UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS MICHAEL LIMEBARGER.

Plaintiff,

NO. C-76-1826-WWS

V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF

5. G

Ė

8

IO

11

12 13

14

15

10

17.

13 .

19

20

22

23

24

25

25

27

28

23

30:

1

25

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

This action arises under the Freedom of Information Act (FOLA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. It follows a request by plaintiff to the F.B.I. "to send me any and all documents you have gathered on me." The F.B.I. responded by sending plaintiff some but not all of such documents, and excising portions of some of the documents sent. Following plaintiff's administrative appeal to the Attorney General, additional documents were released. Not being satisfied with these responses, plaintiff filed this action on August 27, 1976. Defendants filled a motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the affidavits and memoranda filed by the parties, the Court on Jume 22, 1977, ordered the documents held by defendants submitted for in camera inspection by the Court. - The documents have now been submitted and reviewed by the Court. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion for summary judgment cust be granted.

P: 14 21 - 12 - 4 - 14

APPENDIX B Civil Action No. 77-1997

Initially, we may exclude from consideration π substantial volume of material contained in the documents and excised or defendants which, although it contains an occasional reference to plaintiff, is not material within the request for "documents you have gathered on me." Defendants have produced the documents but have deleted from them everything but the material which refers to plaintiff. The other material is extraneous to the request and hence not required to be produced. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).

The bulk of the other excisions made by defendants consists of identification by name or code of the source of information relating to plaintiff. Section 522(b)(7) exempts from production

"investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would . . .

- "(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- "(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by a confidential source; [or]
- "(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures . . . "

The threshold question here is whether the particular records of the F.B.I. were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." No reported decisions shed light on the question what showing is required to qualify F.B.I. records as such. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Weisberg v. U. S. Department of Juntice, 489 F.2d 1195 (C.A. D.C., 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), appears to take a liberal wlaw, suggesting that inasmuch as the F.B.I. is an arm of the Department of Justice, its investigatory activities are conducted for law enforcement purposes. While the 1974 amendments to the FOTA were intended to overrule Weisberg

2

4 ..

5

7

end certain other cases in other respects (see NLNB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 163-164 (1975)), the meaning of the term "law enforcement" was not changed.

Mazines, Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law, Sec. 10.06[3], p. 10-199 (hereafter cited as "Mezines."). The documents examined by the Court reveal that the investigations were conducted by the F.B.I. for internal security purposes.

Although the documents do not indicate a suspected or incipient violation of law, they reflect a sufficient nexus between the conduct of the investigation and legitimate concern for national and internal security as to warrant their classification as being for law enforcement purposes.

The identification of persons, whether employed by the government or not, who provided information to the F.B.I. clearly falls within subsection (b)(7)(C). In addition, that information, along with the information contained in some of the documents revealing methods used in the investigation, also falls within subsection (b)(7)(E). Finally, the codes employed for identification of persons who were sources are exempt under subsection (b)(2) as being "related solely to the interral personnel . . practices of the agency . ."

Defendants also rely on subsection (b)(7)(D), but the extent to which that exemption applies is not clear. The act here seems to require not only that the source be confidential but also that the information which would be disclosed be confidential as well. Inasmuch as not all of the documents claimed to fall under this subsection were classified, there is no basis for determining whether the information provided was "confidential information furnished only by a confidential source . . ." This subsection presents difficult questions of interpretation. Inasmuch as other

8.

. 0

23.

provisions of the act exempt the excised information, it is not necessary for the Court to reach those questions.

Several of the documents are classified confidential. Affidavits by intelligence personnel of the C.I.A., F.B.I. and Army explain in some detail the reasons and necessity for classification. Subsection (b)(1) exempts matters

"specifically authorized under critera established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the " interest of national defense or foreign policy and (3) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such executive order."

Executive Order 11652 (March 8, 1972), authorizes classification of the matters involved as national security information. Disclosure would jeopardize sources of information vital to national defense and foreign policy. The legislative history of the 1974 amendments establishes that the Court may order a withheld document released only if it finds "the withholding to be without a reasonable basis . . ." Senate Report No. 93-854, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1974); Mezines, Sec. 10.02[2], p. 10-19. The Court finds that defendants have met their burden of showing that a reasonable basis for classification exists. See, Alfred A. Knoof. Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir., 1975).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the matter withheld from production falls within one or more exemptions of the FOIA and need not be produced. The complaint is therefore dismissed and judgment granted in favor of defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August _______, 1977.

WHICH STUMMAZER
United States District Judge

26 :·· 27 23 20; 25 ... 51.

9

11.

12

13

14

15

38

17

18

19

20

21

22 .

23

24

25