Re file on Briggs affidavit

Dear Jim - Briggs second 1448 affidavit and my attached memo on it 3/14/78

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15. In claiming there is "no readily available records reflecting that the two documents were ever handled in a manner inconsistent with their classification" he swears falsely because the CIA's known files "reflect" that it lost copies. TOP SECRET, too.

This is without regard to what else its files must hold, like the missing copies and the Dulles if not also the Ford archival deposits.

In his resort to an escape hatch, "readily available", I think he hascrossed the line and that this is material and flasely sworn to. He did not say "I know of no records" or anything with these kinds of loopholes.

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These false claims under oath provide similar opportunities. I'm thinking here also of remand. He should be asked to inform the court under oath how this is possible in the light of what is known, specifying what he has to read of what is known.

11. "There is nothing in either document that is embarrassing to the CIA." This is his full paragraph. Then this means that the transcript does not include Nosenko's statement that the KGB considered Oswald Qan American sleeper agent." If he does he swears falsely.

12. He claims that despite the extensive disclosures there can't be declassification "because it is impossible to predict...when the ~~threat~~ potential threats to intelligence sources and methods involved will no longer exist." What can there be after Barron and Epstein and the FBI reports? He should be asked to specify to the court. The same is true of the claimed exemption from authmatic declassification.

14. Relates to the time to review 11 pages for declassification. In his non-response he avoids and deceives because he does not address the time that could be taken for a subject expert who knows what the CIA let out. There would be very little time required for a review looking toward declassification if the review was by CIA subject experts. He misleads and evades. He resorts to irrelevant generalities not to face the specifics. For an expert I think this is defrauding us and the court.

15. In claiming there is "no readily available records reflecting that the two documents were ever handled in a manner inconsistent with their classification" he swears falsely because the CIA's known files "reflect" that it lost copies. TOP SECRET, too.

This is without regard to what else its files must hold, like the missing copies and the dulles if not also the Ford archival deposits.

In his resort to an escape hatch, "readily available", I think he hascrossed the line and that this is material and flasely sworn to. He did not say "I know of no records" or anything with these kinds of loopholes.

Briggs ¶ much verbiage, no substance. He does not state any qualifications in, training for or authority to classify or declassify these records. He also says his affidavit is not first hand & I want no more second hand ones. CA says first-person any way

CA asks him to state what "foreign intelligence source & method involved is secret" - defectors & defection & not & the Russians do not have to be told they perhaps have kept the info. Where there the possibility of any truth in this there this has to be an "unauthorized disclosure." How can a non-secret be a secret?

D