Dear Jim (aka "Well-tailored Southern Gentleman") 4/25/76

I started to read Rhoads Answers to Interrogatories Nos 26ff yesterday in the doctor's office. Before picking up with it now and stopping almost immediately to take a walk before it rains I want to introduce a new thought.

I have avoided involving Howard in any of this by even referring any copies to him because his law education has to be his first priority. He is not in school this semester and thus far has had no appearances to make on his reissued book. Aside from his excellent knowledge of the subject and judgement on it he now has had some law training. There will not be time for him to do anything before we have to file answers in some form unless there is a delay. So, I'm suggesting that we send xeroxes of the kinds of things they do with Rhoads and Silty to him for any suggestions he may make. If there is no delay both cases certainly will go farthur without what there now is no basis for expecting, capitulation. I'll send him a carbon of this for whatever it can mean. He'll know form this that if his circumstances preclude it we'll expect nothing from him. There will be a by-product in any event, informing him for the future.

26,27 Rhoads objects to this on the ground that it calls for a conclusion of law, his words of April 16. Yet in what follows and the Rhoads affidavit of March 29 attached to the Government's Opposition to our Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories there is an abundance of points at which all Rhoads does when it is convenient for purposes of continuing improper withholding in which he offers nothing but "conclusions" of law" and other conculory opinions as a substitute for fact and in violation of fact.

28 Is the first occasion. Instead of giving what is called for and is proper, a simple "yes" or "no" answer to whether "the Warren Commission [had] authority to classify documents Top Secret Pursuant to Executive Order 10501" he tried to suggest it had this authority when it dod not, first by saying it "originally" was "clouded by an apparent oversight by the Johnson Administration," which is a pair of conclusions and unjustified interpretations and then (bottom page 2, last paragraph) by probing into the long-dead President's mind to say that he did "assume that the Commission had the authority."

To reach this "conclusion" Rhoads had to lie. The dates as well as the precise words in the second par. on p. 2 give him away. He says

"Just before the report of the Commission was to be distributed, it was realized that many of the exhibits in the report still retained national security markings, although the particular documents had been declassified and that, still "Just before the report was to be distributed", /s/ "by letter of November 7,1964...Rankin called this matter to the attention of Acting Attorney General" Katzenbach."

The Report was distributed much earlier than this date, on September 27.

What was involved, what had been largely printed and was about to be distributed and what was distributed prior to the action dated by Rhoads at November 23 is the 26 volumes, not the Commission's Report. Note in some way that Rhoads at no point and in no way, with all the records in his direct custody, produces even a suggestion of proof or support of his statement "those particular documents had been declassified by the Commission or the originating agency."

With the Commission this is an impossibility. First, it lacked the elgal authority, do if it had acted it would have been an illegal act. Stripped of the unjustified and false conclusions and the semantics, Rhoadsactually admits there was no such authority. In addition, the Commission acted through mettings, executive sessions, those sought in this cause being the only ones still withheld. None of those I have contains a single word in any way no matter how indirect supporting Rhoads "conslusion of law." What these sessions do contain is the opposition of some Members, particularly Dulles, to printing any exhibits in the name of the Commission and leaving it all up to others to do this if desired.The reasons are obvious. The exhibits do not support the conclusions of the Report. In these discussions I recall no single consideration of either classification or declassification.

Rhoads here also reaches an unjustified conclusions, that the classification

and declassification

postdeclassification are identical and more irrationally, that when the President ex poste facto gave the Commission the right to declassify - this is all the Rhoads semantics attributes to LBJ's "waiver of the requirement of Section 5(i) of E.O. 10501 - he also gave it ex poste facto the right to classify - both what Rhoads does not say, long after the Commission ceased its legal existence. Of all of this the Rhoads so determined to avpids "conclusions of law" says it "would make no sense at all if the President did not assume that the Commission had the authority to clasify documents in the first place." Rhoads does not twxuble the court with any evidence or support of this utterly irrational cpnclusion that is the most deceptive kind of propaganda, not fact.

Quite aside from the impossibility based on the dates alone, there is no basis for saying that the belated recognition of functionaries that classified documents, no one of which should have been classified and no harm from the printing of which ensued, had been printed, there is absolutely no connection of any kind between this need to sanction the declassification of what had been printed and any "authority to classify".

