


The Way of the AGGRESSOR



By
JOHN MICHAEL

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JOHN MICHAEL

“The country which will be our ally in the course we are blocking out for ourselves... has been an aggressor, the most aggressive aggressor the world has ever known, unashamed of its aggressions — rather proud of them.”


HON. GERALD P. NYE
of North Dakota
in the U. S. Senate, March 8, 1941

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


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FOREWORD

BLOOD is the ink with which the book of history is written. War is older than bread. We may deprecate the fact but we cannot deny it.

The present war is not the first of which people hoped it would be the last. The wish to eliminate murder as an instrument of politics is almost as old as war itself. But through many centuries, fulfillment of that wish has been conspicuous by its utter absence.

We need not go far to find the explanation. Not counting the cost, man has always striven to improve his material wealth. With the growth of organized communities, cruder methods to this end, such as murder and robbery, were abolished, or, at least, their use was reduced. While within their confines the communities were able to enforce such innovations, in their relations with one another force as the final means to settle a quarrel, to reach an end, remained supreme.

Wars will continue so long as there is no organized community of all the nations, with a common law and a common agency of law enforcement. That such an organization can be formed—or, if it is formed, can long survive—is more than doubtful. For such a body to take definite shape and to become effective, nations would have to renounce their wish to advance themselves at the cost of other nations.

Take the case of our own country. With our splendid industry and business organization, we carry on profit-

able foreign trade—profitable not only to a few merchants and industrialists, but to the country as a whole since production for export keeps millions employed. In some countries that are our customers, and in others that are our competitors, our gain is their loss. American foreign trade brings added poverty to nations that are already poor. No doubt many of us would be willing to eliminate those phases of our international business which have such consequences. But would the nation as a whole readily accept such a sacrifice?

The purpose of this volume is not, however, to go into the numerous problems which must be solved if world peace is to be organized. Our object is, rather, to draw a clear picture of the single greatest obstacle that blocks the path. That obstacle is imperialism, and the imperialism of England more than that of all other nations combined.

England has built, entirely for gain, an empire of extraordinary proportions. Her incident attacks on other nations have in turn made those nations try to regain what had been grabbed from them. The more they became impoverished, the harder they fought—until they were so weak that further efforts were hopeless.

English conquests especially during the past three centuries have decisively influenced world affairs. Lesser imperialists have done their share to increase the number and bitterness of wars; but none has been so consistent and so successful as Britain, and no acts of other countries have done so much to poison the international atmosphere. The English method of conquest, and its effects on peace, may be illustrated by two occurrences in recent history.

Cyprus, the large Mediterranean island, was occupied, more or less “peacefully”, in 1878. This occupation was not followed by official annexation until 1914, when the world’s attention was engaged elsewhere; moreover, after nearly forty years of “temporary” occupation the world had become accustomed to the idea that Cyprus was British.

At the end of the World War, England acquired, by the subterfuge of “mandates” from the League of Nations, all the holdings of Germany and Turkey which she thought useful. That she took nothing from Austria and Bulgaria, her other enemies, was simply owing to the fact that they had nothing England wanted. Only a small number of people were sufficiently familiar with English history to realize that here was merely another application of her time-honored method, and that sooner or later the ‘mandates’ would be annexed outright; benevolent rule of England over her new conquests in time became accepted by most of the Powers.

As for the effects of such a policy on world peace, they are there for all of us to see. There is almost universal agreement among those versed in international affairs that had the last war been followed by the equitable peace for which it was professedly fought, conditions on the European continent would not have become so chaotic; the depression of 1929 would not have hit so hard; in Germany, Hitler would not have risen to power. Atrocious events of the immediate past can be traced directly to the fact that the war “to make the world safe for democracy” was ended by treaties which sowed the seeds of new wars and conflicting ideologies. Where a fair settlement might have brought a hundred years

of peace, the "solutions" that were found never provided peace at all, and led to resumption of active warfare after twenty years.

So long as English imperialism continues to be what it has been for many centuries, obviously there is no hope of achieving even a minimum of stability for the world.

The social revolution which, we are told, is on the way in England may or may not put a stop to Britain's acquisitiveness. The probabilities against such a change of policy are overwhelming: the process of gradual incorporation of the 1919 conquests is even now under way; the latest British annexation (of the south of Arabia) occurred as late as 1937; even with England's backward social organization, labor has to some extent benefited from the nation's conquests; and, last but certainly not least, a simple glance at the map shows those gaps in the roads of Empire, and life-lines of Empire, which still wait to be filled.

The British Empire is not a static body. It is intensely dynamic. It will be further expanded, under some humanitarian pretext or other, or it will shrink. Its further expansion will not occur without bloody wars; if it is to fall into its decline, it can be relied upon to put up a stiff fight against disintegration.

Such are the prospects for world peace. It is for the thoughtful reader to decide which country and which trends are to be blamed for so discouraging a state of affairs.

I

THE ROAD TO SUPREMACY

NO NATION in the world, ever since the dawn of its history, has directed all its efforts towards conquest as consistently and ruthlessly as England. England rules one quarter of the globe. That rule was won in nearly nine centuries of fighting. During those centuries, England was at war fifty-six years out of each hundred.

England's policy of military conquest was usually successful, from the early days of the fight against the Scots and the Welshmen to the acquisition by "mandate" of Germany's colonies at the end of the World War. The people who after long fighting succeeded in throwing off the British yoke are spectacular exceptions. They are only three: the Americans, the Irish and the French. But have Ireland and France really become free?

Whether the Irish Free State will not be subjugated again remains to be seen. That England of her own free will may let go of her hold on the northern counties which are still under her rule is more than unlikely. As for France, at the end of centuries of fighting she became a faithful and obedient follower of her erstwhile foe. England did not succeed in keeping France's soil, but she won a vassal.

England vs. France—Seven Centuries of Wars

In 1066 A.D., a Norman duke invades the British isle. On the fateful field of Hastings is laid the foundation of modern Great Britain. Less than fifty years later begins a conflict without end. The curtain rises on more than seven hundred years of wars, raids, constant conflict. None of the fighting is on English soil. All of the killing, looting, raping, is done in France. That country is to be made the first English colony. The French succeed repeatedly in repulsing the invader. Several times, because mutual exhaustion has become too great, or because the English are tempted away by some other objective, a peace treaty is written, and decades of war are followed by years of uneasy quiet.

Full-fledged warfare has been given up for a time, but looting raids continue. Froissard, the French chronicler, writes at the end of the middle ages that to the English "battle and massacre are joy and bliss." He says that "they look with greed and unbounded envy at the wealth of their neighbor" and calls them "the most dangerous and offensive nation on earth."

As the centuries progress, the periods of Anglo-French wars become shorter, the intervals of peace longer. But fighting, when it occurs, is more intense. Allies join the fray. The English aim ceases to be one of outright ownership; it is realized in London that what matters is not to have the English flag fly over Paris, but to have France do the bidding of her English masters. That goal is best achieved by curbing the Frenchman's might, and by depriving him of important overseas pos-

sessions. The goal is not fully reached until after the Fashoda episode, not many years before 1900.

The First Hundred Years' War

At the dawn of the twelfth century, King Henry I sets out to conquer Normandy whence the conquerors of England came. An English King marries a French princess, heiress to much of her native country. The French refusing to pass under foreign rule, English armies set out to assert their might. At one time, English dominion over France extends from the Channel in the north to the Pyrénées mountains in the south, and from the Atlantic seaboard in the west to the Puy-de-Dôme hills in the east. The English design is to conquer the rest of France. But the attempt is given up in 1216 A.D., after one hundred and sixteen years of war in which fighting never stopped entirely but at times became intermittent. King John Sans terre (=without land) has lost the Duchies north of the river Loire, and the battle of the knights at Bouvines, 1214 A.D., was such a bloody defeat that it is best to stop fighting.

The century that ensues is one of peace, but in name only. English looting expeditions against France occur again and again. Undeclared war is by no means an invention of our day.

The Second Hundred Years' War

From 1337 to 1453, a war of four generations is fought. Justification? The Kings of England claim to be rightful heirs to most of France. France's Dukes and Kings, and her peoples, do not agree. The true rea-

son? France is rich. The knights and the hired soldiers of England like to make booty. Flanders cloth and tapestries are beautiful and can be sold at a price. The golden vessels of convents and castles in every corner of France are light to carry off and easily exchanged against hard cash. The best sport of all is to catch some Frenchman of rank and not to release him until the last penny in ransom has been squeezed out of his family. Naturally, war in Scotland, Wales or Ireland, with their poverty and their sparse populations, could not be nearly as lucrative.

That this spirit, the real cause of most of England's wars, was the force back of the invasions of France has been admitted with great candor by Professor G. M. Trevelyan, the famous historian of Cambridge University, who said that the armies sent to France every year to ravage and loot the country were relatively small, but well-organized, and that *for a long period England became the depredator and tyrant of her continental neighbors.*

The effect of this type of warfare on the French is easy to guess. All one need do is remember what happened to Ireland. The half of France was devastated, depopulated. Rich cities became poor. Then, suddenly, a curious thing happened.

The French had suffered frightful defeats, at Crécy, Maupertuis, Azincourt; Paris had been looted. There and in other towns, in villages and on farms, people had been robbed of all but their shirts. They were at the depth of despair when, a symbol of national awakening, Joan of Arc arose and led her weakened people to victory over the invader. Joan was burnt at the stake in

1431. But the new French spirit did not die with her, and twenty years later England had lost all her strongholds in France but Calais. The port at the narrowest point of the Channel was to remain for a time the Gibraltar of its day.

Two Centuries of "Peace."

The second Hundred Years' War has ended in defeat. Trouble brews at home. For the next thirty years, the civil war of the Roses absorbs the strength and attention of the English lords. When it ends, England is weak and France has become stronger. Resumption of the Anglo-French war will have to wait for a time.

But meanwhile, things are happening in other parts. Columbus discovers America. Spain becomes rich and powerful. Holland will follow. Portugal is wealthy. The picture of Europe has changed: instead of one strong neighbor England now has two, will soon have three, all of them sea-faring. Obviously, then, to return to the traditional game of the annual French incursion would be suicidal. France not only has developed a fighting machine, but in addition may ally with Spain or Holland; not content to repulse the invader, as she has twice done successfully after generations of fighting, she may carry the war to British soil.

The first half of the sixteenth century is spent in reconstruction. Then, under virgin queen Elizabeth, the lion roars once more. Not against France, this time. Against Spain, Portugal, the German Hanseatic Cities. The war is fought not by invasion, as in previous days; but by sending out privateers to disrupt commerce and to make loot. With France, relations are almost un-

troubled. France is now too strong to be an easy victim; not yet strong enough, though, to be an immediate threat. Is the fight between England and France ended? No. But before full war can be resumed, Spain, then Holland, must be got out of the way. In the interval, the means of carrying on the French fight are those of diplomacy and trade.

