

NOT AT
MY BK.
ESS. OF
HILL TRAM.
RPT. 11
available
12/16/78

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the Warren Commission, told the Committee it was his recollection that no one from the Commission attempted to interview Nosenko about Oswald. He recalled further that the Commission decided it did not have experience to make a determination about Oswald's credibility. When asked whether he thought the knowledge of the Commission staff about Oswald might provide an advantage in questioning Nosenko, Rankin replied he didn't believe so.

"We didn't have enough information about Oswald at any time to be informed in depth."

Asked if he believed the CIA had special knowledge of Oswald, Rankin replied:

"I always had the impression that they knew quite a bit about the history and that they appeared to know about as much as we did about his life."

- Q. Were you under any impression as to whether the Agency was specifically trying to check out any of the information given to them by Nosenko about Oswald?
- A. I got the impression that they were doing that and were going to do it carefully.

NOSENKO'S STATUS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1968 REPORT

The CIA has informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations of Nosenko's status subsequent to the 1968 report:

Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate to note that a draft of the staff report just read was submitted to the CIA for declassification. Within two days, the CIA declassified the entire draft, requiring only a few minor changes and the deletion of the names of Agency personnel and sources.

The Committee provided both the FBI and CIA with copies of the report and asked the agencies if they wished to respond to the report at a public hearing on September 15. The FBI informed the Committee that no response would be submitted. The CIA has sent John Limond Hart as its official representative to state the Agency's position on the Committee's Nosenko report.

Mr. Hart is a career agent with the CIA, having served approximately 24 years. He has held the position of Chief of Station in Korea, Thailand, Morocco and Vietnam, as well as several senior posts at CIA Headquarters. Mr. Hart had considerable experience with Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence activities while serving in various capacities in the United States and abroad. He has written two extensive studies on Soviet defectors, one of which, dated 1976, dealt with the handling of Yuri Nosenko by the CIA.

NSAC - Blaney narration 9/15/78.
Russia

2. Tapes and transcripts of statements by Nosenko to the CIA about Oswald on January 23 and 30, 1964 and July 3, 27, and 29, 1964.
3. The Soviet Russia Section report of February 1968.
4. The Security Officer's critique of the handling of the Nosenko case, dated June 19, 1967.
5. The security officer's report, dated October 1968.
6. A report written in 1976 by a retired CIA official who documented internal problems at the CIA over the Nosenko controversy.
7. All CIA files on Nosenko which dealt with Oswald or the Kennedy assassination.
8. All FBI files on Nosenko which dealt with Oswald or the Kennedy assassination.
9. The three-page statement on Oswald written by Nosenko in 1968.

Statements taken by the Committee are as follows:

1. The security officer was interviewed on two occasions, on the second of which he gave a 193-page sworn deposition.
2. The two KGB defectors who preceded Nosenko.
3. The Chief of the Soviet Russia Section from 1963 to 1968, who gave a sworn deposition.

11/23/63

PLAIN TEXT

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO BACS, NEW YORK
CLEVELAND

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, NOVEMBER TWENTYTWO
LAST, AFO.

CLEVELAND REQUESTED TO DISCREETLY ASCERTAIN WHEREABOUTS OF
ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER, CV FILE ONE ZERO FIVE DASH THREE SEVEN NINE
TWO, ON NOVEMBER TWENTYTWO LAST. LATEST ADDRESS IN BUREAU FILES FOR
WEBSTER WAS IN DASH CITY MOTEL, MAIN STREET, WELLSVILLE, OHIO,
EMPLOYMENT WESCO MANUFACTURING COMPANY, WELLSVILLE, OHIO, IN MAY,
SIXTYTHREE. NEW YORK DISCREETLY ASCERTAIN WHEREABOUTS OF NICHOLAS
PETRULLI, NY FILE ONE HUNDRED DASH NINE FIVE EIGHT NINE SIX, DURING
SAME PERIOD. BUREAU FILES REFLECT PETRULLI ON HIS RETURN FROM RUSSIA
IN FIFTYNINE WAS TO RESIDE WITH HIS BROTHER, DOMINICK PETRULLI, THREE
FIVE FOUR NORTH CENTRAL AVENUE, VALLEY STREAM, LONG ISLAND. AFFORD
MATTER EXPEDITIOUS ATTENTION.

RJG:cb
(3)

See Robson to Belmont Memo dated 11/23/63, RJG:cb.

de la...

REC-89 62-119101-15

COPIES DESTROYED

74 DEC 19 1972

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evers _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 23 1963

TELETYPE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 24 3
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

URGENT 11-24-63 3-29 PM EME

TO DIRECTOR AND SAC, NEW YORK

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 189-751 /1P/

UNSUB ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY NOVEMBER TWENTY TWO LAST, DALLAS, TEXAS.

MR. AND MRS. CHARLES IVIE, APT. ONE ZERO SIX, SIX ZERO SIX NORTH OCCIDENTAL BLVD., LOS ANGELES, ADVISED THEY ARE MANAGERS OF APARTMENT HOUSE AND NICHOLAS PETRULLI HAS RESIDED APT. ONE ZERO ONE FOR FOUR MONTHS. HE RESIDES ALONE. MR. AND MRS. IVIE ADVISE PETRULLI HAS BEEN IN HIS APARTMENT OR AT THE APARTMENT HOUSE NOVEMBER TWENTY ONE THROUGH NOVEMBER TWENTY FOUR LAST INCLUSIVE.

