the sensitive source and method, this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

(86) Nevertheless, it was Rocca's recollection that during the time period of January 1964–April 1964, Warren Commission representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., and had been shown the original source materials derived from sensitive CIA sources and methods.(95) Rocca, however, did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations.(96)

(87) On February 19, 1964, the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10.(97) The Agency response indicated that Oswald had contacted the Soviet consulate and was also interviewed at the consulate. Nevertheless, the Agency still did not explicitly reveal the source of this information.(98)

D. WARREN COMMISSION KNOWLEDGE OF CIA SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS

(88) During the period of March–April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memorandums that, among other issues, concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the material derived from relevant CIA sensitive operations. CIA headquarters had obtained the raw data generated by these sensitive operations almost immediately after the assassination.(99) A review of these memorandums tends to support the belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman and Willens, did not obtain access to CIA [original source] materials until April 9, 1964.(100) On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with a CIA [representative] who provided them with [raw data] derived from [sensitive operations].*

(89) It appears doubtful that the Commission had been given direct access to this material prior to April 9. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware of the CIA [sensitive operations] that had generated information concerning Oswald.(102) Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that the CIA possessed information concerning conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and Cuban President Dorticos.** The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a March 12 meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police.(104) Helms responded to the Commission's request for access that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material.(105)

(90) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964, concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip were derived

* Slawson, when interviewed by this committee, stated that he became aware of the existence of CIA [sensitive operations] probably prior to his April 9, 1964, trip to Mexico City and no later than during his visit to Mexico City.(101)

**These conversations had been summarized in the CIA's January 31, memorandum concerning Oswald's activities while in Mexico City.(103)

~~SECRET~~
~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE SOURCES AND~~
~~APPLICABLE INFORMATION~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Commission No. 1216

2 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey Oswald

1. The following remarks have been recently attributed to Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich Yatskov in Mexico City regarding the subject.

"I met Oswald here. He stormed into my office and wanted me to introduce and recommend him to the Cubans. He told me that he had lived in the USSR. I told him that I would have to check before I could recommend him. He was nervous and his hands trembled, and he stormed out of my office. I don't believe that a person as nervous as Oswald, whose hands trembled could have accurately fired a rifle."

2. [redacted] has checked its records for the period Oswald was in Mexico City and has advised it is quite possible that Oswald thought he had talked with Valeriy Kostikov when he actually had spoken to Yatskov; or that he first spoke to Kostikov who turned him over to his superior Yatskov.

3. The source of the above information is a confidential contact who is believed to be reliable. In view of this relationship, an appropriate sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this memorandum.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: CIA/CS 12/22/72

Rank + [redacted]
JUL 8

~~WARNING NOTICE~~

27 November 1963

0 KOSTIKOV IS FROM ALL EVIDENCE
A MEMBER OF KGB

1. After examining all our traces on KOSTIKOV, we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he is a staff officer of the KGB. Contributing to this conclusion are his associates, his movements, his Mexican and other contacts and his cover position,

2.

Document Number 179-71

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

RECORD COPY

27 Nov 63

CLASIFIED BY [unclear]

To DIR

9 June 64

[REDACTED] BELIEVE FULL INFO

WORTHWHILE:

THE UNIDENTIFIED SOV [REDACTED] WHO MET

SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH ANTONOV (CHIEF LATIN AMERICAN DEPT KGB) HAS NOW BEEN

POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED [REDACTED] AS BEING VALERLY WLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV.

CIA/FOIA release

190

This Bureau is also in possession of a letter postmarked November 27, 1963, to Oswald addressed to "Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Secretary of Justice, Washington, D.C.," and written by one [redacted]. This letter was dated, [redacted] 27, 1963, and advised that Lee Harvey Oswald was designated as a contact agent at the consulate of the Soviet Union, a Cuban agent who has traveled in the United States [redacted] his activities. According to the writer, Oswald met with Charles in Miami, Florida, several months ago and was paid \$7,500 by Oswald.

An examination of both of the above-described letters has shown that they were prepared on the same typewriter. In addition, both envelopes appear to have come from the same batch, both postmarks contain similar time elements, and the same type pen and ink was used to sign both letters.