When the government wants to continue suppression it invents. This Rhoads follows this irrationality and unreasonableness with "the President's assumption" of which he can and does have neither knowledge or proof and in support of which he attaches no record andtx the equally unsupported clain of "the overlooked requirements of the amendment to E.O.10501.

If there is to be any assumption, and ij the absence of executive action there is no basis for any, it has to be directly the other way, that the requirements as they relate to the Warren Commission were not overlooked and that it was never the intention of the President that the Commission have the right to classify. All the powers the Commission needed it had. What it wanted it sought. It neither sought the right to classify nor had it bestowed by the President. With the men running the Commission the former Chief Justice and the former Solicitor General, if any presumption is justified it is that they know the law and that they had no need. Instead, as the transcripts prove, there never was a granting of any right, even a non-existing one, from the Commission to Rankin to classify and he just went off an his xxx own and claimed the right after the court reporter just adopted it to keep his office running smoothly. The fact is that twice during executive sessions the question of secrecy was raised by two members worried about personal embarrassment. In neither case did Warren or Rankin tell the Member that there was any right to classify or that the transcripts sessions were classified.

What this boils down to is Rhoads' claim that the President did not know how to be President, didn't give a damn about or was ignorant of his own Executive Orders and as a result just when it serves some bureaucrats longing to suppress what is embarrassing, in this case the presumption of embarrassment ot the CIA being also obvious, the Archives has to invent sanction for overcoming the President's alleged stupidity of more than a dozen years earlier.

I think that you as lawyer pught address the anti-American and foreign-type authoritarian concept in the conclusion of this man who declines to make "conclsions of law" that the Commission, in exercising powers it dod not have, was exercising the President's "power under Article II."

I would like to respond to what is basic in all of this by charging that it is false swearing and that in context this false swearing is perjury. The question before the court now is whether or not the Commission had the right to classify. Rhoads has sworn falsely on this, the most obvious of the places in telling the court what is a deliberate deception of the court and an effort to deny me my rights, that at the time the question was first raised and then by Rankin, on November 7, 1964, it was "just before the report was to be distributed." By then millions of copies, to Rhoads' knowledge, had been distributed. I think he further deceives the court and compounds his offense by not informing the court that the Commission's legal existence ended in late September and that it had no existence by the time of the 11/27 printing in the

Federal Register. That date is two months and a day after publication of the Report.

I also think it is time to ask the court to consider punishment, not inherently but specifically. I think this should extend to Dugan, and perhaps you would want to raise this with Dugan first and ask him if he wants to withdraw this false swearing. If he declines I think the claim for relief to the judge will be stronger. Remember that today Rhoads has te position of Warren and that, as I believe, he also had the same role on November 7 and 28, by delegation of Rahmer's authority. Rhoads was put in immediate charge of the Warren records by Rahmer, as I believe he has sworn and I know he told me and I think others, including Fred Graham.

To make the case stronger, there is no single reference to classification in any of his alleged citations from the LBJ library. They are all to declassification. There is none from the Commission's files except those a federal judge was already ruled are invalid. I believe the continued misuse of this spurious argument and the false attribution of meaning to thmose attachments is a wilful attempt to again deceive a federal judge with the purpose of attaining an illegal end.

29. In his answer he still further compounds what I believe to be a felony. The question is limited to if there is an affirmative answer to "Did the Warren Commision have authority to classify documents Top Secret to Executive Order 10501," the words of Interrogatory 28. His citation of authority is therefore a deliberate lie because it says there was this authority. The "documentary materials referenced...attached as an Exhibits..." in no single case reference to any authority to classify anything at any level. They relate only to an ex poste facto declassification.

I believe that if the judge is in any way on the hook in this case, turning the heat onto Rhoads gives him a chance of relieving himself. This answer is a lie, it is under oath, and it is material.

31. Does the answer, that CIA's Briggs determined the 6/23 transcript is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, at the late date of 5/1/75 (or about eight years afttr my request), meet the requirements of the E.O.?

32. Same as 31.

33. This answer is informative in other ways. The date of that executive session, 1/21/64, is the day after the Commission received the autopsy proctocol. If ever there was a need for the Commission to deliberate, it was then and on the meaning and inadequacies of the proctocol, particularly when it was accompanied by the certification of the destruction of written records and was not accompanied by the notes of the autopsy that are now said not to exist and thus, at least by reasonable inference, were not attached to what the Commission did receive 1/20/ Here I'm addressing the claim made elsewhere, that the sessions were deliberative and thus immune. Not that this is not negated under American Mail and other decisions by release of all byt what I seek.