END AND ACK PLS

EX-114

WA 6-33 PM OK FBI WA MSL FOR RELAY REC 7

62-109060-1062

TUDISC

Handwritten notes:
a. This information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

25 DEC 1963

RECEIVED

DEC 24 1963

53 DEC 4 1963

RELAYED TO

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: January 22, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY, 11-22-63
DALLAS, TEXAS

[Handwritten initials]

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

[Handwritten signatures]
[Handwritten initials]

77

Mr. J. Lee Rankin advised that he was aware of the information that had been set forth in Bureau reports relative to correspondence had by Lee Harvey Oswald with the Communist Party, USA, the Socialist Workers Party and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr. Rankin stated that even though considerable information had been developed through the Bureau's sources and through interviews conducted by the Bureau he desired that each of these organizations be contacted officially by the Bureau at the request of the President's Commission and that each group be requested to make available copies of all correspondence, and any other material that they might have available relative to Oswald.

[Vertical handwritten note:] much done and SWP of inside Sullivan

Mr. Rankin was advised that his request would be complied with and results furnished to him as soon as possible. Appropriate instructions have been issued to the field to have this request handled immediately.

During the conversation with Mr. Rankin, he mentioned that the Commission had met on the afternoon of January 21, 1964, and that the members of the Commission had quite a number of questions and were desirous of seeing a great deal of material. At this point, Mr. Rankin was asked if there was anything that the Bureau might do to render assistance in answering any questions that had been raised by the Commissioners. Mr. Rankin replied that he could not reveal what went on at the Commissioners' meeting.

- 62-109090
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Stokes
- 1 - 105-82555

JRM:hw
) 9

[Handwritten note:] I don't see how we can render assistance if we can't be told what they want.

22 FEB 12 1964

29 FEB 13 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

He did state that there would be some correspondence as a result of the Commissioners' meeting and this would be sent forward as soon as possible to prepare the same. He volunteered no information as to whether or not the communications would be directed to the Bureau or elsewhere.

Mr. Rankin advised that the members of the Commission were aware of the large volume of work that had been handled by the Bureau and that he personally desired to express his appreciation for the help given by the Bureau.

The foregoing is submitted for information.

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JRM

R

✓ Her
JRM

R 1880

November 19, 1975

Mr. James B. Rhoades
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Mr. Rhoades:

Pursuant to a request by the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Marion Johnson provided members of the Committee Staff two file boxes of classified internal Warren Commission memoranda on Tuesday, November 18. In order to further the Committee's investigation, I request copies of the following documents from this material:

1. Memorandum, to the records; from W. David Slawson, "Re: Conference with CIA on 3/12/64." *TS declassified to S; List 1, 19; "Released w/ 4 deletions" on Arch. List 1, 19*
2. Memorandum, 1/29/64, "Subject: Presence of Salvador Diaz Verson in Mexico around 22 November 1963." *List 1, 5; "Released with deletions" on Arch. List 1, 5*
3. Letter, 2/10/64, from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms. *TS declassified to S; further declassified to Conf. by P.H. Dec 75; List 2, 7; "Released with deletions" on Arch. List 1, 5*
4. Memorandum, 3/9/64, to Rankin, Willens and Redlich, from Slawson. "Telephone Conference with Rocca of CIA." *List 1, 25; "Released with deletions" on Arch. List 1, 5*
5. Memo for the record, 3/27/64, from Slawson, "Re: Tentative Conclusions on Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico City: Visits to Soviet and Cuban Embassies." *List 2, 7; declassified by P.H. to Conf. Dec 75*
6. Memo for the record, 4/21/64, from Slawson. *TS declassified to S; List 2, 2; "Released with deletions" on Arch. List 1, 5*
7. Memo for the record, 4/22/64, from Slawson, "Subject: Trip to Mexico City." *TS declassified to S; further declassified to Conf. by P.H. Dec 75; List 2, 13*
8. Memorandum, 4/15/64, to Rankin from Coleman and Slawson. "Progress in Area 3." *TS declassified to S; List 1, 2; further declassified to Conf. by P.H. Dec 75*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities S. 570 11/3/75
By [Signature] NARS Date 4/18/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 19, 1975

9. Memorandum, 4/3/64, from Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover.
10. Memorandum, 2/12/64, from Rankin to Hoover.
11. Memorandum, 6/1/64, from Rankin to Hoover.
12. Memorandum, 2/12/64, from Rankin to Hoover.
13. Memorandum, 2/18/64, from Rankin to Hoover
(Please omit the following:

1) page one - paragraph one - last three lines;

2) page one - paragraph one - line four last five words;

3) page two - paragraph one - line five second word;

4) page two - paragraph one - line seven second thru ninth word.)

14. Memorandum, 5/20/64, from Rankin to Hoover.

15. Memorandum for files, ^{4/2/64} 5/2/64, from Coleman/
Slawson, "Subject: Questions Raised by
Ambassador Mann file." ^{not on PH list}

16. Memorandum, ^{Briggs memo Dec '75} 4/28/64, to Rankin from Slawson, ^{not sent by DIA}
"Subject: Request for Information from Cuban
Government."

