


A FLANDERS HALL

Book-of-the-Hour



LORD
LOTHIAN
vs.
LORD
LOTHIAN



LORD LOTHIAN vs. LORD LOTHIAN



Associated Press Photo

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN AND
J. P. MORGAN

LORD LOTHIAN
VS.
LORD LOTHIAN

*Excerpts from the Speeches
and Writings of*

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN
British Ambassador to the United States

FK

FLANDERS HALL : *Publishers*
SCOTCH PLAINS, NEW JERSEY

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Printed in the U. S. A.

Foreword

WHEN, at the outbreak of the present European War, President Roosevelt admonished his fellow-countrymen to be neutral in deed but invited them to be unneutral in thought, one man more than any other in America—not a citizen, but a distinguished visitor—must have blushed inwardly. The President, while virtually urging Americans to be pro-British, could hardly have guessed that the most pro-German reader of his words would be the Marquess of Lothian, British Ambassador to Washington!

Of this distinguished sojourner in our midst, and of his warm approval of the National Socialist regime and its purposes in Germany as well as his sharp criticism of British policy, the following account was printed in the *Congressional Record* for June 19, 1940, on motion of Hon. Ernest Lundeen, late United States Senator from Minnesota:

“Philipp Henry Kerr, Marquess of Lothian, who also bears up under the titles of Lord Newbattle, Earl of Ancrue, and Viscount of Drien, is in many respects a typical member of the British ruling class. The aristocratic standing which he derives from ancient lineage is buttressed by the possession of estates covering some 28,000 acres. To the shrewd, practical intelligence which often characterizes men of his class, he adds two qualities which doubtless account for his appointment as His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the United States. He is persuasively literate in speech and writ-

ing, and his mind is pliant and adaptable to changing circumstances.

"Lord Lothian's career has been well-calculated to develop these special gifts. As Philipp Kerr, he was from 1910 to 1916 editor of the *Round Table*, an influential journal of British opinion. From 1916 to 1921 he was private secretary to the Honorable David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain during the later years of the first World War and the earlier post-war period. In this capacity he was on the inside of the peace conference which framed the Treaty of Versailles, of unhappy memory, and he is supposed to have been the author of the Covering Note of July 16, 1919, which laid on Germany the sole guilt of the war of 1914-18. We shall see that he later recanted this thesis.

"Indeed, in later years, especially after coming into his title and taking his seat in the House of Lords, Lothian demonstrated his mental pliancy by becoming an assiduous and eloquent apologist for the German point of view. After the National Socialist Party and Adolf Hitler came to power, Lothian specifically defended the steps taken by the Nazis to undo the evil work of Versailles, and persuasively urged that British policy should conform with German ideas for the reconstruction of Europe. The writings and speeches of Lord Lothian during this period reveal that he believed—

"That Germany was badly treated at Versailles; that French efforts to keep Germany in vassalage were cruel and unwise; that Britain and the United States share the guilt of France in this respect; that these three are responsible for the triumph of national socialism;

"That national socialism has been good for Germany;

"That Germany was justified in rearming;

"That there were too many small nations in post-Versailles Europe and that hegemony in south-eastern Europe naturally belongs to Germany;

"That the German demands for reunion with Austria, the Sudetenland, and Memel, and for possession of Danzig were justified;

"That Britain belongs in a 'world system' not in the 'European system,' that accordingly Britain should not make commitments in Europe, should not try to dominate Europe, should not go to war over any European issue; and

"That one of the prime causes of the war danger which then overhung Europe—and has since taken such tragic reality—was British meddling in eastern Europe.

"No one reading the noble lord's words can doubt that he spoke his sincere convictions. The discrepancy between his own view and those which, as British Ambassador, he is now daily urging upon the American Government and people cannot but recall Talleyrand's famous definition of an Ambassador's duty—"to lie for his country." Today Ambassador Lothian must try to persuade Americans that Hitler is a monster, nazi-ism an unmitigated evil, and the German people essentially barbarous; that Germany breaks treaties in mere cynical wantonness; that the reunion with Germany of territories inhabited by Germans which were cut off from the body of Germany at Versailles is a crime against democracy; that the German war with Poland made it Britain's sacred duty to war on Germany, and that, in fact, the preservation of civilization, as we have known

it, requires that American might, money, and men shall be freely offered to Britain to save her from defeat in that war which Lord Lothian, before he became Ambassador, warned his countrymen to shun."

No wonder Senator Lundeen added, "Of the two souls in his lordly bosom, one was evidently very friendly to Germany." Of course Irish-Americans, to whom no phenomenon is more familiar than the hypocrisy of British statesmen, may think that the noble lord has merely mastered the technique of Gladstone, of whom it was said that "he could improvise a lifelong conviction on the spur of the moment."

However that may be, the excerpts from Lord Lothian's published writings and speeches which Senator Lundeen caused to be printed in the *Congressional Record* amply bear out the Senator's comments on the "discrepancy" between the Ambassador's real opinions and those which he must pretend and parade in furtherance of his mission to lure America into the shambles abroad. Further research has turned up additional passages from these same writings and speeches, and the following compilation includes such additional passages as well as the excerpts printed in the *Congressional Record*.

The quoted passages are for the most part separate paragraphs, consecutively arranged but not necessarily connected except in the sense that, as indicated, they come from the same article or speech.

JAMES BURR HAMILTON

New York, September, 1940.

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I. The Place of Britain in the Collective System *

France and her Hegemonial System—The League an Instrument for keeping Germany in Subservience—Toying with Preventive War—Great Britain's Place in Europe and in the World—Against Automatic Commitment.

“MANY people think that it has been the League which has kept the peace of Europe for the last fifteen years. This is not true at all. The League has done excellent work and has intervened successfully in various conflicts between minor Powers, especially in the Balkan peninsula. But the fundamental stability of Europe has been ensured not by the Covenant, but by the military preponderance of France and her allies over Germany and the ex-enemy nations.”

“France set to work not only to modernise her own army, but to organize and equip the armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, and to enter into military alliances with them, in order to give her overwhelming military preponderance as against any attempt to upset the Treaties of Versailles, of Trianon, and so on, by force.”

“European realities were nakedly revealed when France, convinced that Germany intended to evade the Treaty of Versailles, entered the Ruhr in 1923, alone and contrary to the advice of Great Britain, in order to

* From “The Place of Britain in The Collective System,” an address given at Chatham House on June 5, 1934, reported in *International Affairs*, vol. XIII, London, 1934, pp. 622 ff.

compel fulfilment. And it was, in fact, the experience in the Ruhr which put the party of fulfilment in power in Germany for some eight years though it also convinced France that reparations could not be collected by bayonets."

"The French have been attempting, with perfect sincerity, to make the League of Nations the instrument for doing what their own alliance system had done, namely give security to themselves and peace to Europe by guaranteeing under military as well as economic sanctions what they call the 'integral' enforcement of the treaty settlement of 1918, except in so far as they themselves were willing voluntarily to make minor modifications in it. They have resisted disarmament by themselves or re-armament by Germany on the ground that the Treaties of Peace were the public law of Europe."