The defeat of Holland is not completed until 1674. Less than fifteen years later begins what some historians have called the Third Hundred Years' War. England's fight for the destruction of French power begins in 1688. It will not end until 1815. It earns Canada. It helps earn India. It finally ensures the Rule of the Waves. England is now the arbiter of the world's affairs. Her only lasting defeat in her Third Hundred Year's War with France is the loss of the United States. Had there not been that War, and had it not prompted the French to help the Thirteen Colonies, the Revolution would have failed dismally.

But the fight between England and France is not yet ended. Even though Napoleon is beaten, France has not been fully bent under the yoke. There are moments of friction during the nineteenth century, the worst of them after Fashoda. But France is in a spot. England's population has doubled, Germany's trebled. France cannot afford to be at odds with both. England has fought her for centuries, robbed her colonies, destroyed her power. Germany has just taken Alsace-Lorraine. Will France choose to forget Fashoda, or to forget Strasbourg? She forgets Fashoda. She becomes, ostensibly, England's ally; in reality, England's vassal. Shots will not be exchanged between English and French

forces until the day of Oran, and the French reprisal bombardment of Gibraltar. Whether that fighting between allies was merely an "incident", or whether the book of Anglo-French strife has been re-opened, only the future can tell.

The Calvary of Ireland

One of the great names in England's history is that of Strongbow. What made him famous? His knightly deeds? His great mind? His generous heart? Oh, no. He was the first invader of Ireland.

In the second half of the twelfth century, Strongbow headed the force which set out to conquer the Emerald Isle. The Irishmen of that day were the most civilized people in northern Europe. For centuries, their monasteries and schools had been renowned. Ireland had become converted to Christianity as early as the fifth century. Irish learning, Irish industry, Irish trade were by-words.

But England's soldiers had excellent arms and knew how to use them. Her archers were the best of Europe. The Irish, fighting with battle-axes and spears, were no match for them. Strongbow's knights took the east of the Isle, divided the land among themselves and forced the owners to become rent-paying tenants. Looting expeditions to the North, South and West succeeded one another for a century. The sons and grand-sons extended their rule, and their ownership, farther west. Wherever they established themselves, the Irish became little better than slaves.

The descendants of Strongbow's knights were the masters of much of Ireland. As the generations went

by, they gradually became accepted. They shared with their Irish neighbors, and with their vassals and tenants, the fear of further English invasions. Centuries went by until a new attack was made.

England's great period of imperialist expansion set in with the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The captains of that monarch roved the seas, seizing or sinking the vessels of other countries. Timber was needed. Ireland had it. Good harbors, closer to the raiding areas than the English ports, would be useful. Ireland had them. But Elizabeth's other ventures prevented the sending of a large army. The invading forces were outnumbered so badly that the Irish might some day win out by sheer force of numbers in spite of their inferiority in training and equipment. That danger was removed simply, effectively, brutally. Since the numbers of Englishmen could not be increased, those of Irishmen were reduced. In those districts which the small English force could not master by direct occupation, the people were exterminated. The more fortunate were put to the sword. Those not so lucky were made to starve to death. Elizabeth's champions of civilization destroyed one and a half million Irish lives. The conquest was undertaken in the interests of humanity and of the true Christian faith.

Even today, Irishmen do not like the English. What the feelings of Elizabeth's victims must have been for that ruler, for her servants or for anything that was English is not difficult to imagine. Their hate, and allegiance to the Catholic Church which was anathema to the invaders, united the Irish. They had been tribes-

men; they became patriots. They began to realize that they all belonged to one nation.

After not much less than a century of oppression, the bitter feeling of Irishmen led to the killing of protestant Englishmen in Ulster, in the northeast of Ireland. The reply was not long in coming. Cromwell, then England's ruler, sent out what he called a punitive expedition. In reality, it was one of conquest. In the eleven years from 1641 to 1652, one third of the population of Ireland was destroyed, by the sword, by hunger, by sickness. Petty, English historian, says that 660,000 people were killed. The expedition had a fitting beginning: at Tredah and Wexford, everybody without exception was murdered in order that the angel of fear might fly ahead of England's troops.

But this was not enough. Twenty thousand boys and girls were sold into slavery to the West Indies. Millions of acres of land were taken from the Irish and given, or sold for a consideration, to English soldiers and traders. The Irishmen who survived Cromwell's expedition were driven away to sterile regions in the interior. The country was transformed into a desert. Thousands of homeless women and children became the prey of the cold or the wolves. In the fertile areas, one acre out of eleven was all that remained to the Irishmen.

The completion of conquest brought a lessening of military violence, but not its cessation. Ruthless policing was needed to compel the Irish farmers, cowed though they were, to submit and pay rent to their despoiler. As the country was bled white by these payments to Englishmen who for the most part chose to live in England and to spend their income there; as the once-prosperous

industries were forbidden and destroyed because they competed with British factories; and as the farmers were driven off their fertile land because it was wanted as pasture, unrest and despair drove the people into repeated insurrections. When, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the potato crop, which provided the main food of the now destitute population, failed several years in succession, the greatest famine in modern history wiped out a quarter of the population. America tried to help; so did the countries of continental Europe. As for England, instead of bringing food to the starving country she took out most of what little there was. The absentee landlords were in the habit of exporting to England the grain grown by Irish farmers on Irish soil; they were not going to change their lucrative plans just because a few million Irishmen were starving. Their government could have stopped them, of course. But then, *they* were the government.

In 1916, while England was fully engaged in her war on Germany, the Irish felt that it was "now or never". Their Revolution led, years after the end of the World War, to liberty of sorts. The exploits of the English "Black-and-Tan" fighters in the long conflict are still present to the minds of most of us. An incomplete record of the policy observed by that chivalrous army of English volunteers—a policy of arbitrary slaughter, arson, and rape followed, as often as not, by the murder of the victim—is contained in every recent history of Ireland.

The Irishman has no happy recollection of English feats of arms. Rape of his land; killing of millions of men, women and children in his small island, by the men of Strongbow, Elizabeth, Cromwell, and the Black-and-

Tans; starvation of other millions, which could have been so easily prevented by his English masters. He has now achieved comparative independence, not for all of his land nor from all of his imposed obligations. Un- easily he looks across his Eastern Sea, fearing, almost certain, that new efforts to force English rule on his country will bring new suffering to his people.

Scotland and Wales

Like all other nations, Great Britain was built by war. Unlike other European nations, the homeland itself was built by wars of subjection.

France became France because from among her princes and knights, who were of the stock and language of their people, those of one of the French states gradually succeeded in asserting their supremacy over the others. Germany became Germany in much the same manner.

In England, a prince and his knights, of foreign, Norman, stock, and foreign, French, language, subjected the Anglo-Saxon population. Having forced them to accept the yoke, the Norman rulers then set their Saxon servitors at their Celtic neighbors. Centuries of bloody strife finally conquered, for the Lord on the Thames, both Wales and Scotland. In this fighting, the Saxons and their masters became amalgamated. As for the Welshmen and the Scots, at the middle of the twentieth century they have not become English in the sense that the people of Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy are French, or those of Bavaria and Austria German. The closest available parallel seems to be that with the Basques of Southern France and Northern Spain. The Basques

have to some extent accepted French or Spanish civilization. Nevertheless, they preserve their own language and traditions. The wish to form an independent state is defended by a few hotheads, but not shared by the greater numbers. The consciousness of racial and cultural distinctness is acute.

Politically, it may be said that unremitting, cruel fighting from the twelfth to the eighteenth century has been successful. Complaints of foreign rule are heard in Edinburgh and Cardiff. Somewhat of the nature of an equivalent, Londoners jokingly lament that English affairs are run by Scots. On the whole, English conquest and English rule have become mutually accepted.

The Murderous Queen

Scarcely has Elizabeth succeeded to the throne occupied, until a few years before, by amorous Henry VIII, her father, than a chain of wars begins which will not end until the downfall of Napoleon, two and a half centuries later. Wars against a variety of European nations, fought seldom on the continent, usually on the seas, at times in foreign parts. Wars with a double objective: to destroy every other European power, and to take from it its wealth. Other conflicts, fought in the main not by the government, but by charter companies ostensibly intended for the development of trade, are aimed solely at the conquest of rich lands in foreign continents.

As embattled as reputedly virginal, Elizabeth is, with Cromwell, the greatest empire-builder since Roman times. Greater than the Turks and Arabs, greater than Napoleon. *Her* empire lasts.

When Elizabeth is crowned, England has been warring, robbing, looting for more than four hundred years. But the conquest of France has ended in failure. In Ireland, four centuries after Strongbow the conquerors have become more Irish than the conquered English. Wales is subjected, Scotland not. The British Empire is as yet a thing of the future.

Elizabeth mounts the throne at the height of an era of discoveries. The world is being mapped. Spain has conquered much of South America. Portugal too has sent out its explorers and won a foothold in foreign continents. Trade and outright looting have enriched the two countries on the Iberian Peninsula. They, and Holland and the Hanseatic Cities, have become wealthy through dealing with foreign countries in Europe and in far-off parts. England's share in this trade and in those possessions is nil. England is as poor as Spain is rich. Nascent English sea-power, and traditional English ruthlessness, will soon change that.

The Navy begun by Henry is completed by Elizabeth's Gresham. He arms the ships with cannons. Captains are now able to fight enemy vessels without grappling. The introduction of shelling into naval warfare is as much of an innovation, and as bitterly resented, as will be, centuries later, the use of submarines and air bombs.

A strange compact is made between Elizabeth's government and England's pirates, between law and lawlessness. The compact is mainly directed at Spain. Not yet powerful enough to tackle that country in open warfare, England encourages, appoints, orders, her pirates to seize Spanish ships. The gold and silver taken from the Hispanic galleons swell England's vaults. A war is

fought without declaration, by forces for which the government bears no official responsibility. Alliances are engineered with Holland, the enemy of tomorrow, and France, the enemy of centuries past and future. Spain, faced with such a strong coalition, dare not take decisive action against the robberies of men like John Hawkins, Francis Drake, Morgan.

Seeley, the historian of British imperialism, has given an excellent description of the mentality back of such arrangements. Says he: * "Consider the nature of the long desultory war of England with Spain, of which the expedition of the Armada was the most striking incident. . . . The English sea-captains were very much like buccaneers, and indeed to England the war is throughout an industry . . . the most profitable investment. . . . That Spanish war is in fact the infancy of English foreign trade. The first generation of Englishmen that invested capital put it into that war. . . ."

"Now whatever may be the natural opposition between the spirit of trade and the spirit of war, trade pursued in this method is almost identical with war and can hardly fail to lead to war."

The alliance between capital and imperialism will outlive Elizabeth's day. It will build the British Empire. At every opportunity it will add new bricks to that edifice. The first war caused by that alliance is the Spanish war from 1588 to 1604—a conflict begun at the end of thirty years of undeclared war and constant raiding.

Since 1560, the fast-sailing ships captained by the Sea-Dogs have been busily tearing chunks from the body of the Spanish giant. John Hawkins, Francis Drake,

* J. R. Seeley: *The Expansion of England*. Boston, 1883.