17. Memorandum, 3/26/64, "Subject: Mexico - CIA
Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey
Oswald." (N.B. page 2 is missing from the file.) ^{not on PH list}

18. Memorandum, 3/4/64, to Rankin from Charles
Shaffer. ^{not sent by DIA}

19. Memorandum, 3/13/64, to Rankin from Shaffer.

20. Memorandum for the record, 4/10/64, from Alfred
Goldberg, "Talk with Barefoot Sanders."

Mr. James B. Rhoades
Page Three

November 19, 1975

21. Memorandum, 4/16/64, to Slawson from Griffin, "Interview of Agent Ellsworth"
22. Memorandum, 3/6/64, to Rankin from Griffin and Hubert.
23. Memorandum, 6/2/64, to Rankin, Willens, Redlich and Liebeler, from Slawson, "Conference with Mr. Isaac Don Levine 5/28/64."

not sent by D/S


not a doc we had

In order to expedite this request, members of the Senate Select Committee made arrangements with Mr. Johnson on the 18th so that the above materials could be easily identified. I would, therefore, appreciate delivery of the documents to the Senate Committee by Monday, November 24.

Additionally, Mr. Johnson advised staff members of the Committee that the material contained in the two file boxes reviewed on November 18, represented all classified Warren Commission internal memoranda. It would be appreciated if Mr. Johnson would confirm this in a cover letter accompanying the requested material.

Finally, Mr. Johnson confirmed that the Archives has a list of all materials given to the Warren Commission that remain classified. I would appreciate the list being enclosed with the above materials by the 24th.

Sincerely,


Richard S. Schweiker
United States Senate

cc: Mr. Marion Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson

On the morning of 12/4/63 I called Mr. Katzenbach and advised him that we see no real reason for us to have anyone at the meeting of the commission on Thursday morning; that there is nothing that we can contribute at this time. I pointed out that we were working on the investigation and the report, and will submit it to the Department as soon as possible, and until that time we are not saying anything.

Katzenbach said he felt this puts him in a rather peculiar position and at least he would like to have someone come down before the Thursday morning meeting and brief him as to what we are doing, so that he could be in a position to answer questions. I told him that this was undesirable; that if the question is raised as to what the FBI is doing, there is a very simple answer, namely that we are pressing the investigation and the writing of the report; that this is our major goal and until this is completed there is nothing we can contribute. I pointed out that there is no question of my reluctance on the part of the FBI, as we are bending every effort to produce the information the commission will need.

Right - N
Relative to the second point, about the Texas board of inquiry, I told Mr. Katzenbach that the Director feels it would be very unwise for this board to conduct an inquiry now; that they would have to use our evidence, and this evidence is being made available first to the President's commission; therefore, the two inquiries would be at cross purposes. Katzenbach was in full agreement and said his problem is one of convincing the commission of this.

Right - N
Katzenbach said that he had been talking to Chief Justice Warren, and Warren had indicated to him that the chief counsel for the President's commission will be Warren Olney. Katzenbach thought that this would be most undesirable. Katzenbach said that, as we probably know, Chief Justice Warren thinks that Olney can do no wrong, and he (the Chief Justice) had made the point that Olney is conversant with the FBI's procedures and thus would be operating in a familiar field. Katzenbach said if we have any ideas as to how Olney can be blocked as chief counsel, he would like to have them. I told him that, as far as I was concerned, Olney was an undesirable choice, and if we had any thoughts we would get them to him.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE 12-3-63

498

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

FROM : Mr. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT
November 22, 1963

At 6:10 P.M., Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach called. He said Chief Justice Warren had called a meeting of the Commission appointed by the President for 10:00 A.M., Thursday morning. Justice Warren wants a high-level liaison man from any interested agency. Katzenbach will attend the meeting but he feels that the FBI should have someone there also to answer any questions the Commission might have regarding the scope of the investigation, etc. Katzenbach thinks the Bureau representative should be the Director or Belmont. I made no commitment to Mr. Katzenbach, but I recommend we advise him that our report in this matter will speak for itself and until the report is ready, there is no real purpose in an FBI representative being present at the Commission meeting. With respect to this, it is noted that Katzenbach felt it was better to show willingness to cooperate with the Commission in every respect.

Katzenbach said that there are problems arising between the Texas Board of Inquiry headed by Texas Attorney General Carr and the Presidential Commission headed by Justice Warren; that Texas wants to go ahead with an inquiry and Warren wants them to hold off. Attorney General Carr and the past president of the Texas Bar Association are to come and see Katzenbach tomorrow, at which time he will try to calm the waters and establish ground rules. Katzenbach wanted to know if we wanted to talk to Attorney General Carr and the others. I told him we did not, that we were busy investigating this matter and trying to get out our report.

Mr. Katzenbach asked whether I could give him a timetable on the report. I told him no I could not, that we were working as hard as we could and that was all I could say.

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

AHB:mjs

(6) prj

DEC 15 1963

XEROX

DEC 12 1963

REG-56

DEC 12 1963

for [unclear]

FOIPA 5/1/77

His book Legend and New York Magazine, Issue of February 27, 1978 with the cover indicating an article by Epstein. It has a title "A War of the Moles" by Edward Jay Epstein and the subtitle, Russian Spies Inside the CIA and the FBI. But on the first page of the story which is on page 28, with the same title, there is a subhead "An interview with Edward Jay Epstein by Susana Duncan."