"They have done this even though it implied indefinite 'inequality' and defencelessness for Germany in armaments and the forcible perpetuation of the whole treaty settlement on the ground that the primary condition of peace is the enforcement of law."

"They (the British) have felt that the Treaties of Peace were both dictated and severe, and required some, though not much, revision by agreement, if they were to become the generally accepted political foundation of a European policy. They have become more and more convinced that there could be no lasting peace in Europe except on the basis of 'equality' in armaments for Germany. They have been unable to persuade themselves that peace could be ensured by permanent enforcement of arms inequality and the treaty 'status

quo' on Germany, by a collective combination, however great."

"*They (the British) . . . have felt that the Nazi revolution in itself has been largely caused by 'inequality' too long continued, and that to convert the League into a system for dragooning Germany into subservience would be to destroy the moral foundations of the League itself.*"

"The long latent crisis has now been precipitated because the Germans, having been promised 'equality' in December 1932 and having found that for one reason or other 'equality' was delayed and was apparently to be indefinitely postponed, refused to remain 'defenceless' any longer, left the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October last, and have now begun to try to recover equality by re-arming.

"It is a dangerous crisis. The French, realizing that it is impossible to get Great Britain to guarantee stability in a rearmed Europe, are vigorously trying to strengthen their old system of security by military preponderance behind the Treaty of Versailles with the assistance of Russia and, in a measure, of Italy. Failing that, they have been toying once more with the idea of a preventive war. Germany, caught between a stimulated public opinion at home and foreign danger, is trying to make up her mind how far and how fast she can safely go towards equality through re-armament."

"We shall never make any progress towards an effective collective system until we separate the world system of peace from the European, and recognise that our place is in the world system rather than the European system."

"Great Britain's international position has fundamentally changed. She is no longer the richest Power in the world. She no longer has a paramount navy, because she has conceded equality to the United States and something not very far short of it to Japan. And she is now vulnerable from the air."

"I come, finally, to my conclusions. My fundamental conclusion, as I have already indicated, is that the only way of avoiding a complete breakdown of the League system, the only way forward towards a really effective collective system, the only way of avoiding a return to the crude pre-War anarchy, is to separate the European regional security system from the world system, and that Great Britain should form part, primarily, of the world system."

"If this is so, the sooner we make it clear that we reject any kind of automatic commitment the sooner will Europe make its own regional system."

"My own view is that, if only we do not interfere, Europe will rapidly establish a regional security system of its own, which may well prevent war and lead both to appeasement and to some measure of limitation of armaments in a system of balance before many years are past."

II. Pacifism Is Not Enough *

Unification of Germany—German Claim to Equality—The League's Chief Failures.

"For centuries before Bismarck Germany had been the cockpit of Europe. This was mainly due to the fact that Germany itself was divided into two or three hundred principalities. Napoleon reduced these states to about thirty. Bismarck saw that if Germany was to have peace, security, and prosperity she must have unity. But he found that the difficulty in obtaining united action in the old German confederation of sovereign states was insuperable. So he pronounced his famous dictum about blood and iron and by means of three wars united Germany, except for Austria, into a single federated state."

"By the end of the century Germany was no longer content with a purely European position. Her union had led to immense economic development. She had become interested in world trade. She became dissatisfied at finding that world politics were being decided by Britain and Japan, Britain and France, or the United States without bringing Germany into consultation. Hence the launching of the German navy Bills by the Kaiser. These Bills were not intended to give Germany supremacy, but as their preamble stated, to ensure that no decision should be made without taking Germany's

* From "Pacifism Is Not Enough," the Burge Memorial lecture delivered at Oxford, 1935.

wishes into account. Germany, in the old phrase, demanded 'her place in the sun,' a phrase which translated into post-war parlance is the word 'equality.' There was nothing wicked about this desire."

"It requires no argument to show that in fundamentals it (the League) has so far failed. It has not been able to secure the adherence of all nations. It has not been able to abate economic nationalism and lower the tariffs and restrictions which have caused unemployment everywhere and destroyed democracy in many lands. It has not been able to bring about all-round disarmament. It has not been able to revise the treaties of peace except in ephemeral and minor particulars. It has not been able to mobilize the kind of strength which would enable it to compel one of the great Powers to conform to that public opinion."

"Wilson in introducing the Covenant to the Peace Conference sadly expressed the hope that one of the central functions of the League would be to bring about peaceful revision of injustices which war passion made unavoidable at the time.

"But the League has never been able to do this, either under Article XIX or Article XI or Article XV. Reparations have disappeared—but through the pressure of facts, not of agreement. The unilateral disarmament of Germany has disappeared, not by agreement, despite three years of discussion, but by unilateral action. The only important agreed relaxation has been the evacuation of the Rhineland five years before the appointed day. It has never been possible seriously to discuss the Polish-German frontiers, the question whether Austria was to have a free choice as to her own

destiny, the duration of the unilateral demilitarization of Germany's western frontiers, the colonial question, the Hungarian frontiers. *If there is to be real peace, agreed solutions for some of these questions are essential.*"

III. Germany and France *

German Inequality after Versailles—Recovery through National Socialism—France's Encirclement Policies and Hitler's Peace Offers—Plea for Fair Dealing between the Powers—The League an Instrument for Keeping Germany Disarmed and Impotent—National Socialism.

"THE Treaty of Versailles imposed two things upon her (Germany). First, a great reduction in territory, a loss of colonies, and heavy reparations. Second, 'defencelessness' against her neighbours through the unilateral disarmament clauses of Part V of the Treaty. Since 1918 this 'inequality' for Germany has, in fact, been France's 'security.'"

"It is, then, 'inequality' that Germany is absolutely determined to get rid of to-day. It involved liability to the Ruhr invasion and to incidents like the present Memel situation. It meant that, in practice, the neighbours of Germany could consult about European problems, while Germany was kept outside the door, and then ask her to 'sign on the dotted line.' They would afford to do this because Germany, normally one of the Great Powers of the world, could not, in the last resort, resist. National-Socialism, which among many other things is a movement of individual and national self-respect, came into being largely to end the abasement of Germany."

* From "Germany And France," in the *London Times*, January 31, and February 1, 1935.

"That is why, at the first hesitation in October, 1933, to implement the undertaking of December, 1932, to give her 'equality' in a régime of security, she left the League and, after making the offer rejected by M. Barthou last April, proceeded to rearm. That, in her view, is now the only road to equality."

"What is the way out? *The central fact in Europe today is that Germany does not want war and is prepared to renounce it absolutely as a method of settling her disputes with her neighbours*, provided she is given real equality, because it is only equality which will enable her to test whether the pacific method of dealing with disputes can reasonably succeed."

"He (Hitler) goes farther and says that he will sign pacts of non-aggression with all Germany's neighbours, to prove that sincerity of his desire for peace, and that in armaments he asks for no more than 'equality' for Germany, and will accept international inspection if everybody else accepts it too. I have not the slightest doubt that this attitude is perfectly sincere. *Hitler's Germany does not want war.*"

"So Germany does not want war, even about those matters in which she most dislikes what is left of the Treaty of Versailles, and which Europe fears she might try to remedy by war."