Walter Raleigh, Richard Grenville, Cavendish, Morgan and other daring pirates have found the backing of the Queen and her merchant adventurers. They are provided with money, men, ships, arms. They raid Spanish convoys, pillage the West Indies and the harbors of Central America. They steal so much gold, silver, precious stones and other goods that England, only a few years ago the land of poverty, overflows with wealth. The "Golden Age" has in truth arrived. Successful pirates are knighted by the Virgin Queen. Those who fail fall into disgrace or, worse, get their heads chopped off.

John Hawkins, most efficient slave trader of his day, earns millions for his Queen. Francis Drake, appointed Admiral, is given warships and, in 1585, starts out on another bloody raid into the Caribbean. In 1587, he sails twenty-three of the Queen's vessels to the very coast of Spain, and takes or sinks a huge number of ships belonging to that country and to the Hanseatic Cities. This is the last of the great acts of war before the war. In 1588, the first Anglo-Spanish conflict officially begins.

Spain has failed to realize what she is up against. In the face of decades of law-breaking, she has precariously maintained "peace". Instead of seeking some arrangement to gain the neutrality of France or Holland or both, and then setting out quickly and efficiently to destroy the pirate in his lair on the Thames, she has hoped for the best and preserved the amenities. Confronted with acts—in peace-time!—which completely dwarf twentieth-century Hitler's worst in war, Spain has almost passively looked on until it is too late.

Not that she has not protested! In 1580, King Philip's envoy to London has demanded the hanging for piracy

of Francis Drake. The English answer has been increased armament, further raiding and, now, the assault which must inevitably bring war.

Events show almost immediately that the Spaniards have missed the boat. In the spring of 1588 the great Armada sets sail for the Channel. 132 large vessels, and innumerable smaller ones, are to defeat the pirate. An army of thirty thousand men is ready in the Spanish Netherlands to invade England as soon as Elizabeth's ships are beaten. The British Empire is threatened with death even before it is born. Better armament, better strategy, and the weather decide the issue in favor of England.

England's 197 ships, manned and captained by the most experienced privateers, are smaller and more agile than the ponderous giants of the Armada. Such men as Hawkins, Drake, Frobisher and Raleigh, fighting under the orders of Admiral Howard, are better than a match for the Spanish captains. Their pilots know the crags and banks, the winds and currents along the English coast.

The battle is joined at Lizard Point, on July 19, 1588. It travels up the Channel, and off Calais fighting lasts several days. Six fireships work havoc among the Spaniards. Sudden storms disorganize their navy. By July 30, the proud force has dwindled to no more than forty ships. Renewed bad weather scatters these to the coasts of Ireland and Scotland; one or two are actually driven as far as Norway.

Only a small number regain Spanish ports. In the first huge battle for the mastery of the oceans, the English shark has remained supreme. He will re-assert at

every challenge, and establish more and more firmly, a rule based on complete disregard of the rights of other nations, and on scarcely veiled contempt of international law.

A symbol of the spirit of the times, and of the attitude ever since observed by British imperialists, the statue of Sir Francis Drake stands at Plymouth Hoe, in the spot from where he is said to have witnessed the arrival of Spain's Armada. Drake's services to the building of English power are unquestioned. Equally undeniable is the fact, revealed in both his acts and his writings, that he was one of the most cruel and cynical pirates and marauders in history, and that he and his men were a lawless, inhuman, and murderous lot.

It is interesting to observe the reaction to such a personality in England and abroad. The Spaniards called Sir Francis the "arch pirate of the universe". As for the English, a typical statement is that of Gardiner, the great historian. Said he, sincerely and with pride: "If England remained free and independent, it was in great part the result of the lifework of Sir Francis Drake."

The Battle of the Armada decides the war at its very outset. Yet fighting will drag on for twenty-six years. Even then, Spanish sea power will not be entirely destroyed. Two more wars, of five years each, will be fought before that goal is finally reached.

But these wars will not occur until decades after Elizabeth's death. They complete the performance which she has so successfully begun. She has secured the grip on Scotland and Ireland. She has made England rich. She has won the rule of the waves. She has acquired the first overseas possessions. Surely no one

would be unkind enough to remember her extraordinary methods.

Spain, Holland—And France Once Again

The Spanish War is ended a short time after Elizabeth's death. But the methods she has introduced with such success outlive her. The Charter Companies, for which the Crown bears no official responsibility but which nevertheless enjoy full tacit support of the government, trade, loot, and conquer. In one territory after the other, they fight down the native rulers; these huge areas will be taken over by England, as colonies, when the time is ripe.

The privateers carry on the horrible game which they have so thoroughly learned. Some of them, who had been among the Queen's most faithful and daring servants, break away and become outright pirates. The only visible difference between their previous occupation and their new status is that, now, even British ships are no longer safe from them. Another difference, not so apparent, is that the Crown receives no share of their spoils.

In Europe, no conflicts of the first magnitude occur until half a century after Elizabeth's death. Then, from 1650 on, the end of one war means the almost immediate beginning of another.

The issue has remained undecided as to who deserves the palm for ruthlessness, bloodlust, ingenuity and sanctimoniousness—Elizabeth or Cromwell. Not that it matters; for Cromwell without Elizabeth is as unthinkable as Elizabeth without Cromwell. Cromwell's wars, his consolidation of British power,

would have been impossible had not Elizabeth's conquest of wealth and might preceded them. Similarly, Elizabeth's work would have collapsed had not the half-finished job been completed by a man whose brutality rivaled her own.

We have seen what Oliver Cromwell did to Ireland. Undisputed rule in the homelands—in the broadest sense of that term—was essential if English power was to be fully available for the foreign wars. Consequently, Scotland was "pacified" as relentlessly as Ireland.

The destruction of Spanish power, begun by Elizabeth, was completed by Cromwell. Little Holland had become a mighty sailor and colonizer, and extraordinarily rich. Cromwell annihilated it. He built the most powerful navy of its day. He promulgated the Navigation Act, which asserted England's rule of the waves and of sea-borne trade. Elizabeth had made England the strongest sea-power among equals. Cromwell made his country the unquestioned ruler of the ocean. From his day on, law, rights of others, power of others, availed nothing on the seven seas. England's will, and England's interest, were supreme.

As Cromwell, with the execution of King Charles I, rises to the head of his nation, Spain is in its decline. The States-General of the Netherlands have risen to the top. They have outgrown their role as one of the German provinces. They have refused to pass under Spanish rule, and the northern half of the Low Countries, converted to the Protestant faith, has successfully fought for its independence from the Catholic kings of Madrid. The southern half, largely catholic, has failed

to achieve independence and will remain for a time a Spanish province.

Elizabeth has given the Netherlands every possible support, ostensibly because Protestants must be emancipated from unbearable papist rule. The same pretense, you may remember, has been used by Elizabeth, and is being used by Cromwell, to justify the Irish invasions. The form of argument may be slightly different; while protestant Holland is to be emancipated, catholic Ireland is to be violently converted. Basically, the pretense is identical.

The loss of the Netherlands will weaken Spain. Therefore, the Dutch protestants must be emancipated. When these same Protestants become powerful, they must be destroyed in their turn, Protestant or not.

And how powerful they have become! They have colonies in North America (New Amsterdam); in South America they own much of Brazil and Guiana. The island of St. Helena, off the African coast, is Dutch, and so is the Cape of Good Hope and its hinterland. There are Dutch possessions in India (Bengal), Ceylon, Australia, the East Indies. Nearly all of these lands will soon pass into British hands.

Unaccountably, Holland repeats the mistake made by Spain less than a century before. English privateers have been seizing or sinking innumerable Dutch ships. The government in London has been lamenting such unfortunate events and assuring the Mijneheers of its peaceful intentions. The Dutch actually believe those assurances, and reduce their navy to one-third its former strength. Their shortsightedness will cost them dear.

Almost the first act of Cromwell is the order to build a strong navy. Admiral Blake, who is placed in command, will prove to be the Nelson of his age. Cromwell now issues the Navigation Act, which stipulates among other things that all foreign vessels must dip their colors to the British flag. Dutch Admiral van Tromp, meeting Blake in the Channel, refuses to comply. The time is May, 1652. The war which now begins will last two years, destroy the Dutch navy and shake Dutch power.

This war, usually called the first Anglo-Dutch, has been inevitable since the day in 1651 that the Navigation Act was published. For besides the assertion that the British flag is supreme, which might be merely offensive to another nation's pride, the Act proclaims the right to search all foreign ships, and to seize them and their cargo.

On May 19, 1652, Blake defeats van Tromp off Dover Downs. On November 29 of the same year, the Dutchman gets even near Goodwin Sands, on the Kentish coast, and Blake is ignominiously driven up the Thames. Three months later, battle is joined again, at Portland; Blake, badly wounded, beats the two Dutch admirals, van Tromp and de Ruyter. On July 29, 1653, the last great engagement is fought off Texel, on the Dutch coast. Van Tromp is killed, the Dutch navy annihilated.

The day of Texel seals the fate of the freedom of the seas. Holland is forced to recognize the Navigation Act. Henceforth no one can sail the oceans if England objects. Countries which do not submit, and refuse to pay homage to British supremacy, will be fought down

one after the other. The wars for the maintenance of Britannia's rule will continue until the twentieth century.

While in the long run the recognition of the Act will prove to be the most significant consequence of the Anglo-Dutch war, it is not at the time the most painfully felt. That Holland's trade in the North Sea and Baltic is ruined; that one thousand seven hundred ships are lost to England; that a thousand prosperous businesses in Amsterdam are wiped out; that the Treaty of Westminster (April 15, 1654) forces Holland into an alliance with its victorious enemy—these are the points that hurt. Enforced acceptance of the Navigation Act will only be valid if Holland does not succeed in shaking off the British yoke; for an unjust treaty lasts only as long as its dictator's unquestioned domination. The same is true with respect to the alliance, even though, while it is in force, the Netherlands may be compelled to lend their aid against Spain. But to retrieve the ships and trade taken away by the English, Holland would have to do more than loosen the British hold on her; she would have to inflict a decisive defeat on England. With Holland's wealth gone, that looks like an impossible assignment.

In 1664, a decade after the signing of the Treaty of Westminster, the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam is taken and re-named New York. The conquest, an outright act of war, is made in peacetime. There seems to be nothing the Mijneers can do about it. However, crippled Holland finds an ally, France, cheated and disappointed only a few years before in one of her rare joint ventures with the island kingdom. This coalition

will bring to England her only invasion from the days of William the Conqueror to those of the present age.

On June 23, 1666, Admiral de Ruyter beats the fleet commanded by Admiral Monk and Prince Rupert. It is a year of vicissitudes for England; a hundred thousand people die of the plague, and on September 2 much of the capital is destroyed in the Great Fire of London. The Dutch fleet, under the orders of de Ruyter and Jan de Witt, sails up the Thames, blockades London, sets part of the British fleet on fire and, withdrawing, takes with it a few of England's greatest ships, among them the "Royal Charles". The peace treaty, concluded at Breda in May, 1667, is the only European instrument of another nation's writing to bear an English signature. It will last scarcely five years. First upon Holland, then upon France, England will visit bloody vengeance for her humiliation.