What follows is not organized. It is comment on the sequence of the appearance of what I commented upon in this article.

Duncan puffs Epstein a bit too much in the first column on page 28 at the bottom saying "Twelve years ago, Epstein published Inquest, the first and most damaging critique of the Warren Report..." He did not publish it, and it was not the first book on this subject.

In answer to a question on page 30, column 1, Epstein discloses that a fact about the assassination is irrelevant. His answer is "I began by rejecting the idea that there was something new to be found out about bullets, wounds, or grassy knoll. Instead, I asked: Why did Lee Harvey Oswald defect the Soviet Union in 1959?..."

The question was "How can you hope to come up with any new facts or different answers?" after all the work done by some of the others for so many years. Page 30, third column, there is what I seem to remember, but can't place a source on in the form of an answer "Now, under the CIA's mail-opening pro-

gram, the agency intercepted a letter written by Oswald in Moscow to his brother in which Oswald said that he had seen Powers." This means Francis Gary Powers. Epstein then said "No one had ever explained where he would have had the opportunity to see Powers."

From this he builds a whole structure that need not be true. Powers was tried.

He goes further in answer to another question "...and Powers also thought that Oswald was involved in his being shot down over Russia."

When he was ghost writing Powers' ^{curt} book, Gentry called me up and did not indicate that Powers had said Oswald was involved in his being shot down. Gentry indicated to me that they were exploring that possibility because it would make ~~a~~ good copy. He was trying to say then that without somebody like Oswald, it would not have been possible for the Russians to have shot down ~~by~~ Powers and that seems to be what Epstein is saying here. In the same paragraph, Epstein says that Oswald was in a position to "ascertain the altitude at which the U-2 flew." Epstein's proof is that Oswald worked at the Atsugi air base from which U-2's took off. Of course, they don't reach their altitude when they take off.

On page 31, there ^{is} ~~was~~ a box titled, "Stone": The Man Who Warned About The Moles. ¹

Epstein begins by talking about the penetration or the alleged penetration of French intelligence by the Soviets. He concludes with this sentence "Leon Uris's Topaz is a fictionalization of this case."

The source of Topaz is Pierre de Vosjoli. De Vosjoli wrote the book supposedly non-fiction called "Lamia". I'm just myself wondering why Epstein, who signed this box, referred to the novel instead of the supposed non-fiction.

While it is not important, I note one of several instances of Epstein talking about intelligence operations and a matter that doesn't seem to come from his sources, but does seem to come from novels. He says "...but in the late 1957, V.M. Kovshuk, one of the key executives of the KGB, had come to Washington under the code name 'Komarov', presumably to activate the mole."

It doesn't require a "key executive" of an intelligence agency "to activate the mole." This is normally done by other than those who are up at the top.

At the bottom of this page, and continuing thereafter, Epstein goes into the story of a Russian official at the United Nations who became an FBI spy. The man is known under the code name "Fedora". I note in passing that from what is in this article alone, it would not be difficult for the Russians to identify Fedora.

In the first column on page 32, Epstein is answering a question of why CIA and FBI officers were willing to talk to him and give him facts about the case. Epstein replies, limiting himself to "The CIA officers I approached." In his explanation, he said "...I received some documents under Freedom of Information which mentioned them or their cases."

↑
referred in all. would have heard on the subject

This states pretty clearly that he got documents under Freedom of Information from CIA and the names or other identities of CIA officials or case officers were left in the records that Epstein obtained.

In response to another question, he gives added detail of what he obtained under Freedom of Information "...documents mentioning their name or operational details of a case." Presumably, operational detail and name are exempt under the Act from the way the CIA treats the records that I obtained from it.

In the next column, toward the top, he talks about having been able to identify from the records he received or from other sources the man who handled Nosenko and who had retired. Epstein says "We met at the Waterloo battlefield in Belgium, and I showed him about a hundred pages of documents that involved him. I had acquired these documents under Freedom of Information."

I have a Nosenko request several years old at the CIA and I have received no response to it.

Beginning a little below the middle of the second column on page 32, there are these questions and answers:

"Q. Did you ever get to see Nosenko? And if so, how?

A. Yes. The CIA put me onto him.

Q. How do you explain that?

A. I presume that it found out I was writing a book on Lee Harvey Oswald and it wanted me to put Nosenko's message in it. Nosenko's message was that Oswald was a complete loner in the Soviet Union

and never had any connection or debriefing by the KGB. I spent about four hours interviewing Nosenko.

Q. Your book strongly suggests that Nosenko is a fake. Do you believe the CIA was trying to mislead you by sending you to him?

A. Yes. It sent me Nosenko as a legitimate witness to Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union without telling me that Nosenko had been suspected of being a Soviet disinformation agent."

This is very important in terms of the official representations in my Civil Action 75-1448 and the Appeal #771831. The Nosenko transcript of the Warren Commission of June 23, 1964 is one of the transcripts withheld. The representations are in the court records. This proves that the representations are false and were known to be false by those who made them. Now, Epstein is a little bit disingenuous, or he knows less than he pretends. He claims the CIA did not tell him that Nosenko "had been suspected of being a Soviet disinformation agent." Several years, ^{ago} Danny Shore ^{aired} ~~heard~~ that on CBS. ~~It~~ ^{THIS} was, I am sure, from Epstein's account of his book, prior to the beginning of Epstein's book ^{project}.