"If these are the facts, and I am convinced they are, how, amid the terrible fears and suspicions and hatreds which dominate Europe to-day, are they to be made the basis of an agreement which will convince Europe that they are really going to have settled peace for 10 years and that they can therefore get on with economic reconstruction and the restoration of international trade in-

stead of preparing for an inevitable war? I think the answer rests with the British Government."

"There is no road, I am convinced, by the method so often pursued, and almost inevitable while Germany was erupting in the National Socialist revolution—namely, that of getting the neighbours of Germany together, agreeing to something they can all accept and then presenting it to Germany on a plate, on the basis that if she refuses it proves her bad intentions and that if she signs she is once more back in a slightly relaxed strait-waistcoat of the Versailles Treaty. Germany has finished once and for all with that system. That was the method of the 'Diktat' of Versailles. And that method is largely what she means by 'inequality.' Equality means that she takes part from the outset in the discussions as to how Europe is to be stabilized on exactly the same terms as everybody else, and with the same kind of power and influence as her equals. Besides, the 'sign on the dotted line' method is the wrong method from the moral and psychological point of view. We are far more likely to interest Germany in the problem of European peace and reconstruction, by treating her as a friend and as one of the European community than as a dangerous animal which everybody approaches with loaded rifles shouting: 'Why don't you show that you are a good European by coming back into the cage?'—a League of Nations which hitherto, from the point of view of Germany, has been little more than an instrument for keeping her disarmed and impotent while evading fulfilment of Article XIX—the article providing for the revision of Treaties by pacific means."

"War comes far more frequently from inability to change out-of-date political arrangements in time than from direct aggression. Unless Article XIX of the Covenant can be made effective the Covenant itself will disappear."

"Take again National Socialism itself. National Socialism is the outcome of a four years' war, the Ruhr, inflation, and two revolutions in 20 years."

"It has been strong enough to give Germany unity where it was terribly divided, to produce a stable Government in place of weak and unstable Governments, and to restore to Germany national self-respect and international standing. One thing, too, about it is not generally understood. It is not imperialist in the old sense of the word."

IV. Problems for the League *

Why Dictatorships?—Why the League Disintegrated—Must Britain go to War?

“NEITHER we nor the League have yet faced the consequences of the tremendous changes which have come over the world since the War.

“In the last century there was practically free migration all over the world, and at least 50,000,000 people left Europe for the New World. In the last century there was in substance free trade in goods, foodstuffs, and capital all over the world. In the last century the British Fleet, being the only large Fleet, was the policeman of the seas. In consequence there was no world war for nearly a century, and few revolutions and dictatorships.

“To-day the nations are living in watertight compartments, with no migration and no freedom for trade, with the result that many of them have got into such tremendous population and economic difficulties that they have resorted to dictatorship to maintain order at home, and most of them are adding to their armaments in order to try to solve their internal problems by action in a foreign field.”

“If the League merely becomes an institution for stabilizing the status quo under threat of sanctions our

* From “Problems For The League,” speech at a Liberal rally at Scarborough on September 18, 1935, the *London Times*, September 19, 1935.

last state will be much worse than our first. There will be two consequences.

“In the first place, all the dissatisfied Powers—and many of them quite legitimately—will leave the League, will remain dictatorships, and we shall get back to the old fatal alliance system, though one side will call itself the League and the other a combination to compel the League members to share the wealth and opportunity of the world with them.”

“In the second place, Great Britain will find itself bound under the Covenant to go to war in order to maintain the status quo for everybody else—because everybody wants to get the British Navy behind their security—but without being able to compel the revision of treaties she may think justly needed.”

V. Open Door *

*"Cramped Nations"—Perpetuating a Status Quo—
What Great Britain Should Have Done.*

"IF THE League is to prove to be more than an instrument for expanding the local war into a general war between the great civilized Powers it is doomed."

"After the War we cramped the nations, many of them with rapidly expanding populations, into countries that were narrow, unproductive, and with few natural resources. *Italy* perhaps is the most conspicuous of those countries, *Japan* is another, and *Germany* will be to-morrow, and there will probably be others. It is no use pretending that the tremendous problems of the sudden stoppage of world movement do not exist. They are there, and unless we handle them firmly and wisely and in time, they will explode in world war, whatever sanctions we create. It is the essential function of the League to deal with these questions, otherwise it will die, because we have allowed it to become an instrument not for settling grievances but for perpetuating a status quo which is every year becoming more difficult to justify."

"Sir Samuel Hoare opened the door a little way when he proposed the question of access to raw materials for all nations, but that does not go nearly far enough. We

* From "Open Door' In All Colonies," speech at a conference held for the formation of a Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction in Lancashire, the *London Times*, September 30, 1935.

have to go much farther in dealing with both Italy and Germany if we are to have lasting peace. The real questions are substantial reduction in the tariffs and embargoes which create unemployment everywhere, so as to make possible a development of international trade; the collective reconsideration of the problem of migration; the revision of the War-time mandates, and collective consideration whether there could not be an open door in the colonial territories of all nations."

VI. Germany and the Rhineland *

The Locarno Pact also a Dictated Treaty—Locarno Invalidated by French Military Alliances—Justice of German Claims in Austria, Danzig, the Corridor, and Memel—Warning lest Britain be dragged into War over Questions of Eastern Europe—Europe might have come to Peace if Britain kept out—The U.S.A. and European commitments.

“THE Locarno Treaty by which Germany accepted once more the demilitarisation of her Rhineland frontier zone was a treaty which she signed when reeling from a worse defeat than she had endured during the War, for the entry into the Ruhr probably did Germany more harm than her defeat in the War; it ruined the middle class, and raised the suicide rate to prodigious heights. Therefore, Germany feels that the Locarno Treaty, to a considerable extent, was also a dictated treaty, because it was the price she paid, and then willingly paid, as a guarantee against a second Ruhr occupation.

“It was inevitable that the signature of the recent Franco-Soviet military convention, together with the Czechoslovak-Soviet convention, should re-awaken in Germany all the old fears of encirclement—the fear that Germany might have to fight simultaneously a fully mobilised Russian army and a fully mobilised French army. The signature of that convention, inevitably as

* From “Germany and The Rhineland,” address given at Chatham House on April 2, 1936, reported in Special Supplement to *International Affairs*, London, April, 1936, pp. 45 ff.

I think, made Germany feel that she could no longer keep open the back-door through which France had made the Ruhr invasion. A very distinguished British General, Sir Ian Hamilton, wrote to *The Times* only a few days ago, and said that Germany, from a military point of view, had escaped from a military embrace just in time.”

“Now a word about the immediate situation. My own view of it is that in the present crisis British public opinion says that Germany has essential justice on her side, that France has the law on her side, that we are in a particularly difficult position because we are guarantors of a one-sided treaty, and that above everything else we want to see negotiations started.”