Inquiries by our Miami Office have failed to develop any information concerning either Lee or John Charles and Mario del Rosario Molina.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2763

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2763—Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

17

— Commission Exhibit 2764 —

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

functions demanded by their cover positions in an embassy or consulate.

5. I hope that the information given above is responsive to the Commission's needs.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

1. In reply to your request, I am forwarding information on Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, one of the Soviet officials with whom Lee Harvey OSWALD is believed to have dealt during his visit to Mexico City on 28 September - 3 October 1963.

2. In his letter of 9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about his "meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico." There was no officer with that name listed as being a member of the Soviet representation in Mexico City during September and October 1963. "KOSTIN" is probably identical with Anatole KOSTIKOV, who was serving in the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at that time. KOSTIKOV is one of several Consular representatives who deal with visas and related matters. Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, Second Secretary of Embassy, was in charge of the Consular Section at the time of OSWALD's visit. OSWALD may also have discussed his visa problem with YATSKOV and other members of the Consular Section.

3. KOSTIKOV and YATSKOV are known officers of the Soviet State Security Service (KGB). The State Security Service is the principal Soviet intelligence service, and is charged with espionage, counterintelligence and related matters.

4. It should be noted that Soviet intelligence and security officers such as KOSTIKOV and YATSKOV, when placed under official cover, are required to perform the routine and legitimate

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2764

-2-

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2764—Continued

Exhibit 26
78-1243

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Information Developed on the Activity
of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City

REFERENCE: Mr. Rankin's letter, dated 11 October 1964.

The Commission's Report (pages 307-308) contains information furnished by this Agency in memoranda dated 11 January and 1 June 1964. Since both include information relative to intelligence methods and operations which should not be placed in the public domain, I suggest the use of the revised and consolidated version dated 4 June 1964 which is forwarded as an attachment.

Attachment - as stated

ATT.

Document Number

907-396

for FOIA Review on

AUG 1975

He had a green passport in his pocket, wore a wrist watch with a yellow band, and appeared to have a pistol in a shoulder holster. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed American currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to OSWALD in English, "I want to kill the man." OSWALD replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "If you go with you, I have a lot to do." OSWALD replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The Negro then gave OSWALD \$6,500 in large denomination U.S. bills, saying "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said that he telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City several times on 20 September before the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"D" was known to this Agency as a former informant of a Latin American security service. His reliability was considered questionable by U.S. authorities although he had not been wholly discredited. "D" claimed he was in Mexico City working against the Cuban Communists for his service. The service, however, has denied that he was acting on its behalf. While investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 13 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive investigation failed to shake "D's" story.

As first "D" persisted in his story but on 10 November he admitted in a signed statement that his whole account about OSWALD was a fabrication. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U.S. Embassy after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in telling this false story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the United States to take action against Castro.

20 Oct 64

5. Following the above interrogation, "D" promptly retracted the confession

Subsequent to changing his story regarding the city he visited the Cuban Consulate, finally admitting it took place on Tuesday, 17 September. It was concluded that "D" had fabricated his story about OSWALD in fact. "D" has since been reported

On 7/17/64 at Beverly Hills, California File # Los Angeles 44-895
by SA A. HAROLD LANDRETH/jm Date dictated 7/17/64

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3151-Continued

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 7/17/64

1

Mr. ISRAEL HORWITZ was telephonically contacted in an effort to make an appointment for an interview. He was contacted at telephone number BR 4-7250. Mr. HORWITZ acknowledged that about three weeks ago he moved his business from 1108 West Lawrence, Chicago, Illinois, to 6344 North Broadway, Chicago, Illinois. He stated that his current business operates under the name Show Time.

Mr. HORWITZ acknowledged that he has been known in the music business in Chicago under the name of JACK HOWARD for many years.

Mr. HORWITZ stated that he would not discuss the matter involving JACK RUBENSTEIN as he wanted no part whatsoever of this individual. Mr. HORWITZ refused to make himself available for an interview and stated he wished he had never acknowledged having known RUBENSTEIN many years ago when RUBENSTEIN lived in Chicago. Mr. HORWITZ stated RUBENSTEIN was only a passing acquaintance of his and he knew nothing concerning him.