35. This is not an answer to the quwstion, "has every person...had a security clearance." It addresses first only "reviews," which cannot cover all who could have had "access." Then it is limited to"persons within the National Archives and" GSA, which still is not "every person." Whether or not "within the scope of their duties" is first ireelevant and then evasive, because we asked only about "every person" and "security clearance." What is left in his non-answer is hot as it begins, again deceptive semantics at best,"For all external access." It is not "for all external access." It is, in Rhoads' won words in his evasion, limited to "for purposes of classification review or legal preparations for defending actions such as the case at hand." This is not all access by every person. Were these not more than enough evasions or answer there is the concluding added qualification,"the National Archives had complied with all regulatory requirements in transferring transcripts." We did not ask about "transferring." He did not answer about in Archives access. I do think there was examination disclosed in 2052-73, which is prior to his date of Briggs' determination,5/1/75. My recollection of what we have in that case is examinations in DJ and CIA, the latter by Dooley and Rocca at least. What he also seeks to be covering in this evasiveness is the claimed loss of some pages within CIA. I think that with these classified TOP SECRET we should now ask how the "transfer" was made and was in in compliance"with all regulatory requirements."

This has other relevance, not merely how can the TOP SECRET be lost if the regulations are complied with and the Agency to which transfer was made not report the loss for months, this security-conecious CIA. It is that for months and as a matter of undeviating practise transcripts not ever classified in the field, particularly Dallas and New Orleans, were regularly forwarded to Washington by United States Attorneys and as I recall by mail, were then classified by the court reporter in Washington, TOP SECRET, without either the court reporter or the Commission ever once telling anyone that these were to be classified TOP SECRET. There is, of course, an obvious answer: how can what is to be published soon be classified TOP SECRET or anything at all; and did the Commission or the court reporter risk telling anyone in any office of the illegal classifications and the ridiculousness of classifying unclassifiable testimony that all knew was to be made public.

36. Does not answer nad is made more relevant by his claim of compliance with all regulations. Do we want to ask for copies of those regulations he considers applicable and complied with? His evasions are a clear signal of non-compliance, which made the claim to exemption more spurious. His answer is firther limited to Archives and GSA personnel and is thus not an answer.

37,38 His answers with regard to these questions about the 1/21 transcript are to refer to questions and answers 35,36, so what is said of them is relevant to these.

39. This question asked "list all persons who have had access to the May 19, 1964" transcript and "the date(s) on which each had access." Typically his answer begins with a non-response and evasion, limiting to "Within" Archives and GSA. He then further evades by naming no single person even within Archives and GSA. So, he has not said, again, who outside Archives and GSA had access.

He does say that even with the limitation to "these persons" he is "unable to specify the dates" of access. I raise the question again of applicable regulations on the TOP SECRET. If he really believed these were properly TOP SECRET would he not have consulted regulations and with this I raise the question do regulations require the keeping of records? Here we might throw in what the requirements of TOP SECRET are and were- like starting capability for World War III and what might shock the judge, that Warren was not reluctant to discuss what in his opinion could, like his acceptance of the post he knew he should not and his fellow justices wanted him to turn down because hr was persuaded that if he did not 40,000,000 people might be incinerated. This would provide a means of getting before the judge the totality of the ridiculousness of it all.

41. In his answer to your quwstion, has the Archives made any determination on the propriety of classification of the 6/23 transfript he says instead that and only that in accord with E.O.11652, Section 11, they consulted CIA. I wonder if there is not another provision of the E.O. on t his long delay, to well into 1975. Nixon's people put lots of window dressing into this, as I recall. It might be worth checking because this, if true, combined with the date of my request, eight years earlier, cank be on some significance.

He thus does not answer your question, did the Archives make any determination.

It gets cute andperhaps helpful when he gets into the subject matter, which he does not give and I think we should ask.

What is the subject matter? What is there about the subject matter that can be classified? They make entirely unsupported allegations about an entirely unspecified subject matter, and I do not mean here alone but everywhere and always. This may be the point at which to clobber them on even this. I'd rather not take the time or attach the proof. I d rather just make the allegation, on information and belief. The subject matter was not Nosenko, if even this would be subject to withholding or their description or characterization. This was the day before (I'd rather say within a day of) the Commission's asking Nosenko to evaluate its Oswald files. Whatever his opinion, hsf opinion is not subject to any of the interpretations of the laws and regulations applied. Whatever he might know could not be secret from the Russians, which reduces it to what the law precludes, keeping secrets from the American people only.