“In the long run Austria must be the judge of her own future. We cannot, and certainly will not go to war to perpetuate a system in which Austria is governed by the combination of Mussolini and the Pope. *If Danzig, which is a German city, wants to rejoin Germany now that Poland has got Gdynia, it is not worth a war to prevent it. It would be wise for Poland to make some permanent arrangement for enabling Germany to have access to East Prussia while she has access to Gdynia. Something has got to be done about Memel.*”

“We would not go to war about those questions in Eastern Europe concerning which the rest of Europe wants to build a sort of armed collective security system in order to maintain the status quo there.”

“I do not believe that we are prepared to go to war for questions in Eastern Europe, and therefore the sooner we make that clear to Europe the better for us, for Europe and for peace. Otherwise war will come

and we shall be dragged into it exactly as we were in 1914. That is the real danger."

"I am inclined to think that Europe will never make peace within herself until we leave her to her own work.

I am not sure that Europe might not come to peace if it were made quite clear that no group in Europe could hope for a military alliance with us, that we were not concerned in that aspect of the European game at all."

"The United States has made up her mind, once and for all, that her intervention in Europe in 1917 was a waste of effort, that somehow or other Europe must solve her own problems and that she is not going to be associated, in any way, with European commitments."

VII. On the Future of the League of Nations *

Justice to be done to Germany in Eastern Europe and Overseas.

"TAKE the case of Germany, now that Japan had found her outlet to China—an aggression which, he thought, would ultimately fail of its own weight—and that Italy had found her outlet in Abyssinia, there was only one question left which might disturb the peace of the world, the German question. If that could be solved peacefully he thought they could feel assured of 25 years' peace, during which those moral elements which were the real strength of the League might have time to grow. As Admiral Mahan once said, 'The function of force is to give moral ideas time to take root.' **"

"There was still, he thought, justice to be done to Germany, by some readjustment in Eastern Europe—say in Austria and Danzig—and by giving her openings in the economic field oversea. But they had got to make concessions to Germany because they were just, and not because they were extorted at the point of the sword or the bomb."

* From "On The Future of The League of Nations," speech to the National Peace Congress at Leeds, the *London Times*, June 27, 1936.

** This passage, as the wording shows, is not a verbatim transcript of Lothian's remarks, but a paraphrase by the reporter for the *Times*.

VIII. England and Germany *

Inability of the League to Remedy the Injustices of the Peace Treaties—The Illegality of the Invasion of the Ruhr—Bismarck—The Economic Folly of the 1919 Treaties—Danger of drifting into an Alliance System—Germany and South-Eastern Europe, one "Living Space."

"IN PRACTICE the high hopes raised by those ideas (Democracy and League of Nations) were gradually nullified by three things.

"The first was that, as was almost inevitable at the end of four years' war-time propaganda, the terms imposed upon Germany and her associates were too severe. They did not conform to that justice which must be the basis for lasting order and peace. Some penalty for defeat was inevitable. But some of the new national frontiers, especially in Eastern Europe, did not conform to majority lines. A fantastic burden of reparations was placed upon Germany. Her colonies, conquered during the war, were not restored. Germany was permanently disarmed and her western frontier was permanently demilitarised, while her late enemies were left in possession of their full rights both to arm and to organise their defence. It was clear, even in 1919, as Woodrow Wilson said, that the future tranquillity of Europe depended on whether the League of Nations could remodel the Peace Treaty in the interests of rea-

* From "England and Germany," published in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. CXXI, January-June 1937, pp. 577 ff.

son and justice as the effect of war-time propaganda wore off. But this it was unable to do."

"The second main reason for the failure of the settlement of 1919 was an almost total disregard of economics. Just as the Vienna Congress in 1815 ignored nationality which eventually blew their settlement to pieces, so the Paris Conference ignored the effect on the world of the increase in the number of sovereign States in Europe, each with full power to put tariffs round themselves, and of war debts and reparations. It has been the division of the world into watertight economic compartments burdened by heavy international debt obligations, both public and private, which has been the main cause of the high tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions which have produced the chronic unemployment, the social distress, the revolutionary movements, either from the right or from the left, the overthrow of democracy, and the return of authoritarian government, in so many countries, since 1920."

"The Third and perhaps most serious tragedy since 1920 has been the failure of the League of Nations."

"What is to happen now? That is the central question which confronts the statesmanship of the nations. The greatest danger of the moment is that we shall drift back to a new rival alliance system. The dangers of this were very visible to Bismarck, who successfully managed to prevent Europe becoming imprisoned within it from 1870 to 1890. The danger arises from the fact that once the double alliance system has become formed the control of policy tends to pass out of the hands both of individual members of the alliance and of each alliance itself. Thus in the crisis of 1914

Germany was largely at the mercy of the diplomacy of Austria-Hungary, and France and England at the mercy of Russia."

"For some time a large number of people in both Germany and England believed that a free discussion between our two countries would fairly easily find a basic agreement. They welcomed the idea because an agreement between Germany and England would mean the peace of the world. But such a discussion has never taken place. Why? Some people think it is because of the opposition of France and Russia. I do not think so. I think there is a more substantial reason. It is because there does not at present seem to be a sufficient agreement as to the fundamentals of a solution to make a discussion possible or fruitful."

"There are a great many people in England who think that *the easiest solution of the economic problem for Germany would be special economic arrangements in Central Europe. Germany and the smaller countries to the east and south are largely economically correlative, and the present excessive economic sub-division of Eastern Europe cannot be permanent.*"

"If Germany and her eastern neighbours would create an association on the British or American model, the main economic problem of the day would be far on the way to solution. Germany would have an economic zone not unlike that of the other great Powers. She would, too, move towards the Anglo-American group. Encirclement would end. The security both of Germany and France would be assured. The colonial question would be soluble."

IX. Preventing a World War *

Collective Security combines the most dangerous features of the old Alliance System—It is Far Better to isolate a war than to spread it into a World War—Shall Britain Fight to Maintain the Anarchy of Europe?

"UNTIL the League is once more universal in membership the theory of collective security combines all the most dangerous features of the old alliance system. It inevitably means the gradual organisation of all the nations of Europe and Asia into two great military alliances, one of which seeks to break through the strait-waistcoat, economic and political, in which the world has been since 1920, and the other of which is committed to go to war to prevent any change to which any one of its members does not agree."

"By far the most serious problem which confronts the statesmanship of the world to-day is to find the method whereby a local war or crisis of power politics does not inexorably spread until it becomes another universal war—by far the greatest calamity that can befall mankind. If you cannot prevent a war it is far better to isolate it than to spread it into a world war, which is precisely what the system of collective security, if adopted, is bound to do."

"If the theory of collective security got us into another European war, what should we be fighting for?"

* From "Preventing a World War," speech at the Reform Club, Manchester, reported in the *London Times*, February 24, 1937.

We should be fighting to maintain the anarchy of Europe, which is Europe's fundamental bane. I do not think that is a cause which was worth 1,000,000 British lives."

"In great measure it (Fascism) was rebellion against the discriminations of the Treaty of Versailles and the economic barriers which since the War had shut all nations, except Russia, the United States, and ourselves, who had immense areas under our control, from the markets of the rest of the world and especially from colonial markets."