In 1670, England concludes, at Dover, a secret treaty with Louis XIV of France. That monarch, the most powerful ruler of his day, feels he has nothing to fear from the so recently defeated island kingdom. Clever English diplomats suggest a joint war against Holland, Louis' prize to be a share in what remains of that country's foreign trade, and the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands—the Belgium of a later day. What if the English dangled that alluring prospect before French eyes only a dozen years before, and then, after France had delivered, failed to keep their part of the bargain! England, chastened by her recent defeat, will not put over any tricks on Le Roi Soleil! And France will make it her business to stop England from ever again becoming so strong that she is a menace. Louis XIV may have

been far-sighted, but he was not far-sighted enough.

In 1672, England attacks Holland—in the best Blitzkrieg manner. A French army marches in almost simultaneously. Holland, unable to withstand this double onslaught, suffers terribly. The words of Cromwell's Anthony Ashley Cooper, future Earl of Shaftesbury, "*Delenda est Carthago*" ("Carthage must be destroyed") have come true. Seeley * quotes him as follows: "Holland is our great rival in trade, on the ocean and in the New World. Let us destroy her, though she be a Protestant Power, let us destroy her with the help of a Catholic Power." That goal is now achieved.

The second Treaty of Westminster is signed on February 19, 1674. Impoverished Holland pays a huge war indemnity. New York, regained by the Treaty of Breda, is English again. Britain's mastery of the seas will henceforth remain unchallenged. Dutch trade with Scandinavia and the Baltic ports, with the East and West Indies, is lost. Its fishing industry is no more. Nearly all of its colonies will soon be English.

France, under Louis XIV, under its ministers Richelieu and Mazarin, has become the Power of Europe. It is now the new "Carthage". England's blows will henceforth be directed once again at her oldest enemy. Meanwhile, between the first and second Dutch wars, Spain has been decisively weakened.

Privateering, in the West Indies and elsewhere, has never stopped. The peace at the end of Elizabeth's Spanish war merely meant that there would be no more official fighting. English transgressions have led to the Stuarts' war against Spain, 1625-1630. That country

* J. R. Seeley: *The Expansion of England*. Boston, 1883.

no longer has a powerful navy; it tries to protect itself by sailing its ships in large, escorted convoys, by occasionally sending out a number of warships against the privateers, and by strengthening the defenses of its ports in the New World.

In 1655, almost immediately after the end of the first Dutch war, Cromwell sends General Penn against San Domingo. Penn is repulsed, but soon conquers Jamaica, key to the Caribbean.

The inevitable result is renewed war with Spain. Penn's expedition has done its duty. For England has made an alliance with her old enemy France, for the express purpose of waging war on Spain. The Spanish Netherlands are to be France's prize; that of England will be a further weakening of Madrid, and the conquest of some Spanish overseas possessions. The alliance being safely signed, England's next step is to get the war started.

France's Marshal Condé defeats the Spaniards at Dunkirk in 1658. The English then compel France to turn this fortress over to them. When the peace is signed, the Spanish Netherlands do not become French. (It is this duplicity of his English ally which, a few years later, drives Louis XIV into the alliance with Holland, and brings to England, a duper duped, her only defeat in nearly nine centuries of European warfare.)

But before the battle of Dunkirk, English warships have sailed into the Mediterranean, to blockade the harbors on Spain's eastern coast and, if possible, to take Gibraltar, key to the Orient trade and to the entire Mediterranean Sea. The unselfconscious imperialistic thought of such a man as Cromwell could not be revealed

better than in his letter of April 28, 1656, to the Admirals in the Mediterranean.

Cromwell blandly suggests that the Spanish fleet in Cadiz be burnt or otherwise destroyed, Cadiz taken, and Gibraltar conquered and made a stronghold for the protection of England's trade, and a perpetual thorn in the flesh of Spain.

But Cadiz proves too strong, and so does Gibraltar. The conquest of the latter strong point, long and relentlessly pursued, will not be achieved until fifty years later.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, under the restoration, England is rich, her sea-power undisputed. Spain, though owning much of South America, no longer is a factor in European affairs or in the areas of England's interest. Holland's might is gone. Her possessions are following. France is the one power on the continent. Farther away from the areas of England's primary concern, Germany is slowly, very slowly, recovering from the ravages and depopulation of her Thirty Years' War.

Cromwell has mastered Ireland and Scotland, conquered Jamaica and Dunkirk. England owns the east coast of North America, and half the West Indies. She has gained her first possessions in Africa and Asia.

The defeat of Spain and Holland has taken time, and France, the traditional enemy, has grown strong. Postponed but never abandoned, the fight against that country is now resumed. Twice before, at the end of wars lasting over a hundred years each, England has had little to show for her pains. The conflict which now begins will not end until French power is decisively weakened.

The Treaty of Breda will only be avenged on the field of Waterloo.

France has not only gained in power, but in prosperity as well. Her trade and industries are rivals of England. Her ships have swelled the ranks of seekers after colonial expansion.

1688, the year of England's revolution, sees the beginning of the Third Hundred Years' War between England and France. It is a strange war, punctuated by a series of peace treaties, resumed over some useful pretext and with the help of some useful ally. But the will to fight continues unabated until the defeat of France is finally accomplished in 1815. And though the battlefield is repeatedly given up as the scene of the war, fighting nevertheless goes on, by the good old English stratagems of the trade war and the pirate ships.

(Seeley later wrote that during those 126 years seven great wars were fought, the shortest lasting seven years, the longest twelve; and that 64 years, or more than half, were spent in actual fighting. If Seeley had bothered to remember the privateers and like activities, his conclusion would have been that of the 126 years, 126 were spent at war.)

In the first and second Hundred Years' Wars against France, the object was outright possession of the country on the continent. This new conflict is fought for entirely different reasons.

The world has grown tremendously since the times of the annual raid into France. Discovery has added the Americas. In India and the Indies, colonies have been established. Silk, precious woods and countless other luxuries are the product no longer of unknown lands,

half geography, half myth, brought in hazardous travels of fairy-tale caravans to the outposts in the Near East and thence relayed to the Occident; instead, they have become regular articles of trade, bartered against Western goods or taken by force, and ferried to Europe on an almost constant flow of vessels.

England, desirous of expansion, need no longer seek possessions on the Continent of Europe. With Ireland, Scotland, Wales vanquished if not incorporated, and contributing steadily from their poverty to the wealth in England's vaults; with the snags struck time and again in all the attempts to establish herself on the European mainland; and with the realization that nations and tribes in distant parts are as rich as they are defenseless against English arms and ruthlessness, conquest has become more inviting in other continents. The aim in Europe is what it has been since Elizabeth's day, more than a century ago—let no European power grow strong; if in spite of England's frowns it has dared to become powerful, smash it; but never smash it quite, for its utter weakness might spell added strength to some third country, on which a job would then have to be done.

The individual conflicts which make up this new Hundred Years' War against France are largely fought outside Europe. Even though their influence on the final outcome of the French struggle is considerable (the effect of the battles in Europe on developments overseas is even greater), their real significance lies in the part they play in the enlargement of the British Empire. The fighting we are concerned with at this point is that in Europe.

It is a period of unparalleled mutual deception, the prize for sly outwitting and downright cheating of partners and foes alike incontestably going to England. For her decisive fight against Spain she enlisted the help of the old enemy, France; the war won, France was cheated out of her reward—only to get even by combining with Holland to defeat England. For her decisive fight against the Netherlands, England then again obtained French co-operation, using the same blandishments as once before and, almost as a matter of course, breaking her promise when the war was over. What was now to follow was even better.

France having been used against Holland, interest and, it might almost be said, tradition now demanded that Holland be used against France. But how to accomplish such legerdemain? Religious and political conflicts inside England, instead of weakening her power, were made an instrument to achieve this end.

William, ruler of defeated Holland, was elected King of England to take the place of James II who had been driven out of the country. A war (to decide who would be put on the throne of the Palatinate, a German principality near France's border) having most opportunely broken out in 1689 to engage France on her eastern boundary in a fight with a number of German states, England found that the strength of the anti-French coalition suited her; she joined the group, undertaking to make no separate peace and not to quit until Strassburg, old German city taken by Louis a few years before, had been liberated. The French landed an army in Ireland which was beaten by the English on the banks of the Boyne (1690). In 1692, the French fleet was defeated

off Cape La Hogue. In 1693, England signed a separate peace, her default towards her allies buying official French recognition for her Dutch king. The war went on without England for four more bloody years, the final French victory assuring possession of Stassburg and Alsace-Lorraine, and thus setting the stage for centuries of Franco-German conflict. During the years that France went on wasting her strength over the Palatinate, England was husbanding hers for the conflicts to come.

Four years after the end of fighting for which one small throne had furnished the pretext rather than the cause, there begins another war over a succession which is really of the first magnitude. Spain was formerly part of the Holy Roman Empire, then became independent. Now a Spanish king has appointed as his successor a French prince, grandson of Louis XIV. But England cannot allow France and Spain to become close friends. France's power would be enhanced. Worse, possession of Spanish-held Belgium, twice promised by England to France and twice withheld, might be the result, in fact if not in law, of such a rapprochement. The war of the Spanish Succession which now begins is fought in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, in Italy, overseas. From 1701 to 1713, England, not without the help of her several allies, opposes this newest increase in French power.

The Duke of Marlborough, Winston Churchill's ancestor, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, German generalissimo, win a number of battles. A combined Anglo-Dutch fleet appears at Gibraltar, which is taken by German troops. A treaty is concluded with Holland obli-

gating the Mijnheers to keep strong garrisons in eight Belgian fortresses, to prevent French capture. Portugal is made an English vassal, the Brazilian gold obtained from Lisbon will finance the conquest of India. Spanish silver transports are captured in the port of Vigo.

When the peace treaty is signed at Utrecht, on April 13, 1713, England keeps Gibraltar, acquiring control of the Mediterranean. France has passed to the second plan. A special treaty with Spain secures for England the right to "export" negro slaves captured in Africa to the Spanish possessions in America. An annual quota of 4800 will be let in free, while on additional numbers slight* duty must be paid.

The real significance of the Utrecht peace lies deeper. England's naval power, firmly enough intrenched before, is made unshakable. The English position that there must be not a single strong power in Europe—expressed in the brutal facts of raids and wars since the days of Elizabeth and Cromwell, and in the coarse words of Ashley Cooper—is now edited in nicer language and recognized though not accepted as an almost idealistic principle of European world politics.

The Balance of Power theory is proclaimed. England will be a just, equitable arbiter of the disputes among the European nations, lending the weight of her influence to that group which seems temporarily weaker. The theory sounds good enough. What it will soon prove to mean in practice is that Europe's powers have to do England's bidding. If they object, English might is loaned to the opposing group. So long as English di-

* W. E. H. Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*. London, 1878.

plomacy succeeds in keeping the rivalling continental groups fairly equal, a few English ships or regiments will be sufficient to tilt the scales against an obstreperous nation or group. Usually, it will not even be necessary to risk a single English life; instead, English gold or English promises—they are cheaper—will buy one or two smaller countries from among the unattached neutrals, and add them to the group favored in London. With British diplomats studiously fostering continental antagonisms, actual military power will scarcely be needed in the home continent—fear of the fleet and of English intrigue will be wholesome enough.