Epstein does not make a vice of consistency. In the caption ^{on} of page 34, it says that ^{of} Nosenko "even disorientation techniques ^{didn't} break him." But on page 35 in a box titled "Nosenko: The Red Herring" signed by Epstein, it says "Under intensive cross-examination, Nosenko broke down" ^{these} to refute each other.

In the same box which takes up all of page 35, Epstein represents of Nosenko

"He claimed that he was the KGB officer who had superintended Lee Harvey Oswald's file during his three years in Russia..." This is not a representation attributed to Nosenko by the FBI, which interviewed Nosenko right after he was brought to the United States by the CIA. All Nosenko represented, according to the FBI, is having had access to the Oswald file when it was flown from Minsk to Moscow after the assassination.

This is Epstein's explanation of how Nosenko got to the United States after his defection: "Given Nosenko's status as an Oswald witness, the CIA had no choice, and Nosenko came to the United States."

I can't imagine any circumstances under which they would not have taken a KGB officer of Nosenko's rank to the United States.

In the middle of the second column on page 35, Epstein attributes suspicion of Nosenko to Angleton. My belief is that Angleton ^{did not} like Nosenko's story because ^{Angleton} he wanted to be able to have a "red" ⁱⁿ the Kennedy assassin.

I'd be surprised if this is not the beginning of Angleton's suspicions.

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walk in New
terms?

Again relating to the CIA and my FOIA request: "Finally, in 1967, the CIA's Soviet Russia Division was asked to produce a report on Nosenko. The report, which ran 900 pages in length, virtually indicted Nosenko as a Soviet agent." This report would be within my Nosenko request and I, of course, have not received it.

Although Epstein says that Nosenko was a disinformation agent, and that ^{this} he had to be suppressed otherwise, the Warren Commission would have had to change its

conclusions about Oswald's connections with the KGB. Epstein says, "It was finally decided in 1968 to give Nosenko \$30,000 a year as a 'consultant' to the CIA, a new identity, and a new home in North Carolina." The last sentences in this box are "Seven years later, after the Angleton firing, Nosenko was rehabilitated. He's now in Washington handling 120 cases for 'new' CIA."

There ^{is} ~~was~~ a box on Fedora on page 36. In the middle of this box, there is an item that, if nothing else, ~~this~~ would have disclosed to the Soviet Union ^{(the identity of Fedora as a FBI informer.} Epstein says "...it was Fedora who poisoned the atmosphere", meaning at the time of the Pentagon papers leaking, "by telling the FBI that the papers had been leaked to Soviet intelligence."

When Epstein is asked how it is that Angleton spoke to him (in the ~~second~~ column of page 36,) his reply is "Because I had already interviewed Nosenko. Angleton knew that since Nosenko was working for the CIA, he wouldn't have seen me unless the CIA had sent him." Epstein says that Angleton "wanted to know why, after keeping Nosenko in isolation for 13 years, the CIA would suddenly send him to see a journalist doing a story about Oswald."

This isn't true. Nosenko was interviewed by Baron for the book KGB. There isn't much about Angleton's connection with that book or with John Baron who was the project director of the Epstein project for Readers Digest.

At the top of the first column on page 37, there is further indication of the assistance the CIA gave to Epstein. Epstein recounts his interest in running "down a lead concerning Pavel Voloshin." He says of this "I got a CIA 'trace'

only recall that I meant that that E repeated the w/without any question

(repeated by)

*In the book he says he got all the traces and that they had
been made earlier - or not for him.)*
on Voloshin, and he turned out to be a KGB officer..."

In the middle of the third column of this page, when asked about help from the FBI, Epstein's answer "It provided me with very little information, but what they did give me was generally straightforward, and I think they tried to be as helpful as they could." There was a box on page 38 titled "A Warning From the 'Old' CIA." In the middle the magazine discloses its political perspective by referring to "the present détente devotees."

This question and answer from the middle of the second column also indicates that Epstein, if he is telling the truth, was given access to the kind of material that is properly exempt under FOIA:

"Q. Which of the spies that you mention in your book have never been discussed in print?

A. All the stories are almost totally new. Fedora has never been mentioned to my knowledge. Neither has Stone. The breaking of Nosenko's story has never been mentioned, and it leads ^{me} one to wonder how much is still left to uncover."

Toward the top of the third column, again relating to the CIA's deletion of all names from the records, it supplies and even from the records of other agencies. Epstein is explaining his own view of what happened to the CIA under ^{Colby.} ~~Kelbe~~. Epstein repeats that Angleton was fired. He then quotes one of Angleton's ~~quotes~~ "keystaffers," giving his name, Newton Milner.

From this first of a series of articles, it is apparent that Epstein had extra-

ordinary help from the CIA as an organization and from some of those no longer with the CIA, some like Angleton, fired, others retired. It also is apparent that Epstein has not changed and still proceeds as did the Warren Commission and the rest of the government, on the assumption of Oswald's guilt rather than by proving it. His approach is essentially that of George McMillan, ^{who,} having decided that ~~Oswald had no motive, Oswald therefore, be-~~ *Ray had motive also decided that motive alone* *Ray alone as guilty.* ~~established~~ *came guilty.*

If the representations ^{made} of Civil Action 751448 are truthful, this article alone is proof of the Commission of Criminal Acts by people in the CIA.