Assume for a mmoment that I am correctx in the subject matter, and I have enough to support the information and belief part from the Commission's files.

Ask them to specify the subject matter. Ask them instead, if you'd prefer, if the subject matter is as I believe. Then ask how this qualifies for their interpretation of the regulations. Include Nosenko's belief, that LHO was not a Russian agent and what you may find tricky but isn't, his statements that the USSR believed Oswald was a U.S. "sleeper agent." How can that properly be withheld or, depending on their advance identification of the subject matter, be encompassed by that or any description that would justify their representations first to me and then to the court. We can nail them on this.

How? Of the other and not generally know or readily-apparent ways, on Hoover's determination. let them ague Hoover didn't know his business. Hoover not only recommended that Nosenko be a witness before the Commission, which would mean that all of this would have been published. Hoover, for his own reasons, made the arrangement in advance, without consulting the Commission, and then informed it. I have it.

Can there be a better witness than Hoover?

There remains a question in my mind whether they can describe these contents and subject matter as they have and downgrade to confidential, too.

Of the man things wrong in his concluding sentence, that he has "assured that the transcripts are properly classified pursuant to E.O.11652," I want to note a few:

This is a conclusion of law that he says is requirement that he not respond to the earlier interrogatory;

Who has he assured, when and where?

Does Briggs qualify for this under the regulations?

How is it that the CIA is the agency to consult if the Archives has the right and is the Commission's successor? There is no showing that the subject matter is other than I say, and that is not the CIA's jurisdiction. It is internal and domestic and if the function of any agency other than the Archives as successor to the Commission, it would have to be FBI, not CIA.

Why, meaning also why else, has he refused to answer your question, which is not did the CIA determine but did he, Archives and.or GSA, when he has and admists having the authority(40)?

I can think of only one basis for the CIA's attempt to withhold Nosenko's expert opinion, belief or repetition of the USSR's spooks' belief that LHO was a sleeper agent, already not classified when this "decision" and "determination" were made and published long before the date on Rhoads' affidavit; the admission that LHO was their agent. This, however, cannot be part of Nosenko's knowledge or experise.

So, even if the Commission discussed this, that cannot be withheld.

It is already public.

It is not classifiable anyway.

It could be secret from the American people only, not the USSR, already quoted by Nosenko and not withheld if originally and illegally it was.

Precedent exists in the release of the session of 1/27, we now know with CIA's OK.

I want to digress here for a suggestion on strategy. First a tactical consideration, my suggestion that I restrict this to information and belief. Let them challenge it and we'll produce it. This get to the strategy, disclosed first in their appeal in 75-226, a direct assault on me and my competence and dependability. Let us take them on on their terms, as we have to in 75-1996 anyway. This can be in any means you prefer. I think whether there is basis for my allegation of information and belief is valid, but I would not ask or raise this that way. I'd do it by pinning it all on this and supporting it only by that fortuitous evasion of answer on perjuey, that I know more about the subject than anyone now in the FBI. That is expertise enough and proper enough certification and lets us get this before this judge in both aspects, a non-answer to perjury, awareness of the unanswered charge and the most credibile of opinions about my experise, from the outstanding ahthority, the other side and the U.S.Attorney's office. This will become explicitly or inherently an issue and our best chance is to anticipate it and make them put up or back off and retreat and withdraw the claims.

Not only can we not avoid this at some point in this case , we already face it in two others right now, the appeal and 1996.

However, it compels them also to face it and there just is no chance that any of their claims, allegations and representations is within reason or applicable or honest and this is the rihht place and the right time to make that an issue. Bracketing it with me is helpful in other ways and cases.

Going back to his answer, he uses "provided" as meaning, in the context of your question, "required." So, in terms of the question, I'd ask a citation of what part of 11652. He doesn t say or suggest in this new conclusion on the law "that is upon his personal knowledge and belief."

52. Here he says he received the Young letter the day it was signed/ and dated. Young is not qualified as having the legal right to make the decision. If Briggs is, he does not claim to have done anything on Briggs's word but on Youngs' only. Why should an FOIA officer of any rank, and Young is not the top at CIA, Wilson is, have the presumed authority under 11652? He gives no indication and I'd ask if he makes these decisions on the basis of second-hand recommendations.