This explains why French resistance to ensuing British conquest of her possessions in America and India was so slight. So long as the system set up in Utrecht functioned, England but not one of the continental powers could afford to denude their home defenses in the interests of colonial conquest or safeguard.

In Europe, the next phase of fighting in which England was directly interested though scarcely involved was the Seven Years' War, fought by Prussia against Austria and France, with Russia belonging at first to the French group, then shifting to the sides of King Frederick. This conflict, begun in 1756, at a time when fighting with the French in America had long been going on, decided the fate of the colonies. At its close in 1763, Prussia had become the strongest power on the European continent. Her victories at Rossbach and Leuthen had, simultaneously, settled the issue of Canada and confirmed possession of the areas taken from the French by troops largely made up of colonials, in campaigns which were to prepare George Washington for his his-

toric task as Commander-in-Chief. Pitt, who could not then foresee that the colonists south of the Saint Lawrence would soon shake off the British yoke, said that "America was conquered in Germany."

While fighting between English and French forces—with the French contribution to the American War of Independence as the most portentous phase—never ceased in other continents, full war in Europe was not resumed until the French revolution. From 1793 to 1815, fighting, first against the revolutionary armies, then against Napoleon, was practically uninterrupted. Not that England supplied army after army—far from it! With the exception of Wellington's campaign in Spain and battle at Waterloo, English contributions were slight. Her share in the wars was to keep the mastery of the seas, to extend her possessions outside Europe, and to drive the countries on the European continent into the fight against France. How thoroughly she took care of this last job is shown by the experience of Denmark.

Together with other nations, Denmark had formed a group of Armed Neutrality under Russian leadership. Since this was scarcely to England's liking, Nelson's fleet took Denmark's ships by surprise and, in a second attack similarly carried out while peace prevailed between London and Copenhagen, ruthlessly bombarded that city, killing some two thousand civilians. Denmark would be taught what it meant to keep on the sidelines when England wanted her in the fray!

Napoleon was, at last, defeated in 1815 and taken to St. Helena. When the smoke cleared away, France's huge colonial empire had shrunk to scarcely more than

a few islands. The rest had taken the road of Holland's possessions, and of many valuable Spanish holdings; they had become English.

France was sufficiently weakened. She would even, fifty years later, be elevated to the passing rank of an ally in England's effort to preserve for what she called the "Unspeakable Turk" the possession of the Straits of Constantinople (Crimean War). She would conquer new colonies, only to find her path blocked at Fashoda when re nascent French imperialism collided with that of England. But French anger would not last long. From the uniting of Germany in 1870 grew a new "Carthage." England was in search of allies. France, forced to choose between her oldest enemy and the new foe, decided for England. She was to be treated, in 1914, to the privilege of fighting another of England's wars—cleverly engineered, begun in defense of some high-sounding slogan, pursued by every legal and illegal means to achieve the defeat of a power that presumed to show independence, terminated by the conquest of that country's colonies. She was to be treated to the same privilege in 1939, in a war the outcome of which is still at issue.

II

CONQUEST OF EMPIRE

ENGLAND rules a quarter of the globe. In America, in Asia, in Africa—not to mention the whole continent of Australia—she has conquered an empire such as never existed before and, in all probability, never will be built again. With political and economic power centralized in London, she was the uncontested master of the world—until the post-war years revealed that financial rule had passed to the United States.

Although England's merchants have fallen upon bad times, political power, and the rule over the greatest aggregation of men and territory, still exist, though shaken by growing articulateness and organizing ability of such unwilling victims as the people of India, and by the present onslaught of Germany, a more recent sufferer from English empire-building.

England Discovers America

Poets and historians have a variety of names for the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Among those not so widely known is "Dawn of Empire." Yet, as Hassall* states, the "end of the first chapter of English colonization" was marked by Drake's return, in 1586, with the settlers which Raleigh had brought to Virginia but a year before; in 1591 not an Englishman was to be found in Virginia;

*Hassall, *British History Chronologically Arranged*.

and at the Virgin Queen's death in 1603 England's overseas possessions consisted of no more than (1) dormant claims in Newfoundland and Virginia, and (2) shadowy rights in New Albion (California) and Frobisher's Bay.

The next hundred and sixty years were to witness a colossal expansion, carried out in innumerable fights against Indians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Dutchmen. During the brief period from 1763 to the Revolution, British domination on the North American mainland embraced all land east of the Mississippi, and all of Canada.

When Cromwell became master of England, the Bermudas and Barbadoes had already become English; the *Mayflower* had landed; Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Maryland were colonized; Boston had been founded soon after the formation of the Massachusetts Company, and Indian hospitality rewarded by treason and atrocious cruelty. Connecticut had been taken. Settlement of Newfoundland was resumed.

A few decades later, the Carolina charter was granted (although "legal" title to the land was not to pass to England until 1713, fifty years after); Delaware was taken; New Amsterdam became New York; William Penn founded Philadelphia.

In 1700, eighty years after the landing of the *Mayflower*, British rule extended from Maine to South Carolina. Settlement had not as yet penetrated far inland, and the colonial population totalled scarcely more than a quarter million souls. Yet the American colonies were invaluable as an outlet for the surplus of English goods

and for all those men who for reasons of religion, politics, or morals were considered undesirable at home.

The elder Pitt, after he had been made Lord Chatham, explained that "America was a twofold market, a customer and a supplier." It is almost exclusively for gain that England carried on wars on land and sea the extraordinary cruelty of which has been noted by American historians.

Seeley, in his classic *The Expansion of England** (which contains these memorable words: "But the United States are to us almost as good as a colony . . .") explains with reference to "the intimate interdependence of war and trade" that "... commerce and war were inseparably entangled together, so that commerce led to war and fostered commerce." And again: "I have said that the English sea-captains were very like buccaneers, and indeed to England the war is throughout an industry, a way to wealth, the most striving business, the most profitable investment . . ."

If British expansion in America in the seventeenth century was facilitated by the simultaneous struggles in Europe, this was even more true during the eighty years that followed. That Nova Scotia passed from French hands to British was a direct effect of European conflict. That one after another, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Canada, Florida, became English possessions was similarly due to, or at least decisively influenced by, wars of hegemony in Europe. To go into the details of all these and many other events would be to write a compendium of early American history. The outstanding fact is that European war helped English

* Boston, 1888.

conquest of America, as it was later to help the fight for American independence and such vital transactions as the Louisiana Purchase; and as English intervention in favor of the South during the Civil War was limited by the danger of war in Europe.

Annexation in the West Indies

From the beginning of the seventeenth century on, England was intensely interested in the Caribbean islands and Central America. In 1609 the Bermudas were taken; the first shiploads of slaves were imported ten years later. After a few decades, Africans in the West Indies were more numerous than whites.

Between 1623 and 1650, most of the Lesser Antilles islands were annexed. St. Kitts, Barbadoes, St. Christopher, Barbuda, Antigua, Monserrat, Sta Lucia, Anguilla fell to England in rapid succession. Islands which had been the lairs of England's often-disowned, ever-protected pirates now passed officially under the British flag, in many cases not without heavy fighting with their original European conquerors. The Virgin Islands and other strongholds were then taken, mainly from the Spaniards and the Dutch.

Cromwell, having completed his Irish campaign, was ready to deal with Spain. In 1654, Admiral Penn set out to attack the Spaniards where it would hurt most.

Gold and silver, spice and raw materials from the West Indies were the mainstay of Spanish wealth. Accordingly, the fleet set sail for the Indies. Defeated by Spanish ships off Hispaniola (Haiti), it nevertheless succeeded in taking Jamaica, in an invasion which Seely has called "the most high-handed measure recorded

in the modern history of England." Was the famous historian referring to the mere technicality that officially England and Spain were at peace?

There is nothing quite so consistent in history as British lust for conquest. Changes of rulers, even of systems, did not henceforth interrupt the even flow of land acquisition by force. The method employed everywhere was to gain a key position and then to add neighboring islands, provinces, states whenever opportunity presented itself.

Under Charles II, Cromwell's successor, conquest of the Bahamas provided additional links in the chain of possessions connecting the Lesser Antilles with Florida. Generations later, Domenica (1756), Grenada and St. Vincent (1763), Trinidad (1797) were taken from Spain. It is curious to note once again how the dates are those of periods when the original colonizers were engaged in fighting, to no mean extent for England, a war on the continent of Europe—a war in which Britain might technically be a party but for which she provided no troops and few ships.

Two conquests on the American mainland at the dawn of the nineteenth century were those of British Guiana, originally settled by the Dutch, and British Honduras, a Spanish possession.

From all these vantage points, England has been able to exert considerable influence on Central America. Her forts, men, and ships could, if there was need, cut off or "pacify" large areas of the American continent.

The first dent in this system did not come until 1940, when the United States, a hundred and sixty years after her fierce fight for independence, broke the potential

British ring by the acquisition of vital bases, not a shot being fired. Whether further parts of the Empire which may be considered vital to American defense will be obtained in similar bloodless deals; and whether other countries will win parts of the Empire which they consider more essential to them than to Britain, are matters which will be decided not only by the outcome of the present war but by its duration.

A record of English annexations in the Americas and off their coastline would be worse than incomplete without mention of the Falkland Islands, occupied once before and finally taken in 1833, much against Argentina's wishes; of Graham Land and South Georgia; and of Ross Dependency in the Antarctic, claimed for the British flag as recently as 1923.

British possessions in the Americas, extending from the North Polar region to the South Polar region, embrace some four million square miles, with fourteen million inhabitants. So long as our relations with England remain as satisfactory as they have been since the advent of Hitler, these possessions hold no threat for us. If, however, relations become strained again—a development which, as history shows, is bound to occur between the best of friends whenever a clash of interests arises—it is certain that the nearness of English power will either procure our acquiescence to that country's wishes, or force us to arm on a scale which will dwarf even our present defense effort. The age of wars fought by few men with little equipment is no more.

We have, it is true, more immediate worries than possible future dangers from Britain. But ten, twenty, or even fifty years are a short time in such fateful matters.

Even if we need not fear a repetition of 1776 and 1812, it will be sufficiently bad if friction such as in 1863, or lesser tensions such as have repeatedly occurred since, come about when the population and power of Canada are several times what they are today.

India

The conquest of India may be traced back to the day in 1587 when Francis Drake captured a Portuguese merchantman whose logs and charts gave an account of the route around the Cape and of the profits from Indian trade.

London's merchant adventurers were not slow in recognizing that here was a golden opportunity. Why should Portugal and Holland make the money? Even so, it took a dozen years to investigate and to plan. On December 31, 1600, "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies" received Elizabeth's Royal Charter. The East India Company had been born. It was to become the world's most efficient looting organization, and the instrument to carry out England's greatest conquest. India would gradually become the pivot around which revolved all of England's political decisions.