X. Speech in the House of Lords *

Collective Security a Modernisation of France's fatal Post-War Policy—British Policy of Encircling Germany Fatal—Plea for British Non-Commitment and Non-Intervention—America and Europe—Let Britain Withdraw from the Conflicts of Europe—Democracy will not Survive another World War.

"I VENTURE to think that if Europe could become normal the chances of world war would be extremely small. It is Europe which is the main focus, the main centre from which the threat of war throughout the world now springs; and the fundamental reason for that is not the ambition or the malignity of any particular race or people, it is the fact that to-day it is divided into twenty-six sovereign States. The difficulties of Europe are far greater to-day than they were in 1914. Then there were seventeen sovereign States, now there are twenty-six, and I do not think in considering the problem of Europe you should ever lose sight of the fact that anarchy lies at the root of its troubles."

"It seems to me that the recent argument for collective security—that is the argument that the nations who are satisfied with the status quo, the nations which want to prevent any alterations, should enter into something like a military alliance in order that they may be overwhelmingly and collectively stronger than any na-

* From a speech in the House of Lords on March 2, 1937, reported in Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 104, London, 1937, pp. 392 ff.

tion that seeks to alter the status quo—is nothing else than the modernisation of what in my view has been the fatal policy which has been maintained by the French Government since 1920. That is a policy which in the first fifteen years of peace concentrated on keeping Germany without arms and encircled, and which is now concerned in building up a system of armed alliances about it, a policy, I may add, for which we and the United States of America must bear our full share of blame.”

“This new alliance system, now ennobled by the phrase collective security, began with the military alliances between France and the Little Entente and Poland. It has now been extended to Russia by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and Russia, a Treaty which has its duplicate or its parallel in the Treaty between Czechoslovakia and Russia. That is one side of the alliance system. Inevitably, as has always happened in the past and as under any system in which alliances are involved between sovereign States always will happen in the future, that system has begun to produce an alliance system on the other side. It produced what is called the Rome-Berlin axis, it produced the Anti-Comintern Agreement between Germany and Japan.”

“In the end we go from one crisis to another, like the Algeiras crisis, the Agadir crisis, the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, the Balkan crisis until finally we get to a state of tension in a world knit by alliances, so that by accident a fool or a knave presses the button which lets off a world war in its most violent, totalitarian and savage form.”

“Really if we take sides in that ideological conflict, as it is called, which is rising in Europe, the only result would be that if we ever did become involved in such a conflict we should be split inside this country from top to bottom. I think that argument for collective security can only produce as the inevitable result both war and confusion at home.”

“Finally, there are those people whose ideas are based upon fear of Germany. There are people, old diplomats, high officials, public men, who seem to be convinced that because Germany is largely isolated, with a population of not more than 70,000,000 people, because it has a totalitarian Government—that Government itself the product of the policy of its neighbours, including ourselves, in great measure—with a country to the East whose armaments are at least three times as great as those of Germany, that Germany is considering an attack on the peace of Europe and the liberty of its neighbours. *I confess that when you consider that Germany occupies the most dangerous position in Europe, that she has no neutral frontiers, that modern air services mean that she is more liable to be destroyed than any other nation, infinitely more liable than ourselves, I think the German fear is to a large extent a bogey.* I do not say that Germany is easy to deal with—I do not think she is—but that we should drift into a policy which, in effect, says that the only way of dealing with Germany is to surround her in such a way, both economically and politically, than an internal explosion is inevitable, is to condemn ourselves and the world to world war. It is the most fatal policy of all.

“While that policy is seldom publicly avowed, you

have not to go very far before you find that it exists in the minds of a considerable number of people in this country."

"And if we did get embroiled, what should we be fighting for, generally speaking? The only possible cause we could be fighting for would be to insist on the maintenance of the anarchy of Europe that Europe should remain divided into twenty-six States each with tariffs to the skies and armed to the teeth. I venture to think that that is not a cause for which it is worth laying down the lives of British men."

"I do not think pacifism can solve the problem, for the reason that it does not create the conditions upon which alone peace is possible, which is the maintenance of government.

"I venture to ask whether there is not a third policy, directed, I confess, mainly to the supreme question of deciding whether it is not possible to create a system which, in the conditions of to-day, may not end all war but can prevent local wars spreading into world wars,—which is the real calamity which besets mankind; whether it is not possible to do more than we are now thinking of doing to isolate wars instead of spreading them into universal wars, as I think the system of collective security would inevitably do."

"The question is whether you cannot apply the system which we have adopted with considerable success in the case of Spain to Europe and if necessary to the Far East—non-commitment to either side, and non-intervention."

"But there is more also to be said for the American attitude to Europe. I spent some time there, and I

found that the fundamental problem is this. The root of the trouble in Europe is the fact that in an area no larger than the United States it is trying still to live as twenty-six States. We found in this country that until we united the Crowns and the Parliaments, there was no order, no prosperity, no peace. Canada found that, until it united its ten Provinces, it could get no order and no peace. So did Australia, so did South Africa, and so of course—in the greatest instance of all—did the great American Commonwealth. All the English peoples have realised in practise as well as in theory that until we overcame the boundary created by sovereignty we could have neither order, prosperity nor peace, and they say in America that that is the fundamental problem which confronts Europe. They ask, 'Did our intervention solve the European problem last time? No. We may have been to some extent to blame for not joining the League of Nations, but the League of Nations itself could not solve Europe's problems. They can only be solved by Europe itself.' The United States will only intervene if Europe breaks out into the rest of the world so as to threaten the interests at any rate of the Monroe system."

"What matter is that we should not be drawn into any form of alliance system or counter-alliance system. I venture to think that if we withdraw from Europe, it is the best contribution we can possibly make to the peace of Europe to-day. Anybody who has any familiarity with what is going on in Europe knows that the central question in European diplomacy to-day is whether Great Britain can be drawn in on either side. I think the day we make it perfectly clear that in no circum-

stances will we be drawn into the conflict between Fascism and Communism, or any of the other domestic conflicts of Europe, we shall take the greatest step we can take to induce the nations of Europe to come to terms, to reduce their tariffs, and to make a lasting peace."

"Democracy itself will not be able to stand another war. To fight it you will have to abandon your Parliamentary system and the financial needs could not be met by ordinary democratic methods. I venture most earnestly to suggest to the Government that they should give more attention to this method of preventing world war than perhaps they have hitherto done."

XI. Germany and the Peace of Europe *

The Crushing of Germany through Versailles and the Ruhr Invasion—The Spirit of Resistance Manifested in National Socialism—The Franco-British Breach of their Disarmament Promise—Germany takes her Natural Rights Unilaterally—What National Socialism has done for Germany—Germany's Claims to Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig, the Corridor, Memel—Living-Space in Europe—The Colonial Problem—The League and Encirclement of Germany—Peace by Reorganizing Mitteleuropa under German Leadership—The League's Inability to Organize Peace.

"Now the Versailles settlement was based on the theory of the sole responsibility of Germany for the Great War. I do not think anybody who has made a serious study of pre-War history, or even of the events which immediately preceded the War, can hold that view today."