If his answer means anything it means that there was no prior decision and there was my prior request which on this basis alone would seem to have been improperly denied and on this basis alone would mean he has to give me the transcript. See WWIV, which was published long before this decision.

55. If true this answer means that no copies were sent out by any means to both Justice and CIA and that if they were, as we know, they were returned. Then how about the missing pages, of which he does know? If not returned, then his answer is false. We do know that copies were sent to the CIA at least and that he knows it.

56 is an evasion. Ask if he has checked. I believe that each Member got a transcript/ Ask also is he now has the copy provided Dulles and if not how security regulations are being obeyed if he claims the classification was proper and from 1964 on he had the tesponsibility. You might ask him to produce the Dulles copy and a chain of possession. I think it is relevant and helps the court understand the frivolity of their positions.

57. He says they have 7 copies of the 6/23 and 3 of the 1/21 transcripts. Here of course we are at the atge of compliance and need for and preservation of security. This is, after all, of the TOP SECRET. So let us correct him a little and raise these proper questions and do a little mindblowing at the same time. He says there are 11 pages nad I'll say there are 12 to the 6/23 transcript. I'll give their numbers as 7640-~~641~~x51/ I'll says that he knows there were 10 initial copies, not counting any subsequently xeroxed, so how is he meeting his obligations when he can account for only 7? And does not simple aithmetic suggest that each of the seven Members got and kept a copy/ only some returning What happened to the copies of the dead members, including Dulles? How is security being preserved? On 1/21 I'll say that while the pages are numbered from 1 to 126, the actual net pages are 124, that the reporter was Forshein (Mills on 6/23), that there were 9 original copies and he now has only 3. Again security.

The Princeton archive should perhaps be under him. But whether or not it is, has he asked before answering? Do we want to write and ask?

I can give more info but would prefer not to. This includes the invoice and receppt numbers, etc. I have it all. Let us lay details out that he had not in the course of a direct challegge that might impress the judge and the clerk. Is relevant, too.

Especially if they read Kilty on me.

58. Here he refers to a "previous review" and a copy then "provided the CIA" that is not included in his prior answers where it is relevant. Here also he alleges that an error by another is binding on him even if he knows it is an error. He also says forall practical purposes that he abdicated total responsibility to Briggs andCIA. And he seems to be taking the position that any possible exemption under FOIA is a mandatory not an optional exemption otherwise the guidlines are not superceded.

59. Now that we have the internal correspondence on the declassification of those classified records the Commission printed, I think that if applicable you ask for the record of downgrading on each, indicated in an earlier comment in a different way.

It would seem that his answers are neither "true" nor "complete" as he swears.

I find it interesting that he did not execute this at his office, as with the earlier one, but at 18 and F, NW, which is the office of another and I do not think that of GSA's general counsel. The G St address of a building that runs between F and G and on the west side of 18th holds the Secret Service.

Responses to Request for Production of Documents

The two covers confirm what I said about the number of copies of each session as well as the page numbers and number of pages in each.

There is a question: why did Johnson stamp a form for new classification on one cover and write the other in in longhand? He is supposed to have done both at the same time.

3. With regard to the CIA's response to my earlier request apparently referred to here in citation of Briggs' letter they take literally what is entirely improbable, Briggs' claim that it is "in order to protect sources and methods" which can't be involved, Nosenko being known and long published as a source and questions by or for the Warren Commission not being a "method" in any reasonable intrepretation.

4. is supposed to be "all communications" between Arch and CIA on these transcripts on classification, ~~xxxxxx~~ declassification, or review. What is here is no answer and only 1 letter, Angel to Helms of 6/16/70. I'd ask for a written answer and all documents asked for. This letter is that of a regular rview only. They have and have referred to other documents. I think they are holding back and not giving a written answer on purpose so I'd press on this.

I now see more after the guidlines the way my set is arranged. It would appear that at the very least it took Helms more than a year to respond and that during this time at least therewas no legally-acceptable classification and that my request should have been honored.

O'Neill's 7/28/78 letter does say that the "internal records of the Commission" were reviewed" by the Archives in 1967, despite Rhpads not saying this when asked. It also says other than Rhoads on the Guidlines and my does suggest, agins despite Rhoads' contrary statement, that E.O.11652 be used.

Helms' 12/22/72 response is so irrationally restrictive that it asks Archives (by his words probably orders is closer) to withhold what had never been and can not properly be withheld. (List 1) List 2 1A he withhod what bears no security classification. Both ture in List 2.