No less a man than Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India and, thereafter, one of the central figures at the 1919 peace conference, said that without India Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the Suez Canal shares; without the Suez Canal England would not be in Egypt; that the historic conflict with Russia was brought about by the necessity of keeping that nation away from India;

that but for India England would not have taken the Cape Colony, or other parts of South Africa. How much England is concerned over her loot was stated by Curzon when he added that but for India Mauritius would not be English, nor would Aden, nor would there be English protectorates and interests in Arabia, Mesopotamia, or on the Persian Gulf.

Surat, first trading post, was established in 1613. Madras followed in 1639 and was strongly fortified a few years later. 1661 saw the English establishing themselves at Bombay; after a few years they were in Calcutta. There was as yet no large-scale military conquest; agreements with the Rajahs provided the basis for profitable commerce, and if there was fighting it was against other European traders. On the whole, early penetration was pacific. Treaties with native rulers were used to dislodge Portuguese, Dutch, French influence. Gradually, relations with the Indian princes became closer, and these potentates could now be played off one against the other. All the wiles known to diplomacy were used by all contending parties. The English might occasionally suffer a setback, but from decade to decade their influence grew stronger and their settlements more numerous.

Military conquest did not set in until the rise of Clive of India. A few years before the outbreak of Europe's Seven Years' War, at a time when England and France were fighting each other on the seas and skirmishing had become frequent in America, Dupleix, in charge of French interests in India, awoke to the fact that he had been completely outmaneuvered by England. He fought,

and won, a battle against the army of an Indian prince allied to England, and thereby re-established French influence in South India.

Robert Clive, of whom it has been said that no act was too bold for him and no means too contemptible, now came to the fore. In an amazing series of treaties, subterfuges, battles, he destroyed French power. By exploiting the jealousies of Indian princes, he weakened them so decisively that British rule could be enforced at extraordinarily slight cost.

Clive's aim was the conquest of Bengal, India's granary. The battle of Plassey, in 1757, was one of the events which have determined the course of history. Both the details and the effects of that battle are illuminating.

The Nabob of Bengal, friend of France, has a general who would like to oust him and become his successor. With this general, Mir Jaffar, Clive makes a deal to put him on the throne if he will accept defeat in battle, betraying his master and his country. Clive wins his fight against the 68,000 men of Bengal, his total cost in casualties being no more than 20 whites and 52 natives. Mir Jaffar, enthroned, now pays the East India Company a "fee" of £3,338,000 (some fifteen million dollars at present rates, nearer fifty million according to the value of money about 1760); of this amount, £243,000 are Clive's commission.

If Mir Jaffar feels that that ends the business transaction, he is sorely mistaken. He realizes, helpless, that he has become a mere puppet in Clive's hands. Not Mir but the East India Company is now the true Nabob

of Bengal. The fifty million people of that rich state pay literally billions into the coffers of their new master, and gradually sink into poverty.

With Bengal as his base—of income to keep the stockholders in London satisfied, of additional levies to pay for his military establishment, of graft for himself and his subordinates, and, if need be, of military operations—Clive has little difficulty in extending British dominion over Bihar and Deccan. The territory he rules is three times as big as England and Wales.

The Dutch, realizing that total English domination of India is only a matter of time, make a last, desperate attempt to save their trading interests. Their men-of-war sail from Batavia. The pitched battle which ensues is won by the English, the Dutch ships are taken, their crews killed. Clive dictates a treaty which barely tolerates the Dutch in their old trading posts, and forbids them to carry arms.

French power has been destroyed by the battle of Plassey and by the outcome of the Seven Years' War in Europe. Portuguese influence has waned. The Dutch have now been rendered impotent. The stage is set for further conquest of India.

The Indian princes, awaking too late to the danger that faces them, ally against the invader. An English army largely made up of natives and totally paid for with money taken from India, defeats the army of the princes at Baxar, in 1764.

In 1773, Warren Hastings, Clive's successor, learns through his agents that the Nabob of Oudh would like to conquer Rohilkand, a fertile country on the southern

slopes of the Himalayas. To that potentate Hastings suggests the loan of two of his regiments, against a consideration of 400,000 pounds. With these well-armed troops, almost exclusively composed of natives, the Nabob easily defeats the bow and arrow warriors of Rohilkand—only to find, as Mir Jaffar in Bengal did before him, that there is now no way to rid himself of the English help he accepted. His country has become, in fact but not in law, a British vassal, one of the choicest contributors to the income of the East India Company. Full annexation will follow in due course, some eighty years later.

There is everything to be said for the view that as an individual the Nabob of Oudh got no more than he deserved. That his successors would be born vassals, and that his people and their sons and grandsons would slave for England's rich capitalists, is a tragedy for which the natives were scarcely responsible, and which was due to the greed of one man in their midst.

Where Clive and his men took bribes of hundreds of thousands, Hastings and his gang now divert millions of pounds into their own pockets. Nevertheless, through their ruthless exactions the Company's annual earnings advance from three to five million pounds. When Sultan Haidar Ali's resistance to British conquest becomes a costly venture for the Company, Hastings makes up for the deficit incurred in the Mysore war by extorting huge amounts from the ruler of Benares, finally annexing his realm outright.

Hastings, later called to account in proceedings that lasted eight years, was excused on the grounds that his

acts had benefited national wealth. His acts had also ruined India, once the world's richest country, to such an extent that in the one year 1770 some ten million natives died of hunger.

Between them, Clive and Hastings conquered practically all of northern India, the country's most fertile districts, and large areas in the Southeast and West. After Hastings' recall, General Wellesley defeated Tipu Sahib, who had continued his father Haidar Ali's fight, and took Seringapatam, capital of Mysore. The massacre of Seringapatam is one of the blackest spots in the dark record of England's deeds in India. Mysore was annexed, first in part, later altogether; it hurts the dog less if his tail is cut off a bit at a time.

Further conquests were those of Assam, east of the Himalaya; Arakan on the Bay of Bengal; and Tenasserim, to the southeast of Burma. An Afghan war, fought from 1838 to 1842, was only partly successful.

A new wave of vigorous expansion set in when Lord Dalhousie was appointed Governor in 1848. His first addition to British India was the Panjab. Denmark's three small possessions were "ceded" to England by treaty. Pegu, a province of Burma, was conquered in the second Burmese war, 1852. The vassal states were annexed outright by simple decree, and declared to be provinces. The Central Provinces, Nagpur among them, were claimed in 1853. 1855 saw the final incorporation of Tandjar, 1856 that of Oudh. This latter country, virtually a vassal ever since Hastings' deal, had been solemnly promised that its legal status would always remain one of independence. Tongue in cheek,

Dalhousie now said that "Great Britain would be guilty of a grave crime if she continued to tolerate an administration which brought great suffering to millions of subjects." The people of Oudh cannot have been worse off under native rule than they are today, when fifteen million people slave and starve for England in that small district of no more than twenty-five thousand square miles.

As for the islands in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, they were taken whenever opportunity was good—Ceylon as early as 1795, the Laccadives and Maledives in 1831, the Andamans and Nicobars soon after Dalhousie's great conquests.

The rape of Burma, on India's easternmost end, was not completed until 1886, though its first province had been taken sixty years before. Aside from this land (which even today enjoys some measure of independence—on paper), and Baluchistan and Pishin in the extreme west, the conquest of India was completed under Dalhousie.

Strangely enough, the brown soldiers of England, who had been as ready as their princes to betray their native country, rose in revolt when their religious rules were disrespected. The Sepoy uprising provides, in a way, the answer to the question as to what caused the downfall of India. Obviously, the jealousies so diligently fostered by England are not in themselves sufficient to explain that extraordinary chain of events; English superiority in armament, organization and purpose, great as it was, cannot either have enabled so few to conquer so many. The decisive fact was that, in India,

adherence to a social system, and allegiance to a religious faith, were so much stronger than national feeling, love of country, allegiance to the greater community, that an energetic invader would find his task easy.

The Sepoy uprising, 1857-59, led to the final subjection of India. The means employed by England to break that revolt were more spectacular, and are therefore better remembered, than those used on other occasions. However, the "blowing away" of men from the mouths of cannon, horrible as it was, was by no means the only instance of the most callous and deliberate cruelty that man can inflict upon man. The history of the conquest of India and of its later rule abounds in atrocities that are difficult to grasp. The English record in India is one of conquest by wile and violence; of exorbitant extortion; and of rule by terror.

Publicity of such deeds having become more difficult to avoid in recent years, and American public opinion having gradually risen to the rank of a decisive factor in world affairs, the means used to keep India quiet are now more civilized. Massacres have not occurred, or not become public knowledge, since shortly after the world war. During the past two decades, the nationalist movement of liberation has made headway. Whether it will become strong enough to overcome the religious and social obstacles inherent in the Indian situation remains to be seen. If the movement ever takes definite shape, it will be interesting to observe the English reaction, and the methods Britain will employ to keep India under her heel.

Asia

India is not by any means the only English possession in Asia. It is, however, the center around which everything revolves.

A safe line of communications had to be built to that rich possession. Gibraltar (conquered in 1704) and Malta (1800) gained additional value when the Suez Canal (1869) shortened the sea route to England's most important colony. Points on the longer route around the Cape, which has again risen to actuality in the present war, will be discussed in the chapter dealing with African conquests.

Earliest stations in Asia and in the Indian Ocean to secure the India route were Mauritius, taken from the French in 1814, and Aden, occupied in 1839. During the same period, Singapore was made British (1819) in an effort to protect the road to the East Indies and Australia better than could be done from Malacca, taken as early as 1795. The Strait of Malacca is, with the Panama Canal, the Strait of Dover, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar, one of the great gateways of world trade. Its watchdog, Singapore, is now perhaps the strongest naval fortress in the world.

The attempt to secure a land route from Egypt to India has failed so far. At the end of the World War, English power in the Near East was well-nigh overwhelming. Arabia became a sphere of exclusive influence. Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq became English by "mandate."

But farther East, the endeavors to secure the land passage did not succeed. England was making the mis-

take, almost unique in her history, of trying to win and hold too much at one time. With women at home clamoring for the return of their men to civilian life, and with public temper up against continued spending, England had troops of occupation in the German Rhineland and in the mandates in the Near East and Africa; Egypt was restless, garrisons there had to be strong; British forces were in the North and South of Russia, fighting the Bolsheviks; in Turkey, English troops were making a vain attempt to bring the beaten enemy to heel, and to force him to accept all the amputations England had designed for him; and the Indian frontier was not exactly peaceful. As a result of diffusion of effort, England's generals were unable to concentrate the forces required for the subjugation of Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan. Yet the proposition seemed simple enough; Iran had been in the English orbit during the war, and that country's jealous protector, Russia, was now in the throes of civil strife; Afghanistan, almost decisively defeated in 1879, had long been India's foreland. However, courageous defense of both countries, and English inferiority in numbers, secured for the Afghans and Persians a measure of independence such as they had not known for decades.

It is futile to hope that England has abandoned her plan to conquer these two nations. Examination of British history and its recent trends, and a simple glance at the map, are sufficient to show that so long as England holds India she will do all she can to add the last two links to the land route, now otherwise com-

plete, from the Cape of Good Hope through Egypt and the Near East to India.

The Opium War

There are rumors afloat that Japan is importing masses of the powerful drug, opium, into occupied China. If these reports are true, the Japanese have stolen a page from the English book.