"By the end of the war, however, as a result of the opinions which we formed during the War, on very inadequate material, supplemented by war-time propaganda (which is largely directed to maintaining the unity and morale of one's own countrymen by proving that we are wholly right and the enemy wholly wrong), we had convinced ourselves that Germany was solely responsible for the disaster, and the Treaty of Versailles was based on that principle. On the strength of it Ger-

* From "Germany and the Peace of Europe," address given at Chatham House on June 29, 1937, printed in *International Affairs*, Vol. XVI, London, 1937, p. 870.

many was deprived of one seventh of her European territory; she was deprived of her colonies; she was unilaterally disarmed, and she was compelled to demilitarise the Rhineland, which meant, in effect, that at any time a French army could march into the vital Rhineland region and reduce Germany to paralysis. In addition, there was placed upon her a burden of reparations for which I do not suppose to-day there is a single advocate; impossible reparations leading in their turn to impossible claims for war debts."

"Yet Germany had to endure another series of tragic events. In 1922 there took place the invasion of the Ruhr, declared by the British Government at the time to be contrary to the Treaty of Versailles and an illegal act, which was inaugurated ostensibly on the grounds of a technical default by Germany in the delivery of certain categories of timber, but really because Poincaré had made up his mind that Germany would not fulfil the Treaty of Versailles except by violent compulsion. Yet the invasion of the Ruhr resulted in the increase in inflation which had been begun by the excessive demand for Reparations, and which finally wiped out the whole middle-class in Germany and produced the National-Socialist Party. It created the body of men called the Ruhr fighters, who instead of acquiescing, as the German government did, in the military occupation, began to fight the French among the slag heaps of the Ruhr. It was in the occupation of the Ruhr that the spirit of the National-Socialist movement, that is, the view that the way of liberty was not through negotiation, but through strength, became established in Germany."

"Then began another series, as I see it, of tragic events. In January 1933, Germany was promised equality in a regime of security. But after many negotiations to this end, Sir John Simon, after consultation with his French friends who were terrified by the advent of Hitler to power, announced at Geneva in October 1933 that, in effect, no practical steps in the direction of conceding equality to Germany could be taken for four more years, and M. Paul Boncour added in his speech that, even at the end of four years, it would be necessary to take the political situation into account. That statement was taken by Germany as a default on our promises, and as conclusive proof that the League was completely dominated by the victors of Versailles. So she left the League; and I have no doubt that if we had been treated in the same way we should have taken the same action. The episode led, none the less, to tragic results: on the one hand, it led to the unlimited rearmament by Germany—and, on the other, to the conviction that what counts in international affairs is not the force of your case, but the strength of your armaments. If any nation has had that conviction borne in on her it has been Germany, by everything that has happened to her from 1918 to 1933. She received nothing substantial in response to reason. She only began to recover her position in the world when she had begun to acquire the strength which enabled her to take her natural rights by unilateral action in defiance of the treaties. On the principle that any government that fails to remedy the serious grievances of its people in time must face revolution at home, I think it is true in international affairs that, unless a situation

which causes a deep sense of injustice, resentment and grievance can be remedied by agreement, it will inevitably be remedied by unilateral action, or in the last resort by power diplomacy or war. *There is no use in talking about the sanctity of treaties unless they are just treaties.*"

"Is there any doubt that if we put ourselves in the position of the Germans, leaving entirely out of account the existence of the Nazi regime, we should feel bitterly that we had been unjustly and badly treated ever since 1918, that we had just claims against the rest of the world, and that if we could not get our just rights by agreement we were entitled to take them back by force if we could do so?"

"I think it must be admitted that *National-Socialism has done a great deal for Germany*. It has undoubtedly cleaned up Germany in the ordinary moral sense of the word. The defeatism, the corruption so manifest a characteristic in the days after the War has disappeared, at any rate from public view. It has given discipline and order and a sense of purpose to the great majority of young people who in earlier days did not know where to go or what they were living for."

"Unfortunately, too, Germany was afflicted by a disease from which Great Britain has never yet suffered, a multiplicity of parties in the Reichstag which could not be remedied by the ordinary electoral process. Election after election was fought, but the parties always came back substantially as numerous as before. I do not think it is possible for any country to have a strong government, a government which is capable of dealing either with international problems or with domestic

problems, if it has to be based on the shifting sands of a multiplicity of parties. So, however much people may dislike National-Socialism, the fact must be faced that, in the eyes of the great majority of Germans, Hitler is a saviour, who has given them back international security and standing and internal order, employment and purpose."

"Now how is one to deal with *a Germany which, in my view, has claims against the rest of the world on the grounds of justice?*"

"Let me deal first with Eastern Europe. Speaking very broadly, the German thesis of to-day is that she is entitled to self-determination in Central Europe. The War was fought for self-determination, and at the end of the War not only were certain groups of Germans like the Austrians forbidden to unite with Germany, but considerable numbers of Germans just outside the German frontiers were united with other countries. The Polish Corridor, though then largely peopled by Germans, was created, and severed Germany's connection with East Prussia. Cities like Danzig, which had always been German since the beginning of history, were cut away from Germany. Now, if the principle of self-determination were applied on behalf of Germany in the way in which it was applied against her, it would mean the *re-entry of Austria into Germany, the union of the Sudeten-deutsch, Danzig, and possibly Memel with Germany, and certain adjustments with Poland in Silesia and the Corridor.*"

"Then on the economic side there is a certain natural balance between the various countries of South-Eastern Europe and Germany. If political antagonism could

be eliminated, economic arrangements could be made between the various States which would give to all of them a higher standard of living and far greater economic stability. And, provided it was done by agreement, I cannot see that vast Russia to the east or the satisfied colonial powers to the west ought to object. *On the contrary, their greatest need is that Central Europe should settle down, and that is only possible, in my view, under German leadership.*

"The other main aspect of the German question is the colonial economic problem. When Dr. Schacht is presented with the usual British contention that colonies are not much use, that really we get almost nothing from them, that they are a burden and a liability, and that we will do everything with them except give them up to anybody else, he replies that these considerations may have been true in pre-War days when the development of any colony depended on whether free capitalists thought that they could make a profit on using their capital for the purpose, but that the situation is very different to-day in a world of economic nationalism and universal governmental intervention in economic affairs."

"The colonial question is now very important, not only as a symbol of the restoration of German self-respect and the withdrawal of the accusation that she was unfit to have colonies, but as a vital element in her own economic system if she is to attain the standard of living which the rest of us think necessary for a civilised country. I think there is a great deal in Dr. Schacht's case."

"Finally, there is the question of Germany's 'place in

the sun.' It is a difficult question. It is largely concerned, I think, with the future of the League of Nations. The League, in Germany's view, is in effect a combination of the beneficiaries of the Treaty of Versailles who are mainly concerned with maintaining what is left of that Treaty, and with 'putting a ring round Germany.' I think that that is not an unfair description of the League and its attitude to Germany since 1920, and I do not believe that the League can come into its own until justice has been done to Germany."