(I learned the night of February 27 that the new issue of New York Magazine has come to Frederick, a copy is being saved for me. I will get it in the morning and go over it as soon as I can.) *(See later typed notes - HLC)*

27 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief,

SUBJECT:

Assassination

Soviet Defector
Comments on President Kennedy's

1. We should understand that my comments which follow are not based solely on the thesis that OSWALD was specifically dispatched to murder our President. The very real possibility also exists that OSWALD was sent here on another mission by the KGB and subsequently accomplished the deed on his own initiative. However, such a possibility does not make the KGB less culpable as the seeds for OSWALD's act must have been planted while he was being trained in the USSR for his other mission. We might first examine the question uppermost in the minds of most Americans, "What did the USSR have to gain by killing the President?" I believe we can make a good case as to the precise gains accruing to the USSR and more specifically accruing to KHRUSHCHEV. In preface let me admonish my readers not to play down the political aspects of Soviet intelligence operations. The American intelligence services' apolitical approach to interpreting and countering Soviet intelligence operations frankly frightens me at times. But more specifically the assassination of President Kennedy would accomplish the following for KHRUSHCHEV personally:

a. Western pressure behind the leadership of the USA would automatically ease up. Witness President Johnson's immediate conciliatory telegram to KHRUSHCHEV, after the murder. We might mention that the USA was the chief proponent for not extending long range credits to the USSR. Extension of long range credits is vital to the USSR at this juncture.

b. This leads us into the most pressing problem within the USSR. The West persistently underrates the extent of the Soviet internal situation. It was my prediction that as a result of the mismanagement of the 1963 harvest and the CHICOM arguments that KHRUSHCHEV would resign during the upcoming December plenum of the Communist Party of the USSR. Our President's death thus effectively diverts the Soviets' attention from their internal problems. It directly affects KHRUSHCHEV's longevity.

c. In the Cuban situation any USA or Cuban expatriate actions against Cuba will now be tainted by the fact that these are vengeful acts against Cuba because of OSWALD's "Fair Play for Cuba" associations. Obviously the Soviets properly interpret our situation in that President JOHNSON will restrain any planned interventions in Cuba for a long time.

for FOIA Review on

MAY 1976

d. A more amenable America will strengthen KHRUSHCHEV's hand in his running battle with the CHICOMS. He will thus have another reason to say his form of peaceful coexistence is superior to that of the CHICOMS'.

e. Conceivably any of President KENNEDY's planned actions to get even more firm with the Soviets during the pre-election year are thus sabotaged by the President's murder.

f. The Soviets obviously understood that the death of President KENNEDY would result in the emergence of DeGAULLE as a strong Western leader. DeGAULLE of course says "what's good for France is not necessarily bad for the USSR."

g. The death of President KENNEDY removes a popular rallying point for our allies. Furthermore, and more pertinent, his death removes a symbol for Soviet intellectuals who have inevitably made invidious comparisons between their own intellectual desert and the flowering of the arts under the KENNEDYS. The problem of the intellectuals in the USSR should not be interpreted as the least of KHRUSHCHEV's internal problems. We must recall that beginning with Lenin, intellectuals have provided the impetus for revolution in the USSR and they comprise one of the three balls KHRUSHCHEV must constantly juggle--the intellectuals, the Party and the Military.

h. If the USSR has any ambitious aims in manipulating U.S. public opinion their murder of President KENNEDY would serve to exacerbate the present differences between the radical left and right in America. In fact the USSR propaganda machine began to say the murder was committed by the radical right as soon as the deed was done and before OSWALD was captured.

1. Finally, the death of President KENNEDY, whether a planned operation or not, will serve the most obvious purpose of providing proof of the power and omniscience of the KGB. This application of sheer terror could be interpreted as a warning to Russia's own citizens, as the Soviet intelligence services have suffered some very real reverses recently with PENKOVSKY, GOLITSIN's defection, their ignominious expulsion from the Congo, etc. I have long predicted that the USSR would take some drastic action to halt the rapid erosion of their security.

2. Can we briefly view the OSWALD operation as a mounted KGB operation to kill the President? What are the essential ingredients?

a. The KGB had some three years to assess OSWALD in the USSR. Lyzen will deprecate the value that the KGB attaches to such on the

spot assessment. They may also say that OSWALD was a nut and properly would not be entrusted with such an operation by the KGB. However the KGB properly knows that historically most assassins have been unbalanced maladjusted types.

b. In such an operation the KGB could not use a Soviet citizen though the very real possibility exists that OSWALD was assisted by a Soviet illegal of the KGB 13th Department. Sticking to essentials-- It was a good plan that did succeed.

c. OSWALD did escape from the book building.

d. He did get to a theater which could have been his point of contact with his illegal case officer. Certainly we know the KGB's penchant for using theaters for meeting places.

e. After his arrest, which was only due to his unfortunate encounter with Policemen TIPPET, OSWALD did remain silent. How like the behavior of Col. ABEL was his behavior in this regard.