Export of opium, obtained from India's poppy seed, was one of England's plentiful revenues from her new possession. However, the Chinese government, concerned for the health of its people, was inconsiderate enough to forbid the traffic. The result was systematic smuggling by English traders. Large quantities of the poison were hiddden in convenient spots on the coast of China. When the Governor of Canton demanded the surrender of these stocks, Dent, agent of the English opium syndicate, scoffed him and made off under English military protection. Chinese troops thereupon took more than twenty thousand cases, containing each over a hundredweight of opium, and threw them into the sea.

Thus began the notorious "opium war." The ships and troops of the Governor of India staged a series of raids and bombardments on Chinese towns. China had long been the world's most pacific nation, and was defenseless against this onslaught which she had brought upon herself by foolishly believing that her laws could be enforced, and the health of her people protected, if such measures brought a loss of profit to the English protector of all nations.

Bombardments and massacres lasted from February,

1840 to August, 1841. In the end, China had to allow opium traffic; to open her five biggest ports to English "commerce"; to pay for the destroyed opium and for England's expenses in bombarding Chinese civilians; and to let England have the island of Honkong, opposite Canton's harbor. Another important base in England's world-embracing system had been won.

The Opium War is the one British act of which most Englishmen are honestly ashamed. But has an effort been made to restore Hongkong to China? How naive to ask such a question!

Australia and the East Indies

Australia rates among England's easier conquests. The record of its early possession and management is unique in that a policy of extermination of the native element was pursued, with results far worse than in any other English colony.

The thirty million that starved to death in India between 1860 and 1900 (English figures), or the five million that died of the flu in 1919 because everybody in India was badly underfed, were, after all, only a small fraction of the total population of more than 350 million.

But in Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, the native population was literally wiped out. In the island of Tasmania, annexed in 1804, actual massacres of natives were staged, and 200,000 were murdered. The island became a convict colony.

In New Zealand, one of the most fertile regions of the world, the Maoris were deliberately destroyed in a series of fights lasting from 1820 to 1886. The twin islands

had been claimed for the British flag by Cook, in 1769. Settlement began in 1814. Extermination of the natives set in soon after. Only 50,000 survived.

On the Australian continent, much the same happened. Sydney, settled in 1788, was made a convict colony. Destruction of natives went on even after the completion of original settlement in the main points, about 1835.

The continent and its neighboring islands are, today, thinly populated, prosperous parts of the Empire. Should Britain ever disintegrate, the indications are that these will be among the last parts to go.

Farther east, England holds a number of islands, some of them acquired in peaceful deals. The years of conquest were between 1860 and 1900, with the German possessions being added by mandate in 1919. Whether England will win additional islands in this vast area—perhaps from among those of France—or whether some of her insular possessions will be lost, is another question the answer to which will to some extent depend on the outcome of the present war.

In the East Indies, Holland has surprisingly been allowed to keep her immensely valuable islands, which England could have so easily taken at one time or another. The answer is that had England robbed these islands, Holland might have become a willing prey of France or Germany, whichever of the two happened to be at odds with England; Britain would then have had her enemy directly facing her on the east coast. By the same token, concern for the East Indies, which England if she wanted could annex practically any day, effective-

ly refrained Holland from antagonizing her formidable neighbor on the other side of the narrow North Sea.

No particular sagacity is needed to predict that unless Holland is restored to liberty the East Indies will not long remain Dutch. Whether they fall to Japan, or whether they are added to England's possession of North Borneo and Sarawak, or again whether America's interest in the Philippines will not, perhaps, be revived and cry for further expansion to the southwest—such questions will be answered by the course the present war will take, and by the future development of imperialism in a number of countries.

Africa

Early English conquests in Africa were undertaken in support of the flourishing slave trade. Gambia on the westernmost coast, taken as early as 1618, became a prosperous "production area" for what has been called "black ivory" and was tortured human flesh. Another important source was Sierra Leone, not officially occupied until much later, in 1785. Meanwhile, a whole string of trading posts—for the exchange of English goods against Africans—were established at various points down to the Gold Coast.

Slave traffic was to remain one of England's foremost sources of income until well into the nineteenth century. Lecky said* that "Of all the many forms of suffering which man has inflicted upon man . . . the slave trade has probably added most largely to the sum of human misery, and in the first half of the eighteenth century

*William E. H. Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*. London. 1878.

it occupied the very foremost place in English commerce." According to the same author, a discussion in Parliament 1750 revealed that 46,000 slaves were being shipped each year into the English colonies alone—that is, not counting sales to Spanish and other possessions.

The importance of the trade, and the callousness with which it was regarded, are made clear by two incidents recorded in Lecky's work. When John Hawkins, the pirate and, probably, first wholesale slave dealer, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth, he selected for his crest a manacled negro; his most important ship he called *The Jesus*. While such events, dating back to Elizabeth's lusty days about 1600, may be viewed with an admixture of indulgence to our natural horror, another Lecky "anecdote" leaves a more painful impression behind. In 1775, (that is, at the eve of the American Revolution, and in the midst of the age of the great liberal philosophers) "Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and one of the most conspicuous leaders of the English religious world" said that "We cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation."

An island off the African coast whose acquisition was of early date (1651), but not connected with the slave traffic, was St. Helena, of Napoleonic fame.

Strangely enough, the conquest of Africa as a whole did not get under way until fairly late in the nineteenth century. The African Association, organized to explore that vast continent, only came into being in 1788. By 1900, England owned more than one-third of the Black Continent.

The first step, it is true, had been made centuries before. The first British flag in South Africa, where Capetown would later be built, was raised in 1620. The Dutch East India Company founded a colony there, in 1652. By 1800, the small settlement had grown to be the prosperous commonwealth of the Afrikanders. England, having but recently conquered Canada and destroyed French power in India, in 1795 sent two fleets against this republic. Valiant defense was soon overcome, and a decade later Capetown was officially annexed by England.

The people brought here from Britain proved to be highly undesirable, and the Boers gradually withdrew northward. Their great "treks," lasting from 1835 to 1848, took them far away from their tormentors, and these people, the only whites who had succeeded in building a regular state in Africa, now founded Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Meanwhile, Natal, the land northeast of the Cape Colony, had been annexed by England in 1836.

English expansion was going on in another part of Africa as well. The gigantic territory of Nigeria was occupied by quiet infiltration, and by 1861 matters had developed to the point where a *fait accompli* could be created without fear of interference by other European imperialists. Lagos, main city of the area, was declared British.

Pressure northward from the Cape Colony increased. Between 1868 and 1885, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Griqualand were added to the British realm. In 1888, Cecil Rhodes annexed the colossal territory which was

given his name. The stage was set for the national extinction of the Boers.

The Boer War, 1899-1902, is the one recorded instance since the Crimean War of atrocities deliberately committed by civilized whites upon their co-racials. Kitchener's 450,000 soldiers took long to defeat the 75,000 Boer fighters. To speed up victory, the Boer women and children were placed in concentration camps, and their men informed of their harrowing conditions. Before the Boers finally surrendered, 26,663 women and children died in English camps. This figure indeed conveys some slight idea of the methods employed.

That sooner or later English fingers would itch to grab Transvaal and Orange had long been a foregone conclusion. That the conquest was begun at that particular time was owing to the fact that gold and diamonds had been found in those parts. Within a few years after their victory, the English protectors of small nations transformed these two small, free republics into an inferno for black and white slaves.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century—in a period which some of us still remember—England took Somaliland (1884), Uganda and Kenya (1895). The most remarkable British achievement was the conquest of Egypt and the Sudan.

The Suez Canal, completed in 1869 against much British opposition, was a boon to England's trade, but she regarded it as a threat to her strategic position. In 1875, Lord Beaconsfield bought a large parcel of shares in that enterprise from the then Egyptian ruler. In 1877, Gladstone stated* that the conquest of Egypt, and

* Gleanings.

the establishment of an all-British land route from Cairo to the Cape of Good Hope, had become inevitable.

When in 1881 England tried to take control of Egypt, there was immediate opposition. English (and French) warships thereupon bombarded Alexandria, and British troops occupied the city and advanced along the Nile. The Sudan was annexed in 1885, but it was not until the defeat of the Mahdi's fanatic followers in 1899 that Egypt could truly be said to be under control. That the declaration of "independence" of 1922 has not materially altered things is shown by the fact of continued British occupation. General Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief for a large part of the globe, has his headquarters in Cairo.

The record of British expansion in Africa would not be complete without mention of the German colonies acquired under "mandate" in 1919. Only at Versailles did Cecil Rhodes' fantastic dream come true, and Gladstone's prediction find its fulfilment. There was now, through conquered German East Africa, an all-British route from Cairo to the Cape.

Other German possessions which passed to Britain are Southwest Africa, and parts of Togo and Cameroon.

The future aims of English expansion in Africa are difficult to foretell. Are the Italian possessions rich enough? Certain French territories may prove more tempting. The Belgian Congo? Perhaps—if England decides that that prize has fulfilled its task as a constant reminder to Brussels that it must not antagonize the men in Whitehall.

III

QUO VADIS?

THE BRITISH EMPIRE has been built on mountains of corpses, and seas of blood and tears have been shed by the victims of centuries of British aggression. But the violence visited on the conquered at the time of their subjugation is not the darkest page in this unique record. Atrocious treatment, horrible as it is, hurts only those upon whom it is directly inflicted.

Even worse is the fact that whole populations, and many successive generations, became so impoverished that they deteriorated, were unable to enjoy life—that hunger was their daily bread. That is true of the French between the twelfth and the fifteenth century, when English invaders robbed them of all but their shirts. It is true of some present-day sections of the Boer community. It is true even now of the four hundred millions of India, that cultured, wealthy nation which was bled white to enrich city bankers, and to which the English blandly say they brought civilization. It was true until recently of Ireland, where mass starvation brought about by English extortion left memories which explain a good deal of present affairs.

English conquests began some decades before the day of William's battle of Hastings. Even as long ago as the eleventh century, the method employed whenever possible was gradual infiltration, with a foothold here

and there, until the point was reached when a claim could be advanced with some semblance, however remote, of justification. Conquest first in Europe; then, after shipping and knowledge of geography had improved, in other continents, has been the one outstanding goal of English policy throughout the past nine hundred years.

The leopard does not change its spots. The Empire, built by conquest, developed by conquest, enriched by conquest from before 1100 to 1937, will not cease to expand—if her imperialist rulers can help it. There is no *if*; there is only a *when* and *where*.

When? Why, what a childish question! Whenever there is an opportunity, of course. Imperialists never pass up an opportunity, and often make one where it did not exist. As for justification, have no fear—it will not be lacking. It has never lacked. England never conquered a country except for “its own good.”

We need not go back to age-yellowed records for suitable examples. Our own century provides these instances: England freed the Boers from their own (democratic) “misrule”; she had the German colonies “mandated” to her for the sake of the populations; and it was to save the people from Turkish “tyranny” that she acquired, by the same devices, rule over Iraq, Palestine, and all of Arabia.