On 7/17/64 at Chicago, Illinois File # 44-645
by SA WILLIAM R. BRODERICK/sbw Date dictated 7/17/64

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COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3151-Continued

857

On 7/17/64 at Beverly Hills, California File # Los Angeles 44-895
by SAs A. HAROLD LANDRETH/jm Date dictated 7/17/64
LANFORD L. BLANTON

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3151-Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Information Developed on the Activity
of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City

1. On 26 November 1963 a young Latin American, referred to herein as "D", came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee Harvey OSWALD received \$6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States.

2. "D" described the circumstances as follows: While standing by a bathroom door about noon he saw a group of three persons conversing on a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English. He had prominent cheek bones and a noticeable scar on the lower right side of his chin. The second was a white person whom the subject had seen previously in a waiting room carrying a Canadian passport. The white person had green eyes, blondish hair, with a pompadour hairdo, and dark eyeglasses. The third person allegedly was Lee Harvey OSWALD. "D" was completely convinced of this from published photos of OSWALD following the assassination. OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned-up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants, and clear eyeglasses.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3152

82-4911-82
EX-1743

He had a green passport in his pocket, wore a wrist watch with a yellow band, and appeared to have a pistol in a shoulder holster. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed American currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to OSWALD in English, "I want to kill the man." OSWALD replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do." OSWALD replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The Negro then gave OSWALD \$6,500 in large denomination U.S. bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said that he telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City several times on 20 September before the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

3. "D" was known to this Agency as a former informant of a Latin American security service. His reliability was considered questionable by U.S. authorities although he had not been wholly discredited. "D" claimed he was in Mexico City working against the Cuban Communists for his service. The service, however, has denied that he was acting on its behalf. While investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September). Intensive interrogation failed to shake "D's" story.

4. On 28 November 1963 the Mexican police interviewed him. At first "D" persisted in his story but on 30 November he admitted in a signed statement that his whole account about OSWALD was false. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U.S. Embassy after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in telling this false story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the United States to take action against Castro.

5. Following the above interrogation, "D" promptly retracted the confession he had made to the Mexican authorities asserting that it had been extorted from him under pressure. He was then questioned by U.S. authorities using a polygraph machine. "D" voluntarily consented to the use of this equipment. During the questioning it was pointed out to him that he was not being truthful, according to the polygraph, in identifying photographs of OSWALD as the person he saw in the Cuban Consulate. He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph, that he would not attempt to refute the results, and that he "must have been mistaken." In addition he changed his story regarding the day he visited the Cuban Consulate, finally deciding it took place on Tuesday, 17 September. It was concluded from the results of the polygraph test that "D" had fabricated his story about OSWALD in toto. "D" has since been deported by the Mexican authorities to his native country.

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Commission No. 1000

1 JUN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 21 April 1964, requesting additional documentation of the investigation of allegations against Lee Harvey OSWALD that were made by Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

2. Attached to this memorandum are exact texts of the following disseminations relative to ALVARADO that were made to other U.S. Government agencies:

a. OUT Teletype No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

b. OUT Teletype No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963, Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

c. OUT Teletype No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

d. OUT Teletype No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

e. OUT Teletype No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of: C. A. [unclear], 4/9/72

Name and title of person making this change:

M. M. J.

Date 4/10/72

~~SECRET~~

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE SOURCES AND~~
~~METHODS INVOLVED~~

Exhibit 29
78-1743

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

PC 1000


f. Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963, Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

g. OUT Teletype No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963, Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD case.

3. These disseminations will, we believe, document the ALVARADO phase of the case and show this Agency's opinion of his reliability. Because of the sensitive sources and methods involved, an appropriate sensitivity indicator has been affixed.

4. Your request for a report from the polygraph operator who examined ALVARADO will be subject of a separate memorandum.

5. I am happy to know that _____ in Mexico City and his staff were able to contribute substantially to the work of your representatives during their visit to that city.



Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of: C. R. Kitter, 4/4/72

Name and title of person making the change:

mmg
Date 4/10/72

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

D.C. 100

OUT Teletype No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, filed at 1820 hours, to the White House, Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to Secret Service

1. On 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan born 31 January 1940 in Ciudad Rama, Zelaya, Nicaragua, came to the American Embassy in Mexico and made a statement about Lee OSWALD. He said that on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

2. About himself, ALVARADO said he in Mexico City awaiting false documentation so he could go to Cuba for sabotage training. He named three other members of his organization in Nicaragua as Juan Lorillo, Rolan Alvarado, and Carlos Fonseca Amador. The questioning of ALVARADO is continuing.