List 2A is headed as Commission internal records. First two items on it are the 1/21 and 1/27 executive sessions. 18 is the 6/23 transcript.

(Above, where I say he withholds what was published - this was after an interruption and I forgot the list of those he OKed, on the first and to me then turned page of the letter . Rather than check all of those forget it. Not important enough.)

Thos a;one makes Rhoads' response less than full, what he swore to, if not also flase from omission when he knew better.

On Page 3, more than eight years after the Report was published, again getting back to the earlier claims by Rhoads, Helms does not oppose publishing or as he says releasing two Commission Exhibits, 631 and 1054. With all declassified prior to publishing, as Rhoads swears?

On page 4 his refusal to agree to release of what he wants withheld is restricted to "to protect sources and methods," neither of which should fit these transcripts. Despite Rhoads he uses Guideline 2, which had been called to his attention.

Rhoads own letter of 3/27/74 says other than he swore to, that he had provided a copy of the 1/27 transcript to Arthur Dooley. It also says it is in CIA's files, other than Rhoads swore to. (both p.1, graf 1.)

P.1 graf 2 Rhoads personally provides copies of guidelines, other than he swore.

This also acknowledge a 1972 review, not in Rhoads affidavit or answers under oath.It was also "subsequent to the issuance of Executive Order 11652," or without the re-classification classified illegally.Tjis also says that Rhoads has the authority to comply with the 10-year mandatory provision and did and ~~xkkk~~ did not say this in his affirmations under oath. Archives did decided that it can declassify transcripts and here he says this, as he did not under oath in affirmatoons where it was relevant. And they asked re 1/27 DJ too.

This March 27 and thereafter we were in court needlessly. Similar letter same date to Saxbe.

4/15 CIA'sWarner had no objections.

Ulman's DJ response of 6/3 does not object to declassification or release and says release is an Archives decision. I think this is quite relevant in the current litigation. Also relevant is that Justice did not invoke what on the face of the court papers it and Archives did, the investigatory-files exemption. This letter would seem to make that spurious.

Johnson's rputing slip note to Baxter, CIA and Morrison's 10/1 reply: we can have some fun. The second item under (a) is one I intended using as a horrible example. They ask that it be withhled and all it doesis show how Helms conned the Commission. I had intended this for our purposes. This is lily-golding and does address the seriousness of the CIA's use of the right to classify to misue and withhold what dirty stuff it pulled than can't be classified.

Do we want to ask for a legible copy of Johnson's 3/19 note? I can't read it.

Johnson's 11/12/74 to DJ (which again shows that Rhoads knew copies of transcripts were out of Archives' possession).

Ulman's 2/26 response, no objection.

(Here from the past we have proof that earlier denial to me for the reasons Rhoads specified in 1967 was invalid and I think is here relevant.These are 1/22 and 27.)

Young's 5/1 letter is proof of incompletehess of repponse. There is not attached MJ's 3/21 to which it responds.

Fo we have the right to decide whether a text is a incoherent or whether we will pay for a copy and then decide? This does not say that all must be withheld and I'd be surprised if anyone would risk this kind of masking knowing there might be an independent review.

5. Letters on 1/18/65 White House letter on availability of files: I do not know that it is so byt the LBJ Library at least is under Archives. In the past Rhoads has used the words" National Archives" to mean his DC headquarters building only. I'd ask about other installations under National Archives and cite LBJ Library as one but not necessarily all. It is clear that he was not reluctant to have a search there when he could misuse the results, so let us ask him one where misuse is less likely.

6. WC instructions to Rankin orderinghim to classify 1/21. abd 6/23 or any other sessions.

They, naturally, have none, despite the Rankin affidavit, etc.

7 Documents on this.

The 1/7/64 Ward letter is propaganda because it repeats what Rankin told Ward not what the Commission told Rankin. Rankin's confirmation of the next day also is meaningless for the same reasons. So also is his downgrading of 5/1/64. You might want to ask for any records showing this was only so that the GPO could set type, which it was. (Or the question of classification came up before long after the Report was printed and distributed.)

8. Statement of views on availability of WC records from named agencies. Arch says it has none

9. Willens' views.

This is a once-through heavily rather than lightly. You regard the spurious use of the Rankin affidavit and the argument with it as res judicata. I regard it as deliberate deception, misrepresentation and with the argument and oath by Rhoads perjury.