And England hasn't ever been apologetic about it. With the hottest and most virtuous indignation that her propagandists could muster, Britain clamored for years for the liberation of those “oppressed” peoples whom she wanted to rule herself. If they really were

oppressed, well and good. If not, torrents of English vociferation served to influence or at least confuse public opinion at home and abroad. Witness the case of the Boers and, more recently, the Turks of Mosul who were forced to become an English satellite, because England wanted their oil. World opinion swallowed the conquest of South Africa. It was not perturbed by the grab of Mosul.

There can be little doubt that England will expand if the opportunity arises. Opportunities are particularly good at the end of a war—unless it is not a decisive victory.

Where? That is another question. Germany has nothing left that England wants. Italy's possessions? Italy owns some islands near Malta. Maybe England will regard them as valuable additions to that fortified area. Another group, the Aegean Islands, might serve to bring British power closer to the Bosphorus. And what of the Italian colonies on the African continent. Both strategic considerations and economic possibilities make it scarcely likely that England wants them—except Abyssinia, the empire of her ally, Haile Selassie.

But to confine thought to the lands owned by England's foes is to adopt too narrow a point of view. New York is not the only example of English grabbing without the formality of war. There are similar instances in recent years: Cyprus, the Arabian Peninsula and so forth. It is, perhaps, more appropriate to think of the needs and the appetite of England's rulers.

England's great needs are strategic rather than economic. The land route to India is incomplete. Persia and Afghanistan, who escaped after the last war, may be the victims at the end of the present conflict. The homeland's position requires strengthening in view of modern warfare: Ireland, and Denmark's Iceland and Faeroe Islands are the logical prey. Many rich prizes may be waiting at the end of the war: The East Indies and the Congo—if Holland and Belgium lose their importance to England's safety. Do not shudder at the thought that England is capable of robbing her own allies! It has happened in practically every war.

Where will the lion strike? It depends on one thing alone—opportunity. Opportunity is shaped by events. Which choice morsel will he swallow first? No one can tell. It hardly matters.

What matters is that with a total absence of squeamishness, behind a smoke-screen of high-sounding but non-committal phrases, the imperialists are even now hatching plans of conquest. That the clique which rules England is not so engaged would be hard to believe. This time, at least, Whitehall seems to have the grace of honesty. It has not, as yet, solemnly foresworn conquest and occupation.

What matters is that, unless a miracle occurs, this war will end as have other wars, in the writing of peace treaties that do not bring peace but war, that are not treaties but dictates.

What matters is that the children of the present generation, including our own, and their children after them, will undergo miseries even more appalling than those which confront mankind today.

APPENDIX

A. ENGLAND'S WARS OF SUBJECTION

I. AT HOME

- About 1170: Irish invasion under Henry II.
 1558-1603: Second Irish War, under Elizabeth.
 1659-1652: Third Irish War, under Cromwell.
 Twelfth to
 Eighteenth
 Century: Wars against Scotland and Wales.

II. WARS OF EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY

- 1100-1216: First Hundred Years' War against France.
 1337-1453: Second Hundred Years' War against France (Joan of Arc)
 1560-1600: Elizabeth's freebooters fight Spain, Portugal, the German Hanseatic Cities.
 1588-1604: Elizabeth's Spanish War.
 1583-1733: Wars of conquest in North America.
 1623-1797: Wars of conquest in the West Indies.
 1625-1630: Spanish War, under the Stuarts.
 1652-1654: First Dutch War, under Cromwell.
 1654-1659: Third Spanish War, under Cromwell.
 1665-1667: Second Dutch War; Treaty of Breda.
 1672-1674: Third Dutch War; Treaty of Westminster.
 1688-1815: Third Hundred Years' War against France.
 1689-1693: England a party in the War of the Palatine Succession.
 1701-1713: War of the Spanish Succession; Treaty of Utrecht confirms mastery of the seas; "Balance of Power" brings the rule of the world.
 1745-1760: Fight against the French in North America.
 1756-1763: Seven Years' War against France; Conquest of Canada and India.

- 1757-1859: Hundred Years' War for the conquest of India.
 1774: Annihilation of the Rohillas in India.
 1776-1782: American War of Independence.
 1799: Conquest of Mysore.
 1817-1818: Third Mahratta War in India.
 1841-1842: Opium War against China; annexation of Hongkong.
 1848-1849: Second Sikh War in India; rape of the Panjab.
 1857-1859: Sepoy War and atrocities.
 1878-1879: Second Afghan War; annexation of the Khyber Pass.
 1885-1886: Burmese War.
 1788: Australia; natives wiped out.
 1795: Ceylon; natives decimated.
 1804: Tasmania; natives wiped out.
 1814: New Zealand; natives wiped out.

III. REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

- 1793-1802: First war of coalition against France.
 1803-1805: Second war of coalition against France.
 1801 & 1807: Raids on Copenhagen and Danish fleet.
 1808: Wellington's Spanish Campaign.
 1813-1815: Third war of coalition against France; Waterloo, St. Helena.

IV. CONQUEST OF AFRICA

- 1795-1806: Fight against the Dutch Afrikanders.
 1836: Natal War.
 1868: Abyssinia.
 1874: Ashantis.
 1879: Destruction of the Zulus.
 1881-1899: Egypt and Sudan War.
 1899-1902: Boer War; annexation of Transvaal and Orange Free State.

V. WARS AGAINST GERMANY

- 1914-1918: England's First World War; Versailles Treaty.
 1939-1941: England's Second World War.

B. LANDMARKS OF ENGLISH IMPERIALISM

I. EUROPE

- 12th century: France, rape of provinces from English Channel to Pyrenees Mountains, from Atlantic seaboard across to Puy-de-Dôme hills.
 1337-1453: Same lands ravaged again.
 1169-1171, 1558-1603, 1649-1652: Major campaigns for the conquest of Ireland.
 1453: Calais remains English.
 1658: Dunkerque is made a Gibraltar on the English Channel.
 1704: Annexation of Gibraltar.
 1800: Malta is taken.
 1878: Cyprus is occupied; annexation follows in 1914.

II. NORTH AMERICA

- 1583: First occupation of Newfoundland.
 1585: Raleigh in Virginia.
 1607: Foundation of Jamestown, Virginia.
 1620: Massachusetts is settled.
 1622: New Hampshire; Portsmouth founded in 1623.
 1630: Foundation of Boston; Conquest of Connecticut.
 1632: Baltimore, Md.
 1636: Rhode Island.
 1637: First settlement of Newfoundland.
 1663: North and South Carolina; settlement begins 1670.
 1664: Delaware; New Amsterdam becomes New York.
 1674: Fort Albany, Moose Fort on James Bay.
 1682: Pennsylvania.
 1713: Treaty of Utrecht; Nova Scotia, Hudson Bay Lands, Newfoundland become British.
 1733: Annexation of Georgia.
 1745-1760: Conquest of Canada; recognized 1763.
 1763: Florida, Louisiana.

III. CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

- 1609: Bermuda.
- 1623-1650: Lesser Antilles.
- 1623: St. Kitts and Newis.
- 1624: Barbados.
- 1625: St. Christopher.
- 1628: Barbuda.
- 1632 (1667): Antigua, Monserrat.
- 1638: St. Lucia.
- 1650: Anguilla.
- 1655: Jamaica, Turk, Cayman Islands.
- 1756: Dominica.
- 1763: Treaty of Paris; annexation of Tobago, Grenada, St. Vincent.
- 1783: Bahamas.
- 1792 (1814): Guiana.
- 1797: Trinidad.
- 1798 (1862): British Honduras.

IV. ASIA

- 1613: Surat.
- 1639: Madras.
- 1661: Bombay.
- 1696: Calcutta.
- 1765: Bengal.
- 1795: Malacca.
- 1795: Ceylon.
- 1798: Allahabad.
- 1799: Seringapatam.
- 1803: Delhi.
- 1815: Nepal.
- 1818: Rajputana.
- 1819: Singapore.
- 1826: Assam.
- 1826: Arakhan.

- 1826: Tenasserim.
- 1831: Laccadive, Maldiv Islands.
- 1839: Aden.
- 1842: Hongkong, Shanghai.
- 1849: Peshawar.
- 1849: Panjab.
- 1852: Pegu.
- 1853: Nagpur, Haiderabad.
- 1856: Oudh.
- 1857: Cocos Islands.
- 1858: Andaman, Nicobar Islands.
- 1867: Bahia.
- 1879: Pishin.
- 1882: Port Said.
- 1883: Baluchistan.
- 1886: Socotra.
- 1886: Burma.
- 1888: British North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei.
- 1888: Christmas Islands.
- 1914: Kuwait.
- 1907: South Russia becomes British sphere of influence.
- 1916: Control of Hejaz.
- 1919: Palestine, Transjordan.
- 1921: Iraq.
- 1937: South Arabia.

V. AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA

- 1788: Sydney, New South Wales.
- 1804: Tasmania; natives wiped out.
- 1814: New Zealand; natives wiped out.
- 1824 (1859): Queensland.
- 1829: West Australia, Perth.
- 1834: South Australia.
- 1835: Victoria, Melbourne.

- 1840: Auckland, Antipodes.
 1841: Chatham Islands, Auckland Islands.
 1864: Malden Islands.
 1868: Starbuck Islands.
 1886: Kermadec Islands.
 1886-1899: Solomon Islands.
 1888: Cook and Fanning Islands, Manihiki Islands.
 1889: Phoenix Islands.
 1892: Ellice Islands.
 1892: Gilbert Islands.
 1899: Christmas Islands, St. Cruz Islands, Fiji Islands.
 1900: Tonga Islands.
 1919: German New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, Samoa Islands.

VI. AFRICA

- 1618: Gambia.
 1664: Gold Coast.
 1651: St. Helena Island.
 1785: Sierra Leone.
 1806: Capetown.
 1814: Mauritius.
 1836: Natal.
 1861: Nigeria, Lagos.
 1882: Egypt occupied.
 1884: Somaliland.
 1885: Sudan annexed.
 1885: Bechuanaland.
 1890: Zanzibar.
 1891: Nyasaland.
 1894: Uganda.
 1895: Kenya.
 1895: Rhodesia.
 1902: Transvaal and Orange Free State.
 1919: German East Africa, German South West Africa, parts of
 Togo and Cameroons.

THE WORLD'S GREATEST EMPIRE



Solid Area, the British Empire; Shaded Area, under British Influence

1	1609	Bermudas	7	1749	Halifax	13	1796	Colombo	19	1829	Perth	25	1878	Cyprus
2	1651	St. Helena	8	1771	(1833) Falklands	14	1797	Trinidad	20	1836	Melbourne	26	1882	Port Said
3	1655	Jamaica	9	1775	South Georgia	15	1800	Malta	21	1839	Aden	27	1885	Sudan
4	1661	Bombay	10	1783	Bahamas	16	1806	Capetown	22	1842	Hongkong	28	1919	German Southwest Africa
5	1696	Calcutta	11	1788	Sydney	17	1814	Mauritius	23	1867	Bahrein	29	1919	German East Africa
6	1704	Gibraltar	12	1795	Malacca	18	1819	Singapore	24	1871	Vancouver	30	1920	German New Guinea

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