3. Also the very real possibility exists that the KGB intended to liquidate OSWALD after he did the job. His meeting in the theater was probably for just such a liquidation or removal from the scene. In RUBY's part in the operation we must recognize the possibility that RUBY was also a KGB hatchet man. Looking at the bare essentials of his part in the operation we see the following:

a. RUBY had access to the police station. Reports say he personally knew most policemen.

b. He successfully silenced OSWALD.

c. RUBY remains silent and his cover is holding up.

d. He has a good legend of temporary insanity.

e. He has a reasonable chance to escape the death sentence.

4. The undersigned might be better qualified to comment on the OSWALD aspects of this case if we knew the following about his activities prior to his departure to the USSR: (a., b., and c. below offer three possible answers to the question, "Why did he go to Moscow?"

a. First, OSWALD was a self-made Marxist or Communist who decided to go on his own; that is, he made this decision by himself and prompted by no one. He possibly was looking for a better life without knowing what the Soviet Union really is.

b. Second, after OSWALD's discharge as an "undesirable" from the Marines, he found himself in a difficult and unpleasant situation; is it possible that in this situation he was noticed by a spotter or recruiter for the illegals or some other department and was considered as a possible candidate for use or recruitment? The full information about OSWALD was sent to Moscow, and on Moscow's order an investigation of OSWALD was made and there followed a decision to "invite" him to Moscow. Using the word "invite", the undersigned has in mind that some agents or recruiters through conversations with OSWALD, but without actually suggesting the trip itself, inspired OSWALD to travel to the USSR. And, in this case, it is possible that someone gave him some financial assistance and some advice on how to do this.

c. Third, OSWALD went to Moscow, or was sent to Moscow, by some pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, pro-Cuban organization(s), having in mind that he would stay in the Soviet Union for a few years, learning more about the Soviet Union and receiving instructions for future operations, activities, etc.

5. Knowing for sure that the Soviets never give a visa without making an investigation of the person making the application, we have to make our own investigation of the following questions:

a. When did OSWALD first begin to express his wish to go to the Soviet Union?

b. To whom did he talk, whom did he contact at this early time, and how much time elapsed between these talks and contacts and his application?

c. How, when and through whom did OSWALD get his Soviet visa?

d. How long did it take for him to get the visa?

e. Who personally gave the visa to OSWALD? We must know if the person at the Embassy who talked to OSWALD was a KGB employee.

f. When and how did OSWALD travel to the USSR (air, sea; through which countries; in which countries, if any, did he make stops; how long were such stops)?

6. Together with the above, it is very important to know of OSWALD's circumstances before his trip to the USSR. Who knew in advance that he was going and who knew that he had gone? Mother, brother, relatives, friends, neighbors, girl friends, boy friends, old buddies, etc.?

To whom did OSWALD say goodbye before he left for the USSR: personally or by telephone, by mail? Did he ever ask anyone any questions on traveling to the USSR? Whom?

6. OSWALD in Moscow. When OSWALD arrived in Moscow, he was under observation, investigation and complete control by the KGB. In this particular case, under the Second Chief Directorate (CI). Being under the control of the KGB, at the same time he was under heavy investigation directed at answering the question of why this stupid American had come to the USSR (it doesn't make any difference whether they knew in advance about OSWALD or not; anyway, they would conduct such an investigation). Every possible bit of information was taken from OSWALD about the USA, especially about his service in the Marine Corps, etc. At the same time, OSWALD was under constant observation and study for possible future use by the Soviet Intelligence and CI services.

7. It should be noted here that any foreigner, especially an American, who arrives in the USSR for permanent or prolonged stay always is examined by the Soviet State Security as a possible candidate for future use (special training and recruitment) within the USA or other countries (but against the USA). After a good study and investigation which continues about six months in Moscow, under normal financial support and minimum comfort from the KGB, the KGB makes its conclusions: that OSWALD is clear and is who he claims to be and that he might possibly be used or useful for Soviet Intelligence or CI Service. NOTE: the undersigned believes that during his (OSWALD's) first few months in Moscow, additional inquiry and investigation of OSWALD was going on through the Soviet Embassy in Washington and through Soviet agent networks in the USA and possibly through pro-Soviet and pro-Communist organizations within the USA.

8. After being a few weeks or months in Moscow, OSWALD expressed a wish to stay forever in the Soviet Union and to be a Soviet citizen. Then the KGB said to him: "If you really want to be a Soviet citizen and serve the Communist cause, you must denounce American Imperialism and American citizenship." Therefore, somewhere in this period, OSWALD went to the US Embassy and renounced his US citizenship. After this act State Security decided to give OSWALD some kind of job in accordance with his knowledge and capabilities, at the same time continuing to study him as a potential agent.

9. Because to make a good agent takes a long time and because OSWALD was impatient—and because he had not yet been given Soviet citizenship—the KGB decided not to make of him a good agent, but did not break relations with him and decided to use him in a more or less open way.