"If the situation created in 1918 could be remedied by bringing about in Eastern Europe the kind of Mittel Europa on the model of the British Empire which I have described; if by some such means as I have suggested, and on the basis of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant so far as the treatment of the natives is concerned, there could be found for Germany areas overseas in which she could produce those special raw materials or minerals necessary to supplement her own economy; and if Germany could be convinced that the League of Nations is not a combination of her enemies, but a group of European nations in which a satisfied Germany would have as much influence as anybody else, I think the peace of the world would be secure. My own view is that there will be no lasting peace until some such solution is found."

"Admittedly, I think, the present regime in Germany has been created by the policy of her neighbours, and mainly by the policy of keeping Germany down and 'encircled,' which has been relentlessly pursued by France since 1920. But when I say French policy, I do not mean to hold France alone responsible for that

policy, because I think the United States and Great Britain are equally responsible."

"How is it possible to enter into such discussions? Can the League of Nations do it? I doubt it. I think it is true to say that League policy in relation to Germany has always been a policy of dictation by the beneficiaries of Versailles. It has been the failure of the League to attempt in any serious way to do justice to Germany, either when she was a Republic or since, which is the fundamental reason for the moral decline of the League to-day."

"The fundamental reason why the League failed in regard to Abyssinia was because everybody was mainly concerned to maintain those unilateral discriminations against Germany which ought to have been removed many years ago. That was why nobody saw it through. Supposing the League had done justice to Germany in earlier years, and Germany had been a member of the League, I do not think there would have been any trouble at all. Instead, everybody was looking at Germany to see whether she proposed to take advantage of the situation in order to remilitarise the Rhineland, which from every moral point of view, seventeen years after the Armistice, she was entitled to do."

XII. The League Contract *

A Plea for Revising the Injustices of the Status Quo.

"I AM not against collective action by the League against an international wrong. Quite the contrary. But such action must be subject to two conditions. The first is that we do not direct it to the maintenance of a status quo which is out of date, but recognise that changes are both just and necessary and that unless the League can bring about these changes by its own action they will inevitably and rightly be brought about in other ways. That may seem a hard saying, but I believe it is common sense because otherwise we shall find ourselves pledged to go to war, to prevent change everywhere."

"If we consider the three great failures of the League, the reasons are clear. In the case of Europe it has been because the League was utterly unable to do justice to Germany while she was a Republic."

"It is perfectly obvious that considerable adjustments will be necessary in the world if it is to enjoy stable peace. I believe that if we get away from legalism, are strong, are willing to be just and to face realities, and relate our policy to our strength and our willingness to make sacrifices for it, there is a good chance that these adjustments can be made without war

* From "The League Contract—Dealing with the World To-Day," a letter to the London *Times*, September 10, 1937.

and without international injustice, whereas to stand by the letter of the Covenant will be as likely to drive us to that calamity of world war which every nation wishes to avoid, as the policy of the 'left' coalition."

XIII. Dependence upon Consent *

Unilateral Action by Great Britain and by Germany.

"I do not remember that Great Britain felt particularly squeamish when it declared recently that an alteration in circumstances had made it possible for it to fulfil its obligations under its debt settlement with the United States."

"Until last year there was irresistible 'superiority' in the hands of France, her Allies, and the League. The League has failed to bring peace to Europe not because it was not strong enough but because it utterly failed to give justice and equality to Republican Germany or to compel M. Barthou to accept Herr Hitler's offers to limit Germany's armaments at a point below that of her neighbours."

* From "Dependence Upon Consent," a letter to the *London Times* September 17, 1937.

XIV. The Issues in British Foreign Policy *

The Origins of the World War—The Haves and the Have-Nots—The Drama of Versailles and the Tragedy of the After-War—Clemenceau's Thesis—Unilateral Disarmament of Germany—Locarno Abortive—Sir John Simon's and Paul Boncour's Sabotage of Disarmament in 1933—"You can get nothing from the Allies by Appeals to Justice"—Why Great Britain rejected Hitler's Peace Offers—Hitler, the Unifier of the German Nation—Responsibility of the Western Democracies for the War of 1939-40—Exploitation of the League for Purposes Fundamentally Unjust.

"THE Treaty of Versailles, as you all remember, was based on the thesis of the sole guilt of Germany. There was a clause in that Treaty which compelled Germany to admit her guilt, and it was from that admission of guilt that the legalistic French mind justified a great many of the decisions which have since been operating in Europe. I am not going to argue the War-guilt case here and now, except to express my own conviction, having read a great many books about the origins of the War, that the doctrine of the sole guilt will not hold water at all. If anyone wants to study that question in the briefest possible compass I commend them to an extraordinarily interesting report published in the *American Historical Review* of January last."

* From "The Issues in British Foreign Policy," address given at Chatham House on March 24, 1938, printed in *International Affairs*, Vol. XVII, London, 1938, pp. 360 ff.

"Of course the War was just an episode, a very important episode, in the collision of forces which go to make up human history. It was partly the result of a conflict which has reappeared since the War, the conflict between what are called the late comers and the early comers, the Haves and the Have-Nots. Germany then, as now, was a late comer."

"There was the peace settlement made by the victorious democracies, and believe me democracies can get as wrong-headed about foreign affairs as anybody else, especially after having been influenced for four years by war-time propaganda. As a result of the beliefs we all had at that time about the origins of the War there was a very stiff Peace Treaty. I do not think anybody disputes that now. Germany lost all her colonies and all her foreign investments, one seventh of her European territory was taken away, she was unilaterally disarmed, the Rhineland was demilitarised and quite fantastic reparations were placed upon her back. There are few people who to-day think the Treaty was a perfectly fair and balanced interpretation of the Fourteen Wilsonian Points upon which the Armistice was signed."

"But what is not, I think, generally realised is that what followed the War was far more fatal, at any rate in its consequences for Europe, than what was actually done at Versailles. Because, whatever you may say about the Big Three, Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau, they were wiser men than perhaps most people would now admit, and they knew quite well that they were imposing upon Germany terms of peace which would have to be revised. It was impossible in their

view to be more moderate at that time because the Peace Conference consisted of some twenty nations excited by four years of fighting and bitter losses, misled, if you like, by war-time propaganda, and there was no possibility of re-educating the democracies in the six months which lay between the Armistice and the signing of the Peace Treaties. But they did provide means which they believed would bring about a revision of the Versailles terms in our time. Indeed, in recommending the Covenant to the plenary session of the Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson made it quite clear that in his view one of the first duties of the League would be to undertake the revision of the work then being done at Paris."

"Clemenceau came to Lloyd George and Wilson and said: 'You Anglo-Saxons believe in allowing Germany to recover. You believe in this new-fangled institution the League of Nations which we Frenchmen have not much confidence in as security. We believe that the Germans are much safer people dead than alive, and that the best way of securing the peace of the world against a renewal of war by Prussia is to divide it up, at any rate to separate the Rhineland from the rest of Prussia.' That was the thesis put to the Anglo-Saxon Powers by M. Tardieu at the beginning of the Conference when he was acting for M. Clemenceau."