3. (Comment: Gilberto ALVARADO is a well-known Nicaraguan Communist underground member

We consider his reliability to be questionable although he has not been wholly discredited. The other men he names are well-known Nicaraguan Communists. A check of the files of this Agency does not show where Lee OSWALD actually was on 18 September 1963, when ALVARADO says he saw OSWALD in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, but based on the information available to this Agency as of this date OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico for the first time after 25 September 1963.)

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED

By authority of: C. J. A. Lister, 4/4/72

Name and title of person making the change

M.H.G.

Date 4/10/72

~~WARNING NOTICE~~

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

OUT Teletype No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, filed at 1457 hours, to the White House, Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation

1. _____ in Mexico City has just advised us that at 1230 Washington time today 30 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan, admitted to Mexican security officials in writing that his whole story of having seen Lee OSWALD receive money in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to assassinate President Kennedy was false. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning about this to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U.S. Embassy, in person, on 25 November, when he talked, as we know, to the Embassy security officer.

2. ALVARADO still claims that he did repeatedly visit the Cuban Embassy to secure false documentation to go to Cuba for sabotage training

3. ALVARADO said that his motive in telling this false story about seeing OSWALD paid money in the Cuban Embassy was to help himself get to the United States so he could participate in action against Fidel Castro. He says he hates Castro and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the U.S.A. to take action against Castro.

4. Our Mexico City _____ is informing the Legal Attache of the U.S. Embassy there of this information.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of: CAA letter, 4/17/72

Name and title of person making the statement

MMJ
Date 4/10/72

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

OUT Teletype No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, filed at 1826 hours, to the White House, Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Acting on a request made to this Agency by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 28 November 1963,

ALVARADO,
was turned over

to officials
of the Mexican Ministry of Government for further interrogation and investigation. On 28 November, ALVARADO had still not changed his story, despite increasing doubt that it was true.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority of *CLA letter, 4/4/72*

Name and title of person making the change
B. H. G.

Date *4/10/72*

~~WARNING NOTICE~~

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

Memorandum to Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
dated 13 December 1963

TO: Acting on a Foreign
Investigation on 28
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO
of the American Ministry of State and investigation. On 28 November ALVARADO had still
changed his story despite increasing evidence that it was true.

1. Attached is a translation of the Mexican police interrogation report on Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan who claimed to have seen Lee OSWALD accept \$6500 in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to assassinate President Kennedy. The report states that ALVARADO retracted these assertions and admitted that he made them to induce the U.S. to take stronger action against Cuba.

3. As you know, ALVARADO retracted the confession of fabrication which he made to the Mexican police and had to be reinterrogated by representatives of this Agency and your Bureau. This later interrogation showed that he was probably lying.

Attachment:
— Translation

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: C. G. L. Letter, 4/4/72

Name and title of person making ~~the~~ ~~change~~
M. M. J.

IX. ALLEGATION BY T-32

On November 25, 1963, T-32 made contact with the United States Embassy at Mexico, D. F., and advised the following:

T-32 entered Mexico illegally from Guatemala on August 29, 1963, traveled to Mexico, D. F., and subsequently made contact with a Nicaraguan communist residing in Mexico City. From this contact a plan was developed for T-32 to travel to Cuba to study guerrilla warfare tactics. He had occasion to visit the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, D. F., several different times for the purpose of obtaining travel documentation for Cuba by furnishing false identification papers as a Mexican citizen.

He stated that on September 18, 1963, he went to the Cuban Consulate, and while sitting in the waiting room saw a group of approximately eight persons enter the Consulate and the office of Cuban Consul EUSEBIO AZCUE. A person unknown to him was sitting at AZCUE's desk. A short time later, while source was standing near the door to the men's room at the Cuban Consulate, he noticed three men conversing a few feet away from him. One of them was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair; the second was a man whom T-32 had seen previously holding a Canadian passport in the waiting room of the Cuban Consulate; and the third person was LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

Source stated that a tall Cuban joined the above group momentarily and passed some United States currency to the Negro.