10. When OSWALD showed some dissatisfaction about the Soviet way of life (it is usual for Americans)—and by this time OSWALD had already met his girl friend (the KGB probably helped him to find her—to make him happy and to make sure that he would not leave the Soviet Union)—the KGB at the same time continued to train him, probably in the way of an old-fashioned Marxist, telling him that he would be a good fighter against imperialists and against American millionaires, such as ROCKEFELLER, KENNEDY and others. And somewhere here, while in this kind of training, a low level case officer of State Security told him that to have a better life in the US you have to fight very hard to bury capitalism, as our Nikita Sergeyevich says; together with capitalism, you have to bury all the millionaires, including your first beast and blood-sucker, KENNEDY (NOTE: this is not a tall story; it is the way in which State Security operates with the stupid Marxists and with naive followers of the Communist movement). If on a high level within the KGB it was decided that there is nothing good in OSWALD and that he is just a naive American and that he could not be relied upon fully, but that nonetheless he could be used because he is for our cause and is against capitalism in general, then the following would have been suggested—after OSWALD already had asked permission to return to the USA: OSWALD was told to be a good fighter against capitalism and to secure your Soviet citizenship, you must show yourself as a good fighter for the Communist cause inside the USA; then, we give you permission because we believe you are a strong Marxist to return to the USA and to do something for our common cause, such as to help any American pro-Soviet organizations or, for instance, become a member of a Free Cuba Committee or in case of crisis to do something outstanding—that will be noticeable everywhere—that will prove that you are a real Communist. Then, somewhere here, if he was already a Soviet agent or not, the girl showed up, or she was there before, but by this time she was pregnant and OSWALD decided to go to the USA. Then he was told. After this talk, OSWALD shouted—where is your freedom? She is my wife, we have a child, and I would like to go. If he did make a big noise, they decided to let him and her go; or if he already was a trained agent, then without any kind of noise on his part, but with some difficulties, permission was granted for her to go with him.

11. Looking at the wife of OSWALD, we should have in mind that she was and still is an agent or at least a low-level informant of the KGB. If she was not before she met OSWALD, she became so after the second day she met him. This is the regulation in State Security on how to handle foreigners—it makes no difference whether they are Communists or not.

12. Investigation of OSWALD's wife should be undertaken as soon as possible, with special attention being paid the questions to follow:

a. First, who is she? Her education, profession, age, family background, Party affiliation (Komsomol membership). If she was a member of the Komsomol, then the Komsomol organization will take any steps possible against her traveling to the US. Also, she must be expelled from the Komsomol, and then she automatically would be considered a member of the Imperialist Camp. Then, if she was a member of the Komsomol and this action did not take place, it was because of KGB interference against such action. The same action would relate to any of her relatives—father, mother, brothers....if they were members of the CPSU or Komsomol.

b. To which offices was she invited before and after their marriage? If she was invited to some official Soviet offices, and if these offices asked her not to marry a foreigner and not to go with him, then probably she was not a member of the Komsomol and she did it on her own will; but if she answers that no one invited her to such offices, then the whole job was done by the KGB—smoothly and quietly, with no talk going around about it.

c. Who helped her and how many times to write papers for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to say that she had married an American citizen and would like to go with him to the USA? If it was done a few times and with great difficulties, then probably it was done only with a little help from the KGB. If, however, the papers were prepared only once and permission was granted after only a few months' wait, then everything was done by the KGB. (According to the American newspapers, her application for permission to come to the US was processed very easily and quickly.)

d. When and where did they register their marriage? Who were the witnesses to that marriage? How many relatives and friends (of wife) were present at the wedding and celebration. What kind of gifts did they receive at the time of marriage and from whom? Where did they take up residence after marriage? Were they given an apartment, or a room? And in what neighborhood?

e. Where did her husband, OSWALD, work? In what factory? What were his hours of work? How long did he spend in Moscow before he went to Minsk? Who chose Minsk—did he or did someone else?

f. Who were her husband's friends? From what circles? Workers? Intellectuals?

g. How many times were she and her husband—while they lived together -- invited to the police stations or any other Soviet government offices, together or separately? (NOTE: There is no other office than the KGB which would make such an invitation. It makes no difference if they were agents or not.)

h. How smart (intelligent) is she? Does she really speak no English? Is her English better than she shows or better than it should be after being here only two years? Or worse?

i. What does she say about life in the Soviet Union?

j. Did her husband have a gun while he was in the Soviet Union? If so, how does she know about it? When did he get it? Did he have special permission to carry a gun? Did he bring this gun with him across the border? For your information, nobody carries a gun in the USSR without the KGB eventually learning of it. Least of all an American.

k. Who gave financial help to them before they left the Soviet Union? (NOTE: For a regular worker in the Soviet Union, it is impossible to save enough money to buy a ticket and make any kind of preparations to go abroad.)

l. Who gave instructions to OSWALD to ask for financial assistance at the American Embassy upon his return to the USA?

m. Was their first child born in Russia--baptized in the USSR? If so, in what church? Whose idea was it? Did they baptize their second child, born in the US?

n. If OSWALD never had a permanent job here in the USA, then who was going to finance his next trip to the USSR? How much did his wife know about his plan to return to the USSR via Cuba?

13. The investigation of the wife should be made step by step, keeping in mind and never forgetting that OSWALD as well as she herself were under constant observation and with constant contacts with organs of the KGB. Without such observation and contacts with organs of the KGB, no foreigner can live within the Soviet Union.

14. In any investigation of this case we should not lose the initiative. In view of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding this case the FBI, through the Department of State, could logically enough request that the USSR provide all available info on OSWALD's story in the USSR and the purpose of his visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. A friendly nation can be expected to ~~make~~ such a request. We might learn a great deal from the Soviet reply. HONOR