"France built up her system of alliances in Eastern Europe, the main purpose of which was to enforce the Treaty of Versailles, especially by the unilateral disarmament of Germany and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, which left Germany militarily at her mercy

and was the real basis of European peace during all the years when the League was at its zenith."

"You then had Sir Austen Chamberlain's great effort to bring about an appeasement which culminated in the Locarno Treaty. But the Locarno Treaty was never followed up. And it could never have been a lasting basis of peace because it rested on the assumption that Germany would be willing indefinitely to accept a position in which she was disarmed while her neighbours were armed and her frontier was to be left open so that at any moment she might have to endure, without being able to resist it, a new invasion of the Ruhr. Whatever you may think about subsequent events, no sensible people can believe that such an arrangement was voluntarily accepted by Germany as part of a permanent and normal international system. You can imagine what we would have said had we been put in that position."

"Finally, you had the disastrous action, as I think it, of Sir John Simon in revising the preliminary agreement about disarmament made in the spring of 1933 between Germany and the allies, when he went to Geneva in October and proposed that effective movement towards disarmament should be postponed for four years in order to give Germany a period of what was then called trial, and M. Paul-Boncour jumped up and said: 'Yes, and at the end of four years what we do must depend on the political circumstances of the time.' This it was which precipitated the final withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and gave her an excuse for rearmament contrary of the Treaty."

"We ought to face honestly the main result of all that history. I do not think there is any doubt that its main outcome was the triumph of Herr Hitler and the National Socialist regime. Nobody who had contacts with Stresemann during those years, still more with Bruning, will forget the way in which they came and said: 'Unless you make some concession to the Republic now, nothing can prevent Germany yielding to those who say that you can get nothing from the Allies by appeals to justice, you can only get your freedom by strength and violence.'"

"I have felt for the last three years that the most imperative thing was to go and to have a real talk with the Germans as to what the basis of a lasting peace should be. Perhaps it was because I felt that they had legitimate grievances which had to be removed before there could be peace. *But I felt also that the time to negotiate with Germany was when Hitler was offering to be content with an army of two hundred or three hundred thousand men or an Air Force half that of France or one third of the neighbouring Air Forces, whichever was the smaller.* That was the time to negotiate. But what stood in the way? That Great Britain was committed to the support of the reign of law and the sanctity of the Paris system of treaties through the League of Nations."

"The whole post-War attitude of the Allies, of the small nations and France and the Great Powers, has been an attempt to stem one of the vital forces of history."

"And now Hitler, by methods which we cannot help deploring because of the shock they give elsewhere, has

at last realized the dream of the German people—the dream they have dreamed for three hundred years, to be a united people, as Italy is a united people, and France is a united people and England is a united people and every other race in Europe is a united people except the Germans. Thus the whole Versailles Settlement was not only 'stiff,' but was turned against what is, I think, the most powerful political movement of the time, the urge towards racial and national unity."

"If another war comes and the history of it is ever written, the dispassionate historian a hundred years hence will say not that Germany alone was responsible for it, even if she strikes the first blow, but that those who mismanaged the world between 1918 and 1937 had a large share of responsibility for it. I say this unpalatable thing because I think it is necessary to a balanced view and is a corrective to the natural instinct of hatred and indignation which springs up when we see what is going on."

"There is no doubt that Hitler and his party were determined sooner or later to absorb the Germans of Austria and whether, if Schuschnigg had played his cards better, it might have been possible to arrive at a slower and gentler method I will leave the historian to decide. But you can now say that the fundamentals of the German case, the unity of the German people in a strong independent state, fundamentals which it was extraordinarily difficult to get recognised by consent, have now been won by rapid and unilateral action."

"I think we have squandered the authority of the League by trying to use collective security for purposes which were fundamentally unjust, for denying its natu-

ral rights to Germany. While we were doing this five of the Great Powers have gone outside the League and a good many more members, while still members of it, are clearly going to remain neutral if they can if war comes."

XV. The Reign of Law *

War is not Police Action—Great Britain's Diplomatic Game spells War.

"TO TALK about going to war to enforce international law illustrates the confusion of thought which now exists, for the very first object of the 'reign of law' is to substitute police action against the individual for war as the sanction behind law. We have had experience of one vast war fought by a collection of democracies from 1914 to 1918 to defend freedom against autocracy and to maintain the sanctity of treaties. Most people now feel that while the cause was just the remedy was almost as fatal as the disease, and that a war for the principle of the League of Nations is not likely to produce ultimately more satisfactory results than a war for Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, which included the League of Nations."

"The diplomatic card which Great Britain, by reason of its worldwide position, so often is asked to play, if it is always to be faithful to principle, is a card which if it is taken up spells world war. To throw down the gage may prevent war or international injustice, but it also, as often before in history, may let loose world war. Yet it is quite certain that morality does not require us to call upon our own countrymen or other people to pay the price of world war to prevent rela-

* From "Reign of Law—The Pooling of Sovereignty," a letter to the *London Times*, July 13, 1938.

tively minor injustices, atrocities, or breaches of justice. Mankind is not going to be benefited by multiplying carnage and destruction a thousandfold for the sake of questions which will immediately be swallowed up in the vast and catastrophic issues which will be raised by general war."

XVI. Wings Over History *

Consolidation of the World in a Number of Living Spaces.

"BUT, though few yet realise it, the old anarchy of multitudinous national sovereignties is about to dissolve and quickly at that. It is not going to disappear through a revived League of Nations, for the League, in basing itself on national sovereignty, consecrated anarchy as a principle. It is going to disappear either through federation, which is the democratic way, or through an integration consequent on the rise of the great totalitarian Powers. We can see the process going on in Europe and Asia under our eyes, whereby the great military Powers, either by compulsion or by the magnetic attraction of their own strength, consolidate a group of otherwise autonomous units to whom they promise peace, security, and prosperity in return for entering their orbit and for accepting mutually satisfactory arrangements for trade. World unity is, of course, at present entirely out of sight. But that the world is going to fall into four or five main political and economic groups, each in great measure self-supporting, each under the leadership of a great State equipped with modern military and air power, at any rate for a time, seems certain. Nothing that we can do

* From "Wings over History—Can Democracy Survive?" an article in *The Observer*, November 27, 1938.

can prevent it. The only issue is whether the process need involve world war, and whether when the consolidation is made the groups can live together in peace."

XVII. America After Munich *

"England Expects Every American To Do His Duty."

"ON THE one hand we have the title to Mr. Quincy Howe's now famous book, *England Expects Every American To Do His Duty*. This represents the inveterate suspicion in the United States that every British proposal is designed to induce the United States to underwrite British interests—a suspicion which rests on the fact that *Anglo-American co-operation obviously operates to the benefit of the British Commonwealth and not so obviously to the benefit of the United States.*"

"We long ago realised that the best and cheapest way of assuring our own security was to encourage other nations to fight for their own security, and when there was doubt as to their ability to do so by themselves to assist them with finance and, if necessary, with arms."

* From "America after Munich," an article in *The Observer*, February 26, 1939.

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