The following conversation between the Negro and OSWALD was overheard by source:

Negro (in English): I want to kill the man.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I can do it.

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COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2121-Continued

Negro (in Spanish): I can't go with you. I have a lot to do.

OSWALD: The people are waiting for me back there.

T-32 stated that the Negro then gave OSWALD \$8,500 in United States currency of large denominations, saying: "This isn't much." Of this sum, \$1,500 was for extra expenses. The Negro also gave OSWALD about 200 Mexican pesos.

In a later interview, source stated that the United States bank notes were in a small pack about one fourth of an inch thick, bound with a paper band, which the Negro broke before counting out \$1,500 extra for expenses and \$5,000 as "advance payment."

T-32 stated that Oswald had carried a green passport in his pocket, and he believed he saw OSWALD wearing a pistol in a shoulder holster, but he was not sure of this point. He stated that OSWALD had long shoes and a wrist watch with a yellow-metal band. According to source, OSWALD appeared to be completely at home at the Consulate and to know and to be known by Cuban Consulate personnel.

T-32 was arrested and interrogated by Mexican authorities on November 28, 1963, and a copy of the interrogation report by the Mexican authorities revealed the following:

At the outset source's story generally resembled that recorded above. He repeated to the Mexican authorities the details of the scene in which he saw the Negro, the Canadian and the American conversing together, the delivery of the money to the American by the Negro, and the conversation he overheard.

T-32 advised the interviewing Mexican officials that upon seeing the photograph of OSWALD in the newspapers following the assassination of President JOHN F. KENNEDY, he recognized OSWALD as the American he had seen at the Cuban Consulate.

An excerpt from source's statement to Mexican authorities, as translated from Spanish, is as follows:

- 155 -

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2121-Continued

647

Exhibit 30
78-7243

".....spontaneously and after reconsidering he desires to state that the American to whom he referred in the body of his statement and whom he saw the 18th of September of this year in the Cuban Consulate had a certain resemblance, about sixty per cent, to LEE HARVEY OSWALD (assassin of the President of the United States). That after the assassination of President KENNEDY the witness took advantage of this fact in his favor to exploit it, furnishing versions such as those initially set forth, for the purpose of provoking an energetic reaction from the political point of view on the part of the United States of America against the government of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ and that he had no motive other than the profound hatred he feels for communism. That all his life the witness had dedicated himself to combating communism and he regrets at this moment not having accomplished his objective in the sense of causing a reaction on the part of the American Government against FIDEL CASTRO."

Because of the fact that subsequent to making the above-mentioned statement to Mexican authorities, source claimed that he had changed his statement because of fear, he was interviewed at considerable length on December 5 and 6, 1963, in Mexico, D. F.

After reiterating his story, T-32 was afforded a polygraph examination on December 6, 1963. During the course of the examination he was asked, "Is this the American you saw in the Cuban Consulate?" At the time he was shown photographs of OSWALD.

Each time he was asked this question, he definitely responded, "Yes," but it was noted that the polygraph indicated a "deception response" on these answers. These responses and those with respect to other questions led to the conclusion that T-32 was a fabricator. It was specifically pointed out to him that the polygraph indicated that he was not being

truthful in identifying photographs of OSWALD as being of a person he saw in the Cuban Consulate, and he was asked for his explanation thereof.

He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph and would not attempt to refute its results. He went on to say that the only explanation he could offer was that he had seen an American in the Cuban Consulate on September 18, 1963, who resembled OSWALD, and that upon seeing the photograph of OSWALD in the newspaper, he built up within himself, either consciously or subconsciously, a complete belief that the person he had seen in the Cuban Consulate was OSWALD.

X. MISCELLANEOUS INQUIRIES AND ALLEGATIONS
RELATING TO OSWALD

(A) Allegation by SALVADOR DIAZ VERSON
Concerning OSWALD and SILVIA DURAN

The White House at Washington, D. C., received a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassination of President KENNEDY" written by JOSE I. LASAGA, 2340 N. E. 7th Avenue, Apartment 4, Miami, Florida.

This speculative paper attempted to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of President KENNEDY was FIDEL CASTRO or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was so motivated during his trip to Mexico between September 27 and October 2, 1963. The paper included the allegation that OSWALD had an extended interview with the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, whom he met at a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexico, D. F., from where they departed together in the Cuban Ambassador's automobile for a private conversation.

LASAGA had advised the White House that he received the above report from ANGEL FERNANDEZ VARELA, an employee of the Voice of Cuba in Miami, Florida, who received the information from SALVADOR DIAZ VERSON, who reportedly was in

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Malley
- 1 - J. C. Stokes

October 22, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
 General Counsel
 The President's Commission
 200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
 Washington, D. C.

OCT 27 11 58 AM '64
 REC'D-RECORDING ROOM
 FBI

Dear Mr. Rankin:

In connection with the conversation on October 16, 1964, between Dr. Alfred Goldberg of your staff and Mr. John C. Stokes of this Bureau, there were delivered to the Commission on October 21, 1964, two copies each of a redraft of pages 154 through and including 157 of our summary memorandum dated May 18, 1964, two copies of which were furnished to you by our letter dated October 12, 1964. It is requested that you replace the present pages 154 through 157 in our summary memorandum with the revised pages 154 through 157 which were delivered to the Commission October 21, 1964.

For your information, the revised pages 154 through and including 157 were prepared by us at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency to avoid disclosure of the identity of the complainant in this matter who is referred to in the amended pages as "T-32."

This will confirm delivery to the Commission of the revised pages 154 through and including 157 of our summary memorandum dated May 18, 1964.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
 62-144090
 NOT RECORDED
 189 OCT 23 1964

REL:dec
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NOTE: ENCLOSURE

On 10/16 Dr. Goldberg, the Air Force historian who is presently engaged in working up the Commission's exhibits, which are to be made public, advised SA J. C. Stokes that the Commission had been requested by CIA not to publicly disclose the name of Alvarado Ugarte, the 23-year-old Nicaraguan who on November 25, 1963, walked into our Embassy.

64 OCT 28 1964

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-22552-501

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-82555)

DATE: 12/11/63

FROM : LEGAT, MEXICO (105-3702) (P)

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS - R

tape of interview

Re telephonic instructions from Assistant Director W. C. SULLIVAN on 12/3/63 to the effect that the CIA was sending a polygraph examiner to Mexico City to interview GILBERTO NOLASCO ALVARADO UGARTE and that the writer should participate in the interviews as an interpreter. Remycab 12/6/63, furnishing the final results of the interviews and polygraph examinations and pointing out that the entire interviews had been taped by CIA, which would make available to this office copies of the tapes. Bucab of 12/7/63 instructed that the tapes be forwarded to the Bureau.

Attached are six rolls of tape which are copies taken from the original tapes recorded at the time of the interviews on 12/5/63 and 12/6/63. It will be noted that the first tape was copied from reel #1 of 12/5/63 covering the period of 1535 to 1712 hours. The second tape was taken from reel #2 covering the period of 1712 to 1800 hours on 12/5/63. The third tape was taken from reel #2 covering the period from 1115 to 1245 hours on 12/6/63. The fourth tape was taken from reel #2 and covers the period of 1245 to 1440 hours on 12/6/63. The fifth tape was taken from reel #3 and covers the period of 1440 to 1610 hours on 12/6/63. The sixth tape was taken from reel #4 and covers the period of 1610 to 1730 hours on 12/6/63.

The CIA technician who made available these tapes advised that the original tape was recorded on a machine adapted to the 50-cycle current which is used in Mexico City. He said that the tapes should play back satisfactorily on a 60-cycle machine utilizing 60-cycle current.

For the possible assistance of the Bureau in utilizing these tapes, the person speaking only in English is CIA polygraph examiner CALVIN DAVIS, the person speaking only Spanish and a

- 3 - Bureau (Encs. 6)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mexico City

CDA:plb
(4)

*Bullg
Notice
12/16/74*

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SECTION

MC 105-3702

very limited amount of English at the outset is GILBERTO NOLASCO ALVARADO UGARTE, and the person speaking both Spanish and English and serving as an interpreter is Legat CLARK D. ANDERSON.

not nec. to
type transcript at
this time as CIA has
furnished summary of
Polygraph findings.
Tapes should be filed as
bulky exhibit
C.D. 12